



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.


We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>









THE
AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

EDITED BY
BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE

Professor of Greek in the Johns Hopkins University

VOL. XVIII

BALTIMORE: THE EDITOR
NEW YORK AND LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO.
LEIPSIC: F. A. BROCKHAUS

1897



A. 29110



The Friedenwald Company
BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.

CONTENTS OF VOL. XVIII.

No. 69.

I.—Dörpfeld and the Greek Theatre. By THOMAS DWIGHT GOODELL,	1
II.—The Question of Language-standard in Modern Greece. By BENJ. IDE WHEELER,	19
III.— <i>Etiam</i> in Plautus and Terence. By WM. HAMILTON KIRK,	26
IV.—The Origin of Latin <i>hanc</i> and Greek <i>οὐ</i> ; and the Extensions of the Originally Unextended Form. By LIONEL HORTON-SMITH,	43
NOTES:	70
Latin <i>-astro-</i> . By GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING.—On the Alleged Confusion of Nymph-Names. Appendix. By J. P. POSTGATE.— <i>νέμειν</i> and <i>νέμεσθαι</i> . By WM. HAMILTON KIRK.	
REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES:	78
Peck's Harper's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities.—Puntoni's L'Inno Omerico a Demetra.—Jastrow's Handbooks on the History of Religions. Vol. I. Hopkins's The Religions of India.—Dahlerup's Nekrolog over Karl Verner.—Ciccotti's Il Processo di Verre. Bornecque's M. Tullii Ciceronis Oratio in Verrem <i>De Signis</i> .	
REPORTS:	96
Englische Studien.—Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.—Beiträge zur Assyriologie und semitischen Sprachwissenschaft.	
BRIEF MENTION,	119
RECENT PUBLICATIONS,	125
BOOKS RECEIVED,	130

No. 70.

I.—The Subjunctive in Independent Sentences in Plautus. I. By E. P. MORRIS,	133
II.—Textual Notes and Queries on Plautus. By EDWIN W. FAY,	168
III.—Superstitions and Popular Beliefs in Greek Comedy. By ERNST RIESS,	189
IV.—On the Definition of Some Rhetorical Terms. By V. J. EMERY,	206
REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES:	214
Schanz's Beiträge zur historischen Syntax der griechischen Sprache. Band III, Heft 3 u. 4. Dyroff's Geschichte des Pronomen Reflexivum. —Rambeau and Passy's Chrestomathie française.—Karsten's Journal of Germanic Philology.	
REPORTS:	228
Revue de Philologie.—Englische Studien.—Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.	
BRIEF MENTION,	242
NECROLOGY,	247
RECENT PUBLICATIONS,	248
BOOKS RECEIVED,	253

No. 71.

I.—The Ethics and Amenities of Greek Historiography. By B. PERRIN,	255
II.—The Subjunctive in Independent Sentences in Plautus. II. By E. P. MORRIS,	275
III.—Caecilius of Calacte. By W. RHYS ROBERTS,	302
IV.—Are the Letters of Horace Satires? By G. L. HENDRICKSON,	313
V.—Notes on Horace. By CHARLES KNAPP,	325
NOTE:	339
On Lucian's Nigrinus. By EMILY JAMES SMITH.	
REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES:	342
Jusserand's A Literary History of the English People.—Hillebrandt's Ritual-Literatur.—Kaibel's Sophokles Elektra.	
REPORTS:	357
Romania.—Hermes.	
BRIEF MENTION,	368
NECROLOGY,	371
RECENT PUBLICATIONS,	376
BOOKS RECEIVED,	381

CONTENTS.



No. 72.

I.—The Subjunctive in Independent Sentences in Plautus. III. By E. P. MORRIS,	383
II.—The Use of <i>enim</i> in Plautus and Terence. By WILLARD K. CLEMENT, 402	
III.—On the Character of Inferred Parent Languages. By HANNS OERTEL,	416
IV.—Concluding Notes on the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive. By LIONEL HORTON-SMITH,	439
V.—Negative Futures in the Greek New Testament. By W. G. BAL- LANTINE,	453
NOTE:	462
On Latin <i>nihil</i> 'naught, not.' By EDWIN W. FAY.	
REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES:	464
Courthope's A History of English Poetry.—Heinze's T. Lucretius Carus de Rerum Natura.	
REPORTS:	484
Romania.—Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.	
BRIEF MENTION,	492
RECENT PUBLICATIONS,	495
BOOKS RECEIVED,	500
INDEX,	502

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. XVIII, I.

WHOLE No. 69.

I.—DÖRPFELD AND THE GREEK THEATRE.¹

It is now twelve years since rumors began to be heard that a young architect in the German Archaeological Institute in Athens was promulgating strange doctrines about the Greek theatre. Dörpfeld went to Greece originally in 1877 as a *Techniker*, to assist in the excavations at Olympia; proving exceptionally useful, he had been advanced and retained in the Institute after those excavations closed. In his study of Greek architecture he had attacked the theatre problem; and on December 10, 1884, at a session of the Institute he first stated publicly some of his conclusions. The paper then presented was never published; but the little audience that gathers on such an occasion in Athens comes from several quarters of the earth, and disseminates quickly and widely any scientific discovery there announced. But philologists are quite as suspicious of the opinions of outsiders encroaching on their domain as are men of other professions. The Greek theatre had hitherto been in fact a province of philology, in the narrower sense. The accepted body of doctrine rested almost wholly on the literary tradition, which appeared, as regards theatre construction, to be fairly direct and full. This young German architect was contradicting flatly one of the clearest statements of the Roman architect Vitruvius, who surely knew how buildings were constructed in his own time better than any modern can. The heresy seemed unlikely to meet

¹ Das griechische Theater. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Dionysos-theaters in Athen und anderer griechischer Theater, von Wilhelm Dörpfeld und Emil Reisch. Athen, Barth & von Hirst, 1896. Square 8vo, pp. xv + 396.

any wide acceptance. Some other young men, not so thoroughly grounded in the literary tradition as their elders, returned from Greece with more or less enthusiasm for the revolutionary doctrine and for its author. In *Hermes* for 1886 (pp. 597 ff.) appeared an article by Wilamowitz, 'Die Bühne des Aischylos.' This was based in part on the new view, and made it widely known in fragmentary form, though the article is now seen to have contained some hay and stubble along with better material. Then it was announced that our revolutionary architect was to publish a book on the subject soon. Years passed and the book did not appear; some were inclined to scoff and others to grieve. Meantime on other grounds Dörpfeld's reputation was growing. His part in the Olympia publications and a steady stream of papers in the *Mittheilungen* attested his power. Schliemann secured his help in excavating Tiryns, and later Troy; in 1887 Dörpfeld succeeded Petersen as First Secretary of the Institute in Athens, and the stream of publications never ceased. It was more and more widely recognized that a mind of exceptional force, training and candor was at work on the scattered remnants of Greek architecture of every sort, discovering order in supposed chaos, revealing significance in little facts till then unnoticed, clarifying and enlarging our knowledge of Hellenic and prehistoric building, and vastly improving the young art of excavation. Further, even before he became the head of the Institute, he adopted the plan of explaining on the spot accessible architectural remains to 'stipendiaries' of the Institute and others. This plan developed into three separate courses, identical in character and differing only in the location of the monuments and the means of reaching them. The first was a weekly peripatetic lecture two or three hours in length during the winter, in Athens and vicinity. The second was a journey to Mykenai, Tiryns, Epidauros, and across Arkadia to Olympia: this has been extended and enriched as excavation has increased the material for study and as facilities for travel have improved. Third comes a trip by sea for similar examination of some of the islands and places on the coast inaccessible otherwise for large parties. The severe charm of those lectures no one can forget who has been so fortunate as to hear them; and during these years a goodly number of scholars, younger and older, have carried back from them to Europe and America more just impressions of Dörpfeld's mastery of the entire field of Greek architecture, as well as a more accurate knowledge

of existing theatres and a clearer perception of the cogency of arguments drawn from the character, position, shape and method of working of walls, pavement, and the very workmen's chips. Also, with the generosity of a mind too rich to fear that some one else may by previous publication rob him of personal glory, Dörpfeld has allowed and freely assisted others to publish his results, contenting himself with oral discussion in his lectures, and with occasional reviews, in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, of publications in which his doctrine was either defended or attacked. Gradually the circle of adherents has enlarged; especially in Germany and America, these have examined anew in the light of his views every scrap of the literary tradition and every fragment of archaeological evidence other than architectural. More theatres have been uncovered and those already known have been more fully investigated, by Greek, French, American and English scholars. Sometimes the aim was to support, sometimes to overthrow the new views, but always the result was more light. Every conceivable argument in defence of orthodoxy has been urged, and so Dörpfeld has gained the opportunity to consider and meet all difficulties that could be raised. On the whole then—seeing the author has lived—it is perhaps just as well that the long-promised 'Theaterbuch' has been delayed till now. 'The greater part of the investigation was substantially finished,' we are told in the preface, 'in the years 1884-8.' If the delay has in part deprived the book of the charm of novelty, it has made possible broader and deeper foundations and far greater completeness and permanence of superstructure. It finds even the stoutest defenders of the old tradition, among our English brethren for example, already abandoning the main fortress and withdrawing to one or two small redoubts. No one any longer believes in a high stage for the fifth and fourth centuries: the utmost claim now goes no farther than to assume as probable a very low temporary stage, wholly without evidence, for the Hellenic, and a high Vitruvian stage for the Hellenistic period. That, I say, is abandoning the main position. The very last redoubt will eventually be carried by the book before us.

The radical difference between this and all previous books on the Greek theatre has already been indicated. Dörpfeld himself approached the problem from the archaeological instead of the literary side, and his book does the same. As an architect he examines the Greek theatres existing and adequately exca-

vated; his aim is to interpret the extant remains and from them to reconstruct the original form and trace its history, appealing to the literature and inscriptions for such help as they can give. History of the drama, and its relation to other literature, to religion and to the state, he leaves to others, except so far as these relations throw light on his special topic, the theatre itself. Now it is clear that if we wish to know what the Greek theatre was, existing theatres are our best witnesses. Nearly sixty years ago A. Schönborn fully recognized this, and made his journey to Asia Minor in 1841-2 mainly in hope of there finding theatres in good preservation. But the best he found was that of Aspendos. With the best possible use of this, he was forced, as were his successors, to make Vitruvius and the grammarians the real starting-point, appealing to the extant plays for confirmation or occasional rectification. The Athenian theatre was not brought to light till 1862, and then but partially; not till Dörpfeld took it in hand twenty years later did the *σκηνή* begin to become intelligible; one important feature even he did not discover till 1895. The smaller Peiraeus theatre near the harbor of Zea was excavated in 1880, that of Epidauros in 1881; and these three were the earliest Greek theatres to become adequately known. Even Albert Müller in 1886, and Haigh in 1889, could go but a little way beyond their predecessors along this road, and for that little were indebted to Dörpfeld, and to Dörpfeld's pupil Kawerau, in Baumeister's *Denkmäler*. My object is merely to note how recently it has become possible to start from anything but literary tradition in forming a notion of the Greek theatre. It was inevitable that the system built on the old foundation should differ from that of Dörpfeld, built on the new, and that those trained in the old system should oppose the new vigorously. For even now, if one has not with his own eyes seen those fragmentary ruins assume form and meaning under Dörpfeld's interpretation, it is difficult to realize how full is the story they tell and how plain is their language, now that this has once been deciphered. The controversy over the Megalopolis theatre is a good illustration. It was really not to be wondered at that the English excavators in 1890 and 1891 misread the signs before them; yet on nearly every point they now read them as Dörpfeld does, and the visitor who has learned from him the elements of that language may easily do them injustice in the confidence of his own recent knowledge. This different starting-point of the entire discussion,

it may be added, lends of itself peculiar attractiveness to the presentation. One feels that these are not shadowy hypotheses nor subjective combinations, but tangible facts. These are the stones the Greek builder laid; if Pollux and Vitruvius really do not agree with them, so much the worse for Vitruvius and Pollux. Seen from this vantage ground of fact, many a fragment of later Greek learning and even familiar lines in the plays themselves take on a different aspect.

Early in the progress of the work Dörpfeld joined to himself as collaborator Emil Reisch, one of his early adherents and pupils in the Institute, now professor of archaeology at Innsbruck. Reisch undertakes the discussion of the literary material and of all archaeological material not architectural, thus leaving Dörpfeld free for that which he alone could do. The plan and distribution of the book is as follows: Of the eight 'Abschnitte,' the first is devoted to a complete description of the Dionysiac theatre at Athens, the second to a briefer description of eleven other excavated theatres in Greece and Asia Minor, the third to the complete text of Vitruvius on theatre construction and a full elucidation of the same. These three purely architectural chapters are by Dörpfeld; the buildings are presented first, and by them Vitruvius's directions for constructing theatres are explained and tested. That is plain common sense and good scientific method. The three following chapters are by Reisch; their titles are: 'Das altgriechische Theater nach den erhaltenen Dramen,' 'Die griechischen Bezeichnungen für die Teile des Theaters,' and 'Theaterdarstellungen auf antiken Bildwerken.' There remain two 'Abschnitte' by Dörpfeld. In one the stage question is discussed by itself, with a formal refutation of the arguments for a stage and a formal marshalling of the arguments against it; finally, in thirty pages is given a condensed 'Entwicklungsgeschichte' of the Greek theatre from the age of Arion to the Roman period, showing how natural and how short was each separate step in that development, rightly understood. The twelve plates and ninety-nine illustrations in the text are a highly important part of the presentation. In the plans of existing remains we find the same clearness and precision as in all published drawings by Dörpfeld or made under his direction. Not only are different materials and periods distinguished by color or by various shading, but the separate stones, if represented at all, are measured and drawn to scale. What that means in such a

mass of apparent confusion as the precinct of Dionysos, one can best appreciate who has spent hours on the spot endeavoring to make things out from the plans and descriptions of others.

One peculiarity that immediately strikes the eye is the absence of footnotes. Of course the footnote has its uses. In it one can give references, and an occasional aside or a polemic observation that really requires to be uttered, without interrupting the course of demonstration or the peaceful flow of exposition. But the difficulty that many feel in properly integrating their disjointed thoughts, in properly relating the straggling observation and the uncontrollable polemic impulse to an organic whole—this difficulty, joined with the tendency towards pedantry to which we professing scholars are all liable, has led to a monstrous development of the parasitic footnote growth. It is a pleasure, therefore, to read a book whose authors do not feel obliged to prove their breadth of reading by giving up a large portion of the page to unincorporated and unincorporable matter. Consequently, when the eye does catch a footnote, one immediately finds it interesting. Now, it is a frank acknowledgment that in some minor point the authors are not in agreement (pp. 10 and 148); again (p. 8), it is the announcement of a paper presented at the Institute two years ago, though not yet printed, in which Dörpfeld has proved that Kollytos, Alopeke and Kynosarges lay across the Ilissos south of the Acropolis. As regards polemic, the preface puts the case admirably: "Wir glaubten eine ins Einzelne gehende Polemik vermeiden zu sollen gegen Behauptungen, denen wir die Grundlagen durch die von uns dargelegten neuen Thatsachen entzogen haben." In point of literary style too the chapters by Dörpfeld are notable. Those qualities which his American audiences lately admired in his speaking appear in more perfect form in whatever he writes. No one could more religiously avoid ornament; there is nothing Dörpfeld more strenuously disclaims in private than literary skill. Using always the plainest language, he makes it his sole aim to present his subject free from all entanglements, with all attainable simplicity. The result is a German style whose lucidity could not be surpassed in French; his quiet description of the old stones and their meaning glows with a calm but unflagging enthusiasm that imparts itself to the reader. Would that philologists and all other men of science would profit by the example. The first step towards a like achievement is an equal mastery of one's subject; the second is a like singleness and sincerity of purpose.

In the description of the Dionysiac precinct the first twenty-five pages or so have a delightfully familiar sound to one who has had the privilege of listening to him under the shelter of the ancient rock-fortress on those golden winter afternoons ; in the succeeding part many details are added that those lectures, though extending to eight or nine hours, did not allow time for. It would be impossible to summarize all this here with any useful result ; a few significant points only will be noticed. It is a part of Dörpfeld's method that he begins with other portions of the precinct—the boundary wall, the altar, the newer and the older temple of Dionysos ; in this way the theatre takes its proper place as one part only of the enclosure. A circumstance passed over lightly in the book, after Dörpfeld's manner, illustrates again the recent date and the main source of our ability to read the language of architectural remains. Some of the most important walls, including the foundations of the older temple, now recognized by their material and their relation to the stoa as of the sixth century B. C., were taken by the original excavators to be of Byzantine date and were partially removed. Dörpfeld regards the art of excavation as in its infancy still, and believes that much which is in like manner now thrown aside as of no value will, twenty-five or fifty years hence, be recognized as full of significance. In spite, however, of ancient destruction and modern demolition, the Dionysiac theatre still exhibits remnants from every age of the Attic drama. This fact alone would make it appropriately the centre of such a discussion as this. Five periods in the structure's history are clearly distinguishable, as follows :

1. To the sixth and fifth centuries B. C. belong fragments of the wall that supported the old circular orchestra ; this is all that survives from the age of Aischylos and Sophokles.

2. To the fourth century, to the administration of Lykurgos, belong the existing seats and the earliest permanent σκηνή, with the stoa at its back facing the temple and altar.

3. The Hellenistic period shows a new form of σκηνή, with first a wooden and then a permanent stone προσκήνιον.

4. In the imperial age, about the time of Nero, appears the first raised stage, of the Roman type.

5. To late Roman times, the third or fourth century A. D., belongs the stage of Phaidros, whose inscription still stands on its front.

Each of these periods in the life of the structure is presented to us in full description, and all but the first and last in more or less

complete restoration. It is surprising how fully the material is supplied, by drawing as well as by description, that enables one to test for himself the steps of the interpretation and restoration. Much, of course, would be unintelligible without the testimony of other theatres, in which now one, now another feature is preserved that has disappeared from this.

These other theatres are therefore presented in 'Abschnitt' II. And here, I think, many will agree with me in wishing that in several cases the description had been made fuller. On every one Dörpfeld could throw still more light by reason of his thorough acquaintance with all the rest. But some limit had to be set to the size of the book, and we may be sure that no essential matter bearing on general theatre construction is passed over. I will restrict myself to noting some of the more important contributions made by these theatres.

The theatre in Peiraeus corresponds in form to the third period of the Athenian structure, from which it is closely copied. It is the form of theatre which Vitruvius describes as the Greek theatre of his time, and shows particularly well, without a trace of Roman rebuilding, the shape of the permanent stone *προσκήνιον*, which Vitruvius called a stage. The little theatre at Oropos is particularly interesting as one in which wooden *ἔκρια* were retained as seats to the latest period. But above all, more of *σκηνή* and *προσκήνιον* are here preserved than elsewhere; so that considerable space is given to the elucidation of important details that are here assured, and so enable us to understand indications elsewhere that would otherwise be inexplicable. At Thorikos we have a specimen of a little provincial theatre of a country deme, its irregular shape conforming to the shape of the hill, with no permanent *σκηνή*; even the orchestra is rudely elliptical instead of round. This, and the theatres of Eretria and Sikyon, were excavated by the American School, and are together no mean contribution. Plate XII gives an excellent general view of the Eretrian theatre, and incidentally illustrates how unfounded is the assertion that actors and chorus, if on the same level in the orchestra, could not be readily distinguished. It is highly probable that the oldest *σκηνή* here, whose polygonal lower course is well preserved, antedates the first permanent *σκηνή* at Athens. This fact is explained by the respective locations. The position of the sixth-century orchestra at Athens was such that a permanent *σκηνή* there would have blocked up the front of the temple of Dionysos; no stone

σκηνή, therefore, was possible until they resolved, in the fourth century, to remove the orchestra farther up the hill and so make room for the σκηνή of Lykurgos. At Eretria there was room enough to permit the innovation as soon as it came to appear desirable—not improbably as early as 400. At Eretria also appears another peculiarity of much significance in theatre construction—the lowering of the orchestra. The location is not on the slope of a hill, but on the level ground a little way from the acropolis. To obtain the support for permanent stone seats, therefore, a large mass of earth or stone had to be built up on all but the σκηνή side of the orchestra. Practical as Greeks usually were, the Eretrians, in remodelling their theatre, left the old σκηνή at its original height, lowered by about 3.20 m. the level of the orchestra, constructed sloping *πάροδοι* at the sides, and used the earth obtained by this excavation for constructing the needed basis for seats. The new orchestra was put a little forward of the old, the new σκηνή added to the front of the old, still left standing; and thus was obtained a theatre at once commodious and inexpensive. The slight elevation above sea level fairly compelled a method of drainage that was a distinct improvement on that at Athens—a method, therefore, generally adopted from that time, as, for instance, at Epidauros. Here too is a perfect and indubitable example of the stairs of Charon—an underground passage leading from behind the *προσκήνιον* to the centre of the orchestra, with a flight of stone steps at either end so cut from a single block as to imitate closely the earlier wooden flight. The surface of the orchestra at Athens and elsewhere was usually of trodden earth merely, until a late period. At Eretria and at Delos the earth was covered with a sort of hard plaster. At Sikyon an interesting feature is the stone foundation of the wooden *προσκήνιον*. This is here sufficiently preserved to give some notion of how the wooden *προσκήνιον* was constructed, and to show that the stone *προσκήνιον* partially preserved in many places was modelled on its wooden predecessor. Another significant fact must not be omitted. Most of the walls of the σκηνή are at Sikyon cut from the solid rock, and can never have undergone alteration; in particular, ramps on either side leading to the top of the *προσκήνιον* are so cut from the rock. This disposes completely of the assumption put forward in their extremity by defenders of a Greek stage, that the *προσκήνιον*, being such a stage, was originally four or five feet high, which height was later increased to eight to ten feet. These ramps cut

from the living rock, and leading to the top of the προσκήνιον, the pretended stage, were never lower. The Epidaurian theatre, most beautiful and best preserved of all, is so well known by plans and photographs that we need not dwell on it. The plan here published corrects some errors to which Dörpfeld calls attention in his own previous plan, the source of all intervening publications, which repeat the errors. There is no better place for the traveler to disprove by experiment the oft-repeated assertion that masks and a 'raising and conventionalizing of the tones of the voice' were made more necessary in the ancient drama than in the modern by the distance between actors and audience. As to the date, it appears certain that this theatre is later than that of Lykurgos: the stone προσκήνιον may belong to the original structure or it may be part of an alteration. For the theatre at Megalopolis the plans published by the English architect, Schultz, are lauded by Dörpfeld as "vorzüglich und in ihrer Ausführlichkeit musterhaft." From Dörpfeld's account, which is longer and more polemic than usual by reason of Ernest Gardner's attitude on certain points, I extract two items. First, the προσκήνιον is here no less than seven meters from the structure behind it. Now, the old theory explains the otherwise universal narrowness of the προσκήνιον roof by its height, which would unpleasantly conceal from the seats of honor in front any actor standing more than five feet back from the edge. A stage ten or twelve feet high and over twenty feet deep is wholly inexplicable on this old theory. On the new theory, however, this extraordinary depth of προσκήνιον is explained very simply. The orchestra had the extraordinary diameter of about twenty-eight meters. When the μεγάλη πόλις had become a μεγάλη έρημία, such an enormous orchestra was absurd. To bring the actors nearer to the shrunken audience, the προσκήνιον, the background of the action, was brought forward until the remaining orchestral space had about the same breadth that was found desirable at Athens and elsewhere. Secondly, we find here, from the earlier period, pretty clear evidence of a *scaena ductilis*, or movable background, which was drawn across before the great columns of the portico when plays were to be presented. The base of this *scaena ductilis* was on the same level with the orchestra. The actors surely did not stand on the top of it. What clearer evidence could be asked that the actors, standing in front of it, were on the same level with the chorus? Passing over to Delos we find a σκηνή of simple and highly instructive form.

It is merely a rectangular building with a colonnade running around all four sides. If the colonnade on the side towards the audience was a stage, what was it on the other three? The new theory makes all four sides alike colonnade: in front of it on one side the action took place. Movable *πίνακες* or painted wooden panels closing the space between the columns, with doors, made this side an ordinary *προσκήνιον*, which in other theatres of the Vitruvian type is, in fact, as here, simply a kind of closed portico. Statue bases before it, on the orchestra level, quite exclude the possibility of any raised stage there. At Pergamon a notable circumstance is that temple and theatre were located in relation to each other as the old temple and orchestra at Athens: a permanent *σκηνή* would have blocked up the approach to the temple front. Accordingly, throughout the Greek period of its history this theatre had only a temporary *σκηνή* erected for each festival. Large stone bases level with the ground contain carefully cut holes to receive the posts of the movable wooden structure, which we may presume was stored, from one festival to another, in a form ready to be set up when needed. In Roman times a permanent Roman stage and fixed *σκηνή* were erected. And it may be noted here that in no Greek theatre in Greece proper, so far as is yet known, with the one exception of that in Athens, was a Roman stage ever built.

Into the detailed consideration of 'Abschnitt' III on the text of Vitruvius I will not enter, being neither Latinist nor architect. Reisch's chapter also on the Greek theatre according to the extant plays there is the less reason for me to report upon, because readers of this Journal are familiar with the discussion from this side.¹ In all his chapters Reisch has a task in one sense easier, in another sense more difficult, than Dörpfeld. Easier, because precisely this field has been so thoroughly worked over in recent years that not much remained to do beyond sifting and arranging. His task was more difficult, however, in that so little remained to glean, and in the nature of the case so much must inevitably remain uncertain so far as evidence from that side goes. The dramas from the oldest to the youngest present an abundance of proof that no high stage existed; but agreement is unattainable on the question how much can be

¹ See Pickard, XIV 68-89, 198-215, 273-304. Historically interesting is Allinson's review of Hoepken, V 252, published in 1884, when it required some courage to say even a word for the new view.—B. L. G.

inferred as to the details of theatrical machinery and the like from the language of characters in a play. One fact, however, comes out clearly from the mass of particulars. The dramas of the fifth century contain nothing inconsistent, they contain much in positive agreement, with the doctrine that the earliest stone σκηναί preserved are substantially the same in form as the temporary σκηναί of the fifth century, before which were acted the plays of the great dramatists.

The conservatives long found great comfort in the vases from Magna Graecia on which are represented scenes from comedy enacted on a raised stage. Following Heydemann and others, Reisch classifies and examines all the known examples of this type, and brings out these facts. Their date is between 300 and 200 B. C.; all were made in southern Italy; they present scenes from popular farces of that region, which were usually played on a temporary stage of moderate height; these farces and this stage had no direct influence on Greek theatre construction, but may well have been one of the influences that led the Romans to prefer a raised stage.

Reisch's chapter on the Greek names for parts of the theatre seems to me of considerable value. By numerous examples the entire range of usage is illustrated for each of the familiar terms, especially those which have figured so largely in the argument against the new doctrine. In this manner more than one rooted prejudice of the conservatives is left dangling without support, while the method of accomplishing this operation is gentle and impersonal. It is true that much of the argument based on this material would be inconclusive if it stood alone. Many of these passages, considered by themselves, might be interpreted otherwise. But it is false method to consider any one of them by itself; and when taken in the mass, it is found that Dörpfeld's interpretation of the theatres introduces a clarifying and organizing principle that was lacking before: what looked like inexplicable contradiction or confusion thus reveals itself as a natural succession. For example, that ὀρχήστρα should be used in Roman times in the sense of stage becomes entirely natural when it is seen that this portion of the ὀρχήστρα always was the ordinary place of the actors, who in the Roman theatre still occupied the same position and the same level, while the remainder of the ὀρχήστρα was lowered. The history of σκηνή and its progeny is very instructive in a similar way. The famous ὀκρίβας passage from Plato (Sym.

194 *b*) is shown to furnish not the slightest ground for argument in favor of a stage in the theatre. Indeed, the same explanation was eleven years ago accepted from Hug and Rohde by A. Müller in his 'Bühnenaltertümer' (p. 365).

It is, however, in the history of the development of the theatre as a building that Dörpfeld rightly finds the most striking and finally decisive proof of the correctness of his interpretation. He shows us the ancient theatre changing by slow and natural steps from the simplest to the latest form; there are no sudden leaps and no breaks in the development. To maintain the old view now is to assume a series of such breaks and leaps in an art which, by the very nature of architecture, is exceedingly conservative, even unreasonably tenacious of old forms because they are familiar, after they have become meaningless and perhaps a hindrance. The whole history of architecture illustrates this quality in it; and he who to-day in planning a house cuts loose from tradition and builds with too great originality illustrates anew the wisdom of such conservatism. It would contradict one of the best established characteristics of Greek art in general to suppose any such sudden leaps in theatre construction. Whoever is interested in the Attic drama from any point of view should read the last chapter on the 'Entwicklungsgeschichte,' if no other part of the work; and I cannot more fitly close this notice than by giving a rapid summary of this story as Dörpfeld reveals it to us.

Five periods are readily distinguishable. For the early choral songs and dances in honor of the gods, and especially of Dionysos at his festival, a level space was required. When the dance and the participants in it learned to follow a more complicated law, the *ὀρχήστρα* became a round floor of trodden earth, sufficiently marked by a visible boundary to delimit the space for participants and spectators. At Athens in the sixth century there were two such dancing places: one, already ancient, somewhere by the western slope of the Areopagus, near the ancient precinct of Dionysos *ἐν λίμναις*, the *Λήναιον*; the other on the southeastern slope of the Acropolis, in the precinct of Dionysos Eleuthereus. The latter developed into the theatre which we know, and the former was eventually neglected. The lookers-on at these festivals found places as they could on the side-hill. As the festival increased in attractiveness and duration, something more in the way of seats became needful, not only for priests and officials, but for the onlooking throng. Such seats, needed but once or twice a year,

were naturally of wood and temporary. But on the lower side of the *ὀρχήστρα* such seats were hardly practicable, and it was necessary that a part of the circle be left free for approach, both for spectators and for the chorus. Ramps on either side, to east and west, were demanded by the nature of the ground. An altar occupied the centre of the circle, on which offering was made at the opening of the festival. The introduction of an actor, carrying on dialogue with the chorus, of itself changed nothing. The common dressing-room for such slight change of costume as the piece required might be anywhere conveniently in the neighborhood. The central altar, of the usual form, had a lower part on which stood the priest in offering sacrifice, and on the same spot stood the flute-player who accompanied the dance and song. On the same platform, a mere step or two above the ground, an actor might, in addressing the chorus, also take his stand for a longer speech. The scene on Easter Tuesday at Megara or elsewhere in Greece to-day offers many analogies to the scene at such an ancient festival.

In the second period, the fifth century, the age of full development of the drama, the *ὀρχήστρα* remained the same. The seats for spectators were enlarged, and probably firmer foundations of earth and stone were found needful to support the benches for such throngs. The addition of a second actor involved no change. All action went on in the *ὀρχήστρα*. It was a better place for the action than our own theatres now offer. But Aischylos, in the first half of the fifth century, as a part of his endeavor to enlarge the range of myth available for dramatic treatment, introduced the *σκηνή*. Hitherto the scene of every play was distinctly a sacred precinct. Temple and altar were visibly there, and sacrifice had just been offered. Even in the *Suppliants*, where a larger altar, a *κοινοβωμία*, had been erected beside the orchestra, the action is still in a sacred precinct, if not distinctly that of Dionysos, and has all the more of reality and effectiveness for that fact. In the *Persians* the tomb of Darius has taken the place of the *κοινοβωμία*, and the spectators are now, by the presence of this tomb, transported in imagination to Persia. In *Prometheus Bound* the mass of rock on which the victim is bound locates the action in some wild region, which the opening lines define more clearly. There is scarcely any limit to the range of story possible, now that the *σκηνή* is available. So in the *Agamemnon* we have the palace of the king; temple, fortress, grove, camp, may all be represented,

that the action may take place before them. It was a convenience also that the *σκηνή* could serve as dressing-room, though that was not its main purpose. It was a matter of course that any such structure was temporary. The spot remains after all the precinct of Dionysos. During the rest of the year it belongs to the god exclusively. Not until the theatre, with what was necessary for the production of plays, had come to be definitely adopted as a natural part of the sacred precinct could the religious sentiment allow one portion of that precinct to be cut off from the other by a permanent building stretching from side to side. For a time each separate play, or each trilogy, might require a different *σκηνή*, built up for a few hours' use and removed at the end of the play, or at evening. Probably by 450, however, it had been found a convenience to build the main *σκηνή* somewhat more solidly, to stand throughout the festival: changes in the front alone would suffice for the successive plays. Somewhat larger use was made of machinery of various sorts. For such a structure projecting wings, *παρασκήνια*, were desirable, to support and bound the decoration between them that constituted the visible background. A passage is left on either side between the ends of the tiers of seats and the *παρασκήνια*; here the audience enter, and chorus and actors use the same entrances when the action demands it, as is usually the case for the chorus and often for actors. Doors are made in the *σκηνή* front as may be needed. A single story was usually enough for such a *σκηνή*; when needed, a lighter upper story could be added as easily as the front was changed. The entire structure was still of wood and light material, and was all removed at the close of the festival.

Not till the fourth century, after the great period of the drama was past, and the art of acting more independently developed, was the *σκηνή* built of stone. At Athens the change was made under Lykurgos in the third quarter of the fourth century. The *ὀρχήστρα*, removed several meters up the hill to make room for the stone *σκηνή*, is still circular, enlarged on the side towards the *σκηνή* by the space bounded by that structure. The spectators' seats were built of fine limestone and marble, supported in part on great masses of earth and masonry, in part on the solid rock hewn out to receive them. Of the *σκηνή*, that which before had been made semi-permanent, probably preserved and set up anew for each festival to remain till its close, was now built of stone—a long hall or series of connected rooms, with projecting wings,

between which the temporary decoration needed for each piece was set up. *παρασκήνια* and front of the *σκηνή* proper were adorned with columns; for the theatre has now become a regular place of assembly on other than festal days, and when the *προσκήνιον* was removed it was necessary that the building should have some architectural character. The *σκηνή* is still of one story, but a second or even a third could be added temporarily if any piece required it. With the growing prevalence of pieces in which a temple, palace, or ordinary house was called for as background, the *προσκήνιον* takes more and more the form of a row of columns, or rather pilasters, with movable painted panels between them; this arrangement itself permitted considerable variety of make-up for the individual play, and if an older play requiring something different was presented, the proper form of *προσκήνιον* could be put in. A space of several feet between the front *προσκήνιον* wall and *σκηνή* was convenient for the actors, and on the flat roof of the *προσκήνιον* gods appeared, or, e. g., the watchman in the *Agamemnon*. The floor level in *προσκήνιον* and *σκηνή* is about the same as that of the *ὀρχήστρα*, and there is not the slightest reason for supposing any change in the relative position of actors and chorus.

In the Hellenistic theatre the one essential change is merely that the *προσκήνιον* itself is now made of permanent stone, and doubtless in connection therewith a second story of stone is added to the *σκηνή*. The *προσκήνιον* has the form which had more and more become the typical one for the wooden *προσκήνιον*—the form which suited the great majority of plays now presented. It was a closed portico, of pilasters with movable *πίνακες* or panels between them; by varying their position, number and decoration, a single palace or three houses, or a temple, could be conventionally represented. If required, on rare occasions a more elaborate special decoration could still be placed before the *προσκήνιον*. The height of its flat roof is three to four meters—the height which Vitruvius gives for it. The *παρασκήνια* have now become of little or no importance, and in many theatres disappear, or at least no longer project in front of the *προσκήνιον*.

There remains, as the final type, the Roman theatre, which Vitruvius describes as very different from the Greek, because he was unable to trace the course of development of one from the other. Probably none of his contemporaries could have done better; the historical method in the study and presentation of such matters was unknown. The typical course of this development,

illustrated abundantly in existing examples, is as follows. Inasmuch as the dance of the chorus, so far as the chorus still existed, had disappeared, the wide space of the orchestra needed for their evolutions was no longer wanted. For their songs and their part in the action, that portion of the *ὀρχήστρα* near the *προσκήνιον*, where the actors ordinarily stood, was quite sufficient. This was a space say sixty by twenty feet. Also we can trace in many ways the great increase in the number of dignitaries and personages to whom the community desired to give seats of honor. By lowering a little over one half the *ὀρχήστρα*, the half farthest from the *σκηνή*, space could be got for more seats of honor without at all interfering with the remaining seats; the rest of the *ὀρχήστρα*, left at its original level, was large enough for actors and chorus together. On some occasions, too, with the growing taste for gladiatorial combats and the like, this lowered portion could be used for the combatants without danger to the spectators. Exactly this change was made, e. g., in Aspendos. Thereby was produced the appearance of a low, broad and long stage, such as Vitruvius describes. Certain minor changes were necessarily brought with this. The *πάροδος* still leads as of old to the part of the *ὀρχήστρα* left at its original level. The enlarged *σκηνή* and the seats are united by a mass of masonry. It is too awkward for the entire audience to enter the old *πάροδος* and pass over what is now a stage, down steps into the lowered portion, and then mount to their seats. Therefore new entrances are made—*κάτω πάροδοι*—to that lowered portion. The new entrance becomes a vaulted passage under the end of the upper tiers of seats, and cuts off the end of the lower tiers; several steps are necessary for descending from the outer level, that of the old *ὀρχήστρα* and new stage, to the lowered space, the *κονίστρα*. But not only does the stage remain on the same level as before, in relation to seats and the ground without, even the *προσκήνιον* before the old *σκηνή* remains also in the old place, back of the new stage, back of actors and chorus. Changes in style of decoration follow the changing taste; but in essentials these are all the changes made. True, the lowering of part of the *ὀρχήστρα* was not the only way of producing the new type of theatre. At Athens a barrier was erected before the seats, and a stage raised; elsewhere the lowest rows of seats were cut away, and a stage raised; but the net result was the same. In the Herodes theatre at Athens one may see a striking illustration of this. Here is a theatre purely Roman, of the second century

A. D. Yet so conservatively is the type preserved that arose from *lowering* the *ὀρχήστρα*, that even here the stage is on the level of adjoining rooms and the outside ground, while the *κάτω πάροδοι* leading into the *κονίστρα* make a descent of nine steps.

The universal acceptance of Dörpfeld's view of the Greek theatre is merely a question of time. Some will doubtless hold out for many years yet; but the great mass of scholars, I believe, will find that the case is sufficiently proved by the architectural evidence presented in this important book. In the words of the preface, "Es war Zeit, die Welt der Antike von jenem wunderlichen Zerrbilde zu befreien, das uns als 'griechisches Theater' geläufig geworden war."

YALE UNIVERSITY, Jan. 1897.

THOMAS DWIGHT GOODELL.

II.—THE QUESTION OF LANGUAGE-STANDARD IN MODERN GREECE.

The appearance of Dr. Thumb's 'Handbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache' marks a significant advance in the question of the Modern Greek language-standard. It does this by virtue of being the first attempt to state with scientific method and precision the facts of the colloquial language.

The book is neither a beginner's hand-book nor an historical grammar. It is not an historical grammar, because it does not consistently attempt to present the material of the language with which it deals according to its genetic relations. Its method of arrangement and presentation is primarily that of descriptive grammar, but it differs from the ordinary descriptive grammar, in that its classifications are invariably made in the consciousness of the real historical relations, and that incidentally an abundance of historical explanation is afforded. Most of our common hand-books of Modern Greek have been pseudo-historical in character. They have simply pared, patched, and re-vamped the paradigms and rules of the Ancient Greek. They were neither descriptive nor historical, for they undertook to set the language forth neither in terms of itself nor in terms of the old. They did not even start with the existing language. They used chips of it to stop gaps with. The result was the presentation to the world of a linguistic monstrosity, looking as fit in a grammar as the beasts of the Apocalypse in a hand-book of zoölogy.

The reputation which the Modern Greek standard literary idiom has acquired for artificiality is in considerable measure due to the manuals which have undertaken to represent it. It is of course unquestioned that both the standard literary idiom and the standard folk-speech are abundantly mixed with materials from the older language. But mixture does not make monstrosity. The grammatical 'great bad' consists in putting together things that do not belong together and do not occur together in the life of a living speech. A book which is to describe grammatically the Modern Greek speech must take as its basis either the modern literary idiom or the modern folk-idiom, and not Ancient Greek ;

and if it takes, e. g., the literary idiom as its basis, it may cite the folk-speech forms, but must cite them as such.

Self-consistency will probably prove more difficult of attainment in describing the literary standard, for the reason that the language of the educated still remains strongly individualized. The wide-spread acquaintance with the ancient vocabulary and morphology among persons of this class gives an abnormally free rein to individual freedom in borrowing. Perhaps the most successful attempt to describe with consistency the literary idiom, in the form of a lesson-book, is that of Captain Eugene Rizo-Rangabé in his recently published '*Practical Method in Modern Greek*' (Boston, 1896). He selects skilfully the essential things, and arranges the material conveniently for the learner's purpose. He may be trusted to have excluded everything, whether form or expression, which would appear out of place either as written in a letter or as spoken in the formal conversation of the drawing-room or in formal oratory. It may be questioned only whether his purism has not gone too far. The forms which he occasionally adds in parentheses or foot-notes and marks '*vulgar,*' are, though an educated man would generally avoid writing them, the almost universally accepted forms in the current speech of the cafés and shops. Nevertheless the book is self-consistent in its attempt to represent the higher literary language and the polite language of the highest social circles. The '*Modern Greek Mastery,*' by Thomas L. Stedman (New York, 1896) is also a good book, though it covers a somewhat wider range and makes more concessions to the every-day speech. It represents with fair consistency the literary language as it appears, for instance, in the daily newspapers.

As an introduction to the standard folk-speech, the common spoken language of the great masses of the people, no book can vie with the little manual of Wied, '*Praktisches Lehrbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache*' (English translation by Mrs. Gardner). This has been found by me in experience to represent very accurately the actual facts of the common spoken idiom. Educated Greeks of the upper class, to whom purism is a part of patriotism, regard the book as an abomination. "That is the way our cooks speak," I heard a lady say, in intended denunciation. One who knows Ancient Greek should begin the study of Modern Greek with the folk-speech, for this added to Ancient Greek gives ready access to all types of the written and spoken

language alike. Inasmuch as those Greeks who speak the literary idiom usually speak also French or German, and perhaps English, and seem to prefer the foreign language, there is little practical value in learning the literary form simply for the purpose of speaking it. One who does not know Ancient Greek probably will do best to learn the literary idiom first, as this enables him to read.

The 'Praktische Grammatik der neugriechischen Schriftsprache und Umgangssprache' von J. K. Mitsodakis (Berlin, 1891) attempts with fair success to describe both idioms and distinguish between them by means of parallel exercises. The book shows, however, the lack of a firm and clear idea of what the spoken language in its norm and standards really is. The facts of this language had never been collected and sifted, so that perspective in its material was possible.¹ It was to supply this lack that Thumb's book was written.

This 'Handbuch der neugriech. Volkssprache' is not a beginner's book. Its material is arranged systematically and not paedagogically. It has no exercises and vocabularies. The texts at the end of the book are essentially its sources, and are appended rather for verification than primarily as reading exercises. It is essentially a first attempt to collect, sift, and assort the facts of the standard language of common spoken intercourse. It is by no means, however, an accepted proposition, especially among the archaizers, that such a standard exists. In the eyes of those who insist that the weal of modern Greece is to be found only in clinging to its great past, in reviving the forms, if not the spirit, of its literature, its architecture, its manners, and its language, there can be nothing so odiously heretical as this. They claim that aside from the literary standard there is nothing that can be called a standard—that over against it stands only the multiplicity of the local dialects or *patois*. Thumb, however, asserts his belief that there is such a thing as a popular Greek *κοινή*, and his book is at once the product and vindication of his faith.

The only fault we have to find with him in this matter is that he states his faith too timidly and sets forth his case too weakly.

¹ The most successful attempt to discriminate fully and practically between the purely colloquial, the standard literary and the learned-archaistic materials of the vocabulary has been made by Jannaris (A. N.) in his 'Concise Dictionary of the English and Greek Languages, as actually written and spoken.' 1895.

While it must clearly be admitted that this colloquial *κοινή* is by no means yet a completely defined and well digested standard, it is unmistakably well advanced in the process of crystallization, and will respond more or less satisfactorily to all the characteristic tests of a standard language. Thus, (1) The dialects are shrinking back into the more isolated districts, such as the islands, and the country districts of Epirus and Asia Minor.

(2) While many of the popular songs and popular stories are published in a form strongly colored with dialectal characteristics; their dialectal character is distinctly felt, and is recognized and enjoyed as such. The great mass of the folk-songs of general currency are cast in the common idiom, and are dependent for such currency either upon having originally had that form or upon having with time assumed it.

(3) Certain departments of literary composition have come to recognize the colloquial idiom as their proper vehicle; thus the comedy, the satire of the comic journals (notably the admirable *Ῥωμῆος*), the humorous anecdote of the daily paper, especially when cast in the dialogue form, comic poetry, and lyric poetry (prevailing). The very fact of the continual use of this idiom for publication in journals which are current throughout the most of the Greek-speaking territory guarantees a regard for a universally intelligible medium, and is furthermore working steadily toward the more precise establishment and definition of a norm. There is no test which more certainly vindicates the character of an idiom as 'standard' than just this; when a given language, even if originally no more than a local dialect, asserts for itself *national* recognition as the proper vehicle for a certain form of intercourse written or spoken, or for a certain type of literature, then it has ceased to be a dialect and has become a standard. This is not a matter merely of correspondence to a set and arbitrary definition; it is so in the nature of the case. A language or dialect which has for any purpose come into inter-tribal or national use has passed out of the state of nature and become a tool of formal, organized civilization—a 'Kultur' fact.

(4) It is not alone as a printed language that the colloquial idiom is assuming the character of a standard. There exists also the substratum, at least, of a standard spoken language. The language which one can use, and which one will hear in the transaction of business and in the carrying on of ordinary intercourse, is, in respect to the ordinary phraseology and the com-

monly used words, essentially one throughout nearly the entire extent of free and 'enslaved' Greece. One is not a little surprised to find, for example, on landing in Samothrace, an apparently isolated island under Turkish sway, that the common language of the people, at least those with whom a stranger comes most naturally in contact, the officials, the priests, the inn-keepers, and the agogiates, is such that Athenian and Samothracian converse freely and without the consciousness of any dialectal barrier between them. This language of general intercourse is not the formal literary language, that of the newspapers for instance, but the colloquial idiom as one hears it in the ordinary conversation of the shops in Athens. If one met the village schoolmaster he would undoubtedly seek to delectate the philological enthusiasm of his hearer and the pedantic vanity of himself by resurrecting an antique form or two, but this would scarcely survive the formalities of the first interview.

An educated Greek in conversing with a foreigner who has not acquired full control of the language, especially if the relation be that of teacher and pupil, is likely to give the impression that the colloquial language is in a most confused condition so far as any standard of usage is concerned. This is largely due, as my own experience has shown, to the artificial consciousness of his language awakened in the Greek by the necessities of teaching. Under the influence of this reflective consciousness he reverts to the fuller or more dignified forms of the higher literary idiom, with which as a written and to a greater or less extent as a spoken language he is acquainted. Unless he has by continued experience in teaching acquired the habit of consciously facing his own language, he is likely, when called upon to commend to his trustful disciple as a cold grammatical fact something hitherto only known to him warm, to repudiate a plain usage of his common speech in deference to what seems the better social presentability of the literary standard.

There is, however, though the Greeks may be slow to confess it to themselves, a standard spoken language, not yet indeed a fixed and unified norm, but a common and universally current form of language which has found a literary expression, is well established in the essentials of phonology, inflexion and syntax, and is perfectly capable of being summarized and stated in grammatical form. Beside it there exist: (1) The archaizing language, used in learned works, formal announcements, etc.;

(2) the literary standard, used in newspapers, general literature, letters, speeches and addresses, school-books, laws, etc.; (3) the folk-dialects, found in the more isolated districts, as in the islands and in Turkey. The colloquial language is steadily enriching itself from the literary idiom, and the tendency of its development is unmistakably toward that idiom. The language which is to become ultimately the standard national language of Greece is evidently to be built upon this basis, and not upon the basis of the present literary language. It will be built upon this basis with free use of materials from the literary language, so that the resultant will be the product of a series of progressive compromises. This is the linguistic forecast for Greece, but it is a prognostic based upon laws which experience has shown unerringly rule in the evolution of national standards of speech. When the various local forms of a folk-speech show a tendency to solidify in a sub-standard, no matter how strong the crust of the literary standard above tending to hold the folk-speech down, it sooner or later bursts through and overspreads the first crust, gradually in turn becoming a crust itself.

The crust with which the literary standard has thus far succeeded in repressing the colloquial speech owes its strength to a variety of causes. The Attic *κοινή* which took shape and held sway between 300 B. C. and 600 A. D. is the parent speech of the modern popular dialects as spoken languages, out of which by consolidation and compromise, as well as by gradual acceptance of the influence of the modern literary language, the modern colloquial standard has been developed. The modern literary standard is also a continuation of the Attic *κοινή*, but by way of the written language. The continuity of the written language through the middle ages (Byzantine) and the influence of the church tended to shore up the literary idiom and hold it aloof from the declining levels of the living popular speech. The re-birth of Greek nationality in the early decades of this century made a sudden demand for a national language. There existed with which to meet this demand, on the one hand the half-formed Church-Byzantine standard, on the other a mass of formless *patois*. Upon the former was constructed through the naturally concurrent choice of historians, publicists, pamphleteers, journalists and public speakers, the modern literary standard. It adapted itself to the need of the times by free use of ancient materials. The Philhellenic spirit which gave impulse to the war

of the liberation, the overshadowing greatness of the ancient literature, the patriotic adherence to the church as the one institution binding the people to their past, the ambition to find a *raison d'être* for the nation in its re-embodiment of Old Greece,—all combined to make and keep linguistic toryism an essential part of national loyalty. Unsoundness on the language question is generally viewed in the higher social circles, and especially in academic circles, as both a heresy and a disloyalty. It has been made an issue in the 'educational politics' of the country, and men tainted with a suspicion of this heresy are likely to find themselves debarred from positions in the university and in the public schools. The curious sensitiveness of the Greeks on the subject of the ancient pronunciation is merely symptomatic.

This linguistic orthodoxy which has created and by main force kept in use for two generations the modern literary standard, artificial and bizarre as it is, has served nevertheless a useful purpose. The language itself has in the first place furnished during an emergency the means of communication. It has furthermore, and what is more important, served as a temporary terrace between the plane of the old *κοινή* and that of the new,—or rather it has been a staging about a structure in building, helping to forward into their proper and well-determined place the builders' materials. The stern orthodoxy which has enforced the standard, has spent, it is true, all its labor upon strengthening the staging, and has even sought to convince us that the staging was the house, but it has ensured slower and more careful construction,—it has indeed made building possible.

ITHACA, Nov. 23, 1896.

BENJ. IDE WHEELER.

III.—*ETIAM* IN PLAUTUS AND TERENCE.

It is not uncommon to find the temporal *etiam* familiar in Plautus and Terence explained as = *adhuc*, *non etiam* as = *non-dum*; but from any other point of view than the narrow one of the Ciceronian this is, of course, an inversion of the facts. *Etiam* is originally, as Kühner (Lat. Gr. II 166, A. 1) truly says, a temporal particle; it is the particle of continuance in time, which, through its development into something much wider and more varied, lost its temporal rights in the negative sentence to *dum*, in the positive, less early and less completely, to *adhuc*—both of them mere usurpers. Its primitive signification, living to Cicero and Caesar, perhaps an archaism for Vergil and Ovid, is not only prominent in Latin comedy, but is often to be felt there even when another sense is growing up beside and out of it; and while the fact that its rhetorical value is much more pronounced in the Ciceronian age depends in some degree at least on a difference of literary sphere, the comparative reluctance of Plautus and Terence to admit a complete disjunction of *etiam* from the verb shows clearly enough that in the sixth century of the city the adverb was still in a period of transition, still clung to its original narrowness of relation. This was ignored by Hand, who paid no regard to the historical point of view and drew his examples indifferently from all periods of Latin literature; Holtze merely copied Hand so far as *etiam* was concerned; and the influence of these grammarians is still to be felt, not altogether happily, in Plautine and Terentian commentaries.¹

The following list of examples² from the twenty fairly complete plays of Plautus (quoted from the edition of Loewe, Goetz and

¹ It is not to be supposed that any modern editor would follow Hand in rendering Haut. 1057 *nil etiam audio ipsum* by "ich höre auf ihn wirklich nicht"; but the spectre of the *vis affirmativa* is not yet wholly banished to its proper place.

² The only similar list known to me is the incomplete one for Plautus in Ramsay's edition of the *Mostellaria*, Excursus III, which is made useless for purposes of interpretation by an insistence on the false rendering 'even now.' This would be incorrect even granting—what I doubt—the correctness of the derivation from *et iam*. Neither *iam* nor *etiam* denotes a single point of time or suffers us to feel action as stationary: both include a point of departure and a point of arrival and mark the flow of action.

Schoell) and the six of Terence (quoted from Dziatzko) is meant to serve as a contribution to the history of the particle and the interpretation of our texts. The three distinct values of *etiam* I have called, with some departure from the usual terminology, the temporal ('still,' with negative 'yet'), the additory ('also') and the intensive ('even'); and I have proceeded throughout on the assumption, which is, I think, justified by the passages cited, that *etiam* has, at this stage of its existence, a certain mobility, a sympathetic quality; that it attracts and is attracted by words or forms of kindred meaning, which often serve to determine its wavering signification.

I. The temporal *etiam* is found with the following verbs or verbal phrases¹: est Truc. 886, Poen. 315, Aul. 507, Curc. 172, Cas. 306, Ad. 358; est? Haut. 742; opus est Cas. 502, Pseud. 735; de integro est Ph. 174; sunt Truc. 174, probably Trin. 1039 eae miserae etiam ad parietem sunt fixae, cf. Andr. 282-3; posse Stich. 617; habeo Mil. 640; pergo? Poen. 1224; pergin? Curc. 196. With expressions of uncertainty: Merc. 896 metuis?, Trin. 572 consulis?, Capt. 892 dubium habebis?, Ph. 774 dubiumst? (cf. Trin. 594), Haut. 188 incertumst, Hec. 614 incertus sum (cf. Truc. 785). With *sto* and its derivatives and other verbs denoting position or delay: stas? Cas. 749, Hec. 430 (cf. Eun. 286), asto? Merc. 129, astas? Most. 522 (on Men. 697, Cas. 728 cf. inf. IX *b*), adstante Amph. 747, restas? Most. 851, restat, restare (in metaphorical sense) Ad. 190. 444, restitas? Eun. 668, retentas? Rud. 877, maneo Ad. 279, manes? Men. 422, mane Men. 177, maneam (fut.) Trin. 1136 (cf. Aul. 805, Cas. 606), cesso? Merc. 129, cessant Haut. 175. So of position: Asin. 923 cubat; of physical action: Asin. 327 anhelitum ducere; of physical perception: Asin. 109, Truc. 331 audin?; of physical condition: Stich. 574 valet?; of mental condition: Capt. 137 beat; of a condition of life: Pseud. 610 servis, Asin. 871 in senatu dare operam.

Spengel on Andr. 116 cites Haut. 175, haud quaquam etiam cessant, as an example of *etiam* with negative = *nondum*, which would yield no sense; Hand's (Turs. II 573) 'no longer' is impossible. The negative here modifies in the first place only

¹ This list is not exhaustive; other instances of the temporal character are dealt with later in different connections. Here and there I have called attention to explanations opposed to or agreeing with my own; in general I have necessarily refrained from discussion.

the modal adverb, and this combination modifies the complex *etiam cessant*, which words reveal to the audience the substance of the fear expressed by Clinias and combatted by Clitipho: "they are by no means (as you imagine) still delaying." Brix³ on Capt. 892, *dubium habebis etiam sancte quom iurem tibi*, translates 'selbst wenn.' But the instances cited above of the temporal adverb with expressions of uncertainty go far towards enforcing a similar interpretation here (and so Lindsay renders by 'still'); moreover, the combination *etiam quom* = 'even when' occurs nowhere else in Plautus, except in Capt. 256,¹ a line which Brix follows Bücheler in regarding as spurious.

II. The notion of continuance sometimes passes into that of repetition, and so we have 'again' as an alternative rendering for Mil. 1418 *verberetur etiam*, 1424 *verberone etiam an iam mittis?* (cf. 1339), Amph. 369 *at mentiris etiam*; in this last passage the sense is to be determined from 366-7 *compositis mendaciis advenisti*. The rendering 'again' is inevitable in Most. 474 *circumspice etiam*, Merc. 1013 *etiam vide*, where the same imperative has just been used, and can hardly be avoided in Merc. 324, Hec. 841 *vide etiam*; Aul. 326 *fur, etiam fur trifurcifer* shows the same force in an elliptical construction, *etiam* denoting 'I repeat' (cf. Mil. 1373).

III. The additory value of *etiam* is an inference from the temporal, and passages are not lacking to illustrate the development of the inference. Brix on Capt. prol. 53, *etiamst paucis quod vos monitos voluerim*, translates the adverb by 'noch ausserdem,' which would correspond to the Plautine *etiam insuper*; but the similar phrase, Merc. 569 *prius etiamst quod te facere ego aequom censeo*, shows Plautus emphasizing the temporal side. *Etiam* = *etiam prius* (cf. inf. VII) is clear enough in Men. 431 *iam sequar ted: hunc volo etiam conloqui*, Pseud. 1158 *mane: iam redeo ad te . . . hunc advocare etiam volo*; the contrast with the future fixes the anticipatory sense of *etiam*. In Bac. 1161, Most. 118 the English idiom admits only the additory idea; that this is for the Latin only a connotation appears from the contrast in the first passage with *iam*, in the second with a perfect. Here

¹ *Quom etiam*, Capt. 255, is not analogous; see under VI; and even if we read *cum* with the MSS in Rud. 1124, *etiam* belongs there to the preceding clause.

the particle is used with verbs of desire; elsewhere with a future tense or a tense or phrase implying futurity. It is purely temporal in Poen. 188, Rud. 441 (cf. inf. XI); usually it has an additory connotation: Eun. 717 ludificabere, Ph. 547 instigemus, Pers. 669 dedimus dabimusque etiam (the notion of time is held fast by the contrasting tenses, that of addition is brought out by the identity of action). The same close connection with *dabo* (the adverb suggesting the undefined object) appears in Ph. 877 immo etiam dabo quo magis credas, Hec. 869 immo etiam qui hoc occultari facilius credas dabo; the verb is omitted in Capt. 290 quin etiam ut magis noscas; Men. 1018 em tibi etiam; similar is the connection with *dicam*: Pseud. 522 vin etiam dicam quod vos magis miremini (cf. 324). The additory sense, which penetrates by implication into such phrases without expelling the temporal, is reinforced when a word denoting or implying addition stands beside *etiam*: porro¹ Curc. 453, Bac. 273. 274; ultro Bac. 567, Rud. 484; insuper Cas. 441, Trin. 1025, Eun. 1014, Ad. 246; unus Poen. 403. 491-2, Andr. 940, Haut. 895, Eun. 1084, Ph. 831; alius Men. 922, Stich. 449-50, Pseud. 370 (cf. 524-5); alter Bac. 692. 954. 971. A similar and stronger effect is produced by a verb denoting addition or accession: addo Poen. 385, Epid. 473, Rud. 1007, Merc. 435²; accedo Merc. 24, Pers. 669, Andr. 215; adscribo Pers. 69, Bac. 745; accudo Merc. 432; accerso Bac. 424; and in elliptical phrases, where the verbal notion is suggested by *etiam*, Stich. 427, Bac. 546, Andr. 300, Eun. 1081 (cf. inf. X). Some of these clauses contain also a word of number; and in some (as Pers. 69 atque etiam hoc in ea lege adscribier) the additory force is further brought out by a position which seems to throw the stress of the adverb on the pronoun, while it still belongs logically to the verb.

IV. *Etiam* is used with words of degree partly in a temporal, partly in a derived intensive sense. In Men. 158 etiam concede huc, Aul. 55 etiamne? (sc. abscedam) the adverb of time is transferred to a relation in space. For Asin. 40 etiamne? (sc. exscream?) the answer, usque a penitis faucibus, gives the notion

¹ In Asin. 875 the rhythm separates *etiam* from *porro* (cf. inf. V a, 1). Some of the examples with *ultro* and *insuper* are cited under VIII; the tense decides whether *etiam* retains or not its temporal quality.

² So MSS and Ritschl (with the easy addition of *me*); on Bothe's *etiam nunc*, adopted by Schoell, cf. inf. VII.

of extent or degree, which is continued by the following question, *etiam amplius*? The employment of the particle with comparatives is by no means so frequent or so fixed as at a later period; both dramatists connect it with *amplius*, Plautus also with *plus*, *magis*, *prius*, but the connection is given by rhythm and context, not by formally established usage. For *etiam prius* cf. inf. VII; the only example which belongs here is Bac. 221 *atque eo fortasse iam opust.—immo etiam prius*, which shows an unusual intensification of the comparative notion and consequent subordination of *etiam*. The temporal force of *etiam* is felt with *amplius* where the latter is an adverb and the tense is present or future: Asin. 41, Men. 791, Ad. 468; it is lost when the tense is perfect: Haut. 132, Eun. 143; or when *amplius* is a substantive: [Trin. 249], Capt. 777, Rud. 961. With the substantive *plus*: Amph. 610, Pseud. 1329, Rud. 504, the adverb has a purely intensive value; so with *magis*, Capt. 150, but in Pseud. 324 the temporal notion is held fast by the future tense. With *parum*, Amph. 374, Truc. 898, Mil. 1142, the temporal sense is always felt, being retained even with the perfect in the third passage by the negative value of this adverb; with *adaucta*, Haut. 435, *etiam* is of course purely intensive.

V a. The examples so far cited exhibit *etiam* as either retaining, wholly or in part, its temporal character, or as losing it by close association with classes of words to which it was originally attached in virtue of that character. It resigns all connection with the idea of time and assumes a purely additory signification in the following cases:

First, where it defines a contrast between two different actions in like time. Here it is still formally a verbal adjunct, but its relation to the verb is not an intimate one, manifested in the sympathy of the tense; the tenses are free, and the adverb bears upon the whole clause, not especially upon its verbal element, for which reason it frequently stands at the beginning of the clause. Secondly, where it contrasts two objects. Here the verb is the same for both clauses, and *etiam* has become a nominal adjunct.

1) Most. 978 *quadraginta etiam dedit huic?*, Mil. 1147–8 *quin etiam . . . omnia dat dono*, Merc. 1002 *quin loris caedite etiam*, Aul. 304 *etiamne obturat inferiorem gutturem*, 452. 465, Asin. 276 [482], Cas. 367–8 *perperam iamdudum hercle fabulor.—pol tu*

quidem, atque etiam facis, Capt. 561 at etiam . . . aibat, Asin. 875 (where *etiam* adds the reproach contained in this line to the preceding, *porro* expresses the transition from *conruptus* to *conrum-pit*), Cist. 775, Rud. 1275 etiamne salutem eam, 1277, Men. 691, Trin. 942. 943, Pseud. 1075 atque etiam habeto mulierem dono tibi, Andr. 368 etiam puerum inde abiens conveni Chremi, Haut. 999, Ad. 209.

2) Most. 513 etiam tu fuge, Mil. 1206 etiam me?, Stich. 709, Aul. 561. 641 ostende huc manus . . . ostende etiam tertiam, Pers. 783, Amph. 760, Asin. 184, Cas. 314. 612. 991, Cist. 522, Rud. 1124. 1275 anne etiam patrem?, Pseud. 195*. 1223 atque etiam mihi aliae viginti minae, Truc. 248, Ph. 238 etiamne id lex coegit?, 940, Ad. 532 etiam noctu, 664 atque etiam inliberaliter. Under this head may be classed the cases where *etiam* qualifies a clause or verbal noun used as object: Poen. 281, Most. 272, Pseud. 1178 etiamne facere solitus es?, Rud. 402. Sometimes the corresponding clause is only implied: Merc. 751, Poen. 251, Truc. 248, Hec. 507; or the clauses cover each other in sense, not in terms, so that for a repetition of the same verb we have two verbs expressing essentially the same notion: Merc. 437 etiam meus adnutat (cf. 435 iubet), Men. 939 qui mihi etiam me iunctis quadrigis minitatu's prosternere (cf. 935, which recalls 851 f.), Pseud. 628, Rud. 201. 382, Mil. 811, Hec. 221.

b. Under these two divisions belong the infrequent instances of *sed (verum) etiam*: preceded by *non modo* Most. 390. 994, Ad. 387; by *non—quidem* Most. 1112; without any preceding particle, Poen. 1386.

c. Occasionally the two divisions are not sharply distinguished. There is a curious transference of emphasis in Bac. 417 (cf. Hec. 543), Rud. 1270, where the adverb belongs logically to the clause but is so placed as to throw its whole stress on the noun or pronoun. In Men. 944 it qualifies the repeated governing verb *scio*; in Amph. 91. 902, Aul. 99, Merc. 728, Most. 422, Haut. 865 (cf. inf. VIII). 980, Eun. 660 the adverb introduces the clause, but by position emphasizes especially a nominal element. This is, I think, also the case in the much-discussed passage Men. 1039 f.; the manuscript reading yields a perfectly good sense if we understand *etiam hic* as giving a definite contrast to the indefinite *alii*: "Some deny my identity and shut me out of my house; on the other hand this fellow said," etc. This use of the additory particle where English requires an adversative phrase finds

parallels in Andr. 849,¹ Hec. 535, and a more perfect one, as showing also the contrast with *alius*, in Cic. Fin. III 19. 63 ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam sibi nata . . . aliqua etiam ceterorum membrorum usus adiuvant (so MSS, Madvig, Orelli; Baiter needlessly adopts the conjecture of Marsus, *alia etiam*).

d. In a number of passages, many of which are interrogative, the additory *etiam* is weakened to the point of being for us untranslatable except by a vocal stress upon the modified word: a weakening which arises from the absence of any contrast, or even any very clear implication of a contrast, to the phrase modified. Not that the contrasting notion is always completely effaced: thus in Trin. 934 it is easily found, but not without going outside of the text. I cite the passages in full, placing side by side those which exhibit the same emphasized verb; the stress is of course variously laid on the clause or a single element:

Aul. 307 at scin etiam quomodo?, Amph. 773 an etiam credis id?, Capt. 556 etiam huic credis?, Eun. 1011 at etiam primo callidum ac disertum credidi hominem: Capt. 255 vix cavet quom etiam cavet: Haut. 235 etiam caves?, Capt. 327 est etiam ubi profecto damnum facere praestet quam lucrum: 455 at etiam dubitavi . . . diu: Amph. 814 haeret haec res si quidem etiam mulier factast ex viro: Bac. 216 sed B. etiam fortis tibi visast?, 910 etiam me mones?, Epid. 524 is etiam sese sapere memorat: Most. 377 quid illi reditio huc etiam fuit?, 552 etiam fatetur de hospite?, Merc. 202 etiam rogas? (cf. inf. IX c), Men. 1072 ego hunc censebam ted esse: huic etiam exhibui negotium: Pseud. 1172 an etiam ille umquam expugnavit?, 1177 tune etiam cubitare solitu's?, Curc. 191 tune etiam . . . odium me vocas?, Poen. 271 tune audes etiam servos spernere?, Rud. 982 ausis etiam comparare?, Trin. 934 an etiam Arabiast in Ponto? Cas. prol. 74 quam liberales etiam probably belongs under this head.

VI. The intensive value of *etiam*, where not coming from the temporal (cf. sup. IV), is an outgrowth of the additory, from which, strictly speaking, it does not differ; only the varying tone of the

¹ Where the stress rests of course on *hoc* and the contrast is with the preceding *id*: "Of that there is now no question; but do you answer me as to this." *Aliud tu responde* would express the contrast in a less concrete and definite fashion; and this apparently adversative use of *etiam* is due to the fact that it can suggest *alius*. Cf. Pseud. 370, Bac. 274. So in Hec., l. c., *etiam illorum* is the definite substitute required for *aliorum*.

context decides for the rendering 'even' or 'also.' The following passages seem to belong here: *etiam* intensive with a clause, Bac. 1092, Poen. 1234, Ad. 146; with a pronoun, Mil. 566. 572, Bac. 397, 791; with a substantive, Asin. 542, Bac. 214; with a prepositional phrase, Merc. 538, Ad. 243 (cf. Haut. 980); with an infinitive, Rud. 817, Most. 423; finally before *si*, Cas. 93 [Epid. 518], Hec. 648, Ad. 851.

VII. The temporal *etiam* often reinforces or is reinforced by other words of time:

nunc: 1) *etiam nunc*¹ Most. 299. 827, Mil. 181. 301. 518, Stich. 571. 702, Merc. 829, Truc. 207. 785, Amph. 329. 1081, Cist. 308, Trin. 594, Rud. 449. 1123, Men. 398. 462. 806, Pseud. 783, Andr. 282. 644, Haut. 187, Ph. 656. 931, Ad. 445. The two particles are slightly separated without losing touch in Amph. 408 *etiam misero nunc*, Cas. 691 *etiamne habet nunc*? As a rule, the combination is used only in positive clauses; but it occurs with a negative in Epid. 42 *patrem videre se ne volt etiam nunc*, [Poen. 99]. It is used with a sense of repetition: Amph. 1082 *vide etiam nunc* (cf. sup. II), Ph. 544, and with ellipsis, Mil. 1373 *etiam nunc vale*. It occurs with verbs of motion: Aul. 55 *abscede etiam nunc*, Men. 159 *etiam nunc concede*; and with a verb of adding if we accept Bothe's conjecture for Merc. 435. The exact correspondence of the compound to the simple adverb is strongly brought out in Aul. 614 *vide Fides etiam atque etiam nunc*, Mil. 1339 *etiam nunc saluto te . . . priusquam eo*. A solitary instance of *etiam—nunc* with entire divorce of the two adverbs occurs in Ad. 243 *etiam de sorte nunc venio in dubium miser* (cf. sup. VI).

2) *nunc etiam*: for this much rarer form a greater freedom exists. The two words are fused in Truc. 520 *quo nunc etiam misera sum*, Amph. fr. XV *abitendi nunc tibi etiam occasio est*, Cas. 365 *et nunc etiam censeo*; they are independent of each other in Poen. 189 *nunc etiam rudest*, Pseud. 610 *nunc quidem etiam servio*, where *etiam* has full temporal force ("at present I am still a slave"); also in Bac. 971 Most. 118–9 *nunc etiam volo dicere*, Ph. 831 *nunc una mihi res etiam restat*, where *etiam* has an additory connotation; finally in Amph. 587 *nunc venis etiam ultro inrisum*, where it is purely additory. In Truc. 539 B has

¹ Equivalent in force only to the simple *etiam*, the second particle seeming to be quite absorbed in the first. It is rarely possible, and never necessary, to translate by an emphatic 'even now, noch jetzt.'

etiamnum mali pendit, for which Schoell conjectures *et iam mali*: the simple inversion, *nunc etiam*, would yield a good sense (*etiam* = 'even') and would save *mali pendit* as a pendant to *boni consulas* Truc. 429, *aequi bonique facio* Haut. 788.

prius: On Bac. 221 cf. sup. IV. Elsewhere the two words, while having much liberty of position, are essentially fused into one temporal expression; but the context sometimes gives to *etiam* an additory connotation, while *prius* serves to bring out the anticipatory side. In the following passages *etiam* might stand alone: Amph. 202, Cist. 586, Merc. 389. 569, Mil. 1401, Pseud. 331; in the following, where a *quam* clause follows or precedes, *prius* might stand alone, save in so far as *etiam* conveys an additory notion: Asin. 232. 939, Curc. 210, Merc. 169, Pseud. 524-5, Bac. 920-1 (this last the only instance where the phrase is negated); cf. also Mil. 1339.

tum: Pers. 356, Rud. 846, Hec. 145.

etiam atque etiam: Trin. 674, Eun. 56, cf. Aul. 614.

diu: Cas. 606, Haut. 402.

denuo: Amph. 394, Bac. 923. Here the idea of repetition possible to *etiam* is made more distinct by the accompanying adverb.

parumper Mil. 596; *paulisper* Aul. 805; *modo* Trin. 910 (with imperfect; the only other example of this tense is with *neque etiam* Eun. 113).

dum: I cite the passages which show the use of *etiam* and *dum*, together or apart, with a negative word:

1) *etiam*: Amph. 248. 733, Asin. 385. 445. 491, Bac. 920, Epid. 336, Merc. 386, Mil. 1400, Pers. 128. 231. 552. 630, Pseud. 280, 567, Rud. 959, Stich. 356, Truc. 526, Andr. 116. 503, Haut. 433. 1057, Eun. 113. 360. 710. 1030. 1092, Ph. 474. The negatives are: *non*, *neque*, *haud*, *numquam*, *nemo*, *nihil*; they precede the temporal particle except in Pseud. 280 *etiam non dedit*, Eun. 710 *etiam non credes*?

2) *etiam dum* (*dum etiam*): Mil. 992, Pers. 174, Pseud. 957, Truc. 321, Andr. 201. 807, Haut. 229, Eun. 570, Hec. 192. 745. The negative is *non* or *neque*, except Truc. 321 *haud*, Pseud. 957 *nihil*.

3) *dum*: Curc. 57, Mil. 641. 787, Pers. 137, Pseud. 622. 730, Rud. 1201, Truc. 205, Andr. 340. 659, Ph. 147. 445. 492, Ad. 467. The negative is *non* or *neque*; in Pers. 137 Schoell adopts Ritschl's metrical correction, *hau dum* for *nondum*.

In two instances the MSS of Plautus exhibit *etiamdum* without a negative. In Rud. 1380-2 they give:

cedo quicum habeam iudicem
ni dolo malo instipulatus sis nive etiamdum siem
quinque et viginti natus annos:

annos natus and *sive* appear in Priscian's quotation. *Sive* is adopted by Sonnenschein and approved by O. Seyffert (Berl. Phil. W. XVI, p. 1291) on the ground that, as Sonnenschein puts it, "in *sponsiones* what the challenger denies is introduced by *si*, what he affirms by *ni*." He adds, as a further argument for adopting *sive*, that the second clause "contains the word *etiamdum*, 'as yet,' which is used only where a negative is expressed or implied." I know of no instance of such an implication of the negative, and it seems impossible because *etiam* (to which *etiamdum* is exactly equivalent) has a totally different meaning in positive clauses from that which belongs to it with a negative.¹ The *sponsio*, says S., is "always expressed from the point of view of the person challenged"; this is true here in the first clause, where *ni instipulatus sis* represents the denial of Griphus, *non stipulatus sum*. The reading *sive* in the second clause would require an affirmation on the part of Griphus; but this could only be expressed by *iam natus es*, since *etiam (dum) natus es* would be contrary to the syntax of the temporal *etiam* and, even if that were not the case, could only mean 'you are still of that age,' which would be nonsense. It is evident therefore that Labrax formulates this part of the challenge from his own point of view, and that we must on the one hand retain *nive*, and on the other follow Acidalius, Bentley and Reiz in inserting a negative, which, however, should stand, according to the normal form, before *etiam*.²

¹ English 'yet' is misleading; alike by sense and construction (with perfect tense) the positive of *non etiam (dum)* is not *etiam* but *iam*. This appears clearly in the question which is akin to the negative; cf. Andr. 806-7 *iam suos parentis repperit? an nondum etiam?* 'has she yet found her parents? not yet, say you?' In the first clause *etiam* would be impossible.

² The corrupt lines 1381-4 may, I think, be thus emended: *ni dolo malo instipulatus sis nive haud dum etiam siem | quinque et viginti annos natus.—habe cum hoc.—at aliost opus. | nam ego ab isto auferre haut ausim si istunc condemnavero.* The last line is spoken by Labrax to the audience: "When I have got sentence against that fellow (Griphus), I shall not dare to claim my money from that one (Daemones)." *At* might easily be dropped by haplog-

Pseud. 1028 reads: *metuo autem ne erus redeat etiamdum a foro*. Here no negative can be inserted; *etiamdum* has the value of the affirmative *etiam*, an irregularity to which we have a pendant in Epid. 42, where *etiamnunc* is used with a negative, and a parallel in Cic. Att. 13. 31. 1 *quoniam etiamdum abes*. As *nunc* and *dum* are mere satellites, adding nothing to the sense, there is no ground for questioning these irregularities, which show that the restriction of *etiamdum* to the negative, of *etiamnunc* to the affirmative, function of *etiam*, though usual, was not absolute. The meaning here is that of *etiam* = *etiam prius*.

VIII. The additory *etiam* also lends itself to conjunction with particles kindred in meaning: *ultra*: Amph. 587, Asin. 440 [Aul. 530], Truc. 112, Eun. 860, Ph. 360. 769; *insuper*: Eun. 645 (cf. sup. III, note); *adeo*: Most. 629. Much the most important of these combinations is that with *quoque*. The refusal (as of Brix on Men. 1160) to recognize this as a pleonasm rests on the assumption that *etiam* is properly an intensive particle; so Brix says "*quoque* ist vergleichend, *etiam* steigernd"; and Lorenz on Most. 1110, while speaking of *etiam quoque* as a pleonasm, inconsistently agrees with Brix in translating it by "*sogar auch*." But this rendering is permissible in few cases, necessary in none; and in fact *etiam* and *quoque*, so far as they coincide in range, correspond exactly in meaning, both having the additory sense 'also,' from which the intensive 'even' is derived for both, though less frequently for *quoque*.¹ The real difference between the two words lies in the fact that *etiam*, by reason of its temporal origin, belongs primarily to the verb, while *quoque* is a nominal adjunct.² This

raphy before *al*—; and the reduction of *haut ausim* to (*h*)*aut sim* would be merely another form of the same error. With *haud dum etiam* cf. Pers. 174 *nondum etiam*. *Etiam* was probably omitted by the copyist of the archetype and inserted in such a manner as to make it seem intended as a substitute for *haud*.

¹ Prof. Gildersleeve, Lat. Gr. 479, Remark, calls attention to the fact that "the difference between *etiam* and *quoque* is not to be insisted on too rigidly," and cites, for *quoque* = 'even,' Juv. 4. 116. Plautine examples are Asin. 207, Poen. 166. 888, Pseud. 295.

² So regularly in Terence, the only exception being Haut. 866, where, however, *desponsam* is a nominal element of the verb. Out of some fifty examples of *quoque* which I have noticed in Plautus, five exhibit it as a verbal adjunct: Pers. 234, Cist. 35, Pseud. 367, Capt. 284, Bac. 892 (in Most. 538 text and sense are uncertain).

distinction is actually retained in Haut. 865-6 *postremo etiam si voles desponsam quoque esse dicito*, where *etiam* by its position serves to introduce the clause (cf. Most. 422 *quin etiam illi hoc dicito*). This is the only Terentian example of *etiam—quoque*; in Plautus the fusion is complete and the phrase qualifies always a noun or pronoun: Amph. 461. 702, Asin. 502. 567, Curc. 128, Most. 1110, Pseud. 121. 353. *Quoque etiam*, following the noun or pronoun, is found in Pers. 145. 744, Stich. 258, Poen. 40, Merc. 299. 328, Truc. 94. 731. 875, Amph. 30. 81. 717. 753, Epid. 234. 589, Men. 1160, Pseud. 932, Hec. 543. 762. In Amph. 281 the words *quoque—etiam* after a pronoun are separated by *edepol*, in Trin. 1048 by the verb; and in Hec. 734 *ego pol quoque etiam timida sum*, the adverbs precede the noun (as *quoque* alone does, Asin. 184).

IX. It has been said that *etiam* in questions loses wholly or to a great extent its proper signification. Thus Ussing on Asin. 677 (670) *etiam me delusisti*, says: "*etiam saepe ponitur in principio interrogationis, ubi quaeritur aut quod per se vix credibile videtur . . . aut quod propter alterius cunctationem fore non videtur . . . Hoc adhortandi quandam vim habet nec multum abest a quin.*" This view appears in the notes of Sonnenschein and Lorenz on Most. 383, Palmer on Amph. 369 and Brix on Trin. 514; objection is raised to it by Langen, Beitr., p. 160, who says that *etiam* in a question retains its proper meaning; but he admits as an exception "*einen bestimmten Fall, in welchem das abgeschwächte etiam lediglich dazu dient, der Frage eine besondere Nüance zu geben, wenn sie nämlich statt einer Aufforderung dient.*" This weakening of the adverb Langen finds in questions where "*etiam dem Verbum immer vorangeht und, wenn die Fragepartikel ne hinzutritt, diese sich an etiam, nicht an das Verbum anschliesst.*" Morris, Am. Jour. Phil. XI, p. 180, says that "*of words of restriction and definition . . . only num clearly assumed the function of an interrogative particle, though etiam came very near doing so.*" Seyffert, in a review of Morris's article, Burs. Jahresb. 80 (1894), p. 346, denies that in Bac. 216, Most. 553, Pers. 651 *etiam* stands "*without any proper meaning,*" and adds, "*ob etiam überhaupt in Fragen wie etiam rogas, minitaris seine Bedeutung soweit verliert, dass es nur dazu dient der Frage den Ton des Dringlichen, Ungeduldigen zu geben, wie M. meint, scheint mir gleichfalls zweifelhaft; ich wenigstens fühle an allen diesen Stellen die*

Bedeutung von *etiam* noch klar heraus. Freilich liesse sich dies nur im Zusammenhang einer eingehenden Untersuchung über den Gebrauch von *etiam* bei Plautus darlegen."

Langen's theory seems untenable; *etiam* and *etiamne* preceding the verb are found in other passages than the score which he cites, and we cannot rely on a formal distinction which is not universally valid. In general, Seyffert is, I think, right in feeling that the significance of *etiam* cannot be obscured; yet a few passages support the view of Ussing and Morris by exhibiting an *etiam* which has no distinct characteristic other than that it introduces an emphatic question. But instead of extending this apparently meaningless use to passages where a meaning may easily be found, we must rather seek to restrict it to cases where it is inevitable, and to find its origin, if possible, in some significant employment of the adverb. I have already cited many interrogative clauses in which the value of the particle seemed sufficiently obvious, and have reserved for this place certain questions which can be easily classified under a few heads.

a) *etiam* temporal with verbs of speaking: *muttis?* Pers. 827, *Amph.* 381 ("nondum taces?" Ussing), *muttire audes?* Men. 710-1, *loquere?* Merc. 982, Pers. 848, *clamas?* Amph. 376; and with omission of verb, *etiamne 'opinor'?* Pers. 651 ("nondum certumst?" Seyffert, l. c.). In Epid. 711 *etiam inclamitor quasi servos*, the suggested contrast may be given in the form of an assertion: *iam non inclamitandus sum*. In the following (where the verb of speaking is specialized as a verb of abuse) the idea of repetition enters in, reference being had to previous utterances of the same kind: *etiam male loquere?* Pers. 289, *at etiam male loqui mi audes?* Capt. 563-4 (this being the second insulting remark of Tyndarus, cf. 551 f.), *at etiam maledicis?* Trin. 991 (cf. 926 *ne male loquere apsentis amico*), *etiam minitare?* Truc. 621 (cf. 612 f.).

b) *etiam* temporal in the elliptical construction noticed under II fin: cf. Weise, Lex. Plaut., p. 463, with whose choice of examples, however, I cannot wholly agree: *respicis?* Pers. 275, *Most.* 886, *dicis?* Pers. 277, *tenes?* 413, *vigilas?* Most. 383, *aperis?* 937. 938, *adstas?* Cas. 728, *imus?* 977, *abis?* Poen. 431, *despondes?* Aul. 255, *acceptura es?* Rud. 467. 469, *redditis?* Bac. 1167, *taces?* Trin. 514. In all these cases the demand (or command) has already been uttered, and *etiam* reintroduces it with emphasis: "once more (I say), will you —?" In Pers. 542 *etiam tu illam*

destinas?, Curc. 188 etiam dispertimini? it is rather a suggestion than a demand that has preceded; in Bac. 670 etiam quid respondetis mihi? there is a sudden shift in the kind of question used; and in Men. 697 mane: etiam astas? etiam audes mea revorti gratia? the particle follows so quickly on the command that we have hardly time to feel its force. In the following there is no backward reference and the meaning is quite effaced: amoves? Asin. 714, taces? Pers. 152, Curc. 41, Ad. 550, abis? Ph. 542. It is only to these last instances that Ussing's formula "etiam interrogantis" can properly be applied; and these can easily be understood as representing the degeneracy of an idiom which in its original value seems not to have survived Plautus. For the two Terentian examples show no trace of repetition; and we may conclude that, while *etiam* was, as Morris says, on its way to become a mere particle of interrogation, it was diverted from this tendency by the disappearance of the usage from which the tendency was derived.

c) *etiam* additory or intensive in questions (occasionally also in affirmative clauses) which imply that the utterance, or act, is an aggravation of some wrong done, an adding of insult to injury. Thus, in affirmative clauses: Amph. 586-7 qui quoniam erus quod imperavit neglexisti persequi | nunc venis etiam ultro inrisum dominum; Poen. 1280 f. si ego minam non ultus fuero probe quam lenoni dedi . . . | is etiam me ad prandium ad se abduxit ignavissimus, | ipse abiit foras; Rud. 325 f. data verbo ero sunt: leno abit scelestus exulatum. | in navem ascendit, mulieres avexit . . . | is huc erum etiam ad prandium vocavit, sceleris semen. In interrogative clauses, expressing anger at denial, mockery, evasion or threats: negas? Merc. 763, inrides? Most. 1132, derides? Men. 499, rides? Eun. 1017, ut etiam inrideat? Ph. 669, delusisti? Asin. 677, exordire argutias? Bac. 127, minitare Bac. 785-6 (differentiated by the context from Truc. 621); so of a question which is regarded as evasion or denial: rogas? Amph. 571. 1025, Andr. 762, rogitas? Amph. 1029, Aul. 424. 437. 633, Cas. 997. But for Merc. 202 etiam rogas? cf. sup. V; here no contrast is implied, and *etiam* therefore merely gives emphasis to the verb.

X. The *vis affirmativa* of *etiam* is to be found in its use as a particle of response = 'yes'; but this use is very rare, and as a rule *etiam* in the response has some meaning of its own. In Poen. 406, atque audin?—etiam, the temporal sense is evident.

Amph. 544 numquid vis?—etiam: ut actutum advenis: Bac. 757 numquid aliud?—hoc atque etiam: Hec. 811 nil aliud dicam? etiam; show the half-temporal, half-additory value noted under III; indeed, from the elliptical phrases there cited these differ only by standing after a question. The same notion is underlying in Most. 1000 numquid processit . . . novi?—etiam: but the use of the perfect tense puts the verb out of sympathy with the particle, and thus reduces the latter to a mere affirmative.

XI. This is the case also in Bac. 214–5 sed nilne huc attulistis inde auri domum?—immo etiam. The fusion of *etiam* with *immo* to a phrase of affirmation is therefore here only apparent; and elsewhere, in Plautus as in Terence, the two words have no relation to each other. The following instances of their occurrence in close proximity have already been cited: under I, Poen. 315; III, Curc. 453, Ph. 877, Hec. 869; IV, Rud. 961, Pseud. 324, Bac. 221; VI, Epid. 518; VII, Mil. 1401, Rud. 1123. In Poen. 188 immo etiam ubi expolivero magis hoc tum demum dices, Rud. 441 immo etiam tibi, mea voluptas, quae voles faciam omnia (both referred to under III) the sympathetic tense decides, as so often, the value of the adverb; the singularity of both passages lies in the fact that they alone exhibit the purely temporal notion with a future, all other examples having additory connotation, unless *etiam* is reinforced by another adverb of time, as in Haut. 402 diu etiam duras dabit, or by a sympathetic signification of the verb, as in Trin. 1136 maneam (these two elements combine in Aul. 805, Cas. 606). Poen. 188 is also noticeable because the more exact definition of time, *ubi—demum*, following on *etiam* detaches the latter to some extent from the main verb and makes it almost equivalent to *mane*.

Andr. 655 reads: immo etiam, quo tu minus scis aerumnas meas, hae nuptiae non adparabantur mihi. Dziatzko's change of *quo* to *quom* shows that he understands *immo etiam* in the sense of Spengel's explanation, "ironisch bestätigend." But it is only *immo* that confirms, and the relative pronoun is necessary to *etiam*, as may be seen by a comparison with Ph. 877 immo etiam dabo quo magis credas, Hec. 869 immo etiam qui hoc occultari facilius credas dabo; the ellipsis is like that in Capt. 290 immo etiam ut magis noscas, where also *etiam* is independent of the principal verb, *utilitur*, as here it is independent of *adparabantur*. These three passages differ from the one under discussion only

by the circumstance that in them the subordinate clause gives the purpose for which the statement is made, while here it merely defines the character of the statement. Pamphilus has several times declared to his friend that he does not understand the circumstances: 647 falsu's, 649 nescis, 652 haud istuc dicas si cognoris; Charinus insists: scio e. q. s. 653-4; "I understand very well; you have had a quarrel with your father, he is angry with you and could not get you to marry to-day." "Nay," answers Pamphilus, "I will tell you another thing by (ignorance of) which you fail to understand my troubles; no one was asking me to marry."

Andr. 673 Davus says: nisi id putas, quia primo processit parum, | non posse iam ad salutem convorti hoc malum. His master replies: immo etiam: nam satis credo, si advigilaveris, | ex unis geminas mihi conficies nuptias. He means: immo etiam posse puto; the temporal sense is clearly given by the preceding *non iam*, which is the negative of the temporal *etiam*, as *non etiam* is the negative of *iam*; and cf. Stich. 617 posse edepol tibi opinor etiam uni locum condi bonum. In Andr. 708-9 Dziatzko and Spengel put a stop after *etiam*; but *etiam volo*, or *dicito*, implies an object: "I wish (say) something else": so in Most. 1000, Bac. 215 an *etiam aliquid* was implied by the preceding *quid* and *nil*. The punctuation of Umpfenbach is therefore to be preferred: verum vis dicam?—immo etiam | narrationis mi incipit initium. The force is temporal: "nay, he is still (*etiam prius quam abit*) beginning a speech to me."¹

XII. In Mil. 1014 *immo etiam* might be treated as temporal if we restore the metre and furnish the temporal contrast by reading *sed iam non celas*; but Studemund's reading of A makes such conjecture needless. For Trin. 708 [Pseud. 566] I can find no explanation; in Rud. 783 *etiam* may have the value considered under X c; in Curc. 612 it cannot easily be defended. Cist. 518 seems hopelessly corrupt; but in any attempt to restore it the reading of A deserves more consideration than it seems to have received: anne etiam quid consultura es? "are you going to form

¹ *Narratio* in the technical sense; the jest is Menander's, not Terence's; for stock oratorical forms were not familiar to the latter's audiences, and it is the Attic orators who constantly preface their *διήγησις* with an assurance of truthfulness: ἀπαντα ἐπιδείξω . . . λέγων τὰ ληθῆ, says the Lysianic Euphiletus; similar examples abound.

any other, any new decision?" Poen. 570 may perhaps be referred to VI *d*; but this interpolation shows an un-Plautine lack of emphasis in the particle. If we accept Lachmann's emendation for Asin. 499, it is to be referred to VI *c*, the closest parallel being Amph. 91; but the passage may be regarded as still doubtful. But Bac. 321 *etiam* *dimidium* *censes?* *sc. eum attulisse*, though unique, need cause no difficulty when we remember that the additory or intensive *etiam* has *ne—quidem* for its negative. "Has he brought even the half, do you think?" asks Nicobulus; in a less hopeful mood he would have exclaimed: *ne dimidium quidem attulit?*¹

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY.

WM. HAMILTON KIRK.

¹ At the time of writing this article I had not seen Birt's discussion of the etymology of *etiam*, Rh. M. 51 (1896), p. 70 f. It was gratifying to find Birt arguing with force and, as it seems to me, with cogency for the rejection of the ordinary derivation and the acceptance of that from *eti* (= *ἐτι*) + *iam*. This naturally leads him to conclude that the original sense was temporal, and he notices this fact briefly, p. 107-8, quoting some passages in illustration, chiefly from Plautus.

IV.—THE ORIGIN OF LATIN *HAUD* AND GREEK οὐ; AND THE EXTENSIONS OF THE ORIGINALLY UNEXTENDED FORM.¹

A.—THE ORIGIN OF LAT. *haud* GK. οὐ ‘NOT.’

§1. *Introduction.*

Lat. *haud* and Gk. οὐ ‘not’ have long been the subject of discussion, but it will hardly be contended that the question of their origin has yet received a satisfactory answer. Under these circumstances I would venture to offer a new explanation in the following pages.

§2. *The three forms hau, haud, haut. The evidence of (a) Inscriptions, (b) MSS and Libri, (c) The Ancient Grammarians. The form *au established as the earlier Latin form.*

One of the chief difficulties lies in the Latin form. Hence we shall do well to examine this word first, to see what its earlier form was in Latin.

The three forms hau, haud, haut.

We have apparently three forms to deal with—namely, *hau*, *haud*, *haut*. Ritschl, Prol. ad Plaut. Trin., pp. xcix–cii (1848), writes: “Corruptelis autem etiam *haut* scriptura non raro proditur, velut cum pro eo *aut* positum est, e. g. Trinummus, vv. 362, 721. Sed novum est quod duabus *haut* et *haud* formis tertia *hau* accessit, suscepta a me ex Ambrosiano vv. 233 (*hau liquet*), 462 (*hau bonumst*), in eodemque codice aliis in fabulis tam saepe exstans, ut de calami lapsu cogitari nequeat.”

(a) *Inscriptional Evidence.*

The usual form of the word on inscriptions is *haud*, e. g. C. I. L. I 1306 *quoniam haud licitum*, but we find *hau* in one inscription,

¹ The present is the paper to which an advance-reference has already been made in the Essay on the ‘Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet,’ Part II (Amer. Journ. of Philology, vol. XVII, part 2, July, 1896), §6, p. 180, n. 3, and §8, p. 189, n. 1, and p. 193.

C. I. L. I 1007 (= Orelli 4848 = Gruterus, p. 769) *heic est sepulcrum hau pulcrum pulcrai feminae*.¹ *hau* does not occur again in C. I. L. I, nor does it occur at all in the indices to C. I. L. II–V (incl.), VII–X (incl.), XII, XIV. The form *haut* is found in C. I. L. II 562 '*haut licitum*' (an inscription 'aevi Antoniani' probably), and XII †1499 '*haut dispar*' ('ex titulis Christianorum'), but is not found in the indices to C. I. L. I,² III–V (incl.), VII–X (incl.), XIV.

(b) *Evidence of MSS and Libri.*

Otto Ribbeck, *Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta*, vol. I (Tragicorum Fragm.), 1871, gives the following readings:—

hauquaquam, Att. 618.

haud in Ennius 330³; Pacuvius 325, 426³; inc. inc. fab. 30.³

haut in Livius 35; Enn. 340; Attius 108, 115, 193, 330, 360, 466; Fabul. Praetext. 31.

Otto Ribbeck, op. cit., vol. II (Comicorum Fragm.), 1873:—

hau, Liv. 3 (*haut* codices); Naev. 16 (*hau* om. libri); Titin. 181 (The MS has room for three letters only); Afran. 58 (*aut* libri); Pub. Syri Sententiae 461 (= 694) (reading very doubtful).

haud, Fabul. Palliat. inc. inc. 47⁴; Afranius 12⁴; Sententiae Turicenses 693 (= 850).

haut, Naevius 60, 112; Caecilius 181; Turpilius 9, 10; Fab. Pall. inc. inc. 74; Titinius 127, 166; Afran. 7, 51.

L. Müller, *Q. Enni Carminum Reliquiae* (1885), reads as follows:—

haud, Annales 278, 389, 578; Fabulae 127, 424 (= Ribbeck, vol. I, Enn. 340 *haut*, v. supra).

haudquaquam, Ann. 293.

haut, Ann. 499.

In connexion with Ribbeck's 'velut cum pro eo (s. c. *haut*) *aut*

¹ C. I. L. I 1007 (= also F. D. Allen, *Remnants of Early Latin*, No. 138, where it is included among 'Epitaphs dating from about the Gracchan period on') and I 1306 are among the "Inscriptiones a bello Hannibalico ad C. Caesaris mortem" (see Mommsen in C. I. L. I, pp. 5, 43), and they are, I believe, the only instances of the negative in question to be found in C. I. L. I.

² *haut* does *not* occur in C. I. L. I 1306, as might perhaps be at first sight inferred from Stolz, *Lat. Gr.*², §69, p. 316. This particular inscription (quoted above in the text) shews '*haud licitum*,' with which contrast *haut licitum* in C. I. L. II 562 (also quoted in the text above).

³ Wrongly placed under *haut* in Ribbeck's index to vol. I.

⁴ Wrongly placed under *haut* in Ribbeck's index to vol. II.

positum est' we may note that in the following of the above-mentioned passages the reading *aut* is supported either by Libri or by at least one MS:

Ribbeck, op. cit., vol. I, Enn. 340; Pac. 426; Att. 108, 115, 193, 330.

Ribbeck, op. cit., vol. II, Naev. 60, 112; Turpil. 9, 10; Pall. inc. inc. 74; Titin. 166; Afran. 7, 12, 51, 58.

Müller, op. cit., Enn. Ann. 499; and Fab. 424 (= Ribbeck, op. cit., I, Enn. 340).

Ritschl, in his edition of Plautus, Trin. 1848, reads as follows (I add critical notes in brackets):

hau in lines 233 (*hau* A, ut videtur. *haud* reliqui), 462 (*hau* A, *haud* reliqui).¹

haut in lines 60 (*haut* A, *haud* reliqui, et sic constanter nisi ubi contrarium testabimur); 62 (*haut* A. R., *haud* reliqui); 90 (*aut* H.); 115 (*haut* B, *haud* reliqui); 362 (*aut* A, *haud* reliqui); 445 (*haud* BCDE, *hau* Camerarius, *au* Palmerius Spicil., p. 859); 584 (*haud dare* Pius, *haddare* B, *addere* CDEZ); 625 (*haut* B, *haud* reliqui); 721 (*haud* Dousa iv. 24, Scaliger. *aut* libri); 835; 1157.

(c) *The opinions of the Ancient Grammarians.*

Marius Victorinus (flor. about 360 A. D.), according to the reading of Ritschl, Proleg. ad Plaut. Trinum., page c, writes:

"*Hau* adverbium est negandi et significat idem quod apud Graecos οὐ: sed ab antiquis cum adspiratione, ut alia quoque verba, dictum est et adiecta *d* littera, quam plerisque verbis adiciebant. *d* tamen litteram conservat, si sequens verbum incipiat a vocali ut *haud aliter muros* et *haud equidem*. at cum verbum a consonanti incipit, *d* perdit ut *hau dubiam* et *hau multa* et *hau placitura refer*."²

An alternative reading given by Ritschl (l. c.) runs as follows:

¹ To these statistics we may add that Georges, Lex. der Lat. Wortf., gives *hau* in Plaut. Bacch. 506; Men. 927; Most. 434, 720, 919; Pers. 11, 23, 500; Poen., Prol. 94; Pseud. 215. Nipperdey, Ritter read *hau* in Tacitus, Ann. (e. g.) II 36 and VI 43 (49).—P. S. Reference may profitably be made also to Friedr. Neue, Formenl. d. Lat. Spr. II³ 664 sqq.

² The reading "at cum verbum a consonanti incipit, *d* perdit ut *haut dudum* et *haut multum* et *haut placitura refert*, et inducit *t*" cannot possibly stand. Keil's reading is, in the main, identical with that of Ritschl, and runs thus: "at cum sequens verbum a consonanti incipit, *d* perdit, ut *hau dudum* et *hau multum* et '*hau placitura refer*' [et inducit *t*]."

"*Haud* adverbium est negandi et significat idem quod apud Graecos οὐ, et fuit *au*: sed ab antiquis etc."¹

Flavius Caper (flor. before the end of the 4th century A. D.), according to the reading of Keil, Gramm. Lat., vol. VII, p. 96, l. 4, writes:—

"‘*hau dolo*’ per *d* recte scribitur, etenim *d* inter duas vocales esse debet. quod si consonans sequitur, *d* addi non debet, ut ‘*hauscio*.’”²

Charisius (flor. some time between the middle of the 4th and end of the 5th centuries A. D.), Institut. Gramm., bk. I, §xv ad fin., after a brief discussion of the particle *sed*, continues:—

"*Haud* similiter *d* littera terminatur: *āu* enim Graeca vox’ *d* littera termina[ri apud antiquos] coepit quibus mos erat *d* litt[eram omnibus] paene vocibus vocali littera finitis adiungere, ut *quo ted hoc noctis* [*dicam pro*]ficisci foras. Sed et per *t* scribi sonus vocis admittit."

Charisius thus gives authority also for the form *haut*.

Results of the foregoing investigation.

(i) The three forms *hau*, *haud*, *haut* are established by the united evidence of Inscriptions, MSS and Grammarians.

(ii) The earlier form of the Latin word under discussion seems beyond all reasonable doubt to have been **au*.

Thus we have before us Lat. **au* 'not': Gk. οὐ 'not'; and the problem is to find the connexion between them.

The explanation of the *h* and *d*: *t* of *hau* *haud*: *haut*, which have been shewn above to be non-original extensions of the earlier Latin form **au*, and the examination of the extensions of Gk. οὐ, viz. οὐ-κ οὐ-χ οὐ-κί οὐ-χί, will be deferred to the latter part of the present essay (§8, pp. 61 sqq.), where the various Latin

¹ This, with the omission of Ritschl's 'et fuit *au*,' is the reading given in Keil's Grammatici Latini, vol. VI, p. 15, ll. 21, 22.

² Keil gives the following critical note: "*haud olo per d recte scribitur* M (= Codex Montepessulanus 306); *haud dolo sic recte scribitur* C (= Codex Bernensis 338); *haud dolo sic alioqui recte scribitur* B (= Codex Bernensis 330); rectius erat *hau dolo per unum d recte scribitur*, nisi potius *haud aliter* scriptum erat, quod ex Vergilii versu Aen. VIII 65 Marius Victorinus p. 15, 24 adscripsit." Lindsay, The Latin Language, ch. II, §136, p. 122, suggests a new reading: *haud uolo*.

³ Ritschl (l. c., p. ci) prefers to read "*hau* enim, graeca vox οὐ, *d* littera etc." Keil, Gramm. Lat., vol. I, p. 112, l. 8, and Lindsay, The Latin Language, ch. X, §18, read "οὐ enim Graeca vox *d* littera," etc.

and Greek extensions of the forms **au : ου*, together with some kindred forms in the same or in some other Idg. languages, will be dealt with in detail.

§3. *Older explanations of haud : ου examined.*

Before I venture to put forward my own views on the vocalism of Gk. *ου* and Lat. *(h)au(d)*, it may be well to examine one or two of the older etymologies or explanations offered.

Corssen, *Ausspr. Vocalism. und Beton. d. Lat. Spr.*¹, vol. I (1868), p. 205, regards the *au* of *(h)au(d)*¹ as the 'Pronominal Particle' *au*, which in *au-fero au-fugio* has the meaning 'away, apart,' and occurs also, according to Corssen, l. c., in Lat. *au-tem*, Osc. *av-ti*, Umbr. *o-te*, Lat. *au-t* (see id. ib., p. 157). This *au*, he says further, corresponds to Skr. *áva*, which properly means 'down, downwards,' but which, he adds (on the authority of Benfey, *Chrestom. Gloss.*, p. 32 f.), in composition often contains the pure negative meaning '-less, un-, not.' On the ground, too, that Pott (*Etymol. Forsch.*, part II, 1836, pp. 64, 134) identified Gk. *ου-κ* with Skr. *avā-k*, Corssen (l. c.) identifies Greek *ου* with the same Skr. *áva*,² which, according to him, has the form *au* in Lat. *h-au-d*.

Thus Corssen identifies the vocalism of Lat. *(h)au(d)*, *au(fero)*, *au(fugio)*, *au(tem)*, *au(t)*, Umbr. *o(te)*, Osc. *av(ti)*, Skr. *áva*, Gk. *ου*. Leaving Lat. *h-au-d* and Gk. *ου* for the moment out of the question, it may be remarked that only on one condition—viz. that Skr. *áva* and the *au-* of Lat. *au-fero au-fugio* represent an Idg. *au* (a view which I believe to be right, v. infra, p. 50, n. 3,)—can we regard as correct Corssen's identification of these with Lat. *au(tem)*, *au(t)*, Umbr. *o(te)*, Osc. *av(ti)*, which must represent Idg. **au* (see Brugmann, *Grundriss*, I, §§96, 97; Lindsay, *The Lat. Lang.*, ch. X, §§4, p. 599, 5, p. 601). If, therefore, Skr. *áva*, Lat. *au(fero) au(fugio) au(tem) au(t)*, Umbr. *o(te)*, Osc. *av(ti)* are all to be identified together as representing Idg. **au*, they must all be separated from Gk. *ου* 'not' (which cannot represent Idg. **au*), and probably, therefore, also from Lat. **au* 'not.' Thus Corssen's identification of Gk. *ου* with Skr. *áva* [based on

¹ For Corssen's view on the *h* and *d* of *h-au-d* see below, §7 *a* and *b*, pp. 55, 59.

² Bopp (as I conclude from Brugmann, *Gr. Gr.*², p. 236) was the first to identify Gk. *ου* with Skr. *áva*.

Pott's incorrect identification of Gk. οὐκ with Skr. *avāk* (on the latter syllable of which v. infra, §8, p. 63)] cannot possibly stand.

Osthoff, in Hübschmann's *Das Idg. Vocalsystem* (1885), pp. 190, 191, regards "Lat. (*h*)*aud* : Gk. οὐ (from *οὐδ)" as shewing different ablaut-grades of the same root. For the ablaut "Gk. ου : Lat. *au*" Osthoff, l. c., compares Gk. οὐρα (Att. ὄρα from *δαρα) : Lat. *auris*, from Idg. √ *aus-* 'to draw, gather, take, obtain' [Gk. αὖω Lat. *haurio* (from **aus-iō*, Osthoff, *Zur Geschichte des Perfects*, p. 486) O.Norse *ausa*],¹ the 'ear' thus meaning 'the grasping organ'—middle grade of Gk. οὐς in Lesb. παρ-αύα 'cheek' and weak grade in Avest. *uši-*.²

Osthoff's derivation of Gk. οὐ from *οὐδ seems unlikely. It is much more probable that οὐ was the earliest Greek form, and that the forms such as οὐδ-εις shewing δ came in later (cf. Brugmann, *Gr. II*, §31 ad fin.). With respect to Osthoff's view that Lat. *haud* Gk. οὐ belong to the *ā*-series, I would not deny that *ō* appears beside *ā* in the strong grade of this series,³ but I would raise the objection that there is (so to speak) no Indo-Germanic 'peg' on which to hang Lat. *haud* Gk. οὐ, thus referred to the *ā*-series.

Victor Henry, in *Mém. d. l. Soc. d. Ling.*, vol. VI, part 5 (1889), pp. 378 sqq., seeks (*unsuccessfully*, I think) to justify Bopp's and Corssen's above-mentioned identification of Skr. *áva* with Gk. οὐ. He observes that at first sight the disparity of *meaning* between *áva* and οὐ is difficult, but remarks (on p. 378) that it is possible to see in Skr. the commencement of the proceeding, by which

¹ It should be mentioned that Havet, in *Mém. de la Soc. d. Ling. de Paris*, vol. VI, part I (1885), p. 18, and King and Cookson, *Sounds and Inflexions in Greek and Latin*, chh. V, p. 86, IX, p. 187, regard Idg. **oys-* as the origin of Lat. *auris* Gk. οὐς. But these scholars seem certainly to be mistaken in their view. Cf. Osthoff, *Perf.*, pp. 486 sqq.; Hübschmann, *Das Idg. Vocals.*, p. 159; Lindsay, *The Latin Language*, ch. IV, §31, and the present writer in his *Essay on the 'Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet,' Part II* (*Amer. Journ. of Philology*, vol. XVII, part 2, July, 1896), §8, p. 194, n. 3.

² Till recently 'understanding' was the only known meaning of Avest. *uši-* (cf. Armen. *uš* 'understanding,' regarded as a borrowed word by Hübschmann, *Arm. Stud. I*, p. 47), but the meaning 'ear' has been established by the new fragments of the 'Nirangistan,' vid. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, fragment vi, verse 26, p. 95 *hvaēibya ušibya* 'with the two ears.'

³ Cf. the above-mentioned *Essay on the 'Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet,' Part I* (*A. J. P.*, vol. XVI, part 4, Dec. 1895), §3 (p. 447, note 1).

áva, "qui a parfois en sanscrit le sens inversif," has been capable of transformation into a negative particle. But to pass on to what is perhaps more important, his attempted explanation of the *form* of the words:—he suggests that *áva* may have come from an Idg. **ouo-* [adding that Latin is not against this, seeing that the shortened form *au-* (*au-fero*, etc.), in virtue of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet, may represent Idg. **ou* just as well as Idg. **au*]. The Old Irish preposition *ó ua* (sic¹), which comes from Idg. **ou*, would correspond to Skr. *áva*, if this latter be rightly derived from Idg. **ou(δ)*.² According to Brugmann's law that Idg. *δ* in an open syllable becomes *ā* in Skr., Victor Henry would have expected Idg. **ouδ* to become Skr. **āvā*, and not Skr. *áva*, adding, however, that this rule is not absolute, being violated notably in the particles, e. g. Skr. *ápa* : Gk. *ἀπό*; he further explains *áva* by supposing the co-existence of two original forms, a full one **ouδ* (or **ouā* or **ouē*), and a shortened one **ou* (with which he compares Lat. *au-*), the former yielding Skr. **āvā* (or **āvā*), the latter yielding Skr. **āv*, and contamination of the two producing *āvā*. So far as Ionic Attic alone is concerned, Victor

¹ *ua* (as accentuated by Victor Henry), which should strictly represent *ūa* (for the 'accent,' which is written in Gaelic, is really no accent at all, but only a mark of quantity), may be criticised as not being quite an exact way of representing the true sound of the word. Some diphthongs in Gaelic may be (1) short, (2) long with respect to the first vowel, (3) long with respect to the second, but there are also (4) a few others, which are *always long*; to this latter class *ua* belongs. Diphthongs of this latter class are never 'accentuated'; thus *ua*, as written by V. Henry, is both right and wrong—wrong with respect to the notation, right with respect to the quantity (*ua* being a long diphthong).

The form *o* belongs to Scots (as well as Irish) Gaelic, e. g. *o urnuigh* 'from prayer,' St. Luke xxii. 45; *o Ghalile* 'from Galilee,' id. xxiii. 5. (This *o* of Scots Gaelic is of course long, as in Irish Gaelic, but Scots Gaelic very rarely makes use of the 'accent.')

The form *ua*, however, is, so far as I know, peculiar to Irish, and even there is, I believe, retained only in the prepositional pronouns which are formed with this preposition, e. g. *uaim* (= *ua* + *me*) 'from me,' *uit* (= *ua* + *tu*) 'from thee' [all the simple prepositions in Irish being thus compounded with the personal pronouns, an odd feature common to Gaelic and the totally unrelated languages, Hebrew (e. g. *Immanu-el* 'with-us God') and, I am told, Hungarian]. Of *ua* I can find no trace in Scots Gaelic. Curiously enough, in O'Donovan's Irish Dictionary, the only form given of the preposition in question is *ua*, but the form *δ* (= *δ*) is now almost invariably written, even in printing old texts which shew *ua*.

² See *infra*, §4, p. 52, n. 1.

Henry observes that *οὐ* might come from the full form **δF_o*,¹ but that as this would not suit Lesb., Boeot. and Doric, in which the said **δF_o* would have become **ὦ*, he prefers to derive *οὐ* from the shortened form **δF* (comparing *πάρ* = *παρά*, *ἄν* = *ἀνά*, etc.), which satisfies all the phonetic needs, the *F* before consonants forming a diphthong with the preceding vowel, so that, e. g., **δF φᾶμι* (which, according to V. Henry, = Skr. *áva bhāmi*) became *οὐ φημι*.

On Victor Henry's theory the following remarks may be made. He is surely wrong in supposing that Brugmann's law, viz. that "Idg. *δ* in open syllables became *ā* in the Prim. Aryan period" (Brugmann, Gr. I, §78), is intended to include final syllables, for Brugmann himself, in Gr. III, §409, regards Skr. *sá* (: Gk. *δ*) *sá-s* as the Skr. representative of Idg. **sδ* **sδ-s*, and in Gr. IV, §1047, he exemplifies Idg. **-sδ*, an Idg. personal ending of the 2 sing. middle, by Avest. *bara-nha* (: Gk. *φέρω φέρου ἐ-φέρω ἐ-φέρου*); thus we should have expected Victor Henry's postulated Idg. **δυδ* to yield Skr. **āvā*, and not (as Victor Henry thinks) Skr. **āvā*. To return to the main question:—his suggested explanation, that Skr. *áva* arose by the contamination of two original Idg. forms **δυδ* (or **δυḍ* or **δυḗ*) and **δυ*, does not seem at all satisfactory, and consequently I would reject the view that Skr. *áva* is the outcome of an Idg. form containing **δυ-*. In the next place, although I believe firmly in the truth of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet,² I yet think that the *au-* of Lat. *au-fero au-fugio* is not an instance illustrative of this Law. Much rather, Skr. *áva* and the *au-* in these two Latin verbs (compare together Lat. *au-fero* : Skr. *ava-bhṛ-* 'aufero'), together with O.C.Sl. *u-* Pruss. *au-* 'off, away' (e. g. O.C.Sl. *u-myti* 'to wash off,' *u-dati* 'to give away, ἐκδοῦναι θυγατέρα,' Pruss. *au-mu-sna-n* 'ablution'), should all be regarded as representatives of the Idg. preposition **au(e)*. Cf. Brugmann, Gr. I, §100; Stolz, Lat. Gr.³ (1890), §50, p. 293, and in the Historische Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache, vol. I, part I (1894), §151, p. 154; Lindsay, The Latin Language (1894), ch. IX, §12, p. 576.³ From this Idg. prepo-

¹ It is curious to compare the representation in Cyprian, viz. *ο-vo* (v. Cauer, Delect. Inscr. Graec. 474, line 3).

² See the above-mentioned Essay on the 'Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet' (Amer. Journ. of Philology, vol. XVI, part 4, Dec. 1895, and vol. XVII, part 2, July, 1896).

³ M. Bréal, in Mém. de la Soc. de Ling., vol. V, part 3 (1883), pp. 197, 198, maintains that the *au-* of *au-fero au-fugio* is the preposition *ab* or *ā* (cf. *abstuli, ablatum*). According to M. Bréal, "l'*ā* a subi la diphthongaison en *āu* comme

sition **au(e)*, Gk. οὐ and (in my opinion) Lat. *h-au-d* must be entirely separated.

§4. *Reference of Lat. *au Gk. οὐ to a common ground-form, namely, Idg. tautosyllabic *du, from the Idg. √eu- 'to fail, be deficient, be wanting.'*

The views hitherto advanced on the etymology of Gk. οὐ and Lat. *h-au-d* have thus been briefly criticised. None of them seems at all satisfactory. I would therefore venture to suggest the following view, which has, at least, the advantage of attaching Gk. οὐ and Lat. *h-au-d* to an established Idg. root with a well-defined meaning. According to my view, Gk. οὐ and Lat. (*h*)*au(d)* are identical in origin, their Idg. ground-form being tautosyllabic **du*. This Idg. **du* became regularly in Greek οὐ, in Latin first **ou* and then at a later date, some time in the 3d century B. C.,¹ **au*. Granting, then, that Gk. οὐ and Lat. **au*

Larentia est devenu *Laurentia*." He relies mainly on the authority of Cicero, Orat. XLVII, §158: "Quid, si etiam '*abfugit*' turpe visum est et '*abfer*' noluerunt, ('*aufugit*' et) '*aufer*' maluerunt? quae praepositio praeter haec duo verba nullo alio in verbo reperietur." He might much more appropriately (from his own point of view) have cited Quintil. I 5, §69: "Frequenter autem praepositiones quoque compositio ista corrumpit: inde *abstulit*, *aufugit*, *amisit*, cum praepositio sit *ab* sola." Such a view, however, can hardly be regarded as correct; cf. the authorities cited in the text, especially Lindsay, l. c., where, speaking of the *au-* in *au-fero* and *au-fugio*, he writes: "It has not been produced from *ab* by any phonetic process, but represents a different I.-Eur. preposition **aw(ē)* (O.Ind. *dva*, Pruss. *au-*, e. g. O.Ind. *ava-bhṛ-* '*au-fero*'), which was brought into requisition in these compounds before an initial *f* to avoid confusion with the compounds of *ad*, e. g. *affero*." With this explanation of Lindsay, I would agree entirely, save in one point:—Surely the *au-* of *au-fero au-fugio* was not "brought into requisition" by Latin "to avoid confusion with the compounds of *ad*, e. g. *affero*," but rather is a relic preserved from Idg. times (cf. Skr. *ava-bhṛ-*, quoted above), long before the Idg. *bh* of the two Idg. roots *bher-* and *bheṃs-* had become Latin *f* (*fero fugio*). It would be more true, therefore, to say that the *au-* of *au-fero au-fugio* was *maintained* in Latin "to avoid confusion with the compounds of *ad*," a confusion which would have ensued if *au* had been exchanged for *ab* (e. g. *aufero* exchanged for *ab-fero*, whence, of course, *affero*, which would have been ambiguous).

¹ See the above-mentioned Essay on the 'Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet,' Part I (A. J. P., vol. XVI, part 4), §3 ad fin. (pp. 456 sq.), Part II (A. J. P., vol. XVII, part 2), §8 ad fin. (p. 195) and §9 (pp. 195 sq.).

come from Idg. tautosyllabic **d̥u*, we have next to ask: What can this Idg. **d̥u* mean? So far as I am aware, no one has yet suggested any Idg. root with a known and definite meaning, with which to connect this Idg. **d̥u*; but there exists one Idg. root, the meaning of which is well established, and from which there are numerous derivatives, a root which exactly suits the needs required of it here, both as to form and meaning: the Idg. *√eu-* 'to fail, be deficient, be wanting.' To this Idg. *√eu-*, therefore, I would refer, as preserving the strong grade *ð* of the *ǵ*-series, Idg. tautosyllabic **d̥u*, the common ground-form of Gk. *οὐ* and Lat. *(h)au(d)*.

From this derivation we can easily trace the development of meaning. In Gk. *οὐ* and Lat. *h-au-d* the idea of 'want' or 'deficiency' has produced the purely negative meaning. In Old Irish *ο̊ ua* 'away from,' if connected herewith (as is quite possible from the phonetic point of view¹), the meaning has further developed through the idea of 'absence' or 'separation' implied in the primitive root.²

§5. *Other derivatives of the Idg. √eu-*.

The meaning of this Idg. *√eu-* 'to fail, to be wanting,' which is thus given by Brugmann, Gr. II, §66, p. 141 (Engl. ed.), §67, p. 153 (E. E.), and Osthoff in Morph. Untersuch. IV, p. 370, is well established from the following derivatives, most of which will be found in Brugmann, Gr. I, §63, II, §66, p. 141 (E. E.), §67, p. 153, §95, p. 286, III, §175, p. 25 (E. E.), IV, §574, and in Fick, Vergl. Wörterb. d. Idg. Spr.⁴, part I, p. 123, s. v. "*ua* 'mangeln,

¹ O. Ir. *ο̊ ua* can represent either Idg. tautosyllabic **ǵu* or **d̥u* (v. Brugmann, Gr. I, §§66, 82), but *not* Idg. tautosyllabic **d̥u* (v. Brugmann, Gr. I, §98).

² If my derivation of Gk. *οὐ* Lat. *(h)au(d)* from Idg. tautosyllabic **d̥u* from Idg. *√eu-* 'to fail, to be deficient, to be wanting'—a derivation to which no exception can possibly be taken from the point of view of the meaning—is correct, it will hardly be denied that this is an example very strongly supporting the views set forth in the above-mentioned Essay on the 'Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet.' For according to no system of ablaut can an *original* (i. e. Idg.) *d̥* appear in the Idg. *ǵ*-series, to which the Idg. *√eu-* (: Gk. *εὐ-νι-ς* 'bereft, mulcted,' etc.) undoubtedly belongs. See Hübschmann, Idg. Vocalsystem (1885); Brugmann, Gr. I (1886), §309 and §§311-14; Bartholomae in Bezzenger's Beiträge, vol. XVII (1891), pp. 91 sqq. Cf. also P. Giles, Short Manual of Comparative Philology (1895), §§258-265, and the Note following §265, pp. 186-94.

fehlen,' " part II, p. 179, s. v. "*ū* 'mangeln,' " part III, p. 542, s. v. "*vā* 'mangeln'":

Avestic root *ū*¹ 'to want,' *ūyamna* pple. mid. 'wanting, failing,' *ūna* 'empty' also subst. f. 'want.' Sanskrit *ūnā*-² 'defective, deficient in something,' *ūnay* 'to leave (a wish) unfulfilled (*ūnā*-),' based on *ūnā*-.³ Armenian *unain* 'empty.'⁴ Greek *εἰ-μι-ς* 'bereft, mulcted.' Latin *vānus*, *vācare*, *vācuus*.⁵ Gothic⁶ *v-an-s* 'wanting, absent, lacking,' *v-an* n. 'want.' O.H.G. *w-an* 'wanting, lacking.' English *wan*- 'lacking, without.'⁸

To the derivatives just given may be added, I. Greek *ἀν-εν* 'without' and II. (1) Skr. *vā* Gk. **-φε* Lat. *-vē* 'or,' (2) Skr. *vā* 'as, like,' Gk. **-φε* 'as, like as,' Lat. **-vē* 'as, like as,' for a full discussion of which see the paper on "Some Sanskrit, Greek and Latin Derivatives of the Idg. *√eu-* 'to fail, to be deficient, to be wanting,'" published recently in Bezenberger's *Beiträge*, vol. XXII, 3/4 (1896), pp. 189-202.

¹ Cf. also, in addition to the authorities cited in the text, Grassmann, *Wörterb. zum RV.*, s. v. (*ūnā*), col. 272.

² *ūnā* is apparently not used independently in the RV. (vid. Grassmann), but it is found in the compound *ān-ūna* 'not defective, perfect' [cf. also *dnūna-varcas* 'possessing perfect glory (*vārcas*),' Grassmann, *Wörterb. zum RV.*, col. 61 and 272]. *ūna* is found independent in classical Sanskrit, e. g. (Raghuvansa) *ūnam na sattvēṣu adhiko babādhe* 'a strong one amongst animals has not hurt a weak (or inferior) one.' *ūna* is frequently used to form phrases of subtraction in the numerals, e. g. 19 *ekōnaviṣatiṣ* (from *eka-ūna-viṣatiṣ* 'a score wanting one') and *ūnaviṣatiṣ*, 57 *tryūnaṣaṣtiṣ* (see Whitney, *Skr. Gr.*, §§477a, 478b; Brugmann, *Gr. III*, §175, p. 25, E. E.).

³ Cf. also Grassmann, op. cit., s. v. (*ūnā*), col. 272.

⁴ Cf. also Hübschmann, *Arm. Stud. I* (1883), pp. 47, 62.

⁵ On these Latin words cf. also the above-mentioned Essay on the 'Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet,' Part II (A. J. P., vol. XVII, part 2), §6 (pp. 178 sqq.).

⁶ With the above-mentioned use of Skr. *ūna*, to form phrases of subtraction in the numerals, we may compare the similar phenomenon in Gothic, e. g. 2 Cor. 11, 24 *fidvōr tiguns dinamma vanans* 'forty save one' (cited by Brugmann, *Gr. III*, §175, p. 25, E. E.).

⁷ Cf. also Osthoff in *Morph. Unters. IV*, p. 375.

⁸ E. g. *wanton* from M.E. *wan*- from A.S. *wan* 'lacking,' and *towen* = A.S. *togen*, past pple. of *teōn* 'to draw, to educate' (v. Skeat, *Concise Etym. Dict. of the Engl. Lang.*, 1887), 'lacking or without education.' Cf. also the following, cited by R. C. Trench (*English Past and Present*, Lect. III, p. 112, and note on pp. 112, 113): *wanhope* 'despair,' *wanthrift* 'extravagance,' *wanluck* 'misfortune,' *wanlust* 'languor,' *wanwit* 'folly,' *wangrace* 'wickedness,' *wantrust* (Chaucer) 'distrust.'

§6. *The ablaut "ou : eu" in Greek.*

The ablaut *ou : eu* in Greek is not common; few examples are known; but it must have existed originally in Prim. Greek, none the less; and an isolated word like *οὐ* is just such as might have been expected to keep its original 'vocalismus,' untouched by external influences. The following¹ are examples of the ablaut *ou : eu* in Greek:

σπουδή : σπεύδω,²
 πλοῦ-το-ς : $\sqrt{\rho l-eu-}$,³
 ἀκόλουθος : κέλευθος,⁴
 λοῦσσον⁵ : λεύσσω⁶ from *λευκ-ιω $\sqrt{leuq-}$ 'lucere,'⁷
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{εἰλήλουθ-ε}^8 \\ \text{εἰλήλουθ-μεν} \\ \text{εἰλήλουθ-ώς} \end{array} \right\} : \text{root } \acute{\epsilon}\lambdaευθ- \text{ (fut. } \acute{\epsilon}\lambdaεύσομαι, \acute{\epsilon}\lambdaευστέον).^9$

In *θοός : θέω*, *πλόος : πλέω*, *χόος : χέω*, etc., the sonantal element became at an early period consonantal.¹⁰

¹ I omit the late word *ροῦσιος* 'reddish,' which Schleicher, *Comp.* 67, derived from **ροῖθιος*, and placed beside *ἐρέιθω*, but wrongly so, *ροῦσιος* being really a borrowed word, Lat. *russus russeus*. Cf. G. Meyer, *Gr. Gr.*², §9, p. 9.

² Cf. Hübschmann, *Das Idg. Vocalsystem* (1885), §165, p. 116; Brugmann, *Gr. I*, §80, p. 72, Engl. ed.

³ Cf. Brugmann, *Gr. Gr.*², §70, p. 96.

⁴ Cf. Hübschmann, *Das Idg. Vocals.*, p. 116, and especially J. Schmidt, 'Assimilationen benachbarter einander nicht berührender Vocale,' in Kuhn's *Zeitschr.* XXXII, p. 325, who there observes that only one *o* in *ἀκόλουθος* can be occasioned by ablaut. A comparison of *ἀκόλουθος* with *κέλευθος* proves, as Schmidt rightly says, that the ablaut syllable is that containing the diphthong. Schmidt considers the original flexion to have been **ἀκελευθος* nom., *ἀκολοῦθου* gen., and levelling to have thence ensued in the historical time.

⁵ *λοῦσσον* 'the pith of the fir-tree,' first attested by Theophrastus, *H. P.* 3. 9. 7.

⁶ Cf. G. Meyer, *Gr. Gr.*², §9, p. 9.

⁷ The *eu* of *λευκός* 'white' cannot be original, but has come in for older *ou* (**λουκός*); cf. G. Meyer, *Gr. Gr.*², §9, p. 9; Prellwitz, *Etym. Wörterb. d. Griech. Spr.*, p. 185, s. v. *λοῦσσον*; and Bartholomae in *Bezz. Beitr.* XVII, p. 99.

⁸ In the Idg. perfect the *δ*-grade prevailed in the 2. 3. sing. indic. act. (*οἶσθα οἶδε* $\sqrt{\mu e i d-}$) and, according to the view of most linguists, in the 1. sing. as well [*οἶδα*, **πεφονγα* (in Fick, *Vergl. Wörterb.*⁴, p. 89, read **bhébouga* for **bhébauga*, cf. id. ib., p. xxxv), from $\sqrt{b h e m q-}$ or $\sqrt{b h e m s-}$ 'to bend, decline'], although some think that the *ε*-grade prevailed in the 1. sing. (e. g. *πέφενγα*). On this question cf. Brugmann, *Gr. IV*, §843.

⁹ Cf. Hübschmann, *Das Idg. Vocals.*, p. 116; Brugmann, *Gr. I*, §77, p. 68 (Engl. ed.), §80, p. 72 (Engl. ed.), IV, §856; id. *Gr. Gr.*², §9, p. 26; and G. Meyer, *Gr. Gr.*², §552, p. 484.

¹⁰ Cf. G. Meyer, *Gr. Gr.*², §9, p. 9.

B.—THE EXTENSIONS OF LAT. **au* AND OF GK. οὐ ‘NOT.’

Having thus examined thoroughly the vocalism of Gk. οὐ and Lat. **au* ‘not,’ and having referred them to the common Idg. ground-form **oʷ*, representing the strong-grade *o* of the *ǵ*-series, from the Idg. √*eʷ*- ‘to fail, be deficient, be wanting,’ we will now proceed to discuss the extensions of Lat. **au*, viz. *h-au*, *h-au-d*, *h-au-t*, and also of Gk. οὐ, viz. οὐ-χι, οὐχ, οὐ-κί, οὐ-κ, together with some other kindred forms in the same or in other Idg. languages.

§7. *Latin h-au h-au-d h-au-t*:—(a) the *h* of *h-au h-au-d h-au-t*; (b) the *d* of *h-au-d*; (c) the *t* of *h-au-t*.

(a) *The h of h-au h-au-d h-au-t*.

The explanation of this *h*- is no easy matter. Various explanations have been offered; but none seems convincing:—

Corssen, *Ausspr. Vocalism. und Beton. d. Lat. Spr.*², vol. I (1868), p. 205, regards *haud* as a compound word, consisting of three parts: *h-*, *au*, *d*. His explanation of the *au-* as the ‘Pronominal Particle’ meaning ‘away, apart,’ considered above (§3, pp. 47 sqq.), did not appear satisfactory. For his explanation of the *-d*, see below (p. 59). The *h-*, according to him, is the remnant of the demonstrative pronominal stem *ho-* of *hi-c hae-c ho-c*, which appears blunted to *h-* in *h-or-nu-s* from **ho-ior-nu-s* ‘this year’s.’¹ Thus, according to his theory, *h-au* must = literally ‘this away,’ and would be a formation similar to Skr. *sō* (contracted from Skr. *sá u*) Old Pers. *hauv* Gk. οὐ[-τος] from Idg. **so* (demonstrative pronoun) + *u* (the particle of place, meaning ‘here’ or ‘there’).² Thus, while Idg. **so u* strictly means ‘this man here,’ Lat. **ho-au*, according to Corssen’s explanation, would mean just the opposite, ‘this away, this not here.’ Although Corssen’s etymology of the *au* did not seem satisfactory, this need not really affect our view concerning his explanation of the *h-*, which, if suitable to the *au* as derived by Corssen, might be equally suitable to the *au* as derived in the present paper (v. supra, §4, p. 51). That Corssen’s explanation of the *h-* is possible may be admitted; but at the same time it can hardly be considered satisfactory.

¹ This Latin stem *ho-* is generally extended by *-ce* (*hic* = **ho-i-ce*), but *ho-die ho-rum* and Falisc. *hei he* = ‘*heic hic*’ (Schneider, *Dial. Ital. Exx. Select.*, vol. I, part 2, p. 106, Nos. 20, 21a, 22) are instances of the unextended root (v. Stolz, *Lat. Gr.*², §90, p. 347).

² Cf. Brugmann, *Gr. I*, §603 ad fin., II, §4, p. 9, E. E., III, §414, p. 337, E. E.

Osthoff, *Zur Geschichte des Perfects* (1884), Excurs III, on 'Indog. *says-*, *aus-*, *eys-* im griechischen,' has on pp. 491, 492 worked out an ingenious theory to explain (1) the incorrect presence of *h* in *h-auriō* (for **aus-iō*, Osthoff, *ib.*, p. 486) : Gk. *αὔω*, Old Norse *aus-a* 'to draw, obtain,' *h-umerus* : the correct *umerus*, *h-erus* : the correct *erus*, *h-ālāre h-ālitus* : the correct *ālum ālāre*, and (2) the incorrect absence of *h* in *anser* : Skr. *hṣá-* Gk. *χῆν*, *arēna* : the correct but less frequent *harēna* (= Sab. *fasēna*), *olus* : the correct *holus*. Osthoff, it is true, makes here no mention of *haud*, but inasmuch as this theory of Osthoff is cited in Hübschmann, *Das Idg. Vocalsystem* (1885), p. 191, in explanation of the *h-* of *h-aud*, we must briefly review the theory to see whether it can be applied to *h-aud*. Osthoff explains the incorrect presence and absence of the *h* as the outcome of sentence-doublets. He suggests that, e. g., Lat. *ex harēnā*, *in harēnā* came to be pronounced *ec s-arēnā*, *i n-arēnā* (cf. French *là z-om* = *les hommes*), the spiritus asper having disappeared after the new consonant thus prefixed. But elsewhere, he says, and especially at the beginning of a sentence, the spiritus asper will have maintained itself unweakened, so that in such a position only *harena* **hanser holus* were pronounced. But inasmuch as in phrases like *ec s-arēnā*, *i n-arēnā* the *h*, though no longer pronounced, continued still to be written, confusion arose, followed by the not unfrequent wrong insertion of *h*; the pronunciation was not altered when the *h* was wrongly written in cases like *exhālāre inhālāre*, just as in *humero*.

This theory may or may not give the correct explanation of the words discussed, but it is difficult to consider it applicable to the negative *h-aud* 'not,' which can but rarely have been preceded by *ex* or *in*.

Bugge, *Beiträge zur Erforschung der Etruskischen Sprache*, in *Bezz. Beitr.* X (1886), pp. 75, 76, attempts to prove that the *h* of the Latin demonstrative stem *ho-* was merely 'vorgeschoben.' Latin, he says, does not know an inflected demonstrative stem *o-*, but rather *ho-* : *hoc* (from **hod-ce*), *hunc* and so forth. But, he continues, no other Idg. language shews an inflected stem *ho-* or *gho-*, and it is well known that Latin sometimes shews a 'vorgeschoben *h*' (e. g. *h-aurio*, where the related Etruscan words *husrnana huzrnatre* likewise shew *h*), hence he regards the *h* of the Latin demonstrative stem *ho-* as 'vorgeschoben,' and identifies formally **hom* (contained in Lat. *hunc*) with Etrusc. *am*, *an*.

Bugge thinks that the older unaspirated forms **om* **am* **od* were aspirated because they were felt to be too unsubstantial, when the pronoun was in an accented position. He accordingly felt himself able to identify Lat. *hō*[-*die*] with the synonymous Skr. *a*[-*dyā*]. In his discussion of Lat. *haud* itself, he appears to call it 'a word of pronominal origin' and says that "if the *h* of *haud* is of the same origin as the *h* of *haurio*, *hic*, *hodie*, then *haud*, as has long been conjectured, may be related to Gk. οὐ."

It is difficult to see whether Bugge means that the *h* of *h-aud* is the 'vorgeschoben *h*' of the demonstrative stem *h-o-* (according to his own explanation of the latter), or that it is a 'vorgeschoben *h*,' as in *h-aurio*, quite unconnected with the demonstrative stem *ho-*. He apparently means the former, in which case his explanation is much the same as that of Corssen, given above, and no more satisfactory. Moreover, Bugge is, I think, quite wrong in regarding the *h-* of the demonstrative stem *ho-* as a 'vorgeschoben *h*.'¹ Much rather does the Lat. *ho-* represent an Idg. stem **ǵho-* (v. infra, §8, p. 62).

Lindsay, *The Latin Language* (1894), ch. X, §18, suggests that the initial *h-* of *haud* must have been used as a distinguishing mark to differentiate the word from *aut*, comparing M. Valerius Probus (temp. Nero and the Flavian Caesars), *Inst. Art.*, in Keil's *Gramm. Lat.*, vol. IV, p. 145, l. 9: "'*aut*,' si sine adspiratione scribatur et in *t* litteram exeat, erit coniunctio; si vero '*haud*' cum adspiratione scribatur et in *d* litteram exeat, erit adverbium." We might compare also Cledonius (flor. 5th century A. D.) in Keil, op. cit., vol. V, p. 74, l. 28: "*aut* si sine *h* aspiratione et in *t* exit, coniunctio est; si vero cum *h* aspiratione et in *d* exit, adverbium"; and Cassiodorus (circ. 500 A. D.), *De Orthographia*, in Keil, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 158, l. 20: "*Haud*, quando adverbium est negandi, *d* littera terminatur et adspiratur in capite; quando autem coniunctio disiunctiva est, per *t* litteram sine adspiratione

¹ It is quite true that we find unaspirated forms on inscriptions fairly often, e. g. *ic* in C. I. L. III 809; IV 1321; V 6400; VIII 5257, 5501, 8297, 9344, 9638, 9768; X 7123, 7172, 7763. *cic* XII 870. *oc* V 4488; VIII 9192; X 1541. *uc* (= *oc*) XII †2147. *unc* V †1642; IX 306 (bis); XII 2584. *uius* V †1741; VIII 9200; X 2184, 4410. *ei*? I 1297. *aduc* V †6244. But these unaspirated forms (which do not occur on any early inscription) are not the survival of an original unaspirated demonstrative stem; they are due merely to the incorrect 'dropping of *h*,' as is proved by the fact that the aspirated, not the unaspirated, forms occur in the earliest inscriptions, e. g. *honc* and *hic* in C. I. L. I 32 (of 253 B. C. circ.).

scribitur." Albinus Magister, in Keil, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 303, l. 3, uses identically the same words as Cassiodorus, only differing from them by the insertion of the word '*aut*' before '*per t litteram.*'

We can scarcely accept Lindsay's explanation of the *h-* of *h-aud*. The grammarians are merely stating linguistic facts, and not advancing theories. Had the usual form of the word been *haut*, the aspiration might in that case have been used, as Lindsay suggests, to distinguish *h-aut* 'not' from *aut* 'or.' But this was not the case. *haut* is very rare on inscriptions, and quite late, the only two inscriptions, on which I have been able to discover it, being respectively 'aevi Antoniani' and 'ex titulis Christianorum' (v. supra, §2, p. 43). The aspiration is already on the earlier and more usual *haud* and on the still earlier form *hau* (v. supra, §2). Hence we must find an explanation of the *h-* which will suit the earlier forms *hau*, *haud*, irrespective of the later *haut*.

The only ancient grammarian, who did not confine himself (like those just quoted) to the statement of the fact that "*aut* 'or' is a conjunction, *haud* 'not' an adverb" or the like, is Marius Victorinus, whose remark (quoted above, §2, p. 45) is: "*Hau* adverbium est negandi et significat idem quod apud Graecos οὐ [et fuit *au*]: sed ab antiquis cum adspiratione, ut alia quoque verba, dictum est." Marius Victorinus would thus seem to regard the *h-* of *h-aud* as a mere 'vorgeschoben *h.*'

Instances of *h* 'vorgeschoben' are numerous on inscriptions, e. g.:

haegregius in C. I. L. V †1709; *homnium* XIV 3323; *heterna* V †1720; *hegit* V 7647; *hordo* IX 5577, X 477; *haliquit* (= *aliquid*) XII 915; *Hillyricus* V 3620; *hac* III 5839, IX 5961, X 7995; *his* XIV 497; *heius* III 3917, VIII 3520; *hil(l)ic* XII 915; *have* IV 1983, 2148.

Compare also Catullus' poem (No. 84) on Arrius, whom he represents as speaking *hinsidias* and *Hionios* instead of *insidias* and *Ionios*. To say nothing of inscriptions, this poem alone is sufficient to prove the fluctuation of *h* in Latin as early as the first century B. C.; while a century later Quintilian (I 6, 21) laughs at those, as affected, who greet one another with *avē* instead of *h-avē* on account of the derivation from *avēre* (cf. Blass, Ausspr. d. Griech.³, §25, and Corssen, Ausspr. Voc. und Beton. d. Lat. Spr.³, vol. I, p. 104).¹

¹ Both forms are found on inscriptions: *have* (v. supra in text); *ave* in C. I. L. XIV 1473, *avete* IV 2071.

For the converse we may compare *ic*, etc. (quoted above, p. 57, n. 1), and also *arrespex*¹ in C. I. L. I 1216; *erceiscunda* I 205, part 2, 55 (48 B. C.); *Irtius* I 625 (42 B. C. circa), IX 3771; *Oratia*² I 924; *ostia* (for *hostia*) I 819; *Osti(lius)* I 1170; *Ypsaeus* I 467 bis (57 B. C. circa); also numerous instances of the common verb *habeo* docked of its *h*, e. g. *abes* V 1712; *abis* (= *abes*) VIII 9277; *abeas* XII 915; *abiat* IV 538; *abeto* IV 2013; *abere* V 4488, X 1365, 4539, XIV 3323; *abebat* IX 2893; *abuit* V 914, 1707, XII 230; *abuis(s)e* IV 3121.

This extreme fluctuation in the matter of the aspirate, which became quite frequent in the second half of the second century A. D. (v. Blass, l. c.; Corssen, op. cit., vol. I, p. 110; Seelmann, Ausspr. d. Lat., p. 265 f.), may very well have arisen early. The *h-* of *h-au h-aud* will, I think, be best explained as a 'vorge-schoben *h*,' which (as in *h-aurio*, v. supra), when once prefixed, was always retained. Nor is it unlikely that the prefixing of this (etymologically incorrect) *h* was partly due to a desire for increased emphasis on a word which, as directly negating the sentence in which it stood, or the word with which it was connected, was one of emphatic importance.³

(b) *The d of h-au-d.*

Corssen, Ausspr. Voc. und Beton. d. Lat. Spr.², vol. I (1868), p. 205, regards the *d* of *hau-d* as the remains of the same *-de* which he sees preserved in *quam-de*, *un-de*, *in-de*, *ex-in-de*, *de-in-de*, *pro-in-de*, and which he translates 'even, precisely.' He holds that, whereas in *ex-in*, *de-in*, *pro-in* the *-de* has again disappeared, the ending *e* having first fallen off, and the (thus final) *d* disappearing thereafter, in *haud* the influence of the preceding vowel preserved the *d* after the disappearance of the final *e*. Corssen's explanation of *h-au* has been given above (§3, p. 47, §7, p. 55). The whole word *h-au-d*, therefore, accord-

¹ I quote this word chiefly in order to point out that C. I. L. I 1216 is an incorrect reference for *arrespex*.

² *Oratia* for *Horatia* beside Praenestine *Foratia* [Schneider, Dial. Ital. Exx. Select., No. 200 (= Gamurrini, add. 1881, No. 2354)].

³ It is true that (so far as I have been able to examine the question) 'vorge-schoben *h*' is at least uncommon on inscriptions prior to the Hannibalic war (no instance is found in C. I. L. I 1-195, which consists of 'Inscriptiones vetustissimae Bello Hanniblico quae videntur antiquiores'), but this does not in the least affect my explanation of the *h-* in *h-au h-aud*, for neither does any example of *hau haud* occur prior to the Hannibalic war [cf. supra, §2 (a), p. 43].

ing to Corssen's theory, should strictly mean 'this away precisely': not a very convincing explanation.

Osthoff in Hübschmann, *Das Idg. Vocals.* (1885), p. 191, deriving Gk. *οὐ* from earlier **οὐδ*, would apparently regard the *d* of *hau-d* as pre-Latin; but his derivation of Gk. *οὐ*, on which his explanation of the *d* of *hau-d* rests, would appear to be incorrect (see *supra*, §3, p. 48).

Of the ancient grammarians, Marius Victorinus (quoted above, §2, p. 45) remarks: "adiecta (est) *d* littera, quam plerisque verbis (antiqui) adiciebant"; and Charisius (quoted above, §2, p. 46), after a brief discussion of the particle *sed*, continues: "*Haud* similiter *d* littera terminatur: *āu* enim . . . *d* littera termina[ri apud antiquos] coepit quibus mos erat *d* litt[eram omnibus] paene vocibus vocali littera finitis adiungere, ut *quo ted hoc noctis* [*dicam pro*]ficisci foras." The words of these grammarians can hardly be termed scientific, but I think that their explanation of the *d* of *hau-d* lies nearest to the truth. It seems most probable that the negative particle *hau* became *haud* on analogy of the adversative particle *sed*, aided probably by the extension of the -*d*, the ablative termination of the *o*-stem-nouns and of the pronouns, far beyond its original limits¹ (cf. Brugmann, *Gr.* III, §240, pp. 133 sq., §243, pp. 139 sqq., §442, part 2, §444).

(c) *The t of h-au-t.*

The *t* of *haut* affords no difficulty; we find *d* and *t* very frequently interchanged on inscriptions, e. g.:

t for *d*:

apud C. I. L. I 206 (15, 34, 120); 818; II 1963 (2, 20)²; 1964 (I 13, 17, 19; IV 35); VIII 619, 2634, 4238; IX 259, 339; X 3334 (10); XIV 474 (*quater*), 1597, 1661.

at (for *ad*) I 1252; III 633 (I 1, 7, 13, 15); IV 1880, 2013; V 1469, 3408, 8003; VII 1310; VIII 284, 1557; IX 2893, 3314; X 787, 3147, 6565; XII 5961 (5 b); XIV 78, 380, 527.

athuc VIII 9624.

aliut II 1964 (II 68; IV 6); V 532 (I 23), 1102; VIII 212 (36); X 4787, 4842 (11); XIV 586, 1828 a.

it V 875 (6); VIII 2728, 4055; IX 136; X 2780, 7852 (3); XIV 2112 [(I 12) (*a.* 136)], 2795 [(13) (*a.* 140)], 3679 [*a.* 127].

¹ We actually find *advorsus ead* in C. I. L. I 196, 25.

² *apud* C. I. L. II 1963 (2, 19).

quit IV 1547 a; V 3415; VIII 212 (49), 2532 B, a, 6; IX 3161, 5860; X 761; XII 915; XIV 1874, 3956.

aliquit IX 5860, (*haliquit*) XII 915.

quot (for *quod*) II 144, 462, 813, 1120; IV 1860; V 2090, 3221; VIII 212 (37), 2728; IX 2164 add., 2475; XII 729, 4326; XIV 1357, 1731, 3014, 3435.

set III 847 (al.); IV 1516, 2400; V 5049 (5); VIII 403, 434, 1557, 9519, 10570; IX 1164, 3337; X 2496, 3334 (19), 5429 (12), 7024 (I 6); XII 743, †5750; XIV 166, 480, 914.

d for *t*:

quod (for *quot*) I 1016; II 1964 (I 2, 10; II 59); IX 2827 (23).

quodquod annis V 7450.

quodannis V 4410, 4448.

†*ed* VIII 4770; *ed* XII *427, 1411.

adque (for *atque*¹) VIII 828, 1027, 1179 bis, 2530; IX 1588, 1685, 2974; XII 894, 2228, 3619; XIV 126, 1826, 2046, 2919 bis.

Also not unfrequently we find such interchange in the terminations of the verb, e. g. *asted*, *sied*, *feced* in the old Dvenos inscription,² beside *mit(t)at* in the same inscription; cf. also *fecid* in C. I. L. I 54, V 1870, VIII 3028, XIV 4112; *diced* IV 1700; *rogad* IV 2388; *liquid* V 7570.

To this great fluctuation between *t* and *d* (aided very possibly by the analogy of the form *aut* 'or') we ought, I think, certainly to ascribe the form *haut* beside *haud*.

§8. *Gk.* οὐ-χί οὐ-χ οὐ-κί οὐ-κ :—(a) *the origin of these extensions (together with an examination of Skr. hi -hī, Avest. zi zī, Lat. hic); (b) the accent of Gk. οὐ-χί οὐ-κί beside that of ἡ-χι vai-χι.*

(a) *The origin of the extensions -χι -χ -κί -κ.*

(1) οὐ-χί οὐ-κί.

There is, I think, no doubt whatever that οὐ-χί and οὐ-κί must be entirely separated from one another. Roscher indeed, in

¹ The ultimate derivation of Lat. *atque* from earlier Lat. *ad+que* (cf. P. Giles, Short Manual of Comparative Philology, §244, p. 180) does not of course affect our point. *adque* in the examples cited is not the old form itself (*ad+que*) preserved, but the new form (*atque*) altered. The form *atque* may be found in C. I. L. 33 ('end of 6th century U. C.,' Ritschl) and thrice in C. I. L. 196 ('supposed to be . . . 568 A. U. C.,' Roby).

² Given in Zvetaieff, Inscrr. Ital. Inf. Dial. (1886), p. 80.

Curtius Stud. III (1870), p. 144, endeavoured to prove "dass in allen vier Wörtern (i. e. μήχι ναίχι οὐχι ἦχι) -χι aus ursprünglichem -κι durch Aspiration entstanden ist, dass wir also von der Tenuis ausgehen müssen, wenn wir diese Formen erklären wollen"; but such a suggestion, as Osthoff has clearly shewn in Morph. Unters. IV (1881), pp. 239 ff., "führt lautgesetzlich nicht zum befriedigenden ziele."

οὐ-χι.—The -χι of οὐ-χι, as also that of ναί-χι, is almost certainly to be identified with Skr. *hi* 'for.' This view, first advanced by Pott (Wurzelwörterb. I 1, 567), and accepted by Osthoff (l. c.), Victor Henry (in Mém. de la Soc. de Ling., vol. VI, part 5, 1889, p. 379) and Per Persson (in Idg. Forsch., vol. II, 1893, p. 247), seems beyond all reasonable doubt to be correct.

The common Idg. ground-form of this Gk. -χι Skr. *hi*, beside which latter we find also Skr. -*hi*,¹ is **gh̥i*, as given by Osthoff, l. c., i. e. **gh̥i*. This is proved to be correct by the Avestic *zi*, beside which we find also Avest. *zi* 'for.'² Skr. *hi* and Gk. -χι, taken by themselves, might quite regularly be derived from either Idg. **gh̥i* (cf. Brugmann, Gr. I, §§386, 405) or Idg. **gh̥i* (cf. Brugmann, Gr. I, §§425, 445, 454), but if (as seems undoubtedly right) they are to be identified with Avest. *zi*, whose *z* can only represent Idg. **gh̥* (cf. Brugmann, Gr. I, §405, and also §452 on Idg. *gh̥* as represented in Iranian), it follows that **gh̥i* must be set up as the original Idg. form (cf. also infra, p. 65, note 2, on Old Pers. **di* 'for').

The meaning of this Idg. **gh̥i* (Gk. -χι Skr. *hi* Avest. *zi*) may be fixed with tolerable certainty by a comparison of the Latin demonstrative pronominal stem **ho-*, in Lat. *hic* (from earlier Lat. **ho-i-ce*, the *-ce* of which comes from the Idg. demonstr. pronom. stem **k̑o-*), etc., which can come quite regularly from

¹ Beside Skr. *nahi* (from *na* + *hi*) we find *nahi* before *nú* in Rigveda 167, 9; 314, 4; 623, 13; also Prātiś. 442, 483 [vid. Grassmann, Wörterb. zum Rigv. (1873), s. v. *nahi*]. Is the *i* of this Skr. -*hi* to be compared to the *i* of Avestic *zi*, or is it due merely to metrical reasons? We find also *nahi nú* in RV. i. 80, 15; vi. 27, 3; *nahi nū* in RV. viii. 21, 7 (v. Osthoff in Morph. Untersuch., vol. IV, p. 240).

² The *i* of Avestic *zi* is curious; beside it we find once *si* 'for,' Yt. xiv. 12 (v. Justi, Handb. d. Zendspr., 125 b), also *-zi* in *ya-zi* 'if, whether' from **yad-si* seen in *yazi-ca* 'and if,' Yt. xxiv. 47 ("lies *yézica*"? says Justi, op. cit., s. v. *yazica*), *yc-si* 'if, whether' for regular *ya-zi* [v. Osthoff in Morph. Unters., vol. IV (1881), p. 240].

Idg. **ǵho-*.¹ The relation between Idg. **ǵho-* and Idg. **ǵhi* would be the same as that between Idg. **k̑o-* and Idg. **k̑i-* (Brugmann, Gr. III, §409, p. 329), and that between Idg. **qo-* and Idg. **qi-* (Brugmann, Gr. III, §411, p. 333). Thus Idg. **ǵho-* (: Lat. stem *ho-*) **ǵhi-* (Gk. *-χι* Skr. *hi* Avest. *zī*) would be a demonstrative pronominal stem, identical in meaning with Idg. **k̑o-* **k̑i-* 'this.' The development of the meaning 'for' in Skr. and Avest. is easily traced: Idg. **ǵhi* would originally mean 'this' (the meaning perhaps still discernible in the *-χι* of Gk. *οὐ-χι*), and might have been used in answers to a question, as we often say 'Just this,' 'Just so,' 'Why, this,' 'Why, just this,' before proceeding with our answer to the question. From the use in such phrases, it might well have developed gradually into a pure conjunction 'for.' It may be observed in this connexion that the Skr. Vedic negative *nahī*, besides its usual meaning 'for not,' shews sometimes the simple meaning 'not' or 'indeed not' (v. Grassmann, Wörterb. zum RV., s. h. v., and Delbrück, Vedische Chrestomathie, p. 84, s. h. v.), in which cases it comes very close to Gk. *οὐ-χι*.

οὐ-κι.—The *-κι* of *οὐ-κι*, quite distinct from the *-χι* of *οὐ-χι* (just discussed), is the neuter singular of the demonstrative pronominal stem **k̑i-* 'this' (cf. Osthoff, l. c.; Brugmann, Gr. Gr.², §95, p. 131, and Gr. III, §182, p. 49, E. E., §331, p. 330, E. E.), so that *οὐ-κι* meant originally 'not this,' and is thus identical in *meaning* with *οὐ-χι* 'not this' (v. supra).

(2) *οὐχ*, *οὐκ*.

None of the theories yet advanced in explanation of Gk. *οὐχ*, *οὐκ* seems at all satisfactory.

We may at once dispose of Pott's above-mentioned (§3, p. 47) identification of Gk. *οὐκ* with Skr. *āvāk*. Skr. *āvāk* is of course, strictly, the nom. acc. sing. neut. of Skr. *āvāc* 'turned downwards,' which is compounded of Skr. *āva* 'off, down' and *-ac-* 'bent in a certain direction, turned' (from Idg. **-nq-*, seen in Gk. *ποδ-απ-ό-ς*, Lat. *prop-inqu-o-s*); cf. Whitney, Skr. Gr., §§407, 409; Brugmann, Gr. I, §228, p. 195.

Osthoff, l. c., explains *οὐκ* : *οὐχ* in the following way:—he holds that in cases of apostrophe of the *-ι* before a following aspirated

¹ Brugmann, Gr. III, §409, Rem. 1, pp. 330, 331, was doubtful how to derive the Latin stem *ho-*.

vowel, οὐκί and οὐχί fell together in οὐχ'; so that e. g. οὐχ ὅτι, οὐχ ἀπτομαι can belong to both οὐκί and οὐχί; before ἔτι he thinks there probably existed both οὐ-κ- and οὐ-χ- (οὐ-κ-έτι and *οὐ-χ-έτι), comparing the Etym. Magn. 368, 30 ὥφειλε γὰρ λέγεσθαι οὐχ' ἔρχομαι. Then at a later date, according to his theory, *οὐχ-έτι and *οὐχ' ἔρχομαι gave way, the use of οὐχ, beside οὐκ from οὐκί, becoming confined to the position before spiritus asper on the analogy of other cases, such as ἀφ' beside ἀπ', καθ' beside κατ', ἀνθ' beside ἀντ', so that thenceforth οὐχ appeared only as a phonetic (or graphic) modification of οὐκ.

Victor Henry, in Mém. de la Soc. de Ling., vol. VI, part 5, 1889, pp. 379 sq., without taking οὐκί into consideration at all, regards οὐχ and οὐκ as both derivable primarily from οὐχί. His explanation is that "before an initial vowel the *í* is elided, e. g. οὐχ ἔξω, and if the following consonant was an aspirate, then the *χ* had to lose its aspiration, whence οὐκ ἔχω, οὐκ ἦλθον; whereupon," according to his theory, "the relation of οὐκ ἔχω to οὐχ ἔξω, and others similar, gave rise to the belief that the *χ* of this last combination was due to the rough breathing of ἔξω, so that the 'deaspiration' has gained more and more, whence οὐκ ἔστι, οὐκ ὄλωλε."

But surely there is at hand a much simpler explanation than either of these two latter. If, as is most probable, οὐ-χί and οὐ-κί both had originally the same meaning 'not this' (v. supra, pp. 62, 63), then both would be used indiscriminately. This being so, it was but natural that in cases of the elision of the *í* before a following aspirated word the form οὐχ(*í*) would be chosen, while on the other hand before a following non-aspirated word the form used would be οὐκ(*í*).

(b) *The accent of οὐ-χί οὐ-κί beside that of ἦ-χι ναί-χι.*

Assuming the correctness of the view that "-χί = Skr. *hi* = Idg. accented **ǵhí*," it appears that the words were originally accented thus: *οὐ χί, *ἦ χί, *ναί χί, and then when composition of the two members took place, the already existing accent on ἦ and ναί ousted the competing accent on *χί, while in οὐχί the accent of *χί had no rival, and consequently remained.

In the same way οὐκί was originally accented *οὐ κί, and then when the two words became one, the accent remained on the -κί in οὐκί for the same reason that it remained on the -χί in οὐχί.¹

¹ Osthoff, in Morph. Untersuch., vol. IV (1881), p. 244, thinks it possible that the prim. Gk. form of Gk. οὐκί was *οὐ-κι (cf. πολλά-κι), and that then *οὐ-κι later became οὐκί on analogy of οὐχί.

§9. *Armenian zi.*

Arm. *zi*¹ 'for' ought, I think, certainly to be identified with Skr. *hi* and (more rarely) *-hi*, Avest. *zi* and (more rarely) *zi*, Old Pers. **di*² 'for,' from Idg. **ǵhi* (**ǵhi*).

Hübschmann (Arm. Stud. I, p. 79) and Brugmann (Gr. I, §410) hold that Idg. *ǵh*, initially and after *n*, *r*, was represented in Armenian by *j*, and only after vowels by *z*; e. g. *jaune-m* 'I

But why should Gk. *-κι* (from Idg. **ki-*) be regarded as originally accentless? It is true that we cannot adduce any evidence from Sanskrit to settle the question either way, as there seems to be no Skr. representative of Idg. **ki-* (Brugmann, at any rate, gives none in the Grundr. III, §409, pp. 329, 330, E. E.). Nor do the representatives of Idg. **ki-* in other Idg. languages—e. g. Lith. *ši*-s O.C.Sl. *si* O.Ir. *ce* 'this (masc.),' Goth. *hit(-a)* Ags. *hit* O.Norse *hið(t)* 'this (neut.)'—prove anything for the accent. Nevertheless, my explanation of the accent of *οὐκί*, given above in the text, seems to me preferable to that of Osthoff.

In *πολλά-κι* (which seems manifestly later than *οὐκί*) we see the same process as we saw above in *ἡ-χι ναί-χι*, where *ἡ ναί* having already an accent of their own, ousted the competing accent already existing on *-χι*. Thus *πολλά* and **κί*, when combined, produced **πολλακί*, whence *πολλάκι* (whence many an analogical formation, e. g. *πλειστάκι*, *ὀλιγάκι*, *ὀσσάκι*, *τοσσάκι*, etc.).

In *οὐ-κί*, on the other hand, there was no competing accent on the *οὐ* to oust that on *-κί*, whence the combination produced *οὐκί*.

¹Hübschmann, Arm. Stud. I, p. 12, and note 1); also Justi, Handb. d. Zendspr. (1864), s. v. *si*.

²I have written an asterisk against Old Pers. **di* 'for,' because Old Pers. does not actually shew a word **di* with the meaning 'for.' We find, indeed, in Old Persian a pronominal stem *di-* = 'this (masc.),' of which the accus. sing. *dim* and the accus. plur. *diš* appear [v. Spiegel, Die Altpers. Keilinschriften (1881), p. 225]. These Persian forms are enclitic (v. Justi, op. cit., s. v. *di*). With this Old Persian stem *di-* Justi (l. c.) and Jackson (Avesta Reader, 1893, p. 73) identify Avestic *di-*, which also is an enclitic pronoun, third person (v. Jackson, l. c.). Now it is obvious that this Avestic *di-* cannot be identified with Avestic *si si*, Skr. *hi -hi*, Gk. *χι*, from Idg. **ǵhi*, hence from these we must separate also Old Pers. *di-* (if this latter is identical with Avest. *di-*). But the Old Pers. form **di* 'for' may quite regularly be referred to **ǵhi* [v. Hübschmann, Arm. Stud. (1883), I, p. 12, note 1; Brugmann, Grundr. I, §405], hence it is possible that Old Pers. **di* 'for' from Idg. **ǵhi* fell together with the (etymologically) quite different stem which was represented in Avest. and Old Pers. by *di-* 'this,' and hence lost its own, apparently Prim. Aryan (Skr. and Avest.), meaning 'for.' Indeed, if I am right in assigning the meaning 'this' to Idg. **ǵhi* (v. supra, §8, p. 63), it is possible that Old Pers. **di*, in contrast to Skr. *hi -hi* and Avest. *si si*, never reached the development of meaning 'for,' and hence all the more easily fell together with the synonymous (but etymologically different) form, Old Pers. *di-* 'this.'

dedicate, sacrifice' from $\sqrt{g}heu-$ 'pour,' *lizum* 'I lick' (: Skr. *lēh-mi*). If this rule is correct, we can only derive Arm. *zi* from Idg. $*\hat{g}hi$ by supposing that $*\hat{g}hi$ was already in Idg. so closely attached to any preceding word which ended in a vowel that the compound thus formed came to be regarded as a word-unity,¹ and that later in some of the individual developments of Idg. the compound split up again, e. g. Arm. *zi* Avest. *zī zī* Skr. *hī*, contrasted with Avest. *yē-zī yē-zī* 'if' Skr. *nahī nahī* Gk. *ὀύχι*, where the compound form has remained. Perhaps, however, the rule, as stated by Hübschmann and Brugmann (v. supra), is too narrow.²

Besides Arm. *zi* 'for' we find also in Armenian *zi* = *ժի*, *zi*? = *ի*; Hübschmann, Arm. Stud. I, p. 12, says that if we identify Arm. *zi* 'for' with Skr. *hī* Avest. *zī* 'for' we must separate it from *zi* = *ժի*, *zi*? = *ի*; I cannot see from what other original than $*\hat{g}hi$ we can derive these latter; the original meaning of Idg. $*\hat{g}hi$ appears to be 'this' (v. supra, §8, p. 63), from which the transition to the meaning *ժի* is easy enough, although the transition to the meaning *ի*; is, I admit, not quite so clear. But, after all, it is much the same difficulty as we have in the transition

¹ In view of the fact that Skr. *hī* -*hī* Avestic *zī zī* Greek -*χι* are always (so to speak) 'postposition-particles,' this would not be a very rash assumption.

² Arm. *sard* 'adornment' I would derive from Idg. $*\hat{g}hr-tu-$, and identify (save for the suffix, on which see Brugmann, Gr. II, §108, p. 327) with Gk. *χαρ-τό-ς* 'delightful, in which one takes pleasure,' $\sqrt{g}her$, which is seen also in Skr. *hār-ya-ti* 'takes pleasure in' Gk. *χαίρω*, Umbr. *heris* 'vis' *heriest* (fut.) 'volet,' Osc. *heriad* 'velit.' Thus the relation between Arm. *sar-d* from $*\hat{g}hr-tu-$ and Gk. *χαρ-τό-ς* from $*\hat{g}hr-tó-s$ is exactly the same as that between Skr. *ṛ-tú-ṣ* and Skr. *ṛ-tá-s*. Thus Arm. *sard* means primarily 'something in which one takes a delight, has pleasure.' So too Skr. *hiranya* (for $*haranya$?), Avest. *saranya* 'gold' (Pr. Iran. $*\hat{s}hranya$) are also traceable to this $\sqrt{g}her$ - (cf. Whitney, Skr. Roots, p. 203, s. v. *har*), and originally meant 'something in which one takes pleasure.'

If the derivation of Arm. *zi* from Idg. $*\hat{g}hi$, and of Arm. *sard* from Idg. $*\hat{g}hr-tu-$ is correct, then the rule concerning the Armenian representation of initial Idg. $\hat{g}h$ as stated by Hübschmann and Brugmann is too narrow.

What, again, is the explanation of the so-called 'prefix' *z* which so often occurs in Armenian, e. g. *z-erc-ani-m* 'I free myself' (Hübschmann, Arm. Stud. I, p. 31), *z-ge-nu-m* 'I dress myself' *z-gest* 'dress' \sqrt{ves} - 'dress' (Hübschmann, op. cit., p. 30), *z-air-ana-l* 'to be in a passion' beside *air-el* 'to burn' (Hübschmann, op. cit., p. 12)? Cf. also the accusatives *z-is* 'me' *z-k'es* 'thee' *z-mex* 'us' *z-jes* 'you' (Hübschmann, op. cit., p. 70); vide on the subject Hübschmann, Arm. Stud., p. 12, where he refers to his *Kasuslehre*, p. 317.

of meaning between Gk. τ (indef.) : Gk. τ (interrog.), both of which come from the same original Idg. form.

§10. *The č of Armenian oč 'not.'*

Before concluding the present investigation, it will be well to add a short remark on the č of Arm. oč 'not,' which I would analyse o-č.¹

I will not venture to explain the difficult vocalism of o-č (of which, by the way, I can find no mention in Brugmann's Grundriss). Arm. oč has long been compared with Gk. οὐκ, and de Lagarde, Arm. Stud., p. 181, regarded their identification as "richtig oder doch in hohem grade wahrscheinlich." Hübschmann, however, is undoubtedly right in holding (Arm. Stud. I, p. 13) that "oč 'nicht' = gr. οὐκ zu setzen, ist aus lautlichen Gründen im höchsten Masse bedenklich." If (as I believe to be the correct view) Gk. οὐ represents Idg. *ou,² the o- of o-č certainly cannot be identified with Gk. οὐ, seeing that o is never the Armenian representative of Idg. *ou (for the true representation of which in Armenian, see Hübschmann in Zeitschr. d. Deutsch. Morgenl. Ges. XXXV, 1881, p. 172, and Arm. Stud. I, 1883, p. 62; Brugmann, Grundr. I, 1886, §63; Bartholomae in Bezz. Beitr. XVII, 1891, p. 99). Nor can Bugge's attempt to derive oč from Arm. *ōč from Arm. *auč from Idg. *au- (Kuhn's Zeitschr. XXXII, 1893, p. 30) be accepted; this will be manifest from the following communication, which I have received from Prof. Hübschmann himself, concerning (1) the examples which Bugge cites in support of his etymology, (2) the Armenian representation of Idg. au-: "Arm. sosk heisst 'blos, allein, leer' und hat mit skr. śúṣka-, etc., nichts zu thun. Ob arm. boč

¹ The first member of Arm. o-č, namely o-, is never (like Gk. οὐ) used independently. But it is interesting to note that the second member, namely č, is used independently, instead of the full form oč, frequently with verbs and sometimes with substantives, e. g. Arm. č-astvac 'not god,' i. e. 'idol.' Cf. also the Old Armenian proper-name Č-unak, Catholicos, successor of Nerses, 'not-having,' i. e. 'poor' (v. Hübschmann, 'Die altarm. Personennamen,' in Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth, 1893). Curiously enough, the same phenomenon is visible in Modern Greek where Old Greek οὐδέν appears as δέν, the truly negative part of the word having been dropped off, without the meaning being thereby affected. Examples of the same phenomenon occurring in other languages will be found in Ziemer, Vergl. Synt. der Idg. Comparison (1884), p. 186, and note 1.

² Vid. supra, §4, p. 51.

'Flamme' zu *πιφάυσκω* gehört ist gleichfalls nicht sicher und beweist jedenfalls für arm. *o* = ursp. *au* nichts. Es giebt *bisher* kein sicheres Beispiel für die Gleichung arm. *o* = ursp. *au*."

In discussing the *č* of *o-č* we are on firmer ground. In Armenian, which does not labialise the velars, Idg. *q* (except after a nasal or liquid) becomes regularly *k*, *k'*, but *č* from *k* before original *e*- and *i*-vowels (see Hübschmann in *Zeitschr. d. Deutsch. Morgenl. Ges.* XXXV 172 f., and *Armen. Stud.* I, pp. 66, 67; Brugmann, *Gr. I*, §455). Thus we may derive the *č* of Arm. *o-č* from Idg. **qi* (: Gk. *τι*, cf. *οὔ-τι*) or Idg. **qe* (: Gk. *τε*, cf. *οὔ-τε*). Bugge, in Kuhn's *Zeitschr.* XXXII, p. 31, comparing Arm. *ačk'* beside Gk. *δοσε* from **δοκε*, thinks that the *č* of Arm. *oč* can correspond to the *-κι* of Greek *οὐ-κί*; but he is, I think, at fault herein; for, whereas Arm. *č* cannot be the outcome of an Idg. *k̂* (v. Brugmann, *Gr. I*, §§380, 408), the *-κι* which occurs in *οὐ-κί* *πολλά-κι*, etc., and in the Greek numerical adverbs such as *τετράκι* *πεντάκι*, etc., comes from the Idg. demonstrative stem **k̂i-* (v. supra, §8, p. 63) and not from the Idg. interrogative and indefinite pronominal stem **qi-*.¹ Hence we must separate the *č* of Arm. *o-č* from Gk. *-κι*, and identify it with Gk. *τι* (from Idg. **qi*) or *τε* (from Idg. **qe*).

§II. *Classification of the forms discussed in the foregoing §§8-10.*

The forms which we have been discussing in §§8-10 (incl.) may be classed accordingly:—

I.

Idg. **k̂o-* **k̂i-*:

Lat. *-ce* in **ho-i-ce* (whence *hic*) from the Idg. demonstrative pronominal stem **k̂o-* 'this.'

Gk. *-κί* in *οὐ-κί*, nom. acc. sing. neut. of the Idg. demonstrative pronominal stem **k̂i-* 'this';² cf. Goth. *hit(-a)*, Ags. *hit*, O.Norse *hit(t)* 'this (neut.)', and Lith. *szì-s* O.C.Sl. *sz* O.Ir. *ce* 'this (masc.).'³

Gk. *-κ* in *οὐ-κ*, abridged from *-κί* in *οὐ-κί*.⁴

¹ If Greek *-κι* were from Idg. **qi-*, as is assumed by Wackernagel (in Kuhn's *Zeitschr.* XXV, p. 286 f.) and J. Schmidt (*Pluralb.*, p. 352), all the Greek dialects except Thessalian must have had *-τι* in place of it (v. Brugmann, *Gr. III*, §182, p. 49 and note 1, §409, p. 330, Engl. edit.).

² Supra, §8 (a) (1), s. v. *οὐ-κί*, p. 63, and (b) text and note, p. 64.

³ Supra, §8 (b), note, p. 64.

⁴ Supra, §8 (a) (2) ad fin., p. 64.

II.

Idg. **ǵho-* **ǵhi-*:

Lat. *ho-* in *hic* (from **ho-i-ce*) from the Idg. demonstrative pronom. stem **ǵho-* 'this.'¹

Skr. <i>hi</i> (and <i>-hi</i>) ¹	} Nom. acc. sing. neut. of the Idg. demonstr. pronom. stem * <i>ǵhi-</i> 'this' (whence in Skr. Avest. and Arm. the meaning 'for').
Avest. <i>zi</i> (and <i>zi</i>) ¹	
Arm. <i>zi</i> ²	
Gk. <i>-chi</i> in <i>οὐ-χι</i> ³	

Gk. *-χ* in *οὐ-χ*, abridged from *-chi* in *οὐ-χι*.⁴

III.

Idg. **qo-* **qi-*:

Gk. *τε* in *οὐ-τε* from the uninflected Idg. **qe* 'how' (indefinite 'somehow' and 'as also' = 'and') of the Idg. interrogative and indefinite pronominal stem **qo-*, and identical with Skr. and Avest. *ca*, Lat. *-que*.⁵

Gk. *τι* in *οὐ-τι*, nom. acc. sing. neut. of the Idg. interrog. and indef. pronom. stem **qi-*, whence come also Skr. *ná-ki-ṣ* (for **ná-ci-ṣ*) 'no one,' Lat. *quid*, etc.⁵

Arm. *չ* in *ο-չ*: either (i) from Idg. **qe* (: Gk. *τε* in *οὐ-τε*), meaning 'some-how,' so that *ο-չ* = 'no-how, in no wise.'⁵

or (ii) from Idg. **qi* (: Gk. *τι* in *οὐ-τι*) 'some-what,' so that *ο-չ* = 'not at all.'⁵

LIONEL HORTON-SMITH.

53 Queen's Gardens, Lancaster Gate, London, W.,
and St. John's College, Cambridge; England.

¹ Supra, §8 (a) (1), s. v. *οὐ-χι*, p. 62.

² Supra, §9, pp. 65, 66.

³ Supra, §8 (a) (1), s. v. *οὐ-χι*, pp. 61, 62, and (b), p. 64.

⁴ Supra, §8 (a) (2) ad fin., p. 64.

⁵ Supra, §10 ad fin., p. 68.

NOTES.

LATIN *-astro-*.

The material for the study of this suffix has been collected by Franz Seck, *Das lateinische Suffix *aster, astra, astrum**, Arch. I 390-404; cf. also Sittl, *Zum Suffix *aster**, Arch. VI 508. Additional examples are also found in H. Stadler's article, *Lateinische Pflanzennamen im Dioskorides*, Arch. X 83-115.

Previous attempts to explain the origin of this suffix have been unsatisfactory. A criticism of the earlier explanations is given by Schnorr von Carolsfeld, Arch. I 404-7. His own solution is that the suffix *-stro-*, whether coming from *-d + tro-* (Osthoff) or from substantives in *-os + tro-*, e. g. *flustrum* > **flovostrum* (Corsen), was added to nominal stems, e. g. *olea-strum, halica-strum*, and from these a suffix *-astro-* was propagated. On the other hand, Lindsay, *The Latin Language*, pp. 329 f., and Stolz, *Historische Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*, I 543 ff., prefer to follow Ascoli in seeing here the comparative suffix *-tero-*. Lindsay does not concern himself about the 'prefixed *-as-*.' Stolz's suggestion is that, in spite of the quantity of the *a*,¹ these words are to be derived from formations in *-ātus*, e. g. **peditaster* > **peditāŕt(e)ro-*, *formaster* > *formāŕt(e)ro*, etc.

The objection to all of these explanations is that they fail to consider sufficiently the lexical contents of the suffix. The suffix is of pejorative value and expresses the resemblance of the derivative to the primitive noun, and generally with a connotation of contempt—'a poor copy of.' This highly specialized meaning and the restriction of the suffix to certain congeneric groups of words suggest at once that we have before us a case of adaptation,

¹ This is one of his objections to von Carolsfeld's explanation. The difficulty, however, is not serious, as there seems to be no evidence for the quantity of the *a* except the analogy of adjectives in *estus*; cf. Marx, s. v. *oleaster*.

meaning by that term "the infusion with some grammatical or lexical value of a formal element originally either devoid of any special functional value or possessed of a value which has faded out so completely as to make this infusion possible," Bloomfield, A. J. P. XII 1; cf. also for the general treatment and other examples of this factor in language, A. J. P. XVI 409-34.

That adaptation had been at work in the case of this formation was noted in the first of the articles cited above, but no attempt was made to determine the mode in which it had operated. The purpose of the present paper is to offer a suggestion that bears upon this point.

In considering this suffix we must keep in mind that it belonged especially to popular Latin and that its use was established before the beginning of our records. Notice the manifestly secondary character of the words that occur in the archaic period: *filiaster*, *peditastellus*, *parasitaster*. Consequently a chronological arrangement of the words would give not the order of their formation, but of their emergence in literature, and accordingly we are warranted in departing from it.

Excepting the names of plants, there is no class of words formed with this suffix that does not make the impression of being a secondary formation. But in the names of plants this suffix seems to be quite at home, and has a very definite value. *Oleaster* denotes the wild olive in opposition to *olea*, the cultivated olive. The distinction is unmistakable; cf. e. g. Verg. G. II 182 and Vulg. Ep. ad Rom. 11, 17 and 24, where the two translate ἀγριέλαιος and εἰλαία; cf. also Isid. Orig. XVII 7. 61 *Oleaster dictus quod sit foliis oleae similibus sed latioribus arbor inculta atque silvestris amara atque infructuosa*. So *apiastrum* denotes the wild apium, *mentastrum* the wild menta; cf. Pliny, N. H. XX 144 *Mentastrum silvestris menta est*; cf. XIX 159; cf. also Arch. X 103 μένθαστρον = ἡδυόσμος ἄγριος, III 36 G. For *pinaster* cf. Pliny, XVI 39 *Pinaster nihil est aliud quam pinus silvestris*; cf. 80. *Lotaster* = wild lotus; *pyriaster* is glossed by *pyrus agrestis*; Pliny, XVI 205 uses *pirus silvestris*. To these should be added *salicastrum*. Pliny, XXIII 20 uses it to denote a wild vine that grows on willows, but the Italian points to the more primitive meaning wild-willow.

There is some slight evidence for a similar use with names of animals. Du Cange reports a gloss *catulaster*: *lo cane salvatico*, and Sittl's quotation, l. c., from the Etymologicum Gudianum,

Ἀλγαστριος αἰξ *ἄγριος*, looks like an imitation of the Latin under the influence, perhaps, of *ἄγριος*. But *pullastra* in Varro, if the emendation be accepted, has only diminutive, and *porcaster* in Aldhelm only contemptuous signification.

Now, other formations of this kind in Latin are clearly adaptive—the lexical value of the suffix can be plainly felt—and if this suffix served originally to express the relation between the cultivated and uncultivated varieties of the same plant, I think it may easily be understood how its meaning could be extended to denote resemblance in general with the connotation of inferiority, and how it might then develop into either a pejorative or a diminutive suffix, and sometimes fade out into a mere expression of resemblance or approximation. Thus **peditaster* is a 'mock foot-soldier,' *philosophaster* 'a mock philosopher,' *Antoniaster* 'a man that apes Antony.' So too it expresses the fictitious relationships *filiaster* 'a stepson,' *filiastra* 'a stepdaughter,' etc.; cf. the German *wilde Ehe* = concubinage.

The suffix comes back on the class from which it started, and we have *siliquastrum*, so called from its resemblance to the siliqua: *liliastrum* planta lilii similis; *ocymastrum* herba ocymo similis. *Apiaster* or *apiastra*, the name of a bird so called *quia apes comedunt*, seems at first a strange formation. But it gets its name (cf. *Antoniaster*) 'Bee's-friend' by a sort of oxymoron. Nothing, in reality, but another application of the principle of the analogy of opposites, which will account for the development of a meliorative signification as far as it occurs.

Finally the suffix was added to adjectives. It is interesting to note the closely congeneric nature of the words. They are either designations of bodily defects—*calvaster*, *adcalvaster*, *recalvaster*, *claudaster*, *mancaster*, *surdaster*—or colors that lend themselves naturally to such use—*canaster*, **gravaster*, *fulvaster* and *nigellaster*; besides these are only *crudaster*, *novellaster* and **mediaster*.

The next question is the origin of the suffix for the names of wild plants. The definiteness of its lexical value leads us to look again for the working of adaptation, and I would suggest that the suffix came from *silvestro-* before its passage into the *i*-declension, being added first to nouns like *olea*, and from these propagating the suffix *-astro-*.

In confirmation of this view it may be noticed that the literary expression corresponding to these popular formations is the use

of *silvestris*; thus, *pinaster* : *pinus silvestris*, *mentastrum* : *menta silvestris*; cf. the examples cited above. Notice also how in English *wild* has almost passed into a prefix for the expression of the same idea.

For the putting of the whole lexical value of an adjective into its suffix, I know of no good parallel; but the process does not seem to me improbable nor essentially different from the formation *execution electrocution *hydrocution*.

In conclusion I would call attention to the closely congeneric nature of the group of words to which *silvester* belongs: *campes-ter*, *equester*, *Fanester*, *illustris*, *nemestrinus*, *paluster*, *paludester*, *pedester*, *rurestris*, *semestris* (and other compounds), *telluster*, *terrester*, *vallestria*. *Lanestris* belongs to late Latin and it stands alone. By the side of this group are *agrestis* and *caelestis*, and it seems desirable to regard them, if possible, as belonging to the same formation.

Brugmann, II 184, sees in these words the comparative suffix *-tero-* under the influence of the analogy of *-es-*stems, and is followed by Lindsay, p. 330. Stolz, p. 503, adopts the same view, but considers *equester* for **equit-'tero-* and *pedester* for **pedit-'tero-* more likely starting-points for the development of the suffix. At the same time he admits, p. 420, the possibility (cf. Schweizer-Sidler, KZ. IV 309; Schulze, ib. XXIX 270) that we have in these words, as well as in *agrestis* and *caelestis*, compounds with *sta-*. This view would be supported by the restriction of the suffix in Latin: contrast the very different range of *-tero-* with nouns in Greek; cf. Otto Keller, Zur lat. Sprachgeschichte, I 150.

In neither case, however, does it seem necessary to divorce the two formations. In the former case *agrestis* might stand for **agrestris*, with dissimilation—in *terrestris* the conditions are not precisely the same on account of the double *r*, while in *caelestis* we also have a liquid in the first part of the word. On the other hand, if we consider these words as compounds of *sta-*, the difference between *-stri-* and *-sti-* may possibly suggest the Aryan forms: Avestan *rapaēštām* and *rapaēštārəm*, Sanskrit *ratheṣṭhām* and *savyeṣṭhāram*; cf. Jackson, §§249, 330; Bartholomae, Altir Dial. 82; Ar. Forsch. I 30.

ON THE ALLEGED CONFUSION OF NYMPH-NAMES.

Appendix.

In my paper on the above subject (A. J. P. XVII, pp. 30 sqq.) I referred to Virgil, Eclogues, X 62, in terms which may be productive of misconception. I said: "What inference can be drawn from the words which Virgil puts into the mouth of Gallus, Ecl. X 62 sq. 'iam neque *Hamadryades* rursus nec carmina nobis | ipsa placent; ipsae rursus concedite siluae'? Why should Gallus not have sung of tree-nymphs just as well as wood-nymphs?" The purport of this remark was to point out that in this mention of the Hamadryads there is a reference to Gallus' own poems, and that consequently the interpretation of the words involves as one of its factors the consideration of the passage thus referred to. A theme which runs through the whole of the eclogue is the inability of the nymphs of whom Gallus has sung to aid him in his day of trial. To pass over Arethusa (v. 1) the *puellae Naidēs* (9 sqq.) are reproached for their failure to help their poet. (It may be remarked in passing that the language of 9 'nemora—saltus' would probably have been twisted into another 'confusion,' but for the circumstance that Virgil, in the commentator's interest, has added the necessary reference to water in 'Aonie Aganippe,' 12.) The practice of making learned allusion to the actual expressions of brother poets is a natural habit of Latin writers. It is hardly necessary to do more than refer to the well-known passages, Ovid Am. 3. 9. 58, Pont. 5. 16. 34 (whence Grattius 23 has been emended), Statius Silu. 1. 2. 255, Mart. 14. 193. 2, and indeed Propertius 2. 34. 76, a reminiscence more or less conscious of this very passage. Further down (52 sqq.) Virgil puts into Gallus' mouth the words 'certum est in siluis inter spelaea ferarum | malle pati—interea mixtis lustrabo Maenala Nymphis | aut acres uenabor apros.' And it is argued that, because in the sequel to these lines, which I have already quoted, *Hamadryades* is used, it is legitimate to equate *Hamadryades* with *Nymphae*. It might have been thought that by this time the principle of poetic variation would have been better understood. From the variation *Hamadryades*—*Nymphae* (which latter word includes strictly all kinds of nymphs, and is of course not limited to 'wood-nymphs'), all that can be legitimately inferred is that the 'Nymphs' of v. 55 included the 'Hamadryads'; and of course this of necessity neglects any reference that there may be to actual words of Gallus. I have already

(l. c.) spoken of the impossibility of drawing any inference from the phrase of Propertius, 'facilis—Hamadryadas,' which appears to unite allusions to this passage (*Hamadryas* occurs nowhere else in Virgil) and to Eclogue 3. 9 'faciles Nymphae.' There is an allusion to this latter passage in a much later writer, Nemesianus Cyneget. 94 sq. 'tecum Naiades faciles, uiridique iuuenta | pubentes Dryades, nymphaeque unde amnibus umor | adsint, et docilis decantet Oreadas Echo.' This place has a special interest, as it distinguishes the Naiads from the Dryads and from the Hydriads ('unde amnibus umor'). An earlier writer on hunting distinguishes the Naiads and the Dryads, though he does not use the latter name. The words are, unfortunately, corrupt, but should probably be read as follows: 'adsciuerē tuo comites sub numine diuāe | centum, omnes, nemorum, umentes de fontibus omnes | Naides et Latii . . . Faunus . . . Maenaliusque puer,'¹ *et q. s.* (Grattius, 16 sqq.). Cf. Calpurn., Ecl. 2. 14 'affuerant sicco Dryades pede, Naides udo.'

A summary of our results may be appended. A *Dryad* was a nymph of the forest or woodland, as an Oread was a nymph of the mountain. The term is more general than *Hamadryad*, which means the protectress of a *particular* tree. A *Hydriad* is a water-nymph. So is a *Naiad*, but with this difference of use, that the word also denotes the protecting nymph (or Hamadryad) of a tree growing in or out of the water.

The passages of classical authors which have or might have been adduced to prove any confusion of the above uses are either corrupt: Anth. Pal. 6. 189, Culex 94, Prop. 1. 20 (excluding those where, as in Anth. P. 9. 668, the error is obvious), 12, 32, 45, Isidorus 8. 11. 97; or irrelevant. Amongst the latter we class (a) those places where *Nais* is used for a Naiad-Hamadryad: Prop. 2. 32. 37 sqq., Ov. Met. 1. 690 sq., Fast. 4. 231, Stat. Silu. 1. 3. 62, to which Nemesianus Cyn. 94 should (apparently) be added; (b) those places where poetical modes of employing language have been misunderstood: Virg. Ecl. 10. 62, Prop. 2. 34. 76, Ov. Met. 14. 623, Fast. 2. 155, Stat. Ach. 1. 294 sq., Silius Italicus 15. 769 sq.; and Ov. Met. 14. 556 'Naides aequoreae.'

J. P. POSTGATE.

¹ The MS has nomine diuine | centem omnes nemorumentes de f. The dots indicate lacunae in the MS.

νέμειν and νέμεσθαι.

Frohberger, ad Lys. XIX 37 and XXXII 4, distinguishes between *νέμειν* and *νέμεσθαι* as used to express the division of an inheritance, and lays down the rule that the active is applied to a father (or guardian) dividing a property among heirs, the middle to heirs dividing with each other. G. Huettner, in *Acta Seminarii Erlangensis* III, p. 107, asserts that this rule has its exceptions, and that the middle has the force of the active in Dem. XXXVI 8-9 and Isae. I 16. Paley and Sandys, in *Select Private Orations* II, 3d ed., p. 12, quote Donaldson, *Gr. Gr.* p. 450, to the same effect and refer to eleven passages in Demosthenes, Isaeus and Lysias for examples of "*νέμεσθαι* used in the middle voice generally (but not always) of the heirs." They probably rely only on Huettner's two passages to prove their point, as a glance at their other references will show that in them all Frohberger's rule is observed.

Before undertaking to show that it is observed also in Huettner's supposed exceptions, I will mention the two legal significations of *νέμεσθαι* (which are not to be found in Liddell and Scott) and will give references for each.

1. "To divide with another or others." *a*, followed by *πρός* c. acc. expressing the other party to the division: Lys. XVI 10; Isae. VII 5 and 25; Dem. XL 42 and 52, XLVII 34. *b*, without *πρός*: Lys. XXXII 4; Isae. I 16; Dem. XXXVI 8-9, 11, 32; XL 14; XLVII 35.

2. "To take or receive as one's portion": Lys. XIX 46; Dem. XXXVI 38; XXXIX 6; XLV 76. The passive in Dem. XXXVI 38 belongs also under this head.

Turning to the two disputed passages, we find in Isae. I 16: *οἱ τούτων φίλοι . . . ἡξίουν νείμασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἡμᾶς ἔχειν*. The usual construction of *ἡξιῶ* would require an accusative to be inserted before *νείμασθαι*, if the two verbs are not to be understood as referring to the same subject. But from Thuc. II 89, 1, Antiph. VI 46 we see that the subject-accusative is not absolutely required after *ἡξιῶ*, and conclude that it may be dropped where there is no danger of any confusion arising in the hearer's mind. Isaeus, in the passage before us, did not fear to be misunderstood, first, because *τούτων* and *ἡμᾶς*, denoting the two parties to the suit, readily suggested a subject for the infinitive, and, secondly, because no person is ever said either *νέμειν* or *νέμεσθαι* who has

not some legal right upon the property in question. The whole tenor of the speech, and especially paragraphs 2, 28, 51, show that the φίλοι of 16 were only friendly mediators, urging a division but claiming no right to make one. The writer could therefore safely give to ἡξίουν the construction of ἐκέλευον; he was probably led to do so by the fact that the only possible subject for νείμασθαι was an ἡμᾶς which should include both contestants, and he was intending to use ἡμᾶς emphatically of one side alone with the second infinitive, ἔχειν.

In Dem. XXXVI 8-9 we read: λογιζόμενοι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἐπίτροποι, ὅτι, εἰ δεήσει κατὰ τὰς διαθήκας, ὅσ' ἂν οὗτος ἐκ κοινῶν τῶν χρημάτων ἀναλώσῃ, τούτοις ἐξελύοντας ἀντιμοιρεῖ τὰ λοιπὰ νέμειν, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν ἔσται περιόν, νείμασθαι τὰ ὄνθ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παιδὸς ἔγνωσαν. καὶ νέμονται τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν. . . .

Here the middle is certainly used of the guardians, but its meaning and the nature of their action are defined by the words ὑπὲρ τοῦ παιδός. As the younger son, Pasicles, was not of age, the operation denoted by the active verb νέμειν—a complete transference of property from guardians to heirs—could not take place. The division here spoken of was indeed made between the elder and younger sons; but as the latter was legally incapable of acting for himself, he was represented by his guardians, who, in their capacity of trustees, could properly be said “to receive a portion of the inheritance on behalf of the child” (νέμεσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ παιδός). A similar definition of the action of the middle voice by ὑπὲρ appears in Dem. XXVII 7-8, where the orator says of his own guardians, εἰς γὰρ τὴν συμμορίαν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ συνετάξαντο . . . συνετιμήσανθ' ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.

WM. HAMILTON KIRK.

REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Harper's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities, edited by HARRY THURSTON PECK, M. A., Ph. D. Illustrated. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1896. Pp. xv + 1701.

The genesis of most dictionaries and books of reference is an interesting subject for investigation, and the portly and comely volume before us is no exception to the rule.

The preface leads one to suppose that the larger part of the biographical and geographical material is based upon Anthon's revision of Smith's *Classical Dictionary*, 1852. It would have been more accurate to refer specifically to Smith's *Smaller Classical Dictionary* (London, 1852) as the source of a very large number of the minor articles which appear in this work. An examination, for instance, of pages 78, 80, 82 of Harper will show the importance of this little volume in the compilation of the new work. Several minor errors would have been avoided if an independent abridgment of the Anthon revision had been made oftener.

The preface also states that the archaeological portion of the dictionary is based in part, but only in part, upon Anthon's revision of Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, 1846. This statement is quite correct, but the dependence of the new work upon that dictionary is slight, and no serious injustice would have been done if special attention had not been called to it in the preface. Nor will any one criticise the editor for placing his main reliance in archaeology upon more recent works.

Certainly neither of the volumes revised by Anthon so long ago was essential to the production of Harper's Dictionary. But this assertion cannot be made of the third edition of Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, London, 1890-91; nor of Seyffert's *Dictionary of Classical Antiquities*, &c., revised and edited, with additions, by Nettleship and Sandys, London, 1891. In the absence of either of these works there might have been a Harper's Dictionary, but it would not have been this dictionary.

A few extracts are found in this work from the second edition of Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities* (1848), but the drafts upon the third edition have been frequent and copious. To illustrate the important place which it holds in the production of the Harper, it may be stated that about one hundred articles appear to have been based upon it under the letters A and B, of which a large majority are substantially in the words of the original. In a few cases the articles in the third edition of Smith are identical with those in the second edition. In such cases it may be fair not to emphasize the dependence of Harper upon the last edition.

The topics are, however, treated in Smith on too liberal a scale for the scheme of this work, and therefore the original articles have been cut down, sometimes by condensation, more often by omissions. That is, most of the articles from this source are, in the main, in the original words, but with a less complete treatment of details. The editor has usually made his selections and omissions with judgment, and in such a way as to bring over the gist of the subject, though necessarily the abbreviated matter sometimes makes the impression of incompleteness in comparison with the original (e. g. *Areopagus*). This, however, could not be avoided if the whole field of ancient knowledge was to be covered within the compass of a single volume.

Of the articles drawn from Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, third edition, may be cited a few titles as examples of the prominent place which this work holds in the compilation of Harper's Dictionary: *Abacus*, *Achaean League*, *Acta*, *Aes*, *Agrariae Leges*, *Ambarvalia*, *Anulus*, *Arcus* (arch), *Areopagus*, *Athletae*, *Aurum*, *Balneae*, *Bona*, *Breviarium Alaricianum*.

The scale and method of the Harper have often necessitated slight changes in order to unite properly passages not originally connected. The editor has also exercised an independent judgment in modifying or reversing statements (cf. *Antefixa*), in making many minor additions, and in numerous verbal changes, sometimes obviously on grounds of taste, often without any obvious reason. Such changes are especially common in the opening lines of the articles.

Seyffert's *Dictionary* has for its field not only Antiquities, but also Mythology, Religion, Literature, Art, and the Biography of authors, artists and philosophers. Hence from its wider field and from the fact that the scale of treatment of topics was satisfactory, the obligation to this volume in respect to the number of articles adopted from it is even greater than to Smith's Dictionary. For example, more than eighty articles under the letter A are to be credited to this source. In most cases these articles are transferred bodily, though with occasional verbal changes. Seyffert prints Greek words in Roman letters, while Harper substitutes the Greek form. In Seyffert the historical present tense is somewhat overworked, especially in mythological articles, but the editor of Harper prefers a past tense. Seyffert rarely gives any bibliography, but this is often supplied in Harper, and sometimes illustrative references to English literature are added.

Among the more important articles due to Seyffert under the letter A are the following: *Acropolis*, *Aediles*, *Anaxagoras*, *Aphrodite*, *Apollo*, *Architectura*, *Archon*, *Ares*, *Argonautae*, *Aristophanes*, *Arma*, *Astronomia*.

The obligation to Smith and Seyffert is, however, by no means limited to the earlier letters of the alphabet, as a chance examination of almost any page will show. For example, from Smith are taken also the articles *Caelatura* (seven columns, slightly reduced by omissions), *Domus* (thirty-five pages reduced to sixteen and a half), *Theatrum* (the letter-press somewhat reduced, but some excellent cuts added), *Vas* (twenty-five columns reduced to five by omissions, leaving the impression of rather scanty

treatment for so important a topic in comparison with the original). From Seyffert have also been taken the following titles, as well as others here and there : *Comoedia*, *Education* (the first four columns), *Eisphora*, *Fulcra*, *Heracles*, *Musivum Opus*, *Ostracismus*, *Philosophia*, *Pictura*, *Statuaria Ars*, *Tragoedia*.

Occasionally articles have a composite origin. For example, *Augur*, four columns, of which the first half-column and the final bibliography are from Smith, the intervening matter from Seyffert; *Aquae Ductus*, three and a half columns, mainly from Smith (but reduced from twenty columns) with a half-column from Seyffert inserted; *Musica*, six columns, mainly from Seyffert, but with two-thirds of a column on Notation drawn from Smith; *Servus*, eight columns, of which six from Seyffert and a half-column from Smith; *Solon*, mainly from Smith's *Classical Dictionary*, but with additions from Seyffert, including references to Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*; *Boeotarches*, a quarter-column from the new and a column and a half from the old edition (1848) of Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*. The effort to bring the articles up to date, as shown above, under *Solon*, is also shown by additions to the article *Themistocles* (from Smith's *Classical Dictionary*). It would have been well to make similar additions to the article *Archon*.

The indebtedness to Seyffert is not limited to articles which the English editors have simply translated from the original *Lexikon der klassischen Alterthumskunde*, but extends also to original contributions or additions made by them, as in the articles *Fulcra*, *Musivum Opus*, *Philo*, and *Pictura*. The preface expresses in complimentary terms a regret that similar additions were not made by the English editors to all the articles.

At this point justice to the editor demands the insertion of a paragraph from the preface: "In drawing upon these and all his other sources, the Editor has allowed himself the very greatest freedom. Whatever he has taken he has used in the way best adapted to secure the end he had in view. When material was, in its original form, precisely suited to his purpose, he incorporated it without a change. When change for any reason was desirable, he enlarged, condensed, modified, transposed, or paraphrased according to his conception of what was most needed in the given case; and as the greater part of his work was compilation rather than original exposition, he wishes here to express his very great indebtedness to the many books that have been drawn upon. No acknowledgment can be too full or too comprehensive; and if the completed work be found of service to the student of the classics, this result must be very largely due to the original sources whence so great a portion of the Dictionary is derived."

This quotation accurately describes the method employed. The statement is frank and comprehensive. There is no concealment. But it remains a fact that very few people who consult a work of reference stop to read the preface to it. And as quotation marks are not used, except as they are brought over from the original article, and as even the special contributions secured from American or foreign scholars are not signed, there is no finger-post of any kind in the body of the work to dis-

tinguish one class of material from another, or to prevent the reader from getting a wholly wrong idea of the character of the book. Most students will be misled in this respect in spite of the candid avowal of the preface.

But even if every one were to read the preface in full and understand thoroughly the composite sources of the work, the objections to the methods adopted in making it cannot be regarded as satisfactorily met. Both Smith's Dictionary and Seyffert's Dictionary are recent, both in English, both prepared at a large expense of time, labor and money, and both largely dependent upon the sales in the American market for their pecuniary return. It may very well happen that such return will be lessened by the new dictionary, and the question naturally arises whether there was any arrangement with the English publishers by which this use of their material was authorized. There is no hint of such authorization in the preface. If it was obtained, the fact should have been stated in the interest of both publishers and editor. In the absence of such a statement no one can justly protest if the reader assumes that the borrowed matter was taken without authority, and if public opinion fails to justify this method of compilation.

It may be justly urged that there is a great mass of literary material which is, in substance at least, open to the free use of all men without the risk of criticism, and that all contributions to human knowledge made by scholars and scientists soon become merged in the common stock. Perhaps the matter in the old editions of Smith's dictionaries may be considered as belonging to that class. But will any one claim that six years are enough for the completion of this communistic process? It may, however, be contended that these works were not copyrighted in this country, and so were legally open to republication here in whole or in part. And that is true. Whether that fact changes the essential character of the transaction is an interesting question in literary ethics upon which scholars are likely to have strong opinions one way or the other. Certainly there are people who are surprised to learn that the attractive literary wares of foreign scholars need the protection of the law to prevent their being offered for sale at a competing establishment in our own country.

It is not the purpose of this article to present any exhaustive examination and criticism of Harper's Dictionary. It is not possible within these limits to review half a dozen important works of reference, but that is what an adequate review of this volume would mean. But a few points of some interest may be noted.

In transferring matter from other works it is inevitable that occasionally the errors and questionable statements of the original article will be included as well as its excellences. Only the most searching and coöperative editorial scrutiny could avoid this. And it will not be surprising if it prove that this volume is not wholly exempt from this kind of criticism.

In the article *Metallum* contributed by Professor Percy Gardner to Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities the following passage occurs (not repeated, however, in Harper): "In one passage of the Odyssey (IX 391)

knowledge is shown of the process of hardening iron by repeated plunging when hot in water." In the article *Aes* from the same competent hand, transferred with slight verbal changes from Smith to Harper, may also be found the following passage: "The abundance of copper sufficiently accounts for its general use among the ancients. We have a remarkable result of this fact in the use of *χαλκεύς* and *χαλκεύειν* where working in iron is meant (Hom., Od. IX 391; Aristot., Poët. 25)."

These two passages are consistent with each other and with the generally accepted view that *χαλκεύς* was used not merely in its natural sense of a coppersmith, but also as a metal-worker in general (*e. g.* Od. III 432, where it must mean a goldsmith, whatever its meaning may be at IX 391). But in the next column of the same article (*Aes*) we find that the ancients "seem to have understood the art of hardening it [copper] by dipping it in water and exposure to air. There is a passage even in Homer which is supposed to allude to this process (Od. IX 391)."

Superficially at least there seems to be an inconsistency between this passage and that which precedes. If *χαλκεύς* is used in Od. IX 391, "where working in iron is meant," can it also be used in the same passage to mean a coppersmith tempering copper tools by a similar process? Certainly more clearness of statement was needed. The average student who consults this article will fail to understand how the same passage may refer to the working of both iron and copper, and it would have been well if the writer had cited authorities. Still further, it would have been well if the American editor had found space for the new evidence which has converted a supposition in Smith into a certainty in Harper. For while Smith cautiously states that the ancients "seem to have understood" the art of hardening copper, Harper says positively that "the ancients also understood" the art.

The statement (from Smith's *Smaller Classical Dictionary*) in the article upon Aristides that he was recalled from exile *after* the battle of Salamis, rather than before it, is, to say the least, open to question.

The statement (page 126), taken from the same source, that Aristarchus "divided the Iliad and Odyssey into twenty-four books each," is inconsistent with the more careful statement of p. 837 that Zenodotus "is thought to have been the first to divide" them thus.

The statement on page 13, taken from Seyffert, that the Acropolis is "about 200 feet in height" is seriously at variance with the statement of page 149 that the hill is "156 meters high." In neither case is it stated whether the reckoning is from the sea-level or the city below. The discrepancy will confuse most students.

Mithridates remains son-in-law of Tigranes, instead of father-in-law (p. 1584), as in Smith's *Smaller Classical Dictionary* from which the article is taken. (The same error occurs in the Anthon-Smith and even in the Marindin-Smith of 1894.)

Under the article *Ostracismus* (from Seyffert) it is stated that this measure "was introduced at Athens in B. C. 509." (Under *Clisthenes*, the date is B. C. 508.) It would have been more exact to say that though

ostracism was legalized at Athens among the measures of Cleisthenes, it was first applied twenty years later (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 22).

The plan of Salamis on a fairly generous scale was hardly demanded to illustrate a five-line article in which there is a mere mention of the battle of Salamis without any details. The map adopted, however, silently commits the editor to the traditional view of the position of the hostile fleets within the narrow confines of the strait. This view has been hardly tenable since the publication of Professor Goodwin's paper in 1885 (Vol. I, *Papers of the American School at Athens*).

The value of the Attic talent is almost as uncertain as that of the American silver dollar. Under *Eisphora* it is just \$1080; under *Liturgia* just \$1180; under *Numismatics* "about \$1000"; under *Talentum* "about \$1180." Each of these articles is borrowed from Seyffert, in which the value of the talent is uniformly given as £200, or "about £200."

Under *Domus* (p. 537, *b*) may be found the following statement: "In the palace of Odysseus the three hundred suitors of Penelope feasted in" the μέγανον. This sentence is taken, with the rest of the article, from Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*. But the Homeric account (*Od.* XVI 247 seqq.) represents the number of the suitors as one hundred and eight with ten retainers. That would seem to be enough.

No such book is free from misprints and minor defects. A few may be noted: *Artios* for *Athos*, p. 16, l. 1; *Ephesian History of Xenophon* for *Ephesian History of Xenophon*, p. 101, *b*; the Achelous, instead of the Alpheius, called the largest river of the Peloponnesus, p. 109, *b*; *Cleodacus* for *Cleodaeus*, p. 127, *a*; ἀρύτανα for ἀρύτανα, p. 186, *b*; *praesumium* (twice) for *praefurnium*, p. 192, *b*, top; *Wagen* for *Wägen*, p. 200, *a*; (lv. 30) for (lib. v. 30), p. 219, *b*, bot.; *Pergamun* for *Pergamum*, p. 1065, *b*; *Mount Vesula* for *Vesulus*, p. 1154, *a*; the omission of Argolis from the list of districts in the Peloponnesus, p. 1195, *a*; *or* for *of*, p. 1223, *b*, l. 14; [B. C.] 296 for 196, p. 1430, *a*, l. 4; ῥόεια for ῥόεια, p. 1560, *a*; confusion due to misplaced commas in the article *Eisphora*. The revised spelling *Munichia* is found under *Athenae*, elsewhere *Munychia*. Under *Artemis* is found the cross-reference *Elethya*. The patient seeker will finally find it under *Ilithya* (to which one article is devoted in the body of the book and another in the Appendix). Under *Barathron* there is a very plausible cross-reference to *Caedes*, a title not to be found. Perhaps *Ceadas* was intended. The error by which the Laocoon (instead of Dirce) group is attributed to Apollonius of Tralles had already been corrected in the list of corrigenda in Seyffert, but it is reproduced in Harper (p. 101).

The illustrations in Harper are abundant and of a much higher average quality than those found in Smith or Seyffert. In many cases articles borrowed from those sources are supplied with additional as well as better cuts. Poor illustrations are exceptional, but one marked instance is the cut of the Vatican Demosthenes. The cut of Tiryns is not called for at page 1068, especially as it is duplicated in its proper place, page 1587. A few of the cuts seem to be mere embellishments of the book rather than illustrations of the subjects. Such are some of the cuts taken from modern paintings.

The special contributions to this dictionary, according to the list in the preface, number somewhat over fifty (counting alphabetical *Abbreviations* as one article). They cover less than one hundred and fifty pages of the total seventeen hundred. The special contributions of the editor are additional to this amount, but no list of them is given, and there is no distinction in the printing between them and other matter, but his influence may be traced in many articles known to be mainly borrowed, and often the changes and additions are distinct improvements. Several of the special contributions are from the highest authority in their special fields and are models of what such articles should be. In one or two cases the writer seems to have allowed himself, or to have been allowed, inadequate space for the complete presentation of an important topic.

The scope of Harper's Dictionary is very comprehensive. It aims to include under a single alphabet the subjects of Archaeology, Art, Biography (including notices of classical scholars and philologists of the recent centuries), Geography, History, Language, Literature, Mythology, etc. It is thus a cyclopaedia rather than a dictionary in its scope, and, supplying, as it will, the place of several books of reference, it will prove a great convenience to any one seeking information in an accessible and compact form. The student will find in it a wide and interesting range of information, attractively presented, and it will not occur to him to be fastidious or even inquisitive concerning the sources of that information. Thus the book will doubtless, as the editor hopes, "be found at least to have done something to promote the comprehensive, intelligent, and sympathetic study of classical antiquity" in this country.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

O. M. FERNALD.

L'Inno Omerico a Demetra. Con apparato critico scelto e un' introduzione.

Di VITTORIO PUNTONI. Livorno, Raffaello Giusti, 1896. 8vo, viii, 165 pp.

It is unfortunate that the work of which the Homeric Hymns at present stand most in need is also that which is most difficult to perform. There is still opportunity for something in the way of illustration and interpretation, though perhaps not very much. Dissection is always possible; here every man can be a law unto himself without gainsaying, and establish his originality at a comparatively small expense. The real struggle comes in the restoration of the text, where leader after leader has fallen without catching even a glimpse of the Canaan of correctness. Perhaps, indeed, we have come to a standstill until such time as we may be able to enrich ourselves here also from the spoils of Egyptian tombs.

The latest editor has chosen the easier way. He has not neglected the text, though he has added no improvement of his own, scarcely even a conjecture except such as result from and help to support his theories. Illustration and interpretation he has not attempted, except incidentally. By far the larger portion of his book consists of the Introduction of 124 pages, in which his argument concerning the origin of our present text of the Hymn to Demeter is set forth carefully and at length, though the author admits that he has left

much to be done in the way of a minute criticism of each separate verse of the hymn.

Signor Puntoni believes in his own theory, and has presented it clearly and emphatically. This theory is briefly stated at pp. 2-3 as follows: The traditional text of the Moscow MS results from the enlargement of a more ancient hymn, A, by the insertion of a considerable number of fragments of two others, B and C, introduced and adapted more or less successfully by two revisers. The argument of A was the rape of Persephone and the consequent *μῆνις* of Demeter; the residence of Demeter in Eleusis was not included. B resembled the hymn attributed to Pamphos (Paus. 8. 37. 9; 9. 31. 9; 1. 39. 1; 1. 38. 3); its principal content was the *πένθος*, not the *μῆνις*, of Demeter, her mournful wanderings over the earth, and her sojourn in the house of Celeus; the foundation of her temple at Eleusis, and the establishment of the mysteries. C combined the motives of A and B in a version probably not widely different from that followed in the lost Orphic *Κόρης Ἀρπαγή*.

Of these three hymns A was the oldest, C the youngest; and the difference in age is marked by an increasing use of non-Homeric words and forms. Puntoni has catalogued these at pp. 112-15, and finds in the fragments he assigns to each hymn the following ratios: in A, 22 non-Homeric words and forms in 100 verses; in B, 32; in C, 42 (fractions omitted). In the 55 transitional lines which he attributes to the revisers he finds a sufficiently high proportion of 40 such words and forms to 100 verses.

At pp. 111-12 Puntoni gives a list of the fragments attributed to each of his three hymns, which will enable any one who cares to examine his theory to take a rapid survey of it, and therefore may be repeated:

A (the original nucleus) = 1-4 + 8-17 + 19-20 + 38-46*** + 62(?) - 81 + 87-90 + 305-335 + 337-351 + 370-394 + 404-413 + 433*** + 441-450 + 459-476 + 483-484 + 486-489. Total, 165 verses.

Fragments of B: 5-7, 22-23 + 30-37, 357 + 359-369, 82-86, 92-188 (to *πρὸς*) + 212-301, and probably 478-482 and 490-491 + (?)494. Total, 225 verses.

Fragments of C: 24-25 + 27-29, 47-54 + (?)58, 191-199 + 202-211, 395-399 + 401-403 + 434-440. Total, 48 verses.

Principal amplifications: 352-356, 414-432, 451-458.

The reasons for the assignment of each of these passages to A, B, C, or to the contaminator himself, are fully and clearly stated, and in most cases rest upon inconsistencies or incoherences of more or less weight. Occasionally the criticisms are captious and unreal, as at pp. 77-8, where it is said that, since Demeter had gone into the temple to stay (*ἐνθα καθεζομένη . . . μίμνε* 303 f.), the statement that Iris found her *in the temple* (319) is out of place (!). It is but fair to say that this is the worst instance of a perverted microscopic criticism in the entire introduction.

A detailed examination of the arguments here advanced is, in the space of a review, obviously impossible. As it is not customary for any two investigators to agree in matters of this kind, it would be necessary either to refute Puntoni's fundamental doctrine of contamination and interpolation, or else to propose a wholly new analysis. It is a matter of curiosity, if scarcely of critical value, to remember how Gottfried Hermann took up Creuzer's theory of five-line stanzas in the Hymn to the Pythian Apollo, but made an entirely new set,

which doubtless pleased him better (Jahrb. 53. 355-73). That sort of thing can be done indefinitely. On an *a priori* consideration of the matter, it seems not at all improbable that a hymn which was used for ritualistic purposes perhaps for centuries should have undergone extensive alterations and enlargements. Nor is it at all impossible that an interpolator should have chosen the method of contamination. There are real difficulties and incoherences in the text of the Hymn to Demeter, as we now have it, such as ἀγγελέουσα 53, the uncertain and shifting rôles of Hecate and Helios as informer, etc. Some of these may be accounted for by the fact that we have the hymn only in a single manuscript, which Cobet regarded as one of the worst known, though it has latterly risen in esteem. Others cannot be so explained. But the theory that the hymn can be analyzed into passages definitely referable to a number of different pre-existing poems will probably be received with skepticism. At pp. 71-2 Puntoni himself admits the possibility that an original poet might have felt himself bound to introduce and harmonize varying versions of the myth.

In his critical notes to the text Puntoni has in one respect rendered a valuable service to the future editor of the Hymns, if not to the general scholar. Though on his title-page he has cautiously promised only an "apparato critico scelto," he has in reality recorded nearly all conjectures and hypotheses advanced concerning the hymn from Ruhnken's day down. Anything so complete would be hard to find elsewhere, and everything is noted with admirable conciseness and lucidity. Frequent protests have been uttered in these days against the perpetuation of absurd or improbable conjectures; but, after all, every new investigator is obliged at least to read what his predecessors have written, and in the 41 pages of Puntoni's text and commentary he will find nearly everything, and save himself a deal of note-taking. Puntoni, however, is ignorant of Brunck, Peppmüller, and some of the recent English and Irish contributions inspired by the Goodwin-Allen edition.

—πολλοὶ γὰρ ὁδὸν πρήσσουσιν ὁδοῖται,
τῶν οἱ μὲν κακὰ πολλὰ μεμαότες, οἱ δὲ μάλ' ἐσθλά,
φοιτῶσιν· χαλεπὸν δὲ δαήμεναί ἐστιν ἕκαστον.

In the last-mentioned monumental edition, which might well have been somewhat less monumental in size and price, we have the latest results of a conservative textual criticism. Puntoni has due reverence for this work, and except for a less liberal punctuation, and the absence of paragraphing, differs from it in not many important passages. The principal ones are as follows:

10. The editor keeps, with Gemoll, the MS *σέβας τότε*.
46. The MS *οὐτ' οἰωνῶν τις τῇ* is retained.
87. Puntoni prints *†μεταναίεται*, but believes that *μεταναιετάειν* was the reading of A, 82-6 belonging to B. Goodwin reads, after Voss, *μεταναιετάει*. Valckenaer proposed *μέτα ναιετάειν*, and the presence of 82-6 does not necessarily exclude the infinitive.
115. *πῖλνῃ* Hermann, Puntoni; *πῖλνᾷ* M; *πῖλνασαι* Voss, Goodwin. *πῖλνασαι*, which has also Cobet's authority, is preferable.
118. In the confusion regarding the daughters of Celeus, Puntoni keeps the MS *ἐφ'αθ'*.

127. Puntoni does not, like Hermann, Goodwin, and others, see a lacuna after this verse, nor does it appear especially necessary. Hermann's other suggestion, *δειπνον δ' ἡρτύνοντο*, or Voss's *δ' ἐντύνοντο*, restores the connection, and an intermediate action does not seem called for. Puntoni, however, follows M.

137-8. Puntoni keeps the MS *ἐμὲ δ' αὐτ' οἰκτεῖρατε . . . τέων πρὸς δώμαθ' ἰκωμαι*, which is of course impossible. But what is to be done with it?

211. *δσίης ἐνεκεν* is retained, and a lacuna marked after the verse. Voss's *ἐπέβη*, adopted by Goodwin, is not convincing.

227. *θρέψω· κοῦ μιν*, the reading of M, is given. Hermann's *θρέψαι* or Goodwin's *θρέψουσ'* would be better. It is needless to say that Puntoni has done nothing for 228-9.

236. Puntoni does not mark a lacuna.

269. Puntoni gives *ἀθανάτοις θνητοῖσί τ' ὄνειαρ καὶ χάρμα τέτυκται*. Goodwin rightly places a mark of desperation at *ὄνειαρ*. The animated controversy in recent numbers of the *Classical Review* has left matters where they stood. It is not clear how Puntoni reads *ὄνειαρ*.

328. *τιμάς θ' ἄς κεν ἔλοιτο μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἐλέσθαι*. Puntoni fails to observe in his critical note that the reading of M is *ἄς κ' ἐθέλοιτο*. *κεν ἔλοιτο* is Hermann's.

344-5. The reading of M, *ἡδ' ἐπ' ἀτλήτων | ἔργοις θεῶν μακάρων μητίσεται βουλῇ*, is repeated with two daggers, as by Goodwin. I should almost venture to introduce Bücheler's *ἐπ' ἀτλήτοις | ἔργοις <οῖα> θεῶν μακάρων μητίσεται βουλῇ* into the text. It gives exactly the sense which we look for, with less violent alterations than any other conjectures of satisfactory meaning. The purport of the passage is clear: Persephone was suffering (1) from longing for her mother, (2) at the intolerable treatment inflicted upon her by the will of the gods. V. 345 lacks either two or three syllables, and they may be supplied either by the insertion of a word, or by the substitution of a longer word for a shorter. The former method commends itself. Furthermore, *ἔργοις θεῶν* suggests that the two syllables have been lost here. A relative is necessary to give the meaning expressed above; and *οῖα* answers the purpose not only metrically, but admirably in sense. The other changes are not difficult.

364. Puntoni finds the MS *ἐνθάδ' ἰούσα* appropriate to the position he gives to vv. 359-69 in B.

428. *ὥσπερ κρόκον* is kept. Goodwin adopts the *ὑπείροχον* of Voss.

490-95. Puntoni reads the sing. throughout, though, as these verses are in his view patchwork, it is not a matter of great importance.

The editor has done well in making the numbering of his lines agree with the actual number of verses. There was no reason why the Goodwin-Allen edition should follow the erroneous numbering of the manuscript.

Puntoni justly says that Goodwin's supplement of the lacuna in vv. 387-99 is the best that has been offered, though it does not entirely square with his theories. Puntoni himself is very shy of attempting Greek composition. What he can do in that line is shown by his attempt on p. 77: *Εὐμόλπω τ' ἀρ' ἀμύμονι καὶ Κελεῶ Δολίχῳ τε (!)*. This lack of feeling for the caesura has allowed him to print the reading of M in v. 203: *πολλὰ παρασκώπτουσα τρέψατο πότνια ἀγνήν*, where other editors rightly change, with Voss, to *παρασκώπτουσ' ἐτρέψατο*.

Whatever the value of his results, the editor has worked at his material faithfully and conscientiously. His scrupulousness has extended even to the proof-reading, affording a striking contrast to the slovenliness of Gemoll, whose otherwise valuable edition is as full of misprints as a country newspaper. Few typographical errors have been noticed in Puntoni: *δφρα* appears in the text, v. 106, as *ωφρα*. A wrong citation, copied from Hermann without correction on p. 54, might arouse suspicion; but this suspicion is not elsewhere confirmed.

CHARLES J. GOODWIN.

Handbooks on the History of Religions. Edited by MORRIS JASTROW, JR.
Vol. I. The Religions of India, by EDWARD WASHBURN HOPKINS.
Boston, Ginn & Co., 1895.

In a prefatory note to this first volume, Professor Jastrow outlines the plan of the series of *Handbooks* in which he desires to present to students of the history of religions the results of the scholarly activity of recent years in the several departments concerned. Each volume is to include an account of the sources and the method of study, and a chapter on the land and people, "presenting those ethnographical and geographical considerations, together with a brief historical sketch of the people in question, so essential to an understanding of intellectual and religious life everywhere." The main portion of the work is to present in greater detail a description of the beliefs—the pantheon, the relation to the gods, views of life and death—the official rites and popular customs, the religious literature and architecture, followed by a general estimate of the religion, its history and the relation it bears to others. In each instance a full bibliography, an index and the necessary maps and illustrations will be provided.

It is much to be regretted that Professor Hopkins has not allowed himself the space necessary for the generous treatment suggested by the editor. The length of time through which we can trace the course of religious ideas and practices in India and the manifold character of the native developments give a special interest and importance to the study of the Indian religions, the consideration of which might well claim in this series more than a single volume. Within these narrow limits, Barth, with whose admirable sketch the present work challenges comparison, has succeeded only by careful abstinence from the discussion of all matters not of the first importance and by rigorous exclusion of illustrative citations from his text. Professor Hopkins, however, writing for "students ignorant of Sanskrit who yet desire independently to examine and to make their own the very words of the Hindu sages," desires not merely to summarize but "to open up the religions of India from within and in orderly succession to explain them as they display themselves."

The order of treatment, accordingly, follows what the author conceives to have been the order of development. The difficulty of the undertaking is apparent. "For none of the native religious works has one a certain date. Nor is there for any one of the earlier compositions the certainty that it belongs, as a whole, to any one time. The Rig Veda was composed by successive generations; the Atharvan represents different ages; each Brāhmaṇa

appears to belong in part to one era, in part to another; the earliest Sūtras have been interpolated; the earliest metrical code is a composite; the great epic is the work of centuries; and not only do the Upanishads and Purāṇas represent collectively many different periods, but exactly to which period each individually is to be assigned remains always doubtful. Only in the case of the Buddhistic writings is there a satisfactorily approximate terminus a quo, and even here approximate means merely within the limit of centuries."

First with regard to the earlier documents. To what conditions must we assign the composition of the hymns of the Rig-Veda? Are they the work of priests, and were they composed for sacrificial purposes? Or were they made "independently of any ritual, as their own excuse for being"? Professor Hopkins warns us that "the Rig Veda is not a homogeneous whole. It is a work which successive generations have produced, and in which are represented different views of local or sectarian origin; while the hymns from a literary point of view are of varying value. The latter is a fact which has been ignored frequently, but it is more important than any other." "A large number of hymns are formal, conventional and mechanical in expression," and "it may be argued with plausibility that these were composed to serve the purpose of an established cult";¹ but in others is found "poetry, not great poetry perhaps, but certainly not ground out to order, as some of the hymns appear to have been." Mechanical hymns, then, are late. "It must not be forgotten that the ritual, as it is known in the Brāhmanas, without the slightest doubt, from the point of view of language, social conditions and theology, represents an age that is very different to that illustrated by the mass of the hymns. Such hymns, therefore, and only such as can be proved to have a ritualistic setting, can be referred to a ritualistic age. There is no convincing reason why one should not take the fully justified view that some of the hymns represent a freer and more natural (less priest-bound) age, as they represent a spirit freer and less mechanical than that of other hymns." Elsewhere, however, the existence of priestly families and of a litany prepared for the warrior class by priests is recognized in the earliest period. And in describing the several gods of the Rig-Veda the author refuses to adopt the method suggested by the distinctions to which he has attached such importance. "After what has been said in the introductory chapter concerning the necessity of distinguishing between good and bad poetry, it may be regarded as incumbent upon us to seek to make such a division of the hymns as shall illustrate our words. But we shall not attempt to do this here, because the distinction between late mechanical and poetic hymns is either very evident, and it would be superfluous to burden the pages with the trash contained in the former, or the distinction is one liable to reversion at the hands of those whose judgment differs from ours, for there are, of course, some hymns that to one may seem poetical and to another artificial. Moreover, we admit that hymns of true feeling may be composed late as well as early, while as to beauty of style the chances

¹ Again we are told "Indra, most honored with Soma, and Agni, most closely connected with the execution of sacrifice, not only receive the most hymns, but these hymns are, for the most part, palpably made for ritualistic purposes . . . In every family book, besides this baksheesh verse, occur the older purer hymns that have been retained after *the worship for which they were composed* had become changed into a trite making of phrases." Is a contrast intended here also between worship and ritual?

are that the best literary production will be found among the latest rather than among the earliest hymns. It would indeed be admissible, if one had any certainty in regard to the age of the different parts of the Rig Veda, simply to divide the hymns into early, middle and late, as they are sometimes divided in philological works, but here one rests on the weakest of all supports for historical judgment, a linguistic and metrical basis, when one is ignorant alike of what may have been accomplished by imitation, and of the work of those later priests who remade the poems of their ancestors."

Throughout the discussion it is assumed that the linguistic differences between mantra and brāhmaṇa are wholly due to difference of time and not to the varying usage of literary tradition. In the Brāhmaṇas, it is remarked, "religion has apparently become a form, in some regards it is a farce"; "the whole moral atmosphere is now surcharged with hocus-pocus, mysticism, religiosity, instead of the cheerful, real religion, which, however formal, is the soul of the Rik"; and this is "the only new literature which centuries have to show." Yet in the same chapter there is a passing recognition of the limitations of liturgical works. Again in the exposition of the law-books, documents of a period subsequent to the pantheism of the Upanishads (itself later than Brahmanic formalism), we are told that "there is a reversion to Vedic belief; or rather not a reversion, but here one sees again, through the froth of rites and the murk of philosophy, the understream of faith that still flows from the old fount, if somewhat discolored, and waters the hearts of the people."

Attention has already been directed to the author's inability to conceive that priests interested in the details of sacrifice could produce anything better than "mechanical" poetry. He also hesitates to credit them with "a devotional spirit that gave voice to genuine feeling." This personal lack of sympathy with religious ritual has perhaps contributed to Professor Hopkins' success in his exposition of early Buddhism, altogether the most attractive chapter in the book, but none the less must be our regret that the whole body of usages, the significance of which is made so evident in Oldenberg's *Religion des Veda*, has been passed by with the simple remark that "the sacrifice is but show; symbolism without folk-lore, only the imbecile imaginings of a daft mysticism, is the soul of it: and its outer form is a certain number of formulae, mechanical movements, oblations and slaughterings."

The failure to co-ordinate the evidence of the earlier texts has resulted in a picture of ancient conditions inherently improbable and inconsistent with the subsequent persistence of belief in India. The theory of "Hindu influence on the Aryan mind" beginning in the late Vedic period is suggested, but nowhere seriously supported.

Apart from such considerations of method in the earlier chapters, the book deserves generous praise. The wide range of the author's reading in the native literature and his extensive acquaintance with the work of Western scholars are everywhere apparent. From his own more special studies he has contributed not a little. Particular mention must be made of the excellent chapters on the epic. Observations, too, such as are made regarding the general character and the position in the Rig-Veda of the hymns in which the worship of certain deities or the expression of certain ideas especially appears, are welcome to all.

Two other features of the book deserve mention here: the survey of the religious traits of the wild tribes, an interesting supplement to the discussion of the Indo-Aryan religions, and the bibliography, which is well arranged, and will call forth the thanks of many students.

A. W. STRATTON.

Verner Dahlerup: Nekrolog över Karl Verner. Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi. New Series, Vol. IX, Part 3.

Not a few great talents have been known as men of one book. Karl Verner is probably the only scholar of distinguished ability that is generally known as a man of one article. Although the name of Verner is a household word among all students of language, probably few in this country have any knowledge of the life and character of the man that bore it. For this reason, if for no other, a brief account of some of the salient features in the career of this so greatly lamented Danish scholar must be of interest to English readers. Additional interest is given to the article on which this review is based by the fact that it is written by a Dane, a friend of Verner's, and one in every way competent to judge of the significance for linguistic science of Verner's work.

Karl Adolph Verner was born in Aarhus, Jutland, Denmark, March 7, 1846. Even before entering the University in 1864 he had shown an interest in the study of language, his attention having been drawn in that direction by reading the life of his great countryman Rask. While at the University he devoted himself chiefly to the study of the Oriental, the Germanic and the Slavic languages. In the beginning of his course he had intended to pursue the classics, and in spite of his later investigation of the so-called modern languages, he always retained a vivid interest in the older tongues.

After serving in the army, Verner went in December, 1871, to Russia, where he remained almost a year, learning to speak Russian, and pursuing his studies with great zeal. On his return his friends induced him with difficulty to take the master's examination, for which he had the utmost dread. The next year and a half were spent in his native town, his health not permitting him to engage in any regular occupation. During this enforced vacation he wrote his first scientific treatise, "Nogle Raskiana" (1874). At the same time he carefully investigated accent in the Slavic languages and in Danish, and outlined the changes in Danish pronunciation from Holberg's time to the present day, only the main results of which were published.

The account of the development in his mind of the law that was destined to make him famous is so interesting that nothing but a full translation of it will suffice. "According to a verbal account of Verner's (repeated to Dahlerup by Hoffory and endorsed by Verner), he happened one morning on getting up to reflect that it was strange that the Gothic words *fadar* and *bropar* had different consonants after the root vowel. As he was just then engaged in studying accent, it was natural for him to seek the explanation in this direction. He examined the conditions in Sanskrit and found there *pitar* and *bhrā'tar*. He had discovered the clue, which he quickly followed out." After briefly explaining the law, Dahlerup adds: "Verner finished his epoch-making treatise

in the spring of 1875, and sent it in a letter dated May 1 to Vilhelm Thomsen. Shortly before this he had learned that a petition for a travelling stipendium had been granted him. On his way to the continent he remained a few weeks in Copenhagen. Vilhelm Thomsen had immediately on receiving his letter encouraged Verner to print his paper, which he said would overturn many accepted views. During his stay in Copenhagen, Verner wrote his treatise in German and sent it to Adolph Kuhn." The results of the publication of the *Ausnahme* in the following year are too familiar to require telling here.

Surprise has often been expressed that Verner, the most famous philologist in Denmark, should have had so comparatively insignificant a career, and his fatherland has been reproached by those unacquainted with the facts for having neglected so brilliant a son. As a matter of fact, Verner was thoroughly appreciated at home, and had it not been for the encouragement of his many Danish friends he would probably have remained in utter obscurity. Strange as it may sound, the discoverer of Verner's Law considered himself a mere amateur, a dilettante in Germanic philology. When in 1876 Wilh. Scherer offered to obtain for him a professorship in Germany, he declined on the ground that he was not sufficiently developed for such a position, and accepted instead a vacancy at the Halle library as assistant librarian. Two years later he refused a professorship at Gratz, and it is believed also at Strassburg, contenting himself with a promotion at the library. It was only with great difficulty that Scherer induced him to apply for the Bopp prize, which was bestowed on him in 1877.

On the death of his old teacher of the Slavic languages, C. W. Smith, in 1881, Verner, again only after persistent urging by friends, applied for the vacancy, and in August, 1882, he was appointed Docent in the Slavic Languages and Literatures, six years later being promoted to Professor Extraordinarius. A year before this promotion he was granted an honorary degree by the University of Heidelberg, in 1888 he was elected a member of the Danish Academy of Sciences, and in 1892 he was decorated with the order of the Danebrog.

Even stranger apparently than Verner's modest career was his comparative unproductiveness. The explanation of this too is to be found in his character. In a letter to a friend, Verner once said, 'I have inclination to enjoy, but not to produce.' (Jeg har tilbøjelighed til at nyde, men utilbøjelighed til at yde.) His enjoyment, it should be added, was of a strictly intellectual character. Like many men of genius, too, his interest was confined to the intellectual process; with the practical result he was not in the least concerned. After having made a discovery he seemed to lack any desire to put it in proper shape for presentation. His innate modesty, too, had much to do with his unwillingness to publish the results of his investigations. Still another reason is found in his extreme conscientiousness. Although after his appointment in Copenhagen his only publications were two short articles in German journals and a number of short articles on Slavic subjects in Salmonsens's Encyclopedia, Verner was one of the busiest members of the faculty. His conscientiousness in preparing and attending lectures was almost painful. He practically rewrote the Slavic grammars used by his classes, prepared exhaustive original treatises on Russian accent and other subjects, and all for the exclusive benefit

of only one or two students at a time. Hr. Dahlerup states that Verner left an enormous amount of unpublished material in this and in other directions. It would be a matter of interest to learn if any of this valuable matter will be published.

Hr. Dahlerup closes his sympathetic and illuminating study as follows: "Not only will Karl Verner be honored as one of the foremost linguists that the North has produced, but his great personal amiability will be remembered by the many friends who with sorrow have learned of his early death."

DANIEL KILHAM DODGE.

Il Processo di Verre; un capitolo di storia romana. Di ETTORE CICCOTTI. Milano, edito a cura dell' autore, 1895. 240 pp. L. 3.50.

M. Tullii Ciceronis Oratio in Verrem *De Signis*. Publiée avec une Introduction et un Commentaire explicatif par HENRI BORNECQUE. Paris, Colin et Cie., 1896. 176 pp. Fr. 1.50.

The purpose of Prof. Ciccotti's book is mainly historical. By means of a wide and careful study of the original documents he has tried to give a faithful picture of Verres and his times.

The subject of the first chapter (pp. 3-21) is well suggested by Juvenal's vivid line, VI 293, which serves as its motto, *Luxuria incubuit victumque ulcis- scitur orbem*. It describes the great changes in the public and private life of the Romans which followed the extension of their sway beyond the natural boundaries of Italy and the establishment of their provincial system. An influx of wealth, an increase of luxury, electoral corruption and plundering of the provinces were among the first-fruits of that system. The provincial governors had almost unlimited powers and the home government provided no adequate check on their excesses; few of them showed the scrupulous honesty of a Piso Frugi or were content with the Jeffersonian simplicity of a Cato Censor. The second chapter (pp. 21-37) gives a brief description of the way in which the Roman provinces were governed (*quasi quaedam praedia populi Romani*) and of the arrangements made for collecting revenue from them. Chapter III (pp. 37-57) gives an account of the various *leges de repetundis*, from the *lex Calpurnia* of B. C. 149 to the *lex Cornelia* under which Verres was indicted. Chapter IV (pp. 57-79) treats of the conquest of Sicily (*insula Cereris*) and of the various relations in which the Sicilian communities stood to Rome; also, of the economic conditions of Sicily and the powers of its governors. Chapters V and VI (pp. 79-106 and 107-44) give an account, closely following that of Cicero, of the earlier career of Verres (*homo amens ac perditus*) and of his doings after he was sent into Sicily (*quasi in praedam*). The last chapter (pp. 144-235) describes the trial of Verres.

It is evident from *In Verrem*, I 37, that Verres was quaestor in Cisalpine Gaul in B. C. 82, the year of Carbo's third consulship. Hence, ever since the days of Drumann, Cicero's statement, I 34, that Verres was quaestor under Carbo in B. C. 84 has been generally regarded as a mistake. Prof. Ciccotti suggests that Verres was quaestor both in B. C. 84 and in B. C. 82, that he either remained in office for three consecutive years or was reappointed in

B. C. 82,—a very plausible suggestion which he has since supported at greater length in the *Rivista di Filologia*, N. S. Vol. I (1895), pp. 332-40.

With regard to Cicero's voyage to Sicily in search of evidence, it is disappointing that an author who has the literature of his subject so well in hand should make no reference to Zielinski's ingenious article "Verrina: Die Chronologie des Processes," etc., in the *Philologus*, Vol. LII (1893), pp. 248 ff. It is interesting, however, to notice that while accepting Cicero's own statement, *Pro Scauro*, 25, that he was in Sicily in the depth of winter, Prof. Ciccotti thinks that he returned to Rome towards the end of April. He may have remained in Sicily for a short time after his task was accomplished because of his eagerness to take his witnesses back with him. In many cases their departure was hindered or prevented by the new governor, Metellus.

The most interesting part of the book is contained in the last forty pages, where we have an examination of Cicero's assertion that defence was impossible for Verres. The writer is not holding a brief for Verres; "*la storia non accusa, nè difende*," and his purpose is historical. The frequency of this assertion in the imaginary Second Actio suggests that the great orator was, like some of Agricola's soldiers, *promptus post eventum ac magniloquus*. In spite of his denial, the *consuetudo accusatoria* is manifest everywhere, and it would be as unsafe to form an estimate of Verres solely from the elaborate fiction of the Second Actio as to form an estimate of Warren Hastings from the rhetoric of Burke, or the brilliant but untrustworthy essay of Macaulay. Cicero himself tells us how much allowance had to be made for the coloring of the advocate in trials in which great political interests were involved (*Pro Fonteio*, 38-9). He is careful to assure his readers that the Sicilians are not ordinary Greeks (II 7), but the majority of his witnesses were Greeks none the less, and he himself knew well the value of a Greek's testimony in a court of law (*Pro Flacco*, 11-12). The first book of the Second Actio and the greater part of the fifth have nothing to do with the matters for which Verres was prosecuted; the charges of the second book are only connected with those matters by an obviously indirect, conjectural mode of argument,—*status principaliter coniectura*, as the ancient scholiast puts it. Many of the misdeeds charged against Verres are moral rather than constitutional in their nature. The most important factor in his condemnation was the political situation of the time. Had he been brought to trial a few years earlier he might have received a much more spirited and loyal support from his senatorial peers. But the Sullan constitution which had conferred a monopoly of power upon the senatorial nobility was now nearing its fall. It was a time for compromise and the intransigent Verres was sacrificed to the political exigencies of the day.

Prof. Ciccotti is full of modern instances. The inevitable comparison of the case of Verres with that of Warren Hastings recurs again and again; the body from which the equestrian order of Rome was drawn reminds him of the class of *francs-tenanciers*, or of the country burghers from whom Cromwell recruited his squadrons of '*ironcoates*'; the popular excitement and political interest aroused by the trial of Verres find a modern parallel in the investigation of the Panama Scandal or in the inquiry into the irregularities of the Roman Bank; the retinue which accompanied each new governor into his province is likened, to compare small things with great, to the host of political spoilers.

who rise up after every presidential election in America to clamor for their reward.

M. Bornecque's little book deserves a short notice in this Journal because of its useful introduction. The study (pp. 20-40) of the works of art acquired by Verres during his stay in Sicily is particularly good. The various statements as to the chronology of the trial are absurdly inaccurate (p. 9, ll. 3-21 ; p. 19, l. 23 ; p. 31, l. 20 ; p. 74, n. 9 ; p. 77, n. 3 ; p. 152, n. 2). The commentary borrows freely from the editions of Thomas and Halm, always with the most ample acknowledgment, but seems to be intended for a much younger class of readers. The proof-reading has been extremely poor.

W. P. MUSTARD.

REPORTS.

ENGLISCHE STUDIEN. Herausgegeben von Dr. EUGEN KÖLBING, Leipzig.

XX Band, 1895.

I.—L. Kellner, Interchange and Tautology: Two Peculiarities of Old and Middle English Style. At the present time, unity and consistency are considered the first requisites of a good style, and we should condemn such a sentence as: "The mob is cruel and they are ignorant." This principle is, however, purely modern. The best writers of Old and Middle English not only did not consider these two qualities as admirable, they deliberately avoided them. Holding that variety was one of the charms of style, they sought this variety in ways that would not now be admissible.

I. Changes of grammatical construction, which can hardly be attributed to carelessness or otherwise accounted for; e. g. the interchange in the same sentence of *thou* and *ye*, when this cannot be explained as a change from formal address to familiar, or vice versa, as, "For I sawe *you* never or nowe, but *pou* semist a gentilman," *Gesta Romanorum*, 208; interchange of tenses, present and preterite, or preterite and perfect, as,

He *rydys* home to þat lady hende,
And *told* hur his tale to ende.

—Ipomadon, A 4535/6;

use of the infinitive with and without the preposition, etc.

II. Similarly, tautology was employed, both in grammatical constructions and in phraseology. Of the first, the double comparative, double negative and double genitive (e. g. "in despite and reproof of Sir Tristrams," *Morte Darthur*, ed. Sommer, p. 324, line 34) are among the examples given. Phraseological tautology is seen in Old English in such phrases as *habban and āgan*, *hweorfan and gān*, *gesēon and ongietan*, etc. In Middle English its forms are more varied, and may for convenience be thus grouped: I. Double forms. II. Synonyms of Germanic origin. III. Synonyms of Germanic and Romance origin. IV. Synonyms of Romance origin. Examples of I are *weilaweī and walawa*, *swete and swote*, *kysse or cusse*; of II, *all whole*, e. g. "We putten oure deede . . . *al holly* in youre goode wille" (Chaucer, *Tale of Melibeus*, 190), *both two*, *clepen and namen*, etc.; of III, *fulfil and perform*, *hap and fortune*; of IV, *accept and receive*, *pite and mercy*, etc. The number of citations from Chaucer's *Melibeus* is very striking.

O. Hoffmann, *Studies on Alexander Montgomerie*. The point of departure for the article is an edition of Montgomerie, 'The Poems of Alexander Montgomerie, edited by James Cranstoun, LL. D., Edinburgh and London, 1887,' which for the first time made this little-known author generally acces-

sible. The article is in two parts: I. Montgomerie's life and writings; II. The strophic structure of his poems.

I. Montgomerie's dates are not exactly known; he was born about 1545 (Cranstoun, in the Dict. Nat. Biog., suggests 1556, but doubtfully), and died between 1605 and 1615, so that the period of his poetic activity would about coincide with that of Spenser, Sidney, and Shakespeare. He was for a while a favorite at the court of James VI, whose treatise on Scottish poetry seems to have been, if not inspired, at least greatly influenced by Montgomerie's poetry. James makes free use of his poems, as illustrations of his "reulis and cautelis," sometimes quoting entire poems, sometimes a few lines from them. Later the poet appears to have lost favor, and the rest of his life was spent in retirement. This may in part account for the slight impression he seems to have made on his times; but another reason is doubtless the fact that much of his poetry remained in manuscript until long after his death, so that the radius of its influence was necessarily small.

In treating the poems, the two long ones, *The Cherrie and the Slae*, and *The Flyting betwixt Montgomery and Polwart*, are dealt with separately; the rest are taken up in groups, following Cranstoun's classification into sonnets, miscellaneous poems, devotional poems, and a collection of paraphrases from the Psalms, called *The Mindes Melodie*.

Of the sonnets Cranstoun says that they show "a cultured taste formed on a careful study of Italian models." From this opinion Hoffmann dissents, holding that, in the main, Montgomerie went his own way untouched by Italian influences except such as reached him through the works of one writer, Pierre de Ronsard, seven of whose sonnets he translated. He used some of Ronsard's metres, and his ideas and expressions show Ronsard's influence. This, indeed, in view of the great mass of poetic thought which was, as it were, common stock among the writers of that day, might not be so significant, were it not that it is with reference to Ronsard alone that we can trace anything of the sort in Montgomerie.

In spite of the fact that he was contemporary with the great Elizabethans, Montgomerie cannot be classed with them, but must be considered rather as the link between the representatives of late Middle English literature on the one hand, and those of so-called Modern English on the other. In some ways he reminds us of Dunbar, while in others he is already modern: he imitates the older verse-structure in his deliberate and extensive use of alliteration, yet much of his verse can well be placed alongside of the best of the new era. His spirit, too, seems often to belong to the past, as in *The Flyting betwixt Montgomery and Polwart*, while in the love poems, for instance, or in his descriptions of nature, we come upon wholly modern thought in wholly modern expression.

It is to be regretted that thus far Montgomerie's verse-structure has not been treated in the works on the subject. Schipper omits his name altogether, and Lentzner, in his work on the sonnet, barely mentions him, although his sonnets are quite as deserving of attention as Dunbar's.

Part II. The notes on strophic structure are of great interest, but it is scarcely possible to do more than indicate their scope and character, without giving them entire. Particularly interesting is the work on sonnet-structure.

Hoffmann assigns Montgomerie a very high place among sonnet-writers, both because of the command of language and because of the originality which they display. One form—abba abba ccd eed—he was, if not the first, at least among the first in Great Britain to employ. Another—abab bcbc cdcd ee—which Schipper says is first found in Spenser, is used by Montgomerie in a large number of poems, some of which certainly antedate Spenser's. It is probable, moreover, that Spenser knew of Montgomerie's work. For it is scarcely supposable that the author of 'The English Poet,' a lost treatise on poetry, should have been ignorant of King James' similar work, which was, we may say, based on Montgomerie.

Aside from the sonnets, his poems show great variety in strophic form. In some he follows familiar Scottish models, in some he adopts older English forms as used by Chaucer and others, while in yet others he shows Renaissance influence.

W. France, *Syntax of Early Modern English*. This is a continuation of work begun in vol. XVII. The present number treats of prepositions. These are taken up in order, and their use is illustrated by citations from seventeenth and eighteenth century authors.

The Book Notices contain reviews of two more numbers of the *Erlanger Beiträge*, containing a *Tractatus de Diversis Historiis Romanorum*, and an edition of Chettle, Dekker, and Haughton's *Pleasant Comedie of Patient Grissil*; then follow:

L. Fränkel's *Shakespeare and the Aubade*, O. Rohde's *The Tale of the Hermit and the Angel in its Historical Development*, C. Ferrel's *Teutonic Antiquities in the Anglo-Saxon Genesis*, F. Liebermann's *The Leges Anglorum Saeculo 13. Ineunte Londiniis Collectae*, O. Sommer's *The Kalender of Shepherdes*, L. Lewes' *Shakespeare's Women*, P. Roden's *Shakespeare's Tempest*, A. Tolman's *Shakespeare's Part in the Taming of the Shrew*, E. Groth's *Charles Kingsley as Poet and Social Reformer*, and J. Wells' *Oxford and Oxford Life*.

The two new volumes of the *Erlanger Beiträge* do not fall below the standard thus far maintained by the whole series. The *Tractatus*, though not so important as the *Gesta Romanorum*, is of great interest as being another of those collections of stories in which the middle ages took such delight. In the opinion of Hippe, the reviewer, Herzstein lays too much stress on a relation between these two works, for, of the sixty-nine tales in the *Tractatus*, only fourteen are treated in the *Gesta*. It is, however, probable that all these collections, in Italian as well as in Latin, drew their material, at least in part, from some common source. The text of the *Tractatus* has come down to us in bad condition, and needed much emendation from the editor. Of *Patient Grissil* an edition has been greatly needed, as Collier's, 1841, no longer meets the demands of modern scholarship. Hübsch's text is a faithful reproduction of the edition of 1603, with little attempt at emendation except in the case of evident misprints. The notes are careful and scholarly, but somewhat too scanty. The introduction traces the story from the time of Chaucer on, but, unfortunately, fails to give as exact a description as we could wish of the rare works referred to. He combats the theory that the drama in question is connected with Boccaccio's novella.

Fränkel approaches his subject "in the full armor of the comparative method." This subject is the parting between Romeo and Juliet, act III, scene 5. Nothing like this passage is to be found in English literature before Shakespeare, but in Germany countless parallels existed, as well as many in Holland and Flanders based on German models. It is with these that the Shakespearean lines must be in some way related, though how the poet came by his knowledge of German lyrics is not known. It may have been through his intercourse with Germans in London, or, more indirectly still, through the close commercial relations between England and Holland, which must have involved some literary interchange as well. Fränkel then makes a line-by-line comparison between the passage in question and the German lyrics of the same class, and follows this with a more general treatment, from the standpoint of comparative literature. The book is, in Hippe's judgment, not only a worthy contribution to Shakespearean literature, but a welcome and suggestive study in the history of the love-lyric.

Fränkel gives a cutting review of Rohde's work, which he scores as almost worthless because of the author's incomplete knowledge of his material, and his failure to profit even by previous critical work on his subject. The book is an illustration, first, of the danger of using second-rate reference books and poor or superseded editions, and, second, of the fact that diligence by itself, without breadth of view and the power to interpret masses of facts, will not produce a scientific work.

Ferrel's study of Old English life offers little that is new, but is valuable as bringing together in a systematic exposition what has till now been scattered through the literature of the subject in incidental remarks. The scope of the volume is sufficiently indicated by its main divisions, which are as follows: I. Mythology. II. Christianity. A. God. B. Angels. C. Heaven. D. Satan and his Companions. E. Hell. F. Paradise. III. Nature. IV. The King and his Subjects. V. Kinship and Home-Life, Manners and Customs. VI. War-Life.

The *Leges Anglorum* is a collection of notes on English legislation from the time of Ine to that of John—a curious work, which must have been put together between 1206 and 1239, though some manuscripts contain additions from a later time, even as late as the fourteenth century. The thirteenth-century collector seems to have tried to piece together from various sources a history of English legislation, with special reference to the city of London. His principal sources were: the larger law-records, i. e. the *Quadripartitus*, the *Leges Edwardi Confessoris*, the *Leges Henrici I*, and Glanville's *Tractatus temp. Henrici II*. These are given only in part, however, and amongst them are inserted many other fragments, some also from older records, some apparently fabricated by the collector himself to bear out his private views. He must have obtained his material in the City archives and the City library. His use of it is superficial and uncritical, and it is hard to see on what principle he worked in making his selections. That his purpose was not scientific but utilitarian is evident. The aim of the work is the furthering of certain great governmental reforms, and, in particular, the glorification of the city of London. Liebermann has in some cases printed the text of the various fragments, in others he has indicated where they are

to be found. He has, moreover, pointed out their sources where this is possible, and compared these versions with their originals. Though in many respects faulty and inferior, the *Leges Anglorum* is, on the whole, to be classed with Roger of Hoveden as the richest collection of early English legal documents which we possess, and Liebermann has rendered a service to his fellow-specialists in making it the subject of a detailed investigation. The reviewer, Maurer, gives a rather full summary of the contents of the volume, to which those who are interested are referred.

The *Kalender of Shepherdes* is of great interest both in itself and by reason of its connection with later literature. It was first written in French, and printed in Paris, 1493, with the title '*Le compost et Kalendrier des bergiers.*' In 1503 it was indifferently well translated by a Scotchman, whose work was revised and republished in 1506 by Pynson. Both these editions are given by Sommer, the first in photographic facsimile, the second in reprint. The introduction gives a brief history of the subject, a bibliography, and a somewhat scanty glossary. Kölbing, the reviewer, adds a few notes of his own on one of the poems in the collection, entitled '*Of an assaute agaynst a snayle.*' This poem, which Kölbing reprints to substantiate the comparison, is evidently an earlier version of the snail episode in the interlude of *Thersites*, 1537 (?). In conclusion, Kölbing expresses his regret that Sommer's publications are so generally ignored in Germany, and his hope that in future they will be better known.

A comprehensive work like Lewes' has not of late years been undertaken in Germany. It does not claim to give anything new, but rather a new arrangement of what is already known. The book, however, according to Koch, does more than its title promises, for it gives not disconnected portraits of the characters, but estimates of them with reference to and by means of a general survey of the plays in which they appear. Koch closes by quoting Lewes' remonstrance against the kind of Shakespeare interpretation which sees in every play a central idea, philosophical or moral. Such an interpretation can never justify itself except by doing violence to Shakespeare.

Koch makes this statement the transition to a brief notice of Roden's work—a study which might well have served as the text for Lewes's protest. Roden attempts to show that in the *Tempest* there is portrayed the spiritual storm which disturbed Europe from the end of the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century. Antonio is scholasticism, which is arrayed with the church (Naples) against the true scientific spirit (Prospero). Ariel is the powers of nature, controlled by Prospero as science, and so forth.

Tolman's study of *The Taming of a Shrew* is interesting, not only in itself, but as coming from a pupil of ten Brink. The case stands thus: *The Taming of the Shrew* (TTS), whose date Tolman thinks lies between 1604 and 1609, was preceded by a strikingly similar play, *The Taming of a Shrew* (TAS), printed in 1594, written probably not later than 1588. Both plays, but especially TTS, contain material borrowed from Gascoigne's translation (1566) of Ariosto's *Suppositi*. The problem, then, is to establish the relation between these three. The general opinion of Shakespeare critics has thus far been that TAS was derived from the *Suppositi*, and that TTS was derived from the *Suppositi* and from TAS. Tolman gives a number of arguments

making for this view, which, he judges, has fewer difficulties than any other theory, with one exception—namely, the view of ten Brink. Ten Brink's suggestion, which he left undeveloped, was that neither play is derived from the other, but both from a third, a youthful production of Shakespeare, antedating *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. Wild as this theory seems, and wholly without external proof, it would, if accepted, explain all the facts better than any other. Tolman does not give a final judgment, but merely presents the evidence. Koch, who reviews his work, though he too admits the difficulties of the question, seems disinclined to take ten Brink's theory seriously, and indeed remarks that ten Brink himself, in his last lecture at Frankfort, appeared to have given it up.

A study of Kingsley is especially welcome because so little has thus far been done on the subject, either in Germany or England. Groth's work, however, though interesting and sympathetic, leaves much to be desired. The treatment of Kingsley as a social reformer, for example, is unsatisfactory, because the background—the social commotions of his day—is treated too sketchily. The study of the novelist and poet is much more successful. The biography, again, is weak, containing many errors and failing often in clearness or adequacy. The treatment of Kingsley's relations with Carlyle, Charlotte Brontë, and Wordsworth is not full enough, while the influence of Scott and Bulwer, of Dickens and Thackeray, is not even touched upon. Nevertheless, the work, with its attractive style and its sympathetic rendering of the poet's personality, will doubtless appeal to a large audience, and may do much to awaken interest in Kingsley.

The Miscellanea contains a number of notes of interest to Old English students: Lindström discusses briefly the etymology of *preost*; Pogatscher has a note on the words *bred weall* (Old English Chronicle, entry for the year 189), which he explains by comparison with the Latin of Beda; Swaen discusses the length of the vowel in *seppan*, or *sepan*. Bülbring contributes a study of the quantity of the vowel before *nd* in Middle English verse, e. g. *sendan*, *wendan*, etc. By the rime-test, applied to the three parts of Robert of Gloucester, with uniform results, he seems to prove that in these verbs the vowel is long in the present stem and short in preterite and perfect participle. The rimes in the *Ormulum*, also, he finds to conform with almost perfect regularity to this rule. E. Koepfel has some interesting notes on Chaucer and Shakespeare: (1) Gower's French ballads and Chaucer; (2) Chaucer's *Anelida*, whom Koepfel would make queen, not of *Ermony* (Armenia), but of *Emony* (Lat. *Haemonia* = Thessaly); (3) a striking parallel between *The Misfortunes of Arthur* and *Macbeth*; (4) parallels, almost as remarkable, between the first part of *Jeronimo* and *Hamlet*.

II.—E. Kölbing, *Contributions to the Elucidation and Textual Criticism of the York Plays*. Since the edition of the York Plays, by Toulmin Smith, appeared in 1885, the attention of scholars has been attracted to this important but corrupt text. Zupitza, Hall, Herttrich, and Holthausen have all done something towards emendation, but much work still remains. The reconstruction of a text of this kind should be, so far as possible, the result of the combined labors of Middle English scholars. The emendations here submitted by

Kölbing do not profess to be exhaustive or final, but are put forth rather as suggestions, looking towards a future critical edition of the text—an edition which he hopes Miss Toulmin Smith herself may superintend.

E. W. Sievers, *Shakespeare and the Pilgrimage to Canossa*. Not Germany alone has had to humble herself in the dust before Rome. England, too, has had her Canossa; the Pope was Innocent III, the King was John. In the reign of Elizabeth this event must have been constantly in men's thoughts, for a like humiliation seemed, until the death of Mary Stuart and the defeat of the Armada, not only possible, but imminent. That the struggle between Protestantism and Rome would have made a deep impression on Shakespeare we can easily imagine; that it actually did so is proved by his play, *King John*. The play must be regarded as the poet's cry of appeal to the nation to stand by the principle of the new religion—that is, the exaltation of the individual as opposed to the belief in authority. The central theme of the play may be stated as the struggle, not only between a foreign pope and a national king, but between the principle of authority and the principle of individuality. Pandulph stands for the one, the other is represented fitfully by John, consistently by Philip the Bastard. Pandulph—and the Roman Church—bases his power on one of the ultimate forces of the human soul, the craving for salvation. It is to this that he appeals in dealing with the French king; in this alone lies the efficacy of his threat of excommunication. To subdue John, however, he must seek other means, for the English king is untouched by threats of a power he despises. In his first attitude towards Rome, then, John represents the Protestant principle of resistance to authority. But to work John's downfall Pandulph relies on another human trait, the instinct of self-preservation. It is this, he foresees, which will tempt John to kill his nephew; it is this which will lead the nation to fall away from their king. All turns out as Pandulph plans, though—and here we are at the heart of the matter—it need not have done so if John had been thoroughly imbued with the Protestant spirit. For, though he is a usurper, he is a man far more fit for the throne than the true claimant, Arthur. Realizing this, John ought to have been strong enough in his self-knowledge to rely wholly on his proved fitness for the place, and to see in the invasion of Philip and Pandulph his opportunity brilliantly to justify his usurpation by arraying himself on the side of the national feeling. But he does not trust this, and thinks it necessary to make his right legitimate by removing Arthur. Thus it appears that, though he is free from the tyranny of authority in one form, he is still under its dominion in another—under the dominion, namely, of the principle of conventional legitimacy. These are, then, the causes of John's, and through him of England's, humiliation. One character in the play, however, remains uniformly true to himself, to his country, and to his king: this is the Bastard, who from his first appearance stands as the representative of individual worth, independent of the conventional sanctions of birth and position. His phrase:

And I am I, howe'er I was begot,

is indicative of his character. In him, if anywhere, Shakespeare himself speaks. His soliloquy, for instance, at the end of act II may be compared with Aristophanes' use of the chorus. He it is who keeps a steady head

throughout the vicissitudes of the kingdom, who brings the nobles again to their allegiance, and takes from England's defeat the sting of finality. In his last words we may hear Shakespeare's warning to England:

This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself.
 ... Nought shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true.

In support of this interpretation it is interesting to note that the features of the play from which it has been deduced are peculiar to the Shakespeare version, although in many respects the poet followed the older play of the same name.

A. E. H. Swaen, *To Dare*. That the verb in question is very variable is seen in the fact that of the seven authorities quoted by Swaen, no two are quite in agreement as to its forms. Its peculiarities are (1) the two forms, *dare* and *dares*, in the present tense, 3d singular; (2) in the two forms, *dared* and *durst*, of the preterite, and (3) in the fact that infinitives governed by *dare* sometimes take *to* and sometimes not. The bulk of the paper is occupied with citations from English literature, from the sixteenth century to the present time, illustrating the use of the word, with special reference to these three points. The citations have exact references, and the whole is so well arranged that the reader hardly needs the table of results that is appended.

The Book Notices include reviews of Kaluza's *Studies in Old Germanic Alliterative Verse*, A. J. Wyatt's edition of *Beowulf*, S. Hewett's *The Peasant Speech of Devon and Other Matters Connected Therewith*, A. Drake's *The Authorship of the West Saxon Gospels*, J. Wright's *A Grammar of the Dialect of Windhill in the West Riding of Yorkshire*, J. Groag's *The Character of Julius Caesar in Shakespeare's Play*, P. Kreutzberg's *Brutus in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar*, E. Frey's *Robert Browning's Dramas*, and P. Branscheid's *Life of Charles Dickens*.

Wyatt's edition of *Beowulf*, with its scholarly notes, well-arranged glossary, and index of names, is highly praised by Brenner, who foresees that it will, in England at least, speedily supplant the German editions.

Drake's investigation of the authorship of the four Gospels yields interesting results. His method has been to compare the use, in each of the Gospels, of such words as allow variation, and hence are well adapted for this kind of test, e. g. *heofon* and *heofone*, or *pāra* and *pāra*. By this test, Mark and Luke would seem to be clearly by the same hand, while Matthew and John are written, if not by the same author, at least in the same locality, and certainly not by the translator of the other two.

Brenner praises Wright's *Grammar* as a model, despite its failure, in some respects, to conform to the German ideal. Phonetics is given its due space, and no more, the system of phonetic sounds is remarkably simple and easily grasped, and the comparisons with older English or Old French words are interesting.

The two papers on *Julius Caesar* are reviewed by Koch. Kreutzberg has, in his opinion, added nothing to what has been already done, but Groag's

work is of interest. There has been a tendency among Shakespeare scholars to the view that Brutus, not Caesar, is the true hero of the play, which therefore has not been properly named, and which fails in unity, because of this confusion of interests. In different phases this was the view of Gervinus and others, and more recently of Brandl. It is combated by Dowden, and now by Groag, with whom Koch seems to be in essential agreement. Shakespeare, who everywhere in his writing exalts the name of Caesar, had surely no intention of making him appear weak, either to lessen the guilt of the conspirators or (Brandl's suggestion) as a foil to Brutus. In judging Caesar's character we must take into account not only what he does and says on the stage, but what every one else says about him—how the people feel towards him. Even Cassius, for instance, can accuse him only of physical weakness, while in the eyes of all he is unquestionably the hero, the man of destiny. By this test he is restored to his proper position as the greatest as well as the truly central figure in the play.

In his essay on Browning, Frey gives a careful analysis of all the dramas, as well as some poems not in dramatic form—Pauline, for example—which are, however, as the reviewer, Hoops, remarks, quite as much—and as little—dramas as are some of those so entitled. He touches upon the influence of Shelley on Browning, but refrains from any detailed handling of sources, or any attempt at a final literary-historic estimate of the poet.

Aronstein, reviewing Werner's study of Thomas May, characterizes it as in part superficial, in part worthless, and in part (the section on May's dramatic style) tolerably successful. Branscheid's life of Dickens, though by no means complete, is on the whole good, and, in Aronstein's opinion, well worth a careful working over.

The Miscellanea contains a few English etymologies by Kluge, and some notes by Wülfing tending to support the theory of Hubbard and Wülker that The Soliloquies are the work of King Alfred. Kaluza contributes a highly interesting note on the controversy concerning the authorship of the Romaunt of the Rose. He defends Skeat against the charge of having ignored some of Lounsbury's arguments, and reiterates his own belief in the 'absurd' theory of a dual authorship. E. W. Bowen in a brief paper called Confusion between δ and δ in Chaucer's Rimes, gives a list of the cases where such confusion occurs, and where the only explanation seems to be that Chaucer gave way to the exigencies of the verse. Perhaps the most interesting contribution is Koch's brief note on Shakespeare and Lope de Vega. The occasion of it is the appearance (Berlin and Weimar, 1894) of Arturo Farinelli's book, Grillparzer and Lope de Vega. Grillparzer always held that Shakespeare had come under Spanish influence, although he did not know the language, and that some passages in his writings almost certainly imply a knowledge of Lope de Vega himself. In this Farinelli (and Koch) agrees. It is interesting to note that in four plays—Romeo and Juliet, Winter's Tale, As You Like It, and All's Well That Ends Well—Shakespeare handles themes which Lope de Vega also used. Webster's Duchess of Malfy is paralleled by the Spanish El Mayordomo de la Duquesa de Amalfi, but the two are, according to Farinelli, only connected by the fact of their common source in Bandello's novella.

III.—G. Richter, Contributions to the Elucidation and Textual Criticism of the Middle English Prose Romance of Merlin. The Merlin legend has been handled three times in Early English literature: (1) in a romance in four-stressed couplets. The main part of this is contained only in the Auchinleck manuscript, in Edinburgh. This earliest English form of the story must be placed, probably, about the middle of the thirteenth century. (2) in the fifteenth-century poem of Merlin, by Henry Lonelich, preserved in a single Cambridge manuscript. (3) in a prose romance of the second half of the fifteenth century, preserved also in but one (Cambridge) manuscript. The first has been lately edited by Kölbing, and an edition of the second is being prepared by Kölbing and Miss Mary Bateson. The third was edited for the Early English Text Society, by Henry B. Wheatley (London, 1865–69; revised, 1877). This has, however, neither introduction, notes, nor glossary, and Wheatley scarcely even attempted to emend the text, full of errors though it was. Richter, therefore, has undertaken the work of emendation, admitting, however, that the first attempt in so large a subject must always contain much that is merely provisional. As to sources, all three English versions go back, according to Kölbing, to the same French text, first printed in Paris, 1528, with the title 'Le premier et le second volume de Merlin.' Of this edition the English prose version is an almost exact translation. Richter then gives his notes on the first half of the romance. Those on the second are to appear later.

Ph. Aronstein, John Marston as a Dramatist. The article is the first part of a rather comprehensive treatment of Marston, whose dramas have thus far [1894] received rather less than their due proportion of attention. The present paper forms the literary-historical part, and, after a brief biographical introduction, is divided into three chapters: I. Marston's works in chronological order. The dates for the works are given as nearly as possible, with the grounds for assigning them. There are also brief notes as to the character of each work and its reception by the public. II. Marston's attitude towards his contemporaries. The bulk of this section is formed by an account of the well-known quarrel with Jonson. III. Marston's conception of the poetic art, and his attitude towards the public. Here he stands in marked contrast to Jonson. As to his idea of the function of poetry, nothing can be more explicit than his own words:

We strive not to instruct but to delight.

—Dutch Courtezan, Prol., l. 8.

His attitude towards the public was almost uniformly apologetic, but we may doubt whether the modesty was not at least in part assumed. His success with his own times seems to have been rather remarkable, and one of his plays, *The Dutch Courtezan*, was revived after the Restoration.

Thus far the treatment of the subject offers little that is new, though the compact arrangement of old material is rather convenient. The author proposes in the next part to take up the individual works, beginning with the tragedies.

J. Ellinger, Contributions to English Grammar. The article gives numerous citations from nineteenth-century prose to illustrate grammatical usages which

have either not yet been noted or have been insufficiently illustrated by grammarians. The points considered are: 1. The omission of the definite article before an attributive adjective modifying the name of a person. 2. The comparison of adjectives of two syllables. 3. The objective case of personal pronouns used for the nominative. 4. *What a*, introducing indirect questions. 5. *Any one, no one, some one*, used adjectively. 6. *Lest* followed by *might*. 7. *Except for, only for, save for = but for*. For a comment on some points in the article, see *Englische Studien*, XXII, p. 153.

O. Schulze, *Contributions to English Grammar*. Schulze takes up Schmidt's treatment of limiting relative clauses, and shows that his definition and exposition is not broad enough to cover all cases in Modern English.

The Book Notices comprise reviews of J. Ries's *What is Syntax?*, T. R. Lounsbury's *History of the English Language*, E. Wülfig's *The Syntax of the Works of Alfred the Great*, Harrison and Sharp's *Beowulf and The Fight at Finnsburgh*, second edition, E. Bormann's *The Shakespeare-Mystery*, W. Creizenach's *History of the Modern Drama*, Schipper's edition of the *Poems of William Dunbar*, and O. Bremer's *German Phonetics*.

Ries complains of the prevalent vagueness of ideas with regard to exactly what syntax is. He defines it as the doctrine of the sentence and of other combinations of words. He objects, moreover, to the old antithesis between syntax and morphology, as well as to that between syntax and semasiology, and would prefer to divide the study of words into: (1) the study of the forms of words, (2) the study of the meaning of words. Similarly, syntax is the study, (1) of the form of word-combinations, (2) of their meaning. Ellinger, the reviewer, concludes that, although Ries's system is not free from flaws, inasmuch as it is (1) too *a priori*, (2) more applicable to descriptive than to historical grammar, yet the author has done good service in making this decided advance towards a scientific demarcation of the field of syntax.

Luick commends Lounsbury's book, but considers its usefulness greatly impaired by the fact that it is in the main a history only of written English. Phonetics would, of course, be out of place in a somewhat popular treatise, but if the author had dealt with his subject from the phonological standpoint he would have avoided many statements which, as they stand, give a false impression. For example, he says that the language of Chaucer is very near to Modern English. Yet Chaucer's speech, or even Shakespeare's, would be unintelligible to a modern Englishman. He was thinking, of course, only of the written language, and took no account of the sweeping changes that have taken place in the spoken language since Chaucer, especially since the sixteenth century. Yet these changes left, as Luick says, scarcely one stone standing upon another, and gave us a language differing, in sound, from Chaucer's little less than did Chaucer's from that of Alfred. It is to be hoped that in another edition this, the only great defect in the work, will be corrected.

Kellner expresses a slight feeling of disappointment that Wülfig's work on Alfred does not offer more that is new, either on syntax in general, or on Alfred's syntax in particular. The work seems in the main to furnish only new instances illustrating principles of syntax already established.

The fourth edition of Harrison and Sharp's *Beowulf* shows few changes in the text, rather more in the glossary and list of names. The contents of the

appendixes of earlier editions is now incorporated in the notes. The system of accentuation is not altered, but some errors are corrected. One good feature of the notes is their constant reference to other Old and Middle English texts.

Fränkel, in a long note on the Shakespeare-Bacon question, takes as his text Borman's work, which is, he says, the ripest and most scholarly defence of the Bacon authorship that has yet appeared. After reviewing the history of the controversy, Fränkel takes up this book somewhat in detail, and finally remarks that as this work, the ablest on the subject, does not seem to have carried conviction with it, the adherents of the theory may as well give up their attempt to prove an absurdity. He quotes with approval Professor Corson's remark: "If Shakespeare did not write the plays attributed to him, certainly Lord Bacon did not write them." In conclusion he alludes to a book about to appear, which promises to be a remarkable work. It is—according to the announcement of the author, L. Strohl—to prove that the works of Shakespeare were written neither by Shakespeare nor by Bacon, but by a London soap-boiler, Shakspere, who also wrote three plays under the pseudonym of Marlow.

The first volume of Creizenach's work contains, of course, less to interest English students than will the second. He has treated his subject under eight heads. In English literature he treats of the Towneley Mysteries, especially Cain, the Chester and Coventry Plays, and the Digby Plays. Creizenach thinks that at this period French influence was less strong in the English drama than in the other branches of English literature.

Schipper's edition of Dunbar goes further than those of Laing and Small, in that it is critical and is, where possible, chronologically arranged. Each poem has a separate introduction. The notes are limited to the elucidation of words and sentences, without giving parallels from other Scotch poetry. Kölbing thinks that in punctuating the text Schipper has followed Small too closely, and that he has been too conservative in making emendations. The edition is, however, far superior to its predecessor, both because of its chronological arrangement, its accuracy, and the beauty of its outer form—the print, etc. Kölbing gives detailed comments on one of the poems, 'The tua mariit wemen and the wedo.'

Bremer's *Phonetics* was at first intended as an introduction to the study, but, owing to the necessity of supporting its views, it contains much that will appeal only to specialists. After its general introduction the book is divided into two parts: I. Our vocal organs and their functions. II. The acoustic results of their activity. By far the greater part of his observations would, of course, hold good of Germanic as well as of German phonetics. Nader says of the book: "It is a work of merit, both because it furnishes a general foundation for German dialect study, and because it gives a careful and acute exposition of phonetic questions of a general nature."

In the *Miscellanea Swaen* has a note on Kellner's study of tautology in Old and Middle English (*Englische Studien*, XX). Kölbing replies for the second time to the criticisms of Vietor and Wätzoldt on the teaching of English in German universities. Sommer pays a warm tribute to Richard Morris, the English philologist, who died May 12, 1894. Sommer describes him as "a

man of modest and retiring disposition, . . . disinterested, self-sacrificing and forbearing," and withal possessed of "a great deal of natural tact." "He was, indeed, the first Englishman who has attempted to utilize the results obtained in the past hundred years in the field of historical and scientific philology, and to apply them to the study of his native tongue. What he has really achieved is witnessed by his contemporaries, but will only be thoroughly appreciated by the growing generation who have been taught by, and have learnt from, his books."

ALBERT S. COOK.

RHEINISCHES MUSEUM FÜR PHILOGIE, Vol. LI.

Pp. 1-20 and 318-20. Zwei neu aufgefundene Schriften der graeco-syrischen Literatur. V. Ryssel. A translation into German of two treatises found in a Syriac MS on Mount Sinai. One is a 'Treatise (composed by the Philosophers) on the Soul,' the other a free version of Plutarch's essay 'On the Advantage to be derived from one's Enemies.' An inaccurate translation of the latter into English has been published by Eberhard Nestle, London, 1894. These two treatises have been published in the *Studia Sinaitica*. They are found in the same MS as the *Apology of Aristides for the Christians*.

Pp. 21-6. Qui orationum Isocratearum in archetypo codicum ordo fuerit. E. Drerup. From a comparison of the order given by the leading MSS with that given by Photios, the writer concludes that the speeches of Isocrates were arranged in the archetype in three parts of seven each, the letters in three parts of three each. Here is his conjectural order: *a*) *Contra Sophistas*, *Busiris*, *Helena*, *Euagoras*, *Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, *Nicocles*; *b*) *Archidamus*, *Areopagiticus*, *Plataicus* (*Plataicus*, *Areopagiticus*?), *De Pace*, *Philippus*, *Panathenaicus*, *Panegyricus*; *c*) *De Permutatione*, *De Bigis*, *In Callimachum*, *Aegineticus*, *In Euthynum*, *Trapeziticus*, *In Lochiten*; *d*) *Dionysio*, *Archidamo*, *Iasonis filiis*; *Philippo*, *Philippo*, *Alexandro*; *Antipatro*, *Timotheo*, *Mytilenaeorum magistratibus*.

Pp. 27-44. Textkritisches zu Statius. F. Vollmer examines a number of passages in Statius. For the *Thebais*, the only reliable authority is the *Codex Puteaneus*, and Kohlmann's edition would have been improved by a closer adherence to the manuscript readings.

Pp. 45-51 and p. 164. Zwei Hermogeneskommentatoren. K. Fuhr. These are (1) Eustathios, whose commentary is mentioned by Johannes Doxopates. He seems to have incorporated parts of an older commentary verbally into his work. (2) Phoibammon, of whose person and time we know nothing, though his name suggests that he was of Egyptian stock. His commentary was freely used by Johannes Doxopates.

Pp. 52-69. De Hippiatricorum codice Cantabrigiensi. E. Oder describes a MS in the library of Emmanuel College, and prints the text of the fragment, *Σίμωνος Ἀθηναίου περὶ εἰδούς καὶ ἐπιλογῆς ἵππων*.

Pp. 70-108. Beiträge zur lateinischen Grammatik. Th. Birt. I. Ueber Vocalisirung des *j*. The trisyllabic *etiam* is usually said to be a compound of

et and *jam*, but no parallel has been cited from the historical period of the Latin language for the phonetic change thus assumed. After a prefix which ends in a consonant *j* regularly retains its consonantal force; it becomes vocalic only when it immediately precedes or follows a vowel *i*. In this case *j* first becomes vocalic and then disappears altogether. Thus *rejicio* (for *redjicio*) becomes *reiicio*, then *reicio*; *quadrijuga* becomes *quadrijiga*, *quadrijga*, *quadriga*. *Etiam* must be formed from *eti-jam*. This *eti* (cf. *dti*, *ēti*) would correspond to *et* as *uti* to *ut*. This hypothesis is supported by such combinations as *etiam tum*, *etiam nunc*, and by many passages in which *etiam* obviously means 'still, yet,' which was its earliest meaning. In like manner *quispiam* is formed from *quispe-jam*, through *quispi-jam*; the trisyllabic *nunciam* of Roman comedy from *nunce-jam*, *nunci-jam*; *quoniam* from *quone-jam*, *quoni-jam*. Incidentally Professor Birt suggests (p. 83) that *cuncti* is derived (not from *co-juncti*, but) from *cumque*, as *quintus* from *quinque*. This is the *cumque* which is found in *quicumque*. *Cumque* = omnino, *cuncti* = qui omnino sunt. Its original independence in position is shown by the so-called tmesis in *qui testamentum tradet tibi cumque* (Horace), *quod quoique quomque inciderit* (Terence), etc. For the addition of the termination *-tus* to an adverb like *cumque*, compare *tam*, *tantus*; *quam*, *quantus*.

Pp. 109–26. Arrians Periplus Ponti Euxini. C. G. Brandis. The document entitled 'Ἀρριανοῦ ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Τραϊανόν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ περίπλους Εὐξείνου Πόντου' is found in only one MS, Palatinus 398. The first part of this document seems to be a genuine letter from Arrian to the Emperor (Hadrian); the remainder is probably a forgery composed in the late Byzantine period.

Pp. 127–37. Das alte Athen vor Theseus. W. Dörpfeld replies to the criticism of J. M. Stahl on his new interpretation of Thuk. II 15 (see vol. L, pp. 566–75; A. J. P. XVI 516). Dörpfeld maintains that the lower part of the city of Kekrops was confined to the slope of the hill; Stahl, he says, must assume that it extended as far as the Ilissos—which is impossible. Relying upon the authority of C. Wachsmuth (Ber. der Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss., phil. Klasse, 1877, S. 387), he holds that ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν must here mean half way up the slope, or a fourth of the way up. He thinks it certain that both parts of the ancient city were surrounded by the Pelargic wall, and that Athens in the days of Kekrops was a small fortified town like Eleusis, or Aphidna, or Thorikos. He still maintains that τοῦτο τὸ μέρος means the site of the whole of the ancient city, not merely of the lower part, and is still of the opinion that πρὸς here means 'on' or 'on to.'

Pp. 138–52. Der pseudoeuripideische Anfang der Danae. R. Wünsch. This fragment, which has been regarded as spurious since the days of Elmsley and Jacobs, seems to have been written by Markos Musuros. The terminus post quem for its composition is the time of Theodorus Prodromus, i. e. the first half of the twelfth century; the terminus ante quem is the year of Musuros' death (1517), or rather the year of his final departure from Venice (1516).

Miscellen.—P. 153. F. Bücheler. Versus tragicus graecus. The verse is οἱ δ' ἀμφιγύσσονται Νέδαν ἐσκληκότα, *illi circumstipabunt sibi Nedam rigidis torridis*.

It is gained by a very slight change in the verse quoted by Hesychius in his gloss on ἐσκληρότα.—Pp. 153–7. Th. Birt. Zu Antisthenes und Xenophon. The fourth book of the Memorabilia was an independent essay περὶ παιδείας, and was intended to be a polemic against Antisthenes. The four divisions of education are announced in Memorab. IV 3, 1, apparently in the order of their importance in the eyes of Antisthenes; but in the discussion which follows the practical Xenophon takes them up in a different order.—Pp. 157–60. J. M. Stahl. Zu Philons Schrift vom beschaulichen Leben. A discussion of the passage 479 M 27–49, with a suggestion toward the improvement of the text.—Pp. 160–62. M. Manitius. Handschriftliches zur Anthologia latina. Variae lectiones of several poems of the Anthology (395, 394, 639, 640, 736) found in the Codex Berolin. Philipp. 1869, s. IX.—Pp. 162–3. J. Ziehen. Zu Cicero ad Quintum fratrem III 1. For *Velvinum* (v. l. *velvinus*) in §4 the writer proposes *V* (= Varro) *eluvium*; for *silva viridicata* in §3 he would read *silva viridi ditatam*.—P. 164. R. Fuchs. Nachtrag zu Band L, S. 580. The word βουζίων is explained by Gustav Meyer, Neugriechische Studien, II, as meaning 'elder' (tree).—K. Fuhr. Nachtrag zu oben, S. 48 f.

Pp. 165–96 and p. 466. Ueber die Schriftstellerei des Klaudios Galenos. III. J. Ilberg. (Continued from vol. XLVII 514; see A. J. P. XV 387.) An account of Galen's treatises on pathology, therapeutics and hygiene, with a table showing the probable order of their composition. Almost all of them were written during his second residence at Rome.

Pp. 197–210. Die Textgeschichte des Rutilius. C. Hosius publishes a collation of a MS in the library of the Duke of Sermoneta in Rome.

Pp. 211–25. Die panathenäischen und eleusinischen ιεροποιοί. L. Ziehen. I. Aristotle, 'Αθην. Πολ. 54, 7, says that the 'annual' ιεροποιοί superintended certain sacrifices and all the quinquennial festivals except the Panathenaea. Ziehen thinks that this exception was intended to include both the greater Panathenaea and the less. The latter was entrusted to a special commission, which is described in C. I. A. II 163 ιεροποιοὶ οἱ διοικοῦντες τὰ Παναθήναια τὰ κατ' ἐνιαυτόν. II. From the same section of the 'Αθην. Πολ. it is evident that the quinquennial Eleusinia was under the general charge of the ιεροποιοί κατ' ἐνιαυτόν. The inscriptions clearly point to the existence of a different set of ιεροποιοί whose duties were confined to the temple at Eleusis. These were at first called ἱ. Ἐλευσινόθεν, but between 419 and 329 their name and, to some extent, their duties were changed, and they were known in later times as ἱ. ἐν βουλῇ.

Pp. 226–39. Das Verhältniss der aristotelischen zu der thukydeischen Darstellung des Tyrannenmordes. P. Corssen. In the 18th chapter of the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία the vengeance of Harmodios and Aristogeiton is referred to the behavior of Thessalos, not of Hipparchos. In order to put Aristotle's account of the assassination in accord with that of Thukydides, J. M. Stahl proposes to strike out the words καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἀνακρέοντα . . . Θέτταλος δὲ νεώτερος πολὺ (vol. L, pp. 382 ff.; A. J. P. XVI 514–15). Corssen maintains that this passage is genuine. Aristotle deliberately differs from Thukydides in his account of this event, and this is not the only point of difference.

Pp. 240-72. Beiträge zur lateinischen Grammatik (continued from p. 108).
 II. Ueber Kürzungen trochäischer Wörter. Th. Birt rejects the view of F. Skutsch (Forschungen zur lateinischen Grammatik und Metrik, Leipzig, 1892) that Plautus sometimes dropped the final *e* of such words as *nempe*, *unde*, *inde*, *ille*, and that the resulting *nemp*, *und*, *ind*, *ill* were often further simplified to *nem*, *un*, *in*, *il*. Our authorities for the popular pronunciation of Latin show no trace of such shortened forms. According to Skutsch's own statistics *nempe*, *inde*, etc., are made pyrrhic in Plautus only, or most frequently, when they are followed by a consonant, a fact which shows the careful pronunciation of the final *e*. Nor is it probable that *ille* and *illa* were both reduced to the form *il*. Birt maintains that the shortening of these words is often due to the fact that they lack emphasis or accent in the sentence. All the pronominal forms under consideration are naturally unemphatic and are apt to be rapidly pronounced. The German 'nämlich' is not an adequate translation of the conversational *nempe*; better is 'ja' or 'doch,' e. g. Curc. 42 *nempe* obloqui me iusseras 'Du befehlst mir doch zu widersprechen.' The proclitic nature of *nempe* is shown by its vocalic weakening (cf. *igitur* for *agitur*), whereas the emphatic *namque* has retained its *a*. Incidentally the writer discusses the 'exilitas' of intervocalic *ll* in Latin, especially with an *i* preceding, and explains certain cases of so-called 'elision.' *Vas argenteis* for *vasis argenteis* and *palm et crinibus* for *palmis et crinibus* are just such expressions as the German 'ein und demselben' for 'einem und demselben,' or 'in gut und bösen Tagen.' The form *omnimodis* is due to a similar conscious omission or ellipsis of a syllable, and *multimodis* is the natural result of analogy. Here belong several of the supposed cases of elision of the *s* before vowels given by F. Leo (Plautinische Forschungen, S. 231 ff.). *Inde* has always kept its *d* intact, while *deinde*, *proinde* and *exinde* sometimes lost their final *de*. All these words begin with a preposition which governs the ablative. In *de-in-de* the final *de* seemed superfluous, and was omitted in popular speech; *proin* and *exin* were formed by analogy. *Perinde* escaped a like mutilation because *per* did not govern the ablative; *subinde* did not appear in literature until after the shortened forms had fallen into disfavor.

Pp. 273-80. Die Theosophie des Aristokritos. A. Brinkmann. Cotelarius and Tollius have published the formula of abjuration dictated by the Greek church to converted Manichaeans. In its present form this formula seems to date from the second half of the ninth century. The first half is directed against the original heresy of the Manichaeans; the second half seems to have been added about a century later for the benefit of their direct successors, the Paulicians. At the end of the first part is an index librorum prohibitorum which includes the 'Theosophy' of a certain Aristokritos: τὴν Ἀριστοκρίτου βίβλον, ἣν ἐπέγραψε Θεοσοφίαν, ἐν ἣ πεिरᾶται δεικνύναι τὸν Ἰουδαϊσμὸν καὶ τὸν Ἑλληνισμὸν καὶ τὸν Χριστιανισμὸν καὶ τὸν Μανιχαϊσμὸν ἐν εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δόγμα. Brinkmann thinks that this work is identical with a work which had the same purpose and the same title, and from which we have some extracts in the *χρησμοὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν* published by Buresch (Klaros. Unters. zum Orakelwesen, Leipzig, 1889, S. 95 ff.).

Pp. 281-302. Die Amtstracht der Vestalinnen. H. Dragendorff. The dress of the vestal virgin is essentially that of the bride. The cingulum and

the turrita corona were worn by both; the flammeum of the bride and the suffibulum of the vestal were originally identical. The seni crines of the vestal was a kind of peruke which almost entirely concealed her own hair. By the formal captio the vestal is freed from the patria potestas, and her position is henceforth that of the mater familias. The captio is, as it were, a marriage to the deity, who is represented at first by the king, later, by the pontifex; the words used by the pontifex in this ceremony are significant: ita te, *amata*, capio. So the Christian maiden renounces earthly marriage to become the bride of Christ. It is significant, also, that it was the pontifex who punished unchastity in the vestal, and that this punishment was the same as was inflicted in early times by the injured husband upon the adulterous wife.

Miscellen.—Pp. 303-4. F. Solmsen. Ein nominaler Ablativus Singularis im Griechischen. This is the word *φοῖκω* in an inscription recently discovered at Delphi and published by Th. Homolle (Bull. corr. hell. XIX 5 ff.). Homolle explained the word as a genitive singular.—Pp. 304-5. J. Wackernagel. Das Zeugniß der delphischen Hymnen über den griechischen Accent. A word which has the grave accent may be compared with the syllables of a single word which precede the accent.—Pp. 306-11. J. M. Stahl. Noch einmal das vortheseische Athen. A reply to Dörpfeld's paper, pp. 127-37. Dörpfeld's topographical view as to the position of the Dionysion ἐν Λίμναις and the Enneakrounos is only an hypothesis, which cannot be admitted unless it agrees with the statement of Thukydides. His excavations have not yet furnished a single certain proof of his claim. Stahl is still skeptical of the discovery of the site of a Dionysion ἐν Λίμναις which was about 15 m. higher than the ancient market-place, and still rejects D.'s explanation of ὑπ' αὐτήν, of τοῦτο τὸ μέρος and of πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος.—Pp. 311-14. E. Oder. Ad Simonis Atheniensis fragmentum (pp. 67-9) addendum. Some notes, supplied by F. Kenyon, on a MS in the British Museum.—Pp. 314-15. L. Radermacher. De Phoinicis loco. A proposed correction of a verse cited by Athenaeus, 530^e. R. would read *τάλαντ', Ἀπολλων*, for *καὶ τάλλα πολλων*.—Pp. 315-18. M. Ihm. Zu Philodem *περὶ κολακείας*.—Pp. 318-20. V. Ryssel. Nachtrag zu 'Zwei neu aufgefundene Schriften der graeco-syrischen Literatur' (Bd. LI, S. 1). The writer has recently discovered the Greek text of the 'Treatise of (one of) the Philosophers on the Soul.' The Syriac version is a translation of the *Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν* written by Bishop Gregorius Thaumaturgus of Neocaesarea, who died about 270 A. D.—Pp. 320-25. E. Hoffmann. Die Fescenninen. Horace, Ep. II 1. 145, says that the Fescennina licentia was introduced at the ancient harvest-home; Vergil, G. II 385, refers not to the festival of the vintage, but to the Liberalia which fell on March 14. Liber, a native Latin deity, was the author of fertility, and his symbol was the fascinum. The name *versus fescennini* is due to the prominence of the fascinum in the celebration of his festival.—Pp. 325-6. F. Buecheler. Zum Gedicht des Pseudosolinus. The title *ponticon* may be a corruption of *poeticon*. To judge from the Latinity, the poem was probably composed in the age of the Antonines.—Pp. 327-8. C. Weyman. Varia. Notes on Acts, XXVIII 16; Juvenus, II 754; Damasus, XXXII 1 ff. (read

carnifices, not *carnificis*); Carm. lat. epigr. 727 B; and on the expression *digna dignis*.—P. 328. S. Fränkel. Zu Band L, S. 587. For the obscure word *τούρπετ*, cf. Ducange, 1591, and Löw, Aram. Pflanzenn., 410, Nr. 80.

Pp. 329–80. Die drei Brände des Tempels zu Delphi. H. Pomtow. It is commonly believed that the temple at Delphi built by the Amphictyons after the conflagration of 548–47 remained standing for more than 700 years, and that it is this temple whose ruins have recently been discovered by the French excavations at the village of Kastri. This belief rests upon the express statements of Pausanias (X 5, 13), Strabo (IX 421) and others. A new temple of stone was begun about 540 and completed about 520–15. The architect was Spintharos of Corinth. This was the *δόμος θαητός* of Pindar's seventh Pythian. The temple of Spintharos was destroyed by fire about 372. The rebuilding soon began, but was not completed before the end of the third century. Under the year 84 B. C. = Ol. 174, 1, Eusebius says (II, p. 133, Schoene): "templum tertio apud Delfos a Thracibus incensum et Romae Capitolium." Ὑπὸ Μήδων in Plutarch, Numa, 9, should be corrected to ὑπὸ Μαίδων, and τὸ Δελφικόν in Appian, Illyr. 5, is a mistake for τὸ Δωδωναῖον. This third fire may be assigned to the last quarter of Ol. 174, 1 = 84–83, i. e. to April–June of B. C. 83. After this calamity Delphi sank into a condition of utter insignificance and helplessness which lasted for more than a century. The work of restoration was perhaps begun in the time of Augustus, but little progress was made until the visit of Nero to Delphi in the autumn of 67; λέγουσι δ' ὅτι ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀτελής (sc. ὁ νεώς), ἕως οὗ ὑστερον Νέρων, ὁ βασιλεὺς Ῥωμαίων, ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτὸν, ἐκεῖσε παραγενόμενος (Schol. to Aeschin. Ctesiph. 115).

Pp. 381–400. Zu Ciceros Rede pro Flacco. F. Schöll. Textual notes, especially on the fragmentary introduction.

Pp. 401–40. Die jetzige Gestalt der Grammatik des Charisius. L. Jeep. Diomedes must have known and used the work of Charisius. Charisius did not borrow directly from Romanus, but both drew upon common sources.

Pp. 441–55. Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung des Dialogs Axiochos. A. Brinkmann.

Pp. 456–62. Das Wahlgesetz des Aristoteles. E. Fabricius. Plutarch, Arist. 22, mentions a decree proposed by Aristides in 487–86, τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων αἰρεῖσθαι. This statement is apparently contradicted by the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, but it need not be absolutely rejected as a "groundless invention" (Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen, I, S. 124. 4). Aristides did propose such a decree, not as a constitutional change, but as an exceptional procedure for that year to suit the exceptional circumstances in which the Athenians found themselves. Plutarch's authority was probably the decree itself, which may have been published by Craterus.

Miscellen.—Pp. 463–6. L. Radermacher. Varia. Textual notes on several passages in Aelian.—P. 466. J. Ilberg. Ueber Galenos, Nachtrag.—Pp. 466–8. K. Kalbfleisch. Ueber Galens Schrift Περὶ λεπτυνούσης διαίτης.—Pp. 468–70. Th. Birt. Zu Catull und Petron. *Gemelli* in Catullus, 57, 6, means '*testiculi*,' and *utrique* is dative. There is a similar use of οἱ δίδυμοι in Greek; cf. Philo-

dem., Anthol. Pal. V 125 τοὺς κείνου πελέκει δεῖ διδύμους ἀφελεῖν. Ammianus Marcellinus, Claudianus and Solinus use *gemi* with the same meaning, and this meaning must be lurking in two passages of Petronius, 35 and 39: "super *geminos* testiculos ac rienes," and "in *geminis* nascuntur . . . colei."—Pp. 470–71. O. Hirschfeld. Petronius und Lucianus. The οἰκέτη νεοπλούτῳ of the twentieth chapter of Lucian's essay πῶς δεῖ ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν is probably a reminiscence of Trimalchio; cf. Cena Trim. 76, 32 and, especially, 36.—P. 471. J. Gilbert. Ad Petroni saturas (53). Proposes to read reliqua *enim* *ta*lia acroamata etc. for reliqua [animalia] acroamata etc.—Pp. 471–3. F. Bücheler. Altes Latein (vgl. Band XLVI, S. 233). XX. The epitaph of Encolpus, C. I. L. VI 14672, may be assigned to the third generation after Petronius and Nero. The word *opter* is a genuine archaism; for its formation cf. *inter*, *praeter*, *propter*, etc.—Pp. 473–4. M. Ihm. Tessera hospitalis. F. Barnabei, Notizie degli scavi for March, 1895, describes a token recently discovered at Trasacco. It is the half of a small ram's head of bronze divided lengthwise, the cut surface being inscribed with the names of two men and the word 'hospes.' It probably belongs to the second century B. C. This discovery explains the purpose of a similar token now at Vienna. It also supports the old view that these tokens were made by dividing a single object, each party keeping one part. Cf. Plato, Sympos. 191 D and 193 A; Plaut. Poen. 1047 f.—Pp. 474–5. O. Hirschfeld. Das Consulatsjahr des Tacitus. This was the year 97. The person referred to in Plin. Panegy. 58, erat in senatu ter consul, was not Verginius Rufus, but Fabricius Veiento.—Pp. 475–7. O. Hirschfeld. Die Tyrier in dem zweiten Römisch-Karthagischen Vertrag. Polybius, III 24, wrote Τυρίων for κυρίων by mistake.—Pp. 478–80. F. Skutsch. Randbemerkungen zu S. 240 ff. A brief reply to some of Th. Birt's criticism, pp. 253–6. No Roman poet hesitated to place *ille*, *illa*, *illam*, etc., before a word beginning with a vowel, because the gender of the pronoun was likely to be obscured. Plautus did sometimes shorten the first syllable and elide the last syllable of the same word; e. g. Aulul. 708 ūbi ille ābiit, 785 ēgo illum ūt, Asin. 370, 757, Rud. 960, etc., etc.—P. 480. C. F. W. M. Zu Band LI, S. 328. With the expression *digna dignis* compare Arnob. I 39, p. 26, 19 Reif. *digna de dignis sentio*.

Pp. 481–91. Zur Handschriftenkunde und Geschichte der Philologie. (Continued from vol. XL, pp. 453 ff.; A. J. P. X 112.) R. Foerster. IV. Cyriacus von Ancona zu Strabon. Cyriacus of Ancona had a copy of the seventeen books of Strabo made for him by a friend in Constantinople, and on the margin of this copy he added all sorts of geographical, historical and linguistic comments with his own hand. The first part of this MS, containing the first ten books, is in the library of Eton College, the second part (11–16) is at Florence, Laurent. XXVIII 15. The interesting history of its fortunes.

Pp. 492–505. De Properti poetae testamento. Th. Birt. A commentary on Propert. II 13 b. After the introductory couplet the poem falls into two parts of equal length. The first part closely follows the order of the Roman funeral rites. The words *funeris acta mei* (v. 18) may be compared with *mandata de funere suo* (Sueton. Aug. 101).

Pp. 506-28. De Francorum Gallorumque origine Troiana. Th. Birt defends the epithet *Gallicus* in Propert. II 13. 48 *Gallicus Iliacis miles in aggeribus*. The belief that the Franks and Gauls were descended from the Trojans was widely spread throughout the Middle Ages, and must have existed at Rome when this poem was written. Cf. Aethicus, Cosmogr. (ed. Wuttke, p. 77); Lucan, Phars. I 427; Amm. Marc. XV 9; Caes. B. G. I 33. 2; Quint. Smyrn. Posthom. VII 611. The use of this epithet is very like the erudite Propertius; for its application cf. *Teucrum Quirinum*, IV 6. 21.

Pp. 529-43. Neu aufgefundene graeco-syrische Philosophensprüche über die Seele. V. Ryssel. These 'Sayings of the Philosophers' are found in the same Syriac MS as the 'Treatise of a Philosopher on the Soul' (pp. 1 ff.). A German translation is given.

Pp. 544-59. Excuse zu Virgil. O. Crusius. I. Entstehung und Composition der achten Ekloge. The writer refutes the heresy of the prosaic E. Bethe (vol. XLVII, 590 ff.; A. J. P. XV 387) that the two songs of the eighth Eclogue were originally intended to be independent mimes, not counterparts for an agon. II. Zur vierten Ekloge. In v. 60 *risu* can only mean the laugh of the child, and the subject of *risere*, v. 62, must be the same as the logical subject of *risu*. Crusius would read with Quintilian *qui non risere parenti*. The *nascens puer* of v. 8 is not the child of any Roman noble; he is a purely imaginary wonder-child. *Modo* in the same line should be compared with *modo*, Aen. IV 49 f. The mystic imagery of the beginning and close of the poem is of Sibylline origin, e. g. v. 10 and vv. 50-51. The infant is to show at once that he is more than human (v. 60); this idea is derived from Greek mysticism.

Pp. 560-88. Delphische Beilagen (S. oben S. 329). H. Pomtow. I. Die Jahre der Herrschaft des Peisistratos. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα in Arist., 'Αθην. Πολ. XV 1, should be changed to μετὰ δὲ ταύτην, and ἔπει μάλιστα ἐβδόμῳ to μὲν μάλιστα ἐβδόμῳ. The career of Peisistratos was as follows: first tyranny, spring to autumn, 560; first exile, autumn 560 to the end of 556-55; second tyranny, seven months of 555-54; second exile, spring 554 to the end of 545-44; third tyranny, middle of 544 to spring, 528-27. II. Die Datirung der VII. Pythischen Ode Pindars. The date of the poem is B. C. 486.

Pp. 589-95. Textkritisches zu Ciceros Briefen. J. Ziehen proposes the following readings: 1) Qu. F. II 14, 2 nec *labor antiqua* mea etc.; 2) Qu. F. I 1, 11 atque *incertos eos* quos etc.; 3) Att. II 20, 1 sed quia *holopragmatici* homines etc.; 4) Att. IV 11, 2 abs te *opipare* delector etc.; 5) Att. XI 23, 3 audimus enim *de statua Clodi*; 6) Brut. I 4, 5 *prorsus* alienae etc.; keep the reading unchanged and make *prorsus* ironical; 7) Qu. III 8, 1 *Labeoni* dedisse, *qui* adhuc non venerat.

Pp. 596-629. Ueber den Cynegeticus des Xenophon. I. L. Radermacher concludes from an examination of the language and style of the Cynegeticus that it is not the work of Xenophon. Even the mention of bears (XI 1) becomes a stumbling-block, and so does the absence of all reference to riding to hounds.

Miscellen.—Pp. 630–32. H. Weber. Zu Ariston von Chios.—Pp. 632–6. E. Ziebarth. Zur Epigraphik von Thyateira.—Pp. 636–7. W. Schwarz. Die Heptanomis seit Hadrian. By the founding of the city of Antinoë, under the Emperor Hadrian, the number of districts in the Heptanomis was increased to eight. The district of Arsinoë was then separated from the Heptanomis, and the domain of the old Heptanomis was thereafter described as “epistrategia septem nomorum et Arsinoitae.” This Arsinoë was the city on Lake Moeris, not the Arsinoë on the Red Sea. Cf. Orelli, Inscr. 516; C. I. L. III 6575.—Pp. 637–8. A. Riese. Zu Statius’ Silven. Proposes to change *calvum*, IV 3, 19, to *clavum*.—P. 638. M. Ihm. Zu Augustins Confessiones. For inspirabat *populo jam*, VIII 2, 3, read inspirabat *populo Osirim*. Cod. Bamberg. s. X has *populosirim*.—Pp. 638–40. F. Buecheler. De inscriptionibus quibusdam christianis. Notes on some inscriptions, both Greek and Latin, recently found in the catacombs at Syracuse. They were written between the years 383 and 452.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

WILFRED P. MUSTARD.

BEITRÄGE ZUR ASSYRIOLOGIE UND SEMITISCHEN SPRACHWISSENSCHAFT, herausgegeben von FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH und PAUL HAUPT. Dritter Band, Heft 3 (pp. 385–492). Leipzig, 1897.¹

The third Heft of the third volume of the Beiträge contains three articles.

The first of these (pp. 385–92) is an introductory paper by Friedrich Delitzsch, embodying some ‘preliminary remarks’ to the two following treatises by Demuth and Ziemer on legal and government records, dating from the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses. Delitzsch takes this opportunity to explain the method of transliteration (his own) followed by both writers, to comment on the reading of the proper names, and to give a complete table of the numbers of the texts as they occur in Strassmaier and in Demuth-Ziemer’s work.

He devotes two pages to an interesting discussion of the doubtful words *imittu* and *sattukku*. The first of these, which occurs hundreds of times in the legal tablets in apposition to *suluppu* ‘dates,’ he explains with great ingenuity as meaning ‘assessment, valuation,’ deriving it from *emēdu* ‘to impose,’ e. g. a tax or duty (**imidtu* = *imittu*). *Suluppu imittu*, therefore, are dates which are to be paid by the tenant to the proprietor as a rent, according to a previous agreement between the owner and the lessee of a field. Delitzsch had already conjectured that this was the meaning of *imittu* in his AW., p. 93, but arrives definitely at this conclusion in this article in the Beiträge, being led thereto by a passage in a legal document which he cites in full, where the word is used without any doubt in the sense of ‘rent.’²

He states also that *sattukku* does not mean ‘established offering,’ which is the meaning given in his AW., p. 513, but rather ‘the established, regular standard of value’ (*Gehalt*).³ This word seems to be an intensive noun-form from a stem 𐎶𐎢𐎠, which probably meant originally ‘to stand, to be perpetual.’

¹ For the report on Bd. III, Heft 2, see A. J. P. XVII, pp. 121–5.

² Cf. also Demuth, p. 404.

³ Cf. also Demuth, p. 438.

Thus we find the adjective *sattakka*, Nerigl. ii. 12, used practically synonymously with *la batlak* 'unceasing.' *Sattukku* is also discussed ZA. I, p. 3. The noun *mastaku* 'place of abode' seems also to be a derivative from the same stem.

The second article in the Heft (pp. 393-444) is a transliteration and translation with philological commentary by Ludwig Demuth, of fifty legal and government records of the time of Cyrus (538-529 B. C.).

Among other interesting legal peculiarities of the Babylonians, the author explains (p. 400) the laws in force regulating the value of slaves, if offered as security for a debt. Thus, according to him, a female slave and her daughter were accepted as security only when the debtor offering them owed the interest on the capital debt, e. g. the slaves were expected to pay the amount of interest due by their labor for the creditor during a fixed period of time. If, however, the debtor owed his principal, slaves were not regarded as a satisfactory security. In this case it was necessary to offer real property.

The opinion expressed, p. 408, that the original meaning of *urđū* was not 'assignment,' but rather 'debt, obligation,' is highly interesting, as it suggests the possible derivation of the word from *erđū* 'to desire, demand,' e. g. *urđū* might have meant 'a demand on a person,' hence 'an obligation.' Demuth considers *ilku* a synonym of *urđū* (p. 409).

The author's remarks on government slaves (p. 417) are also very instructive. He shows, in commenting on the expression *arad-šarrātu*, that there may have been certain male slaves who had been conquered in battle and who were forced, either to render military service, or to work on the royal buildings (palaces, temples, walls, etc.). He adds, however, that it seems probable that these slaves were purchasable by private persons.

The third and last article in the Heft is a similar treatise (pp. 445-92) by Ernst Ziemer on the legal and government records of the reign of Cambyses (529-521 B. C.).

It is interesting to notice that in Nr. 1 of these selections the fact is recorded, but not especially alluded to by Ziemer, that Cambyses was coregent while his father, Cyrus, was still living. Both Solomon and *Ašurbānīpal*, and possibly Belshazzar, son of Nabonidus, probably exercised similar functions in the lifetimes of their respective fathers, while in the inscriptions of Antiochus Soter, V R. 66, 25, mention is made of Seleukus his son and *the vice-king*.¹

Ziemer comments very strikingly (p. 449) on the exact meaning of the preposition *pāt*, which is translated by Peiser, who writes it *pāt*, (sic), as 'receipt' (see also p. 398). The author shows satisfactorily that the word in the contracts is a preposition with the force 'for, instead of, opposite to.' He might have added that this word is also used in the narrative inscriptions in the sense of 'opposite'; cf. Shalm. Mon. 26 *ina pāt ālišu arcip*. As *pāt*, *pātu* is an abstract formation from *pā* 'mouth,' its original meaning is probably 'entrance'; cf. *Šamširamman*, iv. 41 *ina pāt Durpapsukal*.

The allusions in various contract tablets to Egyptians who appeared as witnesses of deeds, etc., as, for example, that mentioned p. 452, show conclu-

¹ Prince, Mene, Mene, p. 27, n. 14.

sively, as Ziemer states, that the relations existing between Egypt and Babylonia during the reign of Cambyses must have been very close. The Egyptians mentioned in most of the inscriptions had become entirely Babylonian, bearing Babylonian names and living, no doubt, according to the Babylonian customs.

Such work as that of Demuth and Ziemer, which contributes to our knowledge of the laws and family customs of the Babylonians, cannot fail to be of the greatest value both to Assyriology and general history.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

J. DYNELEY PRINCE.

BRIEF MENTION.

Archaeologists' Greek is not intended to be a complimentary expression (A. J. P. IX 98), but it can hardly be expected that archaeologists should pay much attention to grammar. It is doubtless to archaeologists' Greek that we owe the precious statement, still to be found in Baedeker and repeated carelessly everywhere, e. g. in *The Nation* of Jan. 14, 1897, that Herodes Atticus "almost exhausted the quarries of Pentelikon in carrying out [his] magnificent improvement" [of the Stadion]. What Pausanias says (I 19 ex.) is: τοῦτο ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος Ἡρώδης ὠκοδόμησε καὶ οἱ τὸ πολὺ τῆς λιθοτομίας τῆς Πεντελῆσιν ἐς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν ἀνηλώθη. Surely it was not necessary to appeal, as has been done, to the actual state of Pentelikon in order to correct the 'exaggeration' of Pausanias. In the very next chapter we read ἐφασκεν [Φρίνη] οἰχεσθαι τῷ Πραξιτέλει τὸ πολὺ τῶν ἔργων. The quarry was the quarry of Herodes as the works were the works of Praxiteles. I cannot recall whether it was an archaeologist or a philologist who translated ΔΙΑΣΩΤΗΡΑ 'by the Saviour,' but it was an archaeologist who settled the hypaethral question by translating Strabo, VIII 30: ἀπτόμενον δὲ σχεδὸν τῇ κορυφῇ τῆς ὀροφῆς 'appearing almost to touch the uppermost ceiling.' And why should not ἀψασθαι take the dative in Strabo as θιγεῖν does—in Pindar? But apart from such monstrosities as these last, and their number might be multiplied, archaeologists are apt to satisfy themselves too readily as to points of Greek usage, especially on the dangerous ground of the prepositions, and so Professor REISCH, in the great work noticed elsewhere, has a short and easy method with ἐπὶ σκηνῆς (p. 285). "Dass das Vorwort ἐπὶ (mit Genetiv, Dativ und Accusativ) nicht nur zur Bezeichnung von Höhenunterschieden, sondern auch zur Bezeichnung der Nachbarschaft zweier auf gleichem Boden befindlicher Dinge verwendet wird, dürfte wohl bekannt genug sein." Then follows a list of quotations, sadly in need of sifting. Surely the average grammarian, on contemplating this 'happy despatch,' cannot but sadly think how long he has disquieted himself in vain about this very preposition ἐπὶ, and especially about the uses of ἐπὶ w. gen. and ἐπὶ with dat. Nay, there has of late appeared a special dissertation on a single branch of the subject, and perhaps Professor REISCH would not have written in this slap-dash way if he had read Dr. FORMAN's thesis *On the difference between the genitive and dative with ἐπὶ used to denote superposition*, 67 pp. (1894), inasmuch as the author has decidedly advanced the treatment of the subject and brings out the characteristic difference of the cases in a manner that does great credit to his fine appreciation of syntactical effect. The general conditions of the problem are, after all, not so abstruse, but it is one thing to state the conditions, another to work them out with scholarly care and discernment. When there is a rivalry between the genitive and dat.-locative, the dat.-locative is the more plastic. This is very plain with

ὑπό (Introduction to Pindar, c), and ἐπί is used most frequently with the dative "when the superposition sense makes itself felt" (l. c., xcix; A. J. P. XIV 499). ἐπί w. gen. tends to the phraseological, ἐπί with dat.-loc. to the actual, the corporeal, if plastic (Introduction, xcvi) is not plain enough; ἐπί with dat.-loc. tends to fixity, ἐπί with dat. to freedom (A. J. P. XI 372). ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς, to put the matter coarsely, is 'on the head,' ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ 'on top of the head.' Comp. Pind. Ol. 2, 12. This is a natural deduction from the cases themselves. The dative combines with a preposition *qua* locative, the genitive either *qua* ablative or *qua* fossilized adjective. Such a fossilized adjective we have in the familiar expressions εἰς, ἐν, ἐκ διδασκάλου, in which the genitive may be replaced by the proper case of διδασκαλεῖον. The genitive does not depend on the preposition, but on the local notion involved in the use of a preposition. There is no real ellipsis any more than in the corresponding English possessives. Tom's may be Tom's house or Tom's shop or what not. The practical equivalent is παρά, *chez*: παρὰ διδασκάλου, παρὰ διδασκάλῳ, παρὰ διδάσκαλον. Now, an extension of this doctrine would satisfy the conditions with ἐπί and elsewhere. In the vast majority of instances ἐπί with gen. denotes characteristic superposition, and it may still denote superposition in such standing expressions as ἐπὶ τέγους, ἐπ' οἰκήματος. See my Justin Martyr, Apol. I 26, 15, and note especially Athen. 5, 220 D: ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν μικρῶν οἰκημάτων. Perhaps a visit to Pompeii might help the grammarian's faith in the behavior of prepositions and postpone the divorce of this ἐπὶ τέγους from the ἐπὶ τοῦ τέγους of Lys. 3, 11: φύλακας κατέστησαν ἐπὶ τοῦ τέγους. The height of such a hut was well fitted for the display of the wares exposed. But any stand, any form of superposition, will answer the conditions—a seat in front, a step in the doorway. Still, Dr. Forman has cited a number of examples against such rule-makers as Rutherford (Babrius 2, 9), examples in which ἐπί cannot strictly mean superposition, though he adduces an interesting example (p. 63), Dem. 58, 40: ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων καὶ τοῦ βήματος, in which ἐπί retains enough literalness for the second member. But whatever the local exigencies may be, the phraseological, the adjectival character of the combination is unmistakable. οἱ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς as a technical term is simply οἱ σκηνῖται, the 'hutmen.' The rarity of ἐπί w. gen. of mere proximity in the best period, the large possibilities of the 'upon' element even then—all this is abundantly shown in Dr. Forman's dissertation. That οἱ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς is more common than οἱ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς, a fact on which REISCH lays great stress, is a very simple matter. ἀπὸ σκηνῆς is ἐπὶ σκηνῆς from a different point of view. Sporadic examples in which ἐπί with gen. seems to mean 'before' do not strengthen the σκηνή argument, which may quietly repose on the phraseological use of ἐπί. 'On the playhouse side' is all the theory demands, and the phrase was fixed long before the time of the earliest passage cited.

Another preposition which plays an important part in topography is πρὸς, and the Enneakrunos controversy may be said to hinge on it. See Thuk. 2, 15. Without going into that controversy, it may suffice to say that πρὸς with acc. can only mean 'facing, fronting.' It is the same preposition that is used of the same locality in Ar. Lysistrata. The Akropolis, or πόλις, as it was popularly called, has two faces, and the part meant in the Lysistrata is τὰ προπύλαια (v. 265), the western end. The women had barred the Propylaia,

and the men had resolved to burn the barriers away, so that the burning question of the Akropolis now was the burning question then.

A satisfactory edition of Horace, like a satisfactory translation of Horace, is an impossibility. Every scholar worthy of the name has an edition of his own, just as he has heartstrings of his own about which the Venusian plays. For the English schoolboy, perhaps nothing better could be hoped than the abridged triumvirate *Horace* of PAGE, PALMER and WILKINS just published by The Macmillan Co., and many American scholars will welcome it in spite of drawbacks which will be felt more in this country than in England. Neither grammar nor metres are in accord with recent studies. German authorities as late as 1894 are cited, it is true. Names like that of Plüss recur frequently, but there has been no systematic revision. On *egit visere montes* (C. I 2, 9) we are told that this infinitive is of extreme rarity, but Robinson Ellis, who remarks, A. J. P. V 12 (1884), that 'it belongs in the main to later Latin,' says in his *Avianus*, XXII 1 (1887), that 'it is common from the earliest Latin to the latest, and that it is not unfrequent in Augustan and post-Augustan poetry.' Brenous (*Hellénismes*, p. 275), like Bonnet, believes in Greek influence, but it is Greek influence, not strictly Greek idiom. The note on *ne—quaesieris* (C. I 11, 1) is decidedly behind the times, not to say antiquated (see Elmer, A. J. P. XV [1894], 133 foll.), and one becomes a little weary of the fut. indicative as a 'polite imperative,' against which I raised my voice—a *vox clamantis in deserto*—many years ago. It is not a polite imperative, nor a mild imperative: it is a familiar imperative, such as one often uses in English to a servant (cf. Hopkins, *The Aryan Future*, A. J. P. XIII 37), and Horace has some good examples in *Epist.* I 13, where he addresses one Vinius, whom he treats throughout *de haut en bas*.—To turn for a moment to another sphere, the long note on *Epist.* I 6, 51—a note which, like many others, is too long for a schoolbook—might have been shortened, if the redactor, Mr. Page, had noticed or had seen in time the inscriptional evidence which Mr. Olcott (A. J. P. XVI 79) has brought to strengthen the traditional interpretation of *trans pondera*. But such close study of periodical literature is hardly to be expected. Not unreasonable, however, would be the demand of decent proof-reading. It is hard to understand how a Greek scholar could suffer the jumble of accents one finds in the familiar quotation from Alkaios (C. I 9), and *Heraclides*, cited C. I 14, has been *Herakleitos* to my certain knowledge since 1851, the date of Mehler's edition of the Homeric Allegories, and ought to have been *Herakleitos* before. Inexplicable to me is the omission of the Greek original or the Greek basis of C. I 27. But perhaps the editor was too busy to notice Anakreon, so bent was he on the mild joke, 'The manner of Mr. Bardell's decease is strictly classical.' Now, personally I have no objection to the playful reference. Only I remember how I myself was maltreated by Mr. Page's countrymen for a like reference to Mrs. Waterbrook, who is quite as presentable as Mr. Bardell (cf. A. J. P. XIV 501). In the same ode, v. 10, we have *Opuntiae Megyllae*, and we are told that "Megylla is a fictitious name" and that "Opus was the capital of Opuntian Locris." That may be quite

enough, but is it quite enough? Of course, Horace's Greek girls are fictitious. No human being—not even the author of the *Amores* (III 7, 26)—would have been equal to so many sweethearts. But, however unreal they are, it is the scholar's business to find out the origin of their names. Milton's Amaryllis comes straight from Vergil, Milton's Neaera comes straight from Horace, hair and all, and in like manner Horace's Neaera comes straight from Parthenius. There was a Milesian lady of that name, a name which would have been tolerable in the home of Aspasia (see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, cited A. J. P. XVI 125), and we all know what manner of woman the Neaira was that figures in Ps. Dem. LIX. Lyce's name is borne by an ancient Greek light o' love, Λύκα. Lyde was the sweetheart of Antimachos. Asterie recalls the famous epigram ἀστέρας εἰσαθρεῖς, ἀστὴρ ἐμός, and Asterie was doubtless a fallen star. In short, the proper names of these improper persons are clothed or must have been clothed with literary atmosphere, and I do not believe that Horace had the courage to invent so much as the name of a Greek *cocotte*. So *Megylla* or *Megilla* is not a chance name selected for its smooth sound, as Orelli would have us believe. *Megylla* was doubtless a great scamp, and we find a Μέγυλλα playing the part of an ἐταῖρα in Lucian. Nor is the adjective *Opuntiae* taken at random. *Megylla* was a Locrian, and every one knows what manner of songs the Λοκρικὰ ᾄσματα were (see Hanssen, A. J. P. IX 457 foll.). Now, I do not say that Horace belongs to those who are capable of alluding to Doll Tearsheet and Moll Flanders without having met a Doll Tearsheet or a Moll Flanders in the flesh, but he is a bookman through and through, and Greek is necessary to the appreciation of him even in a school edition.

The fourth edition of the *First Book of Classen's Thukydides* has appeared (Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung). The editor is J. STEUP, who has made considerable additions and modifications, so that the Thukydidean scholar cannot afford to neglect the book. Especially interesting is STUDNICZKA's learned appendix on the Old Attic coiffure. In the preface, after resenting Croiset's treatment of his labors, STEUP proceeds to mention the late Professor MORRIS's ed. of Classen in the usual sniffy German way. Now, Morris worked very carefully and conscientiously. His basis was Classen, to be sure, but beneath Classen lay what Morris deemed to be truth, and he did not hesitate to differ on occasion from the master whom he followed in the main. Consequently STEUP is forced to admit that MORRIS has often aided him in the correction of typographical errors and other small oversights, though otherwise he has very, very seldom received any furtherance from the American editor. The correctness of the statement I am not disposed to impugn, inasmuch as the examination of a few selected passages has sufficed to convince me that, at least in matters of grammar, STEUP does not know enough to learn from others, and I call attention to his grudging acknowledgment of American work chiefly to emphasize a doctrine which it is the duty of an American Journal of Philology (X 502) to uphold. No one has been more generous than I have been in my praises of German learning and German methods, but are we capable of nothing else but adaptations? No matter

how carefully the work may be done, it will be considered by some slavish and by others indolent. The ancient classics speak to each nationality with a different voice, and surely American classical philology is no longer in its nonage, and American editors ought to stand on their own feet. Let hand-books be translated, if it must be so, but let us look into the face of the ancients with American eyes.

Mr. LIONEL HORTON-SMITH's elaborate article on *οὐ* = *haud* reminds me to say what I ought to have said long ago, that while I welcomed very heartily Professor Elmer's first treatise on the *Latin Prohibitive*, which appeared in A. J. P. XV 132-53, and was glad to incorporate the main results in my Latin grammar of 1894, the second part, which resolved *nec* with the perf. subj. into a potential construction (XV 299-328), has never satisfied me. The only true syntactical parallel to *οὐ* is *haud*. *Neque* and *nēve* have, it is true, a certain practical correspondence to *οὐδέ* and *μηδέ* respectively, but *nē quidem* and *nē-quaquam* and *nēquiquam* are sturdy monuments of the old state of things, and prevent the perfect parallelism of *μή* and *ne*. *Nē quis* seems to be sharply differentiated from *nullus*, but how often does *nē quis* occur, how often the accusative feminine? Or are we seriously to suppose that in the line *Nullam, Vare, sacra vite prius severis arborem*, which is an instructively close translation of Alkaios: *μηδὲν ἄλλο φυτεύσης πρότερον δένδριον ἀμπέλω*, Horace conceived the *nullam severis* as *οὐδὲν ἂν φυτεύσειας*. To be frank, should we not be tempted to call Horace *nēquam*, if he had used *nē quam* as demanded by the strict rule? Nor does it seem probable that in passing from *tu ne quaesieris scire nefas* to *nec Babylonios temptaris numeros* he felt any special lurch. Why, one may well ask, if the feeling was so strong, did he not use *neu*? In a matter that is largely a matter of feeling it is impossible to be dogmatic, but a syntactical equation of *μή* and *nē* does not seem tenable, especially when one considers the enormous range of *μή* in Greek.

This Journal has been singularly unlucky in its efforts to call attention to 'epochal' works, and the notices of Mr. GAWAIN HAMILTON's *Moods of the English Bible* (IX 516) and Mr. PHILIP SKENE's *Ante-Agamemnona, a New Departure in Philology* (XIV 258) have been interpreted unfavorably by the authors concerned. The Editor's mind is wide open to conviction on all etymological matters, and when his collaborators have refused to consider doctrines that they had condemned in advance, he has not hesitated to call for a fair field; but in vain. And it is to be feared that the Abbé ESPAGNOLLE's laborious work, *Le vrai dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française* (Paris, Klincksieck), runs counter to so many prejudices that the bare statement will suffice. According to him, Hellenic is the direct descendant of Pelasgian. The neo-Latin peoples are of Greek or Pelasgian origin. Modern French is a sister-language of Hellenic, and Modern French exhibits about 4500 Greek roots attested and, as it were, authenticated by Hellenic. The common stock of the idioms of the Mediterranean is Greek, not Latin. A few examples will serve to show the way in which the vocabulary is handled. "Accort vfr.

cortois, χόρτος, poli, qui sait les usages. LIT(ΤΡΕ), **a** et **corriger**e." "Aieul vfr. *aiol*, αἰώλιος, très âgé, αἰώλιος est le même que αἰώνιος parceque le ν et le λ permutent. LIT(ΤΡΕ), **aviolus**, Latin forgé." "Arracher, *arrachō*, ἀρράσσω dor. pour ἀναρρήσσω, le même qu'ἀναρρήγνυμι, j'arrache. LIT(ΤΡΕ), **abradicare**." "Artiste, d'ἀρτίστω, *je prépare avec art, j'embellis*. 'Αρτίστω est une forme dor. d'ἀρτίζω. LIT(ΤΡΕ), **ars**." The Doric and Aeolian dialects play a great rôle in the Abbé Espagnolle's etymologies, and a special chapter prepares us for the unfamiliar forms which the Hellenic words assume in this *Dictionnaire Étymologique*. But the subject, as I have said, does not lie within my competence, and I must content myself with recording the appearance of a book which will remind every scholar of Henri Estienne's famous *Conformité*.

In the matter of English *di me pusilli finxerunt animi*. I am conservative by nature, by education, by profession. I do not glory in American English unless I am backed by ancient usage, and I am mortally afraid of my transplanted fellow-countryman, Dr. Fitzedward Hall. His 'Modern English' is always at my elbow, but I am afraid to consult it too often, lest I should cease to write altogether, and writing is my trade. The letter A in the Oxford Dictionary caused me sleepless nights. To be sure, I was comforted for having used *aloofness* in my Pindar, but I could not deny that I had once or twice in my life employed *aside* in order to vary the monotony of *apart*, and when Dr. Hall transfixed an American scholar for having used *at that*, I felt as if his spear had gone through me also. And the worst of it is that in my Essay on Platen the wretched phrase makes a rhyme with 'flat,' and I have never been able to think of a good equivalent. Of late, *around* has begun to haunt me, and when 'fond memory brings the light of other days around me,' I bethink me of the many passages in which I and other people—notably English classics—have used that unnecessary 'a.' If, then, I am somewhat given to Biblical phraseology, it is because I can cling to the altar of the Authorized Version and feel myself fairly safe. But my timidity does not keep me from indulging in a certain fearful joy when any one is bold enough to try conclusions with Dr. Fitzedward Hall, and this is what Mr. RALPH OLMSTED WILLIAMS has done in *Some Questions of Good English Examined in Controversies with Dr. Fitzedward Hall* (New York, Henry Holt & Co.). All I dare say is that it is very good reading.

'Eine edle Frau giebt es nicht bei [Pindar],' says WILAMOWITZ in his recent edition of the *Choëphori* (*Das Opfer am Grabe*, p. 32). That is a hard saying, especially to an editor who has ventured to call Pindar 'a manner of Frauenlob' (see my Pindar, p. 201). Surely Alkmene is not unworthy of her son (N. 1, 50). It means something that Cheiron is known by his mother's name and that the pure daughters of the Centaur reared that model prince Jason (P 4, 103). The Ninth Olympian is given up to the Eternal Feminine, and the lofty realm of personifications is full of goddesses. If the worship of the Virgin Mary is a tribute to womanhood and motherhood, something is to be said for Pindar's shining forms arrayed in woman's garb.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Thanks are due to Messrs. Lemcke & Buechner, 812 Broadway, New York, for material furnished.

AMERICAN.

D'Ooge (B. L.), Ed. *Easy Latin for Sight Reading*. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. 8 + 146 pp. 16mo, cl., 45 cts.

Fernald (Ja. C.) *English Synonyms and Antonyms*. New York, *Funk & Wagnalls Co.*, 1896. 10 + 564 pp. 8vo, buckram, \$1.50.

Homer. *Iliad*; tr. into English verse by W. C. Bryant. (Students' ed.) Boston, *Houghton, Mifflin & Co.*, 1897. 12mo, cl., net \$1.

Müller (F. Max), Ed. *Sacred Books of the East*. V. 42. *Hymns of the Atharva-Veda*; tr. by Maurice Bloomfield. V. 46. *Vedic Hymns*. Pt. 2; tr. by Hermann Oldenberg. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 8vo, v. 42, cl., net \$6.50; v. 46, pt. 2, cl., net \$4.50.

Stedman (T. L.) *Modern Greek Mastery: a short road to Ancient Greek*. New York, *Harper*, 1896. 12mo, cl., \$1.50.

ENGLISH.

Dawson (J. W.) *Relics of Primaeval Life*. London, 1897. 8vo, 352 pp. With 55 illustr. 6s.

Gardner (P.) *The Sculptured Tombs of Hellas*. London, 1897. 8vo, 280 pp. £1 5s.

Herodotus. *The Text of Canon Rawlinson's Translations*. With the notes abridged by A. J. Grant. 2 vols. London, 1897. 8vo. 12s.

Murray (J. A. H.) *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*. Vol. III. *Disobst.—Distrustful*. London, 1896. 4to, 64 pp. 2s. 6d.

Sacramentum Leonianum. Edited with notes by C. L. Feltoe. London, 1897. 8vo. With 3 illustr. 12s. 6d.

Sweet (H.) *The Student's Dictionary of Anglo-Saxon*. London, 1897. 4to, 234 pp. 8s. 6d.

Winckler (Hg.) *Tel-El-Amarna Letters*. Transliteration, English translation, vocabulary. London, 1896. 8vo, 507 pp. 21s.

Wright (J.) *The English Dialect Dictionary*. Pt. 2. *Ballow—Blare*. London, 1897. 4to. 15s.

FRENCH.

Lermina (L.) et Levêque (H.) *Dictionnaire thématique français-argot*. Paris, 1897. 16mo, xvi + 224 pp. 10 fr.

Michel (Ch.) *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques*. Fasc. 1. Paris, 1896. 8vo, 192 pp. 5 fr.

Rambaud (I.-B.) *La langue mandé*. Paris, 1897. 8vo. 5 fr.

Révillout (E.) *Notice des papyrus démotiques archaïques*. Paris, 1897. 4to, 544 pp. 70 fr.

Viteau (I.) *Étude sur le grec du Nouveau Testament*. Paris, 1897. 8vo. 12 fr.

Vlachos (A.) *Dictionnaire grec-français*. Paris, 1896. 8vo, 1000 pp. 25 fr.

GERMAN.

Aegyptiaca. Festschrift f. Georg Ebers zum 1. III. 1897. Mit 1 Taf. in Lichtdr. u. 9 Fig. im Text. gr. 8. vii, 152 S. L., *W. Engelmann*. m. 20.

Αἰσχύλου δράματα σωζόμενα καὶ ἀπολωλότων ἀποσπάσματα μετὰ ἐξηγητικῶν καὶ κριτικῶν σημειώσεων τῇ συνεργασίᾳ Εὐγενίου Ζωμαρίδου ἐκδιδόμενα ὑπὸ Ν. Wecklein. Τόμος II καὶ III τεῦχος Α'. gr. 8. Athen. Leipzig, *O. Harrassowitz in Komm.*—II. περιέχων *Προμηθεῖα, Ἰκέτιδας καὶ Ἀποσπασμάτια*. vii, 648 S. m. 10.—III Α'. περιέχων *Ἀποσπασμάτια*. S. 649–798. m. 2.

Anthologia latina, edd. Franc. Buecheler et Alex. Riese. Pars II. *Carmina latina epigraphica*, conlegit Franc. Buecheler. Fasc. II. 8. S. 399–921. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 5.20.

Apulei (Lucii) metamorphoseon libri XI. Recensuit J. van der Vliet. 8. xxix, 292 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 3.

Ausgaben u. Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der romanischen Philologie. Veröffentl. v. E. Stengel. 95. Hft. gr. 8. Marburg, *N. G. Elwert's Verl.*—95. Pätzold (Alfr.) *Die individuellen Eigentümlichkeiten einiger hervorragender Trobadors im Minneliede*. 145 S. m. 3.20.

Bibliothek der angelsächsischen Poesie, begr. v. Chrn. W. M. Grein. Hrsg. v. Rich. Paul Wülker. 3. Bd. 1. Hälfte. gr. 8. vii, 248 S. L., *G. H. Wigand*. m. 11.

Bibliothek indogermanischer Grammatiken, bearb. v. F. Bücheler, B. Delbrück, K. Foy u. a. III. Bd. L., *Breitkopf & Härtel*.—III. *Griechische Grammatik* v. Gust. Meyer. 3. Aufl. xviii, 715 S. m. 13; geb., m. 14.50.

Breymann (Herm.) *Die phonetische Literatur von 1876–1895*. gr. 8. iii, 170 S. L., *A. Deichert Nachf.* m. 3.50.

Brünnow (Rud. E.) *A Classified List of all Simple and Compound Cuneiform Ideographs occurring in the Texts hitherto published*. Indices dazu. gr. 4. viii, 344 S. Leiden, *Buchh. u. Druckerei vorm. E. J. Brill*. m. 25.

Corpus inscriptionum atticarum academiae litterarum regiae borussicae. Appendix. *Defixionum tabellae atticae*, collegit, collectas praemissa praefatione edidit Ric. Wuensch. Fol. xxxii, 52 S. B., *G. Reimer*. m. 9.

Fragmenta scaenicae Romanorum poesis, tertiis curis recognovit Otto Ribbeck. Vol. I. *Tragicorum fragmenta*. 8. viii, 335 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 4.

Gregorii Abulfaragii Bar-Hebraei scholia in libros Samuelis, ed. E. Schlesinger. gr. 8. iv, 32 S. B., *S. Calvary & Co.* m. 2.

Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft. Hrsg. von Iwan v. Müller. 22. u. 23. Halbbd. qu. Fol. München, *C. H. Beck*. In Mappe, m. 13.50.—22, 23. Atlas zu Bd. VI: *Archäologie der Kunst* v. Karl Sittl.

64 Taf. m. 1000 Abbildgn., nebst Inhaltsverzeichnis u. alphabet. Register. 28 S. m. 13.50.

Heinichen (Frdr. Adph.) Lateinisch-deutsches Schulwörterbuch. 6. Aufl. v. C. Wagener. Lex.-8. xxix, 926 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 6.30; geb. in Halbfr., m. 7.50.

Höhler (Wilh.) Die Cornutus-Scholien zum 1. Buche der Satiren Juvenals. [Aus 'Jahrb. f. class. Philol.,' 23. Suppl.-Bd.] gr. 8. 63 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 2.40.

Holder (Alfr.) Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz. 9. Lfg. gr. 8. 2. Bd. Sp. 1-256. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 8.

Jacob (Geo.) Studien in arabischen Dichtern. IV. Hft. Altarabische Parallelen zum Alten Testament. gr. 8. 25 S. B., *Mayer & Müller*. m. 1.

Jahresbericht, kritischer, üb. die Fortschritte der romanischen Philologie. Hrsg. v. Karl Vollmöller. III. Bd. 1891-94. 2. Hälfte. 4 Hfte. gr. 8. 1. Hft. 128 S. Erlangen, *F. Junge*. m. 18.

Kluge (Frdr.) Von Luther bis Lessing. 3. Aufl. Mit e. Kärtchen. 8. vii, 151 S. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 2.50.

Krassowsky (Walth.) Ovidius quomodo in isdem fabulis enarrandis a se ipso discrepauerit. Diss. gr. 8. 38 S. Königsberg, *Gräfe & Unzer's Sort.* m. 1.

Krohn (Frdr.) Quaestiones Vitruvianae. Particula I. De M. Ceti Faventini epitoma. Diss. gr. 8. 43 S. B., *Mayer & Müller*. m. 1.20.

Kuhn (E.) u. Schnorr v. Carolsfeld (H.) Die Transcription fremder Alphabete. gr. 8. 15 S. L., *O. Harrassowitz*. m. 1.20.

Kunze (Alfr.) Sallustiana. 3. Hft. Zur Stilistik. 1. Thl. Beitrag zu e. Darstellg. der genet. Entwickelg. des Sallustian. Stils. gr. 8. xiv, 95 S. L., *Simmel & Co.* m. 2.50.

Lucretius Carus (T.) de rerum natura. Buch III, erklärt v. Rich. Heinze. gr. 8. vi, 206 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 4; geb., m. 5.

Ludwich (Arth.) Kritische Miscellen (I-XI). Progr. gr. 4. 20 S. Königsberg, *Akadem. Buchh. v. Schubert & Seidel*. m. —30.

Mémoires de la société finno-ougrienne. IX. gr. 8. Helsingfors. L., *O. Harrassowitz in Komm.*—IX. Schlegel (Gust.) Die chinesische Inschrift auf dem uigurischen Denkmal in Kara Balgassun. Uebers. u. erläutert. xv, 141 S. m. Titelbild u. 1 Schrifttaf. m. 6.

Miladinoff (Iwan An.) Deutsch-bulgar. Wörterbuch. 3. u. 4. Hft. 8. S. 281-612 u. iii S. Sofia. L., *Kössling*. m. 4 (1. Thl. kplt., m. 8).

Mitteilungen aus den orientalischen Sammlungen der königl. Museen zu Berlin. VIII. Hft. Fol. B., *W. Spemann*.—VIII. Steindorff (Geo.) Grabfunde des mittleren Reichs in den königl. Museen zu Berlin. I. Das Grab des Mentuhoten. viii, 46 S. m. Abbildgn. u. 13 (11 farb.) Taf. m. 80.

— der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft. 1896. 2-4. gr. 8. B., *W. Peiser Verl. in Komm.*—2. Hartmann (Mart.) Bohtän. Eine topographisch-histor. Studie. I. 60 S. m. 3.50.—3. Peiser (F. E.) Skizze der babylonischen Gesellschaft. 32 S. m. 1.50.—4. Meissner (B.) Pallacottas.—Müller (W. M.) Ein phönikischer König; Ein neuer Hetiterkönig.—Winckler (Hugo). Das Siegel Ahlib-sar's, u. s. w.—Niebuhr (C.) Das Land Jarimuta. 36 S. m. 2.

Müller (Joh.) Kritische Studien zu den Briefen Senecas. [Aus 'Sitzungsber. d. k. Akad. d. Wiss.'] gr. 8. 32 S. Wien, *C. Gerold's Sohn in Komm.* m. —90.

Mussafia (Adf.) Zur Kritik u. Interpretation romanischer Texte. 2. Beitrag. [Aus 'Sitzungsber. d. k. Akad. d. Wiss.'] gr. 8. 72 S. Wien, *C. Gerold's Sohn in Komm.* m. 1.60.

Petraris (K.) Taschenwörterbuch der neugriechischen u. deutschen Sprache. 2 Tle. gr. 16. L., *O. Holtze's Nachf.* Geb. in Leinw., m. 7.60. —1. Neugriechisch-Deutsch. iv, 430 S. m. 3.60.—2. Deutsch-Neugriechisch. ii, 553 S. m. 4.

Phaedri Augusti liberti fabulae Aesopiae, ed. Leop. Hervieux. gr. 8. 133 S. Paris, *Firmin-Didot & Cie.* m. 3.20.

Pischel (Rich.) u. Geldner (Karl F.) Vedische Studien. 2. Bd. 2. (Schluss-) Hft. gr. 8. x u. S. 193–334. St., *W. Kohlhammer.* m. 4.50.

Planta (Rob. v.) Grammatik der oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte. 2. Bd. Formenlehre, Syntax, Sammlg. der Inschriften u. Glossen, Anhang, Glossar. gr. 8. xv, 772 S. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 20.

Platonis opera omnia. Recensuit et commentariis instruxit Godofr. Stallbaum. Vol. VIII, sect. II. Sophista. Ed. II. Recensuit, prolegomenis et commentariis instruxit Otto Apelt. gr. 8. viii, 217 S. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 5.60.

Plini Secundi (C.) naturalis historiae libri XXXVII. Post Ludov. Iani obitum recognovit edidit Carol. Mayhoff. Vol. IV. Libri XXIII–XXX. 8. x, 500 S. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 6.

Plutarchi moralia, recognovit Greg. N. Bernardakis. Vol. VII. Plutarchi fragmenta vera et spuria multis accessionibus locupletata continens. 8. lvi, 544 S. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 4.

— Epilogus. 8. 47 S. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 2.

Preuss (Arth.) De versuum iambicorum in melicis partibus usu Aeschyleo. Diss. gr. 8. 118 S. L., *E. Gräfe.* m. 2.

Prosopographia imperii romani saec. I. II. III edita consilio et auctoritate academiae scientiarum regiae borussicae. (In 4 partibus.) Pars I et II. Lex.-8. B., *G. Reimer.* m. 44.—I. Edidit Elimar. Klebs. ix, 489 S. m. 24.—II. Edidit Herm. Dessau. v, 443 S. m. 20.

Radloff (W.) Versuch e. Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte. 8. Lfg. hoch 4. 2. Bd. Sp. 321–640. St. Petersburg. L., *Voss' Sort. in Komm.* m. 2.50.

Rydberg (Gust.) Zur Geschichte des französischen *ʀ*. I. Die Entstehg. des *ʀ*-Lautes. gr. 8. 67 S. Upsala, 1896. L., *O. Harrassowitz in Komm.* m. 2.50.

Schoemann (G. F.) Griechische Alterthümer. 4. Aufl., neu bearb. v. J. H. Lipsius. 1. Bd. Das Staatswesen. gr. 8. viii, 600 S. B., *Weidmann.* m. 12.

Schöne (Alfr.) Ueber die Ironie in der griechischen Dichtung. Rede. gr. 8. 23 S. Kiel, *Universitäts-Buchh.* m. 1.40.

Schwieger (Paul). Der Zauberer Virgil. gr. 8. 76 S. B., *E. S. Mittler & Sohn.* m. 1.50.

Scriptores latini medii aevi suecani, ediderunt Johs. Paulson et Lars Wählin. L. Petri de Dacia vita Christinae Stumbelensis ed. Johs. Paulson. Fasc. 2 secundum de vita Christinae librum continens. gr. 8. v, 257 S. Gothenburg, *Wettergren & Kerber*. m. 6.

Serrurier (L.) Catalogue raisonné des livres et des manuscrits japonais enrégistrés à la bibliothèque de l'université de Leyde. Lex.-8. xlii, 298 S. Leiden, *Buchh. u. Druckerei vorm. E. J. Brill*. m. 15.

Strassmaier (J. N.) Babylonische Texte. 12. Hft. gr. 8. Leipzig, *E. Pfeiffer*.—12. Inschriften v. Darius, König v. Babylon (521–485 v. Chr.), v. den Thontafeln des Brit. Museums copirt u. autogr. 3. Hft. Nr. 452–579 vom 17.–23. Regierungsjahre. S. 321–416. m. 7.20.

Studien, semitistische, hrsg. v. Carl Bezold. 12. Hft. gr. 8. Weimar, *E. Felber*.—12. Mordtmann (J. H.) Beiträge zur minäischen Epigraphik. Mit 22 in den Text gedr. Fcsm. xiv, 127 S. m. 12.

Tacitus (P. Cornelius). Ab excessu divi Augusti Buch I u. II. Für den Gebr. der Schüler erkl. v. Geo. Andresen. Text. gr. 8. iii, 90 u. Anmerkgn. 53 S. B., *Weidmann*. Geb. in Leinw. u. geh., m. 1.40.

Thukydides. Erklärt v. J. Classen. 1. Bd. Einleitung. 1. Buch. 4. Aufl. v. J. Steup. gr. 8. lxxiv, 398 S. m. 6 Abbildgn. B., *Weidmann*. m. 4.50.

Tiktin (H.) Rumänisch-deutsches Wörterbuch. 2. Lfg. Lex.-8. S. 65–128. Bukarest. L., *O. Harrassowitz*. m. 1.60.

ITALIAN.

Monaci (Ernesto). Crestomazia italiana dei primi secoli, con prospetto delle flessioni grammaticali e glossario. Fascic. II. Città di Castello. L. 10.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Addresses delivered at the Lowell Commemoration held in the Architek-
tenhaus, Berlin, Feb. 19, 1897. Berlin, *Mayer & Müller*, 1897.

Bernstein (Ludwig). The Order of Words in Old Norse Prose. (Colum-
bia University Diss.) New York, *The Knickerbocker Press*, 1897.

Bursy (Bernhardus). De Aristotelis πολιτείας Ἀθηναίων partis alterius,
fonte et auctoritate. Dorpat, *C. Mattiesen*, 1897.

Ciceros Rede gegen Q. Caecilius u. das vierte Buch der Anklageschrift
gegen C. Verres. Für den Schulgebr. herausg. v. Hermann Nohl. 2te
Aufl. 70 pf.

— Anklageschrift gegen C. Verres. Fünftes Buch. Für den Schul-
gebr. herausg. v. Hermann Nohl. Leipzig, *G. Freytag*, 1897. 70 pf.

Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, ed. consilio et impensis
Academiae Litterarum Caesareae Vindobonensis. Vol. XXXII. S. Am-
brosii opera. Pars I ex recensione Caroli Schenkl. Fasc. Prior. Vindo-
bonae, *F. Tempisky*. Lipsiae, *G. Freytag*, MDCCCLXXXVI. 12 m. 80 pf.

Dante Society. Fifteenth Annual Report. Dante in America, by Theo-
dore W. Koch. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1896.

Demosthenes. The First Philippic and the Olynthiacs, with introduction
and critical and explanatory notes by John Edwin Sandys. London, *Mac-
millan & Co.* New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897.

Dictionnaire général de la langue française du commencement du XVIIe
siècle jusqu'à nos jours, par MM. Hatzfeld, Darmesteter et Thomas. 20e
livraison. MERCENAIRE-NÉGRILLON. Prix de souscription à l'ouvrage
complet, 30 fr. Paris, *Ch. Delagrave*, 1897.

Educational Review. Ed. by N. M. Butler. March, April, May, 1897.
New York, *Henry Holt & Co.* \$3 per annum; 35 cts. a copy.

English Dictionary (The Oxford). Ed. by James A. H. Murray. DIS-
TRUSTFULLY-DOOM (vol. III). FLEXUOSITY-FOISTER (vol. IV),
by Henry Bradley. Oxford, *At the Clarendon Press*. New York, *The
Macmillan Co.*, 1897. @ 2s. 6d.

Euripides. The Troades. With revised text and notes by R. Y. Tyrrell.
London, *Macmillan & Co.* New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897.

Fairclough (H. Rushton). The Attitude of the Greek Tragedians toward
Nature. (J. H. U. Diss.) Toronto, Ont., *Ronsell & Hutchinson*, 1897.

Fletcher (W. I.) and Bowker (R. R.) The Annual Literary Index, 1896.
New York, *Office of the Publishers' Weekly*, 1897.

Galdos (B. P.) Doña Perfecta. With an introduction and notes by A.
R. Marsh. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897.

Gardner (E. A.) A Handbook of Greek Sculpture. Part II. New York,
The Macmillan Co., 1897. \$1.25.

Hanssen (Federico). Estudios sobre la conjugacion leonesa. (Reprint from *Anales de la Universidad*.) Santiago de Chile, *Imprenta Cervantes*, 1896.

— Sobre el hiato en la antigua versificacion castellana. (Publicado en los *Anales de la Universidad* di Diciembre.) Santiago de Chile, 1896.

Hempl (Geo.) Middle English -wð -wð-. (Reprinted from the *Journal of Germanic Philology*, vol. I, No. 1, 1897.)

Hübner (Emil). Jacobo Zobel de Zangióniz. (*Deutsche Rundschau*, März 1897.) Separatabdruck. Berlin, *Gebr. Paetel*.

Inscriptiones Hispaniae Latinae, ed. Aemilius Huebner. C. I. L. supplementum. Ex Eph. Epigr. vol. VIII, fasc. III seorsum expressum. Berlin, *Georg Reimer*, 1897.

Johnston (Harold W.) Latin Manuscripts. (Inter-Collegiate Latin Series.) Chicago, *Scott Foresman & Co.*, 1897.

Journal of Germanic Philology. Ed. by Gustav E. Carsten. Vol. I, No. 1. Bloomington, Ind., *The Editor*. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897.

Koerting u. Koschwitz. Zeitschrift für französische Sprache u. Litteratur, herausg. v. D. Behrens. Bd. XIX, Heft 2 u. 4. Referate u. Rezensionen. Berlin, *Wilhelm Gronau*, 1897.

Kretschmer (Paul). Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache. Göttingen, *Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht*, 1896. 10 m.

Le Blant (Edmond). 750 inscriptions de pierres gravées inédites ou peu connues. Extrait des Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et de Belles-Lettres. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1896. 8 fr. 75 c.

Mather, Jr. (F. J.) King Ponthus and the Fair Sidone, an inedited version of the Story of King Horn in LXVII 1-150. Publications of the Modern Language Association of America. Ed. by Jas. W. Bright. Vol. XII, No. 1. N. s., vol. V, No. 1. Baltimore, *The Association*, 1897.

Modern Language Association of America (Publications of the). Ed. by James W. Bright. Vol. XII, No. 2. N. s., vol. V, No. 2. Baltimore, *The Association*, 1897.

Mortet (Victor). Un nouveau texte des traités d'arpentage et de géométrie d'Epaphroditus et de Vitruvius Rufus. Avec introd. de Paul Tannery. Tiré des Notices et Extraits des mss. de la Bibliothèque Nationale, XXXV 2°. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1896. 2 fr. 60 c.

Plauti Rudens. (MacGill University Edition.) Montreal, 1897.

Postgate (J. P.) Silva Maniliana. Congessit J. P. P. Cantab. MDCCC-LXXXVII.

Πρακτικὰ τῆς ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας. Ἀθήνησιν, 1896.

Ramsay (W. M.) The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia. Vol. I, Part II. West and West-Central Phrygia. Oxford, *At the Clarendon Press*. New York, *The Macmillan Co.* 218.

Riess (Ernst). Superstitions and Popular Beliefs in Greek Tragedy. (Extract from *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. XXVII, 1896.)

Sanders (Daniel). Encyclopaedic English-German and German-English Dictionary. Part second, German-English. Unabridged edition. Fasc. 1.

A-Ambannen. Berlin, *Langenscheidt'sche Buchhandlung*. New York, *International News Co.* 24 fasc. @ 1 m. 50 pf.

Satura Viadrina. Festschrift zum fünfundzwanzigsten Bestehen des Philologischen Vereins zu Breslau. Breslau, *Schottländer*, 1896.

Schneidewin (Max). Die antike Humanität. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897. 12 m.

Schoemann (G. F.) Griechische Alterthümer. Vierte Auflage. Neu bearbeitet von J. H. Lipsius. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897. 12 m.

Sweet (Henry). The Student's Dictionary of Anglo-Saxon. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897.

Thucydides. Book VI. Ed. by E. C. Marchant. London, *Macmillan & Co.* New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897.

Thukydides. Erkl. von J. Classen. Erster Band. Einleitung. Erstes Buch. Vierte Aufl., bearb. von J. Steup. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897. 4 m. 50 pf.

Tsountas (Chrestos) and Manatt (J. Irving). The Mycenaean Age. Boston and New York, *Houghton, Mifflin & Co.*, 1897. \$6.

Vos (B. J.) The Diction and Rime-Technic of Hartman von Aue. (J. H. U. Diss.) New York, *Lemcke & Büchner*, 1896.

Weil (Henri). Études sur le drame antique. Paris, *Hachette et Cie.*, 1897.

— Un nouveau fragment de Phérécyde de Syros. *Revue des Études grecques*. (Tirage à part.) 1897.

Wilhelm (Eugen). Perser. (Sonderdruck aus *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft*.) Berlin, *R. Gaertner's Verlagsbuchhandlung*, 1897.

Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum u. deutsche Litteratur, herausg. v. E. Schroeder u. Gustav Roethe. XLI. Bd. 2tes Heft. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897.

Zielinski (Th.) Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte. Ein Vortrag v. Th. Zielinski. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1897. 2 m. 40.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. XVIII, 2.

WHOLE No. 70.

I.—THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN INDEPENDENT SENTENCES IN PLAUTUS.

I.—FACTS.

This paper consists of three parts: first, a presentation of the facts of usage; second, a discussion of some of the forces which appear to have affected the mode; third, remarks upon the potential and the optative uses and upon the subjunctive in general.

No precise line can be drawn between the independent sentence and the dependent clause, but for my purpose I have included most of the cases of the subjunctive in parataxis. Of indirect questions, however, I have taken only those into which *uis*, *uin* and similar words are inserted; other indirect questions, though many of them are actually paratactic, are not included in the lists. The paratactic prohibition with *ne* passes at once into the *ne* clause, and is therefore not given. No sentences are included which contain a formal protasis; this involves the omission of a considerable number of cases where the subjunctive is undoubtedly independent of the protasis, but they are in all respects similar to the cases given in the lists and the material is sufficient without them.

In the presentation of the facts there is no classification by function, such as is usually made. The division is by tense, person and number, with a subdivision according to the form of the sentence. This, in full, would be as follows:

I. Affirmative.

A. Independent.

a) Non-interrogative.

b) Interrogative.

B. Paratactic.

a) Non-interrogative.

b) Interrogative.

II. Negative (with the same sub-classes).

For all practical purposes this scheme is followed closely enough by making for each person and number four classes:—Independent, Interrogative, Paratactic and Negative with *ne*. Under each class the uses to which the form may be put are described and illustrated, and this leads in the end to a partial classification by function. Full lists are given only where the usage is important or infrequent, but complete statistics will be found in the tables.

Present, 1st sing.

A. *Non-interrogative, independent*.—As the same form is used in the 3d and partly in the 4th conjugation for pres. subj. and fut. indic., the undoubted subjunctive forms are given first and used as a criterion for distinguishing pres. from fut. where the form is the same.

Three cases are marked as subjunctive by *utinam*, Aul. 433, Epid. 196, Trin. 618. These are all wishes. Pers. 575, modo ut sciam quanti indicet, is marked by *ut*, but in meaning is like those which follow.

The subj. form is found in the following cases: Ba. 1049 quod perdundumst, properem perdere; 1058 sed crepuit foris: ecfertur praeda ex Troia. taceam nunciam; Trin. 1136 quid ego cesso hos conloqui? sed maneam etiam, opinor; Pers. 542 uideam modo mercimonium. Cf. 575, above, and Ter. Heaut. 273 hoc quod coepi primum enarrem, Clitipho: post istuc ueniam. All express the speaker's desire or choice in regard to an act of his own. The first three are in soliloquy; Pers. 542 and 575 are in a dialogue and are answered, but they are also half-soliloquizing.

All the remaining cases (except those of the 3d conjug.) are hypothetical, dealing with the speaker's action in a supposed case. The phrase *non meream* (*merear*) is found in Ba. 1184 quem quidem ut non hodie excruciem, alterum tantum auri non meream, Men. 217, Poen. 430, and in a like sense, *non emam*, Capt. 274. Almost identical is *floccum* (*ciccum*) *non interduim*, Rud. 580, Trin. 994, and, with negative implication, Aul. 672 tam duim quam perduim. All these assert the speaker's conviction in regard to his own action in a supposed case, corresponding in general to the English, 'I would not do it for the world.'

In two cases the speaker assures the hearer in regard to his action in a supposed case. Capt. 237, *quod tibi suadeam, suadeam meo patri*, is not above suspicion (*suadeo*, Cam., Sch.), but Trin. 758 is a clear statement of intention.

The assurance is scarcely more than a view or opinion in Truc. 495 *sine uirtute argutum ciuem mihi habeam pro praefica*, and Aul. 230, Merc. 125 *nimis nili tibicen siem*, are clearly only expressions of opinion. In Capt. 237, Trin. 758, Aul. 230, a clause with conditional coloring precedes, and the same thing is implied in Truc. 495.

The text is doubtful in several passages. In Aul. 570 there is a hiatus and Seyffert supplies *quod . . . habeo*. This makes good sense, but I think it sure that *non potem* could mean the same thing as *nolo potare*, which Goetz suggests in the notes. In Trin. 749 the difficulty is in reconciling the text to the following verses, but *adeam, edoceam* are correct in themselves, and precisely similar to cases which will be mentioned in 3d sing., where a half-indirect subjunctive is used in proposing a plan of action. Men. 982, if *si* (Bx.) be not supplied, is an extreme case, scarcely parallel to any of the preceding. St. 208^b is a gloss.

Of clearly subjunctive forms, then (omitting *uelim*), Pl. uses only 20, with perhaps two to be added from doubtful passages. Functionally, they are of four kinds. They express *a*) the speaker's choice or desire in regard to his own action; *b*) his conviction as to his (negative) action in a supposed case; *c*) his assurance to another person in regard to his action in a supposed case; and *d*) his opinion about a supposed case. In *c* and *d* there is usually a clause or phrase which gives hypothetical tone.

As to the verbs which use the same form for 1st sing. of fut. indic. and pres. subj., it may be said, by way of preliminary, that the fact that language has found no special form to express futurity in the first person *dicam*, as it has in *dices, dicas*, is clear proof that there was no strong distinction in meaning. It is therefore an error to force every case of *faciam* or *dicam* either into a future or a pres. subjunctive.

Some of the frequently recurring soliloquies in which a speaker conceals himself as he hears the door opening, like Ba. 610 *sed huc concedam*, Epid. 103, Cas. 434, closely resemble Trin. 1136, so that with a different verb we might have had a clear subj. form, e. g. *abeam*. The situation in Ba. 798, Rud. 1356 *sed contiscam*, is exactly like Ba. 1058 *taceam nunciam*. As the periphrastic

form in Ba. 1049 (above) helps to define *properem*, so in Cist. 657 *faciundumst* puerile officium: conquiniscam ad cistulam, the two phrases refer to the same act, toward which the speaker's mental attitude is the same, and the periphrastic strongly suggests the sense 'must' for the subj. Cf. the parataxis with *necessesst*, below. In Asin. 605 sermoni iam finem face tuo: huius sermonem accipiam, Aul. 405, Cas. 516 nunc amicine anne inimici sis imago, . . ., sciam, the verb expresses desire, not futurity, and Merc. 881, recipiam me illuc, expresses choice, as in parataxis with *optumumst*.

The modal shading in these cases is faint and it would no doubt be possible to translate them all as futures, but they are parallel to the subj. forms given above and to the paratactic uses to be given later. With them, though less clearly, may be classed the cases of the subj.-fut. forms with *potius*, like Epid. 149 ne feceris: ego istuc accedam periculum potius, Cas. 999 hercle opinor potius uobis credam quod dicitis, Aul. 767 i refer: dimidiam tecum potius partem diuidam. There is a slight modal shading, determination taking the form of preference, but there is nothing in the context to give a hypothetical tone. Cf. also the difference between *uelim* and *malim*, below, and see the careful treatment of these expressions in Neumann, de fut. in prisc. Lat. . . . ui et usu, Breslau, 1888.

non dicam dolo, Men. 228, Trin. 480, is an introduction to a following remark and is allied to the frequent use of *dicam*, *eloquar* to introduce a statement. Trin. 90 haud dicam dolo is exactly similar, though the statement is postponed to 94; it should be followed by a colon, not by a period. The ordinary punctuation makes it wrongly a reply to the preceding question. Of the same nature is the phrase deum (maiorum) uirtute dicam, M. G. 679, Pers. 390, Ps. 581, Trin. 346. It is parenthetical and introductory to the statement which follows.¹ In Aul. 283 *dicam* seems to be similar, though the text is hopelessly corrupt. It is possible enough to translate 'I may say,' but instead of trusting to the very uncertain test of translation I prefer for the present to say that these cases lie in the borderland between the future and the subjunctive, having resemblances to both.

In a few cases the context shows that the mode expresses an opinion in regard to a supposed case. In Aul. 232 there is an

¹ Cramer, de perf. coniunct. usu potentiali ap. prisc. script. Lat., Marburg, 1886, p. 54, calls this optative and comp. *pace tua dixerim*. Brix on Trin. 346 calls it future.

ubi clause; in Ps. 358 the hypothetical suggestion is in the sentence itself; in M. G. 845 it is suggested by the other speaker; Amph. 156, 161 are in a long hypothetical passage containing a *si* clause. Men. 985 is confused and Bx. is probably right in making a protasis.

To summarize, there are in 1st sing. pres. the following :

With <i>utinam</i> ,	3
<i>modo ut</i> ,	1
Subj. forms—	
of desire or choice,	4
conviction (neg.),	7
assurance,	2
opinion,	3
Doubtful forms—	
of desire and choice,	9
with <i>potius</i> , (?)	
<i>non dicam dolo</i> , 3	
<i>deum uirtute dicam</i> , 4	
of opinion,	5
	<hr/>
	34

To this number perhaps two or three should be added from passages of doubtful text, and if the cases with *potius* were added, the number would be somewhat increased.

The remaining cases under this heading are all cases of *uelim* and compounds, of which full lists are given.

uelim with paratactic subjunctive.—In the 2d sing. pres., Cas. 234 enicas. || uera dicas uelim; Rud. 511 pulmoneum edepol nimis uelim uomitum uomas; Rud. 1067, Men. 909. The taunting verse in Trin. 351 quod habes ne habeas et illuc quod non habes habeas is followed by *uelim malum* in A, by *malum* in BD. To the reasons given by Bx. Anh. for believing *malum* to be the gloss, I would add the close resemblance of this passage to the others above and the fact that the 2d sing. always has *utinam* or *uelim* in wishes except in certain formulas and once in the marriage song, Cas. 822. With the 3d pers., Rud. 877 perii. || uerum sit uelim; and six cases with *ueniat*, Aul. 670 nimis hercle ego illum coruom ad me ueniat uelim, Cas. 559, Most. 1074 nunc ego ille huc ueniat uelim, Poen. 1288, Ps. 1061, Truc. 481. In five of these *nunc* is used and the person is sometimes in the

nom. with *ueniat*, sometimes in acc. (Aul. 670, Cas. 559, Ps. 1061). The order is always *ueniat uelim*. With the 3d pers. of the perf., Ba. 334 nescit quid faciat auro. || mihi dederit uelim, Poen. 1206 . . . quod haruspex . . . dixit. || uelim de me aliquid dixerit, Rud. 662, Poen. 570. Once, in Most. 632 nihilo plus peto. || uelim quidem hercle ut uno nummo plus petam, an *ut* is inserted between *uelim* and the subjunct., with the same challenging and hostile sense that appears in most cases with paratactic subjunctive.

In ten cases *uelim* takes an infin. Without subject acc., Cist. 497 di me perdant— || quodcumque optes, tibi uelim contingere; Asin. 274. With *me*, Ba. 530, Cas. 287, Epid. 120, Most. 218 in anginam ego nunc me uelim uorti. With *te*, Aul. 120 uelim te arbitrari med haec uerba . . . tuae rei causa facere; Fragm. 41 uelim ted arbitrari factum. With other subjects, St. 587 edepol ne ego nunc mihi medimnum mille esse argenti uelim; Trin. 433. With a perfect participle, Aul. 504 moribus praefectum mulierum hunc factum uelim; Ba. 603 sufflatus ille huc ueniet. || disruptum uelim; Cas. 326 ego edepol illam mediam disruptam uelim; Curc. 83, St. 191, 613. With an adj., Amph. 834 uera istaec uelim; cf. Rud. 877, above. With a direct object, Amph. 1058 animo malest, aquam uelim; Most. 266 nimis uelim lapidem, qui . . . diminuam caput; Ps. 598, Rud. 211. Absolute, Cas. 464 ut tibi, dum uiuam, bene uelim plus quam mihi! (This is the only passage where *ut*, which here shows plainly its exclamatory character, is used with *uelim*); Most. 742 (R.¹ L.² *uellem*), Pers. 629, Ps. 1070, Trin. 58, Fragm. 38.

As to the meaning of these 44 cases, the following points may be noted: 1) With a few exceptions, the speaker does not expect that the expression of his desire will bring about the realization of the desire. This is the general characteristic which, with some modifications, is common to all the various forms of optation.¹ The exceptions are Men. 909, perhaps Rud. 1067, Aul. 120, Fragm. 41, in all of which the person addressed is to be the actor. An expression of desire thus directly addressed to the person who has it in his power to act is of necessity very little removed from a direct expression of will, and Men. 909 *adeas uelim* is only a trifle more polite than *adeas* or *adeas uolo*. But in Rud. 1067 . . . ne uideas uelim it is not in the power of the second person to avoid seeing, and in Aul. 120, Fragm. 41, where

¹ I venture to use this word in a technical sense, in order to avoid confusion from the different meanings of the English word *wish*.

the dependent phrase is *te arbitrari*, the thinking or believing is not strictly an act which depends on the will of the believer. Possibly Most. 742 should also be called an exception, but the passage is peculiar in other ways also. 2) In more than half of these cases the content of the sentence is a curse or a wish which involves a threat. 3) The paratactic subjunctive is, with perhaps two exceptions, the kind of subjunctive which in other connections would be recognized as optative.

In general, the understanding of a modal usage must depend upon a correct interpretation, and full lists of *uelim* have been given in order to enable the reader to see for himself that the ordinary explanation of *uelim* as a potential or a subjunctive of modesty or of mild assertion is absolutely inconsistent with the facts of usage in Plautus. To translate it 'I should like' is simply to introduce confusion by the use of a peculiar English idiom. The subjunctive is optative in character, but the fuller discussion of this must be postponed until the other paratactic verbs are given.

mauelim, malim. With paratactic subjunctive, Poen. 1150 *abeo igitur. || facias modo quam memores mauelim*, Poen. 1184.

With *ut* clause, Trin. 762 *malim hercle ut uerum dicas quam ut des mutuom.*

With infin., Asin. 811 *emori me malim, quam haec non eius uxori indicem*, Ba. 465, 490, 514, 519 (a gloss), Men. 720, Merc. 356, 889, Pers. 4, Poen. 827, Truc. 260, 743 (a somewhat uncertain conjecture), Vid. 110. The subject is *me*, expressed or implied, except in the last case.

With direct object, Poen. 151 *istuc mauelim.*

With adj. or ptc., implying *esse*, Aul. 661, Epid. 119, Poen. 1214, Truc. 742.

With dependent phrase implied in the context, though not expressed, Capt. 858, Rud. 570, Truc. 422.

It will be noted that *malim* takes the infin., with *me* implied or expressed, much more generally than *uelim*, and that it has the paratactic subjunctive only twice, in 2d sing. pres. With these exceptions, the relationship to *uelim* appears clearly; the desire (preference) is expressed without expectation that the expression will lead to its realization, as in all optations, and a large number of cases contain a kind of self-curse (*emori me malim, quam; perire me malim; mendicum malim mendicando uincere; arare mauelim*, etc.). The composition with *mage*, however, by reduc-

ing the wish to a preference somewhat obscures the optative sense and gives more apparent reason for calling *malim* potential. Compare what is said later on the effect of *potius*.

nolim is used three times: Amph. 86 and Capt. 943 with infin., Merc. 539, absolutely.

peruelim also occurs three times: with infin., Cas. 862, Epid. 536; with ptc. (*esse* implied), Curc. 102.

In tabular form these uses are:

	Parat. subj.	<i>ut</i>	Infin.	Ptc. and adj.	Obj.	Absol.
<i>uelim</i> ,	16	1	10	7	4	6 = 44
<i>malim</i> ,	2	1	13	4	1	3 = 24
<i>nolim</i> ,			2			1 = 3
<i>peruelim</i> ,			2	1		= 3
						—
						74

B. *Interrogative sentences, with pres. subj., 1st sing.*—Since the effect of the interrogative form of sentence upon the meaning of the mode must come up later for discussion, the statement of usage is made as brief as possible.

I. Questions with *quis*, arranged (with the exception of the *dicam* questions) according to the form and construction of *quis*.

The pronoun occurs 5 times in the accus. (*quem* 3, *quam* 1, *quod* 1); two of these are in soliloquy and the question is deliberative, the others follow an impv. or its equivalent and seek to learn the desire of the person addressed. *quam ob rem* (3 cases, if we include Mil. Glor. 360) follows and repudiates a suggestion or command. *quo modo* (*pacto*), 3 cases, always implies *nullo modo*, and in M. G. 1206 seems to imply 'can.'

The adverbs of place are like the pronominal forms, not idiomatic. *ubi*, 3 times in soliloquy with *quaeram*, *requiram*, *inueniam*, all deliberative, once in a question as to the will of the person addressed. *quo* follows an impv. 4 times and an implied suggestion once, in true questions; in soliloquy, deliberative, 3 times. *unde* (2), once after an impv., with rejecting force, once in soliloquy.

The adverbs which mean 'how' or 'why' are more idiomatic. *qui* is used only in the formula *qui ego istuc credam (tibi)?*. Curc. 641, Merc. 627, 902, 'how do you expect me to believe that?,' with repudiating force. *quin*, M. G. 426, is repudiating. *ut*, Ba. 149, is more nearly hypothetical, under the influence of *lubens*.

quor (*cur*) is used 13 times. The verb is always of mental action, *postule*, *roge*, *nege*, *cure* (2), *mirer*, *mentiar*, *miniter*, *quaeram* (2), *suscenseam*, *adflicter* (Ps. 1295), *perpetrem* (Cas. 701). A few of the questions are addressed directly to the other speaker, but nearly all have a half-soliloquizing tone, and all imply a rejection, as in English when the *why* is made emphatic with a falling inflection. The negative is *non*.

Of the 139 *quis* questions with the 1st sing. pres., 81 are introduced by *quid*.

quid is the direct object in 54 cases. Of the 18 cases with other verbs than *faciam* and *agam* (which are given separately below), about half repeat an impv., as in Aul. 651 *redde huc. || quid reddam?*, with a tone which varies from repudiation to a distinct question as to the desire of the speaker (cf. Truc. 789 *quid loquar?* with Epid. 584 *quid loquar uis?*). About half a dozen are in soliloquy and are deliberative.

quid faciam serves so well to illustrate the history and meaning of *quis* questions that I give the lists in full.

a) *quid faciam?* Ba. 634, Cist. 63, 301, Epid. 98, Merc. 207, 565, M. G. 459, Most. 523, Pers. 42, Poen. 357. Of these, Ba. 634 and Merc. 207 are in soliloquy and are deliberative; the rest mean 'What do you want me to do?'

b) *quid nunc faciam?* Men. 834, Ps. 1229, both asking for advice or direction.

c) *quid ego faciam?* Curc. 589 (deliberative), Pers. 26 (addressed to another person, but half-soliloquizing).

d) *quid ego faciam nunc?* Epid. 255, like Pers. 26.

e) *quid ego nunc faciam?* Ba. 857 (*nunc ego*), Cas. 549, Curc. 555, Men. 963, M. G. 305, Most. 371. Both Ba. 857 and Most. 371 are answered, but the question was not necessarily addressed to the other person; the rest are in soliloquy.

f) *quid faciam* with other added words: *aliud* Merc. 568, *hoc . . . postea* Most. 346, *tibi* Ps. 78, *huic homini* Ps. 1316. The last is in pretended deliberation.

There are also some cases with appended protasis.

quid agam is used in the same way. a) *quid agam?* in dialogue, Aul. 636, M. G. 363. b) *quid nunc agam?*, Amph. 1046, Cas. 952, Poen. 351 (*agam nunc*), all in soliloquy. c) *quid ego agam?*, Most. 378 (in soliloquy), Trin. 981 (repudiating an impv.). d) *quid ego nunc agam?*, Aul. 274, 447, Cist. 528, all in soliloquy. f) *quid ego nunc cum illoc agam?*, Men. 568, for advice.

In the accus. of compass and extent *quid* is generally indistinguishable from *quid* 'why.' Capt. 556 . . . etiam huic credis? || quid ego credam huic? || insanum esse me, is clearly the pronoun, and where the pronominal force is distinct the questioning force is also most distinct. But in general these cases, 20 in all, are like those with *quor*, above, in implying that there is no reason for acting as the other person desires, or at least in implying a disinclination toward the action. Three cases, Capt. 536, Rud. 447, Trin. 1024, are in soliloquy, and Amph. 41 is in a prologue.

In *quid ni* (7 times), *quippe ni* (once) the *ni* has been sufficiently shown to be negative, not conditional,¹ and these sentences are merely the negative form of those given above.

Cas. 454 deosculer. || quid 'deosculer'? is not really a question with subjunctive verb, and in Epid. 281, Merc. 887 the text is entirely uncertain.

Beside these there are 13 cases in which *dicam* is inserted and one similar case with *praedicem*. They are introduced by various forms of *quis*. Truc. 689 quam esse dicam hanc beluam?, Cas. 616 *qua*, abl.; *quid*, acc., Ps. 744 sed quid nomen esse dicam ego isti seruo?, Asin. 587, Merc. 516, Pers. 400; *quid* 'why,' M. G. 1201 quid te intus fuisse dicam tam diu?, St. 288; *quo*, Capt. 533 quo illum nunc hominem proripuisse foras se dicam ex aedibus?, Curc. 1, 12; *unde*, Ps. 966, Rud. 264, Ps. 1305 f. sed dic tamen, . . . unde onustam celocem agere te praedicem? In the last case it does not matter whether the question is regarded as direct or indirect; see Becker in Studemund's Studien, I, p. 160, and cf. Ps. 709. The introducing word in these questions is for the most part of a kind that does not greatly influence the meaning of the mode, and the questions differ from those given above only in the fact that *dicam* with the infin. is used as a periphrasis for the simple verb. In the simpler form these questions would be *quae est haec belua?* *quid nomen est isti seruo?* *quid intus fuisti tam diu?* The inserted *dicam* expresses the same thought as the English 'What kind of a creature *am I to suppose* this to be?' 'What *would you have me* call that slave of yours?' That *dicam* is subj. and not future is plain from Ps. 1306 and from the thought.

II. Sentence questions are for the most part exclamatory, corresponding in form to exclamations with the indicative rather than to true interrogations.

¹ O. Brugmann, Ueber den Gebrauch des condicionalen *ni*, Leipzig, 1887.

egone is used 26 times, including Cas. 117 *egon quid faciam tibi?* and Truc. 276, where Schoell reads *tene ego*. All are repudiating exclamations, and the will of the other person, which is repudiated, is frequently expressed in a preceding imperative. The verb is usually a repetition of the preceding (. . . *mecum i potatum. || egone eam?*) or an amplification of it (Curc. 10 *lautus luces cereum. || egon apicularum congestum opera non feram?*). In a few cases a verb of speaking or keeping silence is used, or the force of the repudiation is intensified by *patiar, possim* (Asin. 810 *egon haec patiar aut taceam? emori me malim*).

Other forms of pronouns with *-ne* (*tene 2, eamne, tuane, mene, uosne, meosne*) have exactly the same meaning, and *patiar* is used in 3 of the 7 cases.

Parallels to these, in which the indicative occurs in exclamatory repudiation of a statement of fact, may be found in any play.

Questions with *-ne* appended to a noun are not idiomatic, either with the indic. or with the subj. Pers. 26 *deisne follows quid ego faciam?* and is half-deliberative. In Poen. 730 *quid tum? hominemne interrogem . . .?* would be a question for advice, but *-ne* is a conjecture of Ritschl, following A; the passage is given below under parataxis (*censen* for *quid tum*, with Pall.).

The two cases with *etiamne* are for advice, Rud. 1275, 1277.

Without a particle, there are 8 cases of the verb alone or with introductory *quid?* repeating and repudiating an expressed impv., as in Most. 579 *abi quaeso hinc domum. || abeam?*, Merc. 749 *abi. || quid, abeam?*

Four cases with *non* at or near the beginning of the sentence repeat and repudiate a negative suggestion, Epid. 588 *quor me igitur patrem uocabas? || non patrem ego te nominem, ubi . . .?*

With the verb at the beginning of the sentence, the exclamatory and rejecting force is especially clear. Such sentences begin like those which consist of the verb alone (e. g. Asin. 838 *an tu me tristem putas? || putem ego quem uideam esse maestum . . .?*), but run off into added details. Where the verb is not at the beginning the sentence is short (*tibi ego dem? loricam adducam?*), because the exclamatory tone cannot be long sustained. In three or four cases (Ba. 903 *hodie exigam aurum hoc? || exige ac suspende te*, Men. 539 *dicam curare? || dicito*, and Pers. 26, after *quid ego faciam?*) the question is not repudiating. The first two are, of course, not to be distinguished from futures; the last is partially deliberative. In Most. 664 GS. rightly use a period.

Most. 556 quid nunc faciundum censes? || egon quid censeam? is an indirect quotation, and *censeam* is not properly the verb of the question.

Amph. 813 quor istuc, mi uir, . . . ex te audio? || uir ego tuos sim? is defended by Ter. Andr. 915, Hec. 524. It repudiates the claim implied in *mi uir*.

The one case with *anne*, Cist. 518, is an impatient demand; the disjunctive questions (4 cases) are all deliberative.

Of the 73 cases of sentence question, four are asked for the sake of getting advice or direction, and four (the disjunctive questions) are deliberative. Beside these the only deliberative questions are the two in Pers. 26, which in form seem to deliberate, but in content (*deisne aduorser, cum eis belligerem*) are plainly rejecting.

C. *Present, 1st singular, in parataxis*.—The value of these examples for the interpretation of the subjunctive is so great that full lists are given.

a) Depending upon an impv.—Upon *sine*, Ba. 29 (24 GS.) *sine te amem*; 1027 *sine perlegam*, 1176, 1199, Cas. 136, Cist. 454, Ep. 204, M. G. 1084 (*sinite*), Most. 1180, Pers. 750, Poen. 142, 261, Poen. 375 (3 cases), Ps. 61, 239 (2 cases). Total, 18.

These are all short sentences, usually only *sine* and the verb.

With *fac*, Epid. 567 *fac uideam*; Poen. 893 *fac ergo id* 'facile' *noscam ego*; the rest are all *fac sciam*, taking the place of the impv. of a verb meaning 'to cause to know'; Curc. 414, 617, Men. 890, M. G. 277, Ps. 696, Rud. 1023, Trin. 174. The verbs are all of knowing. Total, 9.

With *caue*, St. 37 *tace sis: caue sis audiam ego istuc posthac ex te*. Truc. 942 is a conjecture.

There is a small but remarkable group in which a paratactic subj. goes with the impv. of a verb of action. Curc. 313 *uin aquam? || si frustulentast, da, obsecro hercle, obsorbeam*; Truc. 367 *deme soleas: cedo bibam*; Most. 373 *uigila. || uigilo: cedo bibam* (MSS *cedo ut bibam*). Cf. Verg. Aen. IV 683 f. *date uolnera lymphis abluam*, where *date* is not equivalent to *sinite*, as Ladewig thinks. Most. 849 *mane sis uideam*, and perhaps such cases as Curc. 427 *concede inspiciam quid sit scriptum*, though this is usually printed with a colon after *concede*. The impv. in these uses expresses the action which is necessary as an antecedent to the subj. verb.

With the impv., 32.

b) With an impersonal phrase.—*optumumst*, Asin. 448 nunc adeam optumumst; Cas. 949, 950, Epid. 59 sed taceam optumumst; Rud. 377 capillum promittam optumumst occipiamque hariolari.

With *necesse est*, Poen. 1244 pro hoc mihi patronus sim necessest. Truc. 817 is a conjecture.

With *concessum*, *datum*, Amph. 12 nam uos quidem id iam scitis concessum et datum mi esse ab dis aliis, nuntiis praesim et lucro.

With *decretumst*, Poen. 501 profestos festos habeam decretumst mihi.

With *certumst*, Asin. 248, Aul. 681, Ba. 382, Capt. 779 (*certaines*), Cas. 448. These are all verbs of 3d conjug., but they are not quite futures.

Possibly Cist. 519 non remittam definitumst is similar.

The single case of *licet* with 1st sing., Asin. 718 licet laudem Fortunam, tamen . . . shows by the use of *tamen* that *licet* is felt as a conjunction.

With impersonals, 14.

c) With indicatives.—Rud. 681 quae uis uim mi adferam ipsa adigit, Trin. 681 meam sororem tibi dem suades sine dote. Amph. 9 is in a dependent clause in a long sentence, uti bonis uos uostrosque omnis nuntiis me adficere uoltis, ea adferam, ea uti nuntiem, and I have no doubt that, with colloquial freedom, the infin., an *ut* clause, and the paratactic subj. *adferam* are used as parallel constructions.

The effect of indirect discourse, which will be felt in these cases, will appear also where other persons and numbers are used paratactically with an indic. verb.

With indicative, 3.

d) Paratactic questions.—In *quis* questions *uis* is inserted, Aul. 634 redde huc sis. || quid tibi uis reddam? (cf. 651 redde huc. || quid reddam?), Ba. 692 nunc hoc tibi curandumst, . . . || quid uis curem?, Epid. 19, 584 quid taces? || quid loquar uis?, Merc. 158 quid uis faciam?, M. G. 300, Most. 578, St. 115.

uis stands between *quid* and the verb except in Epid. 584. The function of *uis* is evidently to bring out more clearly the inquiry as to the will of the person addressed which is contained by implication in, e. g., *quid reddam?*

With *uis* inserted, 8.

In sentence questions, which are almost invariably repudiating, *uin* is inserted or prefixed in order to emphasize the true interrogative character of the sentence.

Capt. 360 uin uocem huc ad te? || uoca; 858 uin te faciam fortunatum?; Asin. 647, Cas. 272, 544, Men. 606, Merc. 486 (2),

721, M. G. 335, 1399 (but the text is not sure), Pers. 575, Poen. 439, 990, 1226, Ps. 324, 522, St. 397, 486, Trin. 1092, Truc. 502 uin adeam ad hominem? || uolo, 924 (2). In Trin. 59 uin conmutemus? ego tuam ducam et tu meam? the force of *uin* passes over to *ducam*. In Merc. 728 etiam uis nomen dicam? the question is introduced by *etiam*, and *-ne* is not needed. In Capt. 121 the position of *-ne* is changed for emphasis to *mene uis dem*. In Poen. 730 GS., following Pall., have *censen hominem interrogem?* A has *quid tum*.

Of these, Men. 606 has something of repudiating force (men rogas? || uin hunc rogem?), but none is either an exclamation or a deliberative question. *uin* is prefixed in order to exclude the ordinary meaning of sentence questions with the subjunctive.

With *uin*, 27.

The 1st person sing. is not used with *ne*.

Present subjunctive, 2d person singular.

A. *Non-interrogative, independent*.—Wishes with *utinam* occur Men. 1104 utinam efficere quod pollicitu's possies, Cist. 555 utinam audire non queas, both with verbs meaning 'to be able.' In the marriage song, Cas. 821 uir te uestiat, tu uirum despolies, the circumstances give something of optative force, which comes out more clearly in the following verses. Trin. 351 will be given under parataxis.

saluos (salua) sis is used 17 times as a form of greeting and *ualeas* 7 times in parting. The meaning gives them optative force.

Postponing for a moment the hypothetical uses and the indefinite 2d person, there remain 121 cases of the subjunctive expressing some kind of will or desire. In a broad sense of the word these might be called jussive, but not more than a tenth of the number are true commands and about as many more are demands. Advice, serious or sarcastic or urgent, is the most common kind of use, not far from 50 cases coming fairly under this head. There are 15 or 20 requests and about as many expressions of permission. Invitation, challenge, petition, expression of obligation, curse, are used each a few times, and there is one asseveration, Most. 182. But where the form is unchanged it is useless to make purely functional distinctions. I prefer to note the usage of certain of the more common verbs. *accipias* (4 cases) is used only in requests and advice; *agas* (2) and *uel aias uel neget* (2) in a challenging demand; *dicas* (6) is in all cases

but one advice, as part of a plan; *habeas* (11) is generally a sarcastic permission; *ignoscas* (3) is a petition; *iubeas* (3), advice; *taceas* (6) a command in all but one case.

Hypothetical uses are rare, and in every case some preceding or accompanying phrase gives the hypothetical tone. In Capt. 599 *sapias magis* is in answer to the question *quid si . . . iusserim?* In Rud. 1229 *si sapias, sapias: habeas quod di dant*, *habeas* is only a continuation and expansion of the apodosis. In Aul. 231 the *ubi* clause contains a protasis and in Asin. 180, Trin. 554, *quouis* and *quamuis* prepare for the hypothetical use.

una opera, in its peculiar Plautine sense, is used three times with *postules* and twice with *iubeas*, all hypothetical.

There are 21 cases, also, in which the subject seems to be the indefinite second person: Aul. 506, 517, 520, Capt. 420, Cas. 562, M. G. 94, 689, 761, Most. 278, Poen. 585, 831, 836, 1416, Ps. 137, 1176 (?), Trin. 671 (2 cases), 914, 1031, 1052, 1054. Two or three of these, which are not in soliloquy, might be questioned. If they are not indefinite, they should be added to the list of hypothetical passages. In many of the cases, some phrase or clause precedes which sets the hypothetical tone. Thus in Aul. 506 *quoquo uenias*, Cas. 562 *quom aspicias*, Ps. 1176 *ubi aspicias*. The verbs are *uideas* (5), *censeas* (3), *audias* (2), *nescias* (2), *scias*, *inuenias*, *conspicias*, *cupias*, *uelis*, *desideres*, all of mental action, and *noceas* and *perdas*. The last two are preceded by *quom ferias* and by *duarum rerum exoritur: uel perdas . . . uel . . . amiseris*.
2d sing. independent, 179.

B. *Questions*.—There are only 5 *quis* questions, and the small number and sporadic character make a precise interpretation difficult. Rud. 1322 *quid dare uelis, qui istaec tibi inuestiget indicetque?* and Asin. 558 *edepol uirtutes qui (hōw) tuas nunc possis conlaudare, sicut ego possim?* appear to be hypothetical, but the use of the auxiliary verbs as expansions of *quid des, qui conlaudes*, complicates the phrases. Pers. 638 *quid (why) eum quaeras qui fuit?* is like Rud. 1322, i. e., might have been expanded for greater clearness into *quid quaerere uelis*. Epid. 693 *quid ago? || quid agas? mos geratur* means ‘what should you (ought you to) do?’ as the mode of *mos geratur* shows. M. G. 554 *fateor. || quid ni fateare, . . .?* goes with other cases of *quid ni*. Rud. 767 is not a *quis* question, but a relative *qui* with *ne*.

Sentence questions all repudiate the expressed or implied desire of the person addressed. There are 8 cases with *-ne*, all

tun or *tuin* (gen.), one with *an* (or four, if Asin. 813 is read *an tu*), and 10 without a particle. Aul. 431 is an indirect question.

C. *Parataxis*.—*a*) With imperative. *fac* (13), Amph. 976 huc fac adsis; Capt. 439 fac fidelis sis fideli; Cas. 421 et quamquam hoc tibi aegrest, tamen fac accures. || licet; Curc. 521, Merc. 498, M. G. 812 (*face* follows subj.), 1360, Pers. 196, 198, Poen. 1035 (*face* follows), Ps. 236, 481.

With *facito*, Asin. 238 syngraphum facito adferas; Cas. 523, Most. 216, Poen. 1084, 1278, 1418, 1414 leno, tu autem amicam mihi des facito aut mihi reddas minam; Trin. 485. The impv. precedes the subj. in 17 of the 20 cases.

With *sine*, Asin. 902 sine reuenias modo domum: faxo scias... GS. punctuate *sine: reuenias*, but cf. Cas. 437 sine modo rus ueniat; Most. 11 sine modo adueniat senex, with exactly the same threatening tone. *sine* has lost something of its verbal force.

With *uide*, Asin. 755 adde et scribas uide plane et probe; Poen. 578 uide sis calleas.

With *caue*, 10 cases. Capt. 431 caue tu mi iratus fuas; 439 caue fidem fluxam feras; Cas. 530, Epid. 437, Most. 810, 1025, Pers. 51, 816 caue sis me attigas, ne tibi... malum magnum dem; Rud. 704. Aul. 660 is also a case of *caue*, though the rest of the sentence is confused. With imperatives, 33.

b) With indicatives.—*uolo*, Capt. 383 ergo animum aduortas uolo; 388, 430, M. G. 546, Poen. 279, 1197, Rud. 1414, Trin. 372. *uolo* follows in 6 of the 8 cases.

nolo, Cas. 233 ted amo. || nolo ames; Most. 1176 sine ted exorariet. || nolo ores. || quaeso hercle. || nolo, inquam, ores. || nequiquam neuis; Pers. 245, Trin. 945. *nolo* precedes the verb in all cases.

malo, Ps. 209 taceo. || at taceas malo multo quam tacere dicas.

faxo, Asin. 876 iam faxo ipsum hominem manifesto opprimas; Men. 113 faxo foris uidua uisas patrem; 644 faxo scias; Most. 1133 ego ferare faxo; Ps. 949, Trin. 62 ne tu hercle faxo haud nescias quam rem egeris; 882 faxo scias. In Curc. 587 BJ have *faxo reperias*, E *reperies*; the future is of course possible, but the subjunctive is perfectly good. In Asin. 902 the MSS have *faxo ut scias*, and as this construction is not infrequent, there is no sufficient reason for omitting *ut*. In 7 of the 8 cases *faxo* precedes.

c) With *uelim* and *faxim*.—Cas. 234 enicas. || uera dicas uelim, Men. 909, Rud. 511, 1067. Compare especially Poen. 1150 abeo igitur. || facias modo quam memores mauelim, with Ps. 209, quoted above with *malo*.

With *faxim*, Amph. 511 illa si sciat . . . , ego faxim ted Amphitruonem esse malis, quam Iouem.

d) With impersonals.—*optumumst*, Aul. 568 tum tu idem optumumst loces ecferendum. With *licet*, Epid. 471 estne empta mihi istis legibus? || habeas licet; Most. 713, Trin. 1179. Rud. 139 is especially noteworthy because *saluos sis* is usually so distinctly optative: me periisse praedicas. || mea quidem hercle causa saluos sis licet.

e) In questions.—Most. 322 uisne ego te ac tu me amplectare? Here the parataxis is really due to the omitted *amplectar*. With *potin*, Cas. 731 potin a med abeas?, Pers. 297.

C. *Present, 2d person singular, with ne*.—The distinction between the independent sentence and the dependent clause is nowhere more difficult than in sentences with *ne*. No thought is really independent of the preceding thought, and the connection may increase in closeness until it is one of real dependence without finding expression in language. It is only when language begins, so to speak, to run in ruts, to form fixed phrases giving evidence of dependence, that we know that the line has been crossed.

Such a phrase has been formed in Plautus in the clauses in which *ne* is used with a verb of mistaking, of thinking wrongly. *ne frustra sis* occurs 7 times, *ne postules* 6 times, *ne censeas* twice, *ne erres* once, *ne speres* twice, and other forms (*existumes*, *arbitrere*, *opinere*, etc.) with verbs of thinking and saying (*praedices*, *dicas*), and even occasionally with other verbs (*metuas*, *terriles* (?), *quaeras*), are found once or twice each. These may fairly be excluded as semi-dependent, though they of course show something of prohibitive force.

molestus ne sis (10 times) shows in a few cases (Asin. 469 abscede hinc, molestus ne sis, Aul. 458), especially where it follows immediately after another command, a tendency to dependence, and the same beginnings of a feeling of purpose may be suspected in other cases, e. g. M. G. 1361 i, sequere illos: ne morere; Pers. 318 emitte sodes, ne enices fame: sine ire pastum; M. G. 1215 moderare animum,—ne sis cupidus. But whether

these are included or not, they would not change the result. In the use of the pres. 2d sing. with *ne* there is the same range of function as in independent uses without *ne*. The cases vary from sharp and emotional warning (*ne attigas me, ad portum ne bitas, dico iam tibi, molestus ne sis*) to prayers (*Amor, amicus mihi ne fuas*) and mild warning and advice. So far as I can see, the proportion of emotional cases is not smaller than in the corresponding uses without *ne*, where also the prevailing tone is one of advice or suggestion. The number given in the table (61) includes the partially dependent cases.

Present, 3d person singular.

A. *Non-interrogative, independent.*—Certain forms of wish are so well marked in the 3d pers. that they can be set apart with precision, differing in this from wishes in 1st or 2d pers.

With *utinam* there are 4 cases, Asin. 418, M. G. 1009 f., Most. 233, Rud. 158, all general in content, not like the specialized forms of wish to be given below.

With *ut*, Cas. 238 *ut te bonus Mercurius perdat*, an unusual kind of wish with *ut*. In Poen. 912 *ualeas beneque ut tibi sit*, two forms of wish are put together. Pers. 290, Curc. 257 have *ut* in an expression of desire, not a wish.

The phrase *quae res bene (male) uortat, quod bonum atque fortunatum sit*, etc., is found 10 times. It is introductory, as in classical Latin, in only 3 cases.

Other impersonal forms of wish are *bene (male) sit, uae tibi sit, bona pax sit, male istis euenat*, in all 7 cases.

The wishes which contain the name of a god are especially well marked. *Mars adiuuet, me faciat quod uolt Iuppiter, Iuppiter te seruet, Hercules te infelicet* (after a repetition of *licet*), and especially *Iuppiter te perdat (perduit)*; 13 cases. There are also 6 cases of asseveration, *ita . . . amet*; Most. 182 has a lover's name instead of a god's, and Capt. 877 f. combines *ita amabit* with *ita condecoret*.

Beside these, Pers. 269 *uapulet* is a curse, Most. 374 *pater aduenit . . . || ualeat pater* is the 3d pers. of *ualeas*, and Cas. 822 *tua uox superet tuomque imperium: uir te uestiat* is defined as a wish by the fact that it is used in a marriage song. Wishes, 45.

The formal contract read by the parasite in Asin. 751 ff. contains 9 cases of the 3d sing. These, like the other subjunctives

in that passage, express that kind of obligation which is involved in a contract and deserve separate mention.

The remaining cases (except the hypothetical) require a somewhat careful analysis, because they imply in use much more than the verb-form is capable of expressing, and the implied but unexpressed elements lead to a considerable extension of the meaning of the mode. Nothing in the verb-form defines in any way the relation of the hearer to the will or to the action, though that relation may be both real and close, and the variety of possibilities in regard to the subject of the verb (a person, a thing, *impers.*, etc.) further complicates the matter.

When the subject of the verb is a definite person, the relation of the hearer to the action suggests the following groups of usage:—*a*) The hearer is to convey the speaker's will to the third person, the actor. *Amph.* 951 *euocate huc Sosiam: gubernatorem . . . Blepharonem arcessat*, i. e. 'tell him that I want him to call Blepharo'; *Poen.* 905 *manu eas adserat, suas popularis, liberali causa*. Cf. *M. G.* 1037 *adeat, siquid uolt*. (i. e. 'tell her to come here') || *siquid uis, adi, mulier*, where the wish (permission) is immediately conveyed to the actor.

b) The hearer is to bring about the performance of the action by the third person. *Most.* 920 *octoginta debentur huic minae? || . . . || hodie accipiat* 'see that he gets them'; *M. G.* 1304 *omnia composita sunt quae donauit: auferat* 'have her carry them off'; *M. G.* 1100, *Cas.* 697. With these should go the large number of cases in which the speaker is advising the hearer as to the way in which a third person is to act in order to carry out a plan. *Pers.* 151 *sed longe ab Athenis esse se gnatum autumet*; *Trin.* 764 ff. *scitum consilium inueni: homo conducatur . . .: is homo graphice exornetur . . .: salutem ei nuntiet uerbis patris*; *M. G.* 792, *Ps.* 753 f., *St.* 299.

c) The speaker wishes the hearer to permit the third person to act. The will may not extend to the third person, who may be ready of himself to do the act. *Merc.* 989 *redde filio: sibi habeat*. || *iam, ut uolt, per me habeat licet*; *Merc.* 991, *Pers.* 447, *Rud.* 1121 *aliud quidquid ibist, habeat sibi*.

d) The speaker expresses his indifference in regard to an act of the third person and implies that the hearer also is to be indifferent. *Poen.* 264 *erus nos . . . mantat*. || *maneant pol: mane*, i. e. 'never mind if he is waiting'; *Ba.* 224 *adueniet miles. || ueniat quando uolt*.

e) In some cases—the large majority, probably, in formal style—the second person is merely a hearer, the recipient of the speaker's confidence. Ba. 502 illum exoptauit potius? habeat; Amph. 300 clare fabulabor: hic auscultet quae loquar, where LG., ed. crit., suggest *ut hic*, unnecessarily, I think. In such sentences the expression of speaker's desire is the important thing, and its effect upon the action of the third person is of little consequence, so that these sentences may approach a wish; St. 711 modo nostra huc amica accedat.

As only definite persons are involved, the nature of the will—command, advice, permission—is much the same as in 2d sing.

With definite actor, 48.

Passages in which the actor is not a definite person fall also into several groups, but the difference in meaning is slight. When the subject is described in a relative clause, the meaning is almost the same as when the subject is definite. M. G. 81 qui autem auscultare nolet, exurgat foras; Rud. 486; with *quisque*, Pers. 373 dicat quod quisque uolt: ego non demouebor. In a number of cases the subject is an ideal or typical person, a true lover (Ps. 307 det, det usque: quando nil sit, simul amare desinat), a genuine woman, by the standards of comedy (M. G. 190 qui arguat se, eum contra uincat iure iurando suo), an ideal slave (Amph. 960 proinde eri ut sint, ipse item sit: uoltum e uoltu conparet; Ba. 656, Aul. 599 f.). In Pers. 125 cynicum esse egentem oportet parasitum probe: . . . pallium, marsuppium habeat, the decline of the subjunctive in these cases to a mere sense of artistic propriety is illustrated by the parallel of *esse oportet*. In nearly all of these cases the second person, if one is present, is disregarded and the speaker addresses the audience; i. e. both the actor and the hearer are indefinite. In all, 25 cases.

If the subject is a thing (which occurs rarely) or if the verb is passive, the subject is not the actor.

When the subject is a definite person, the hearer is usually to be the actor, and the expression of will may be essentially the same as in the cases above under *b* or even in 2d sing. So Fragn. 50 (Carbon. II) patibulum ferat per urbem, deinde adfigatur cruci; Trin. 767 is homo exornetur; M. G. 1401 iamne ego in hominem inuolo? || immo etiam prius uerberetur fustibus; Capt. 609, M. G. 1418.

The cases in which the subject is a thing are nearly all in the plural, but beside a few verbs of passive meaning, *maneat*, *stet*,

supersit, *defiat*, the phrase *cena detur* occurs twice, *mos geratur* 4 times and *fiat* 27 times. Of the last, three cases have a subject, but the rest are all in connection with an expression of desire, to which *fiat* gives assent. In these cases the previous speaker, the second person, has already expressed the desire, and the speaker of *fiat*, who is really to be the actor, selects a form which leaves the person who wills, the hearer, the actor and the nature of the act indefinite, so that, in truth, nothing is expressed except assent to the desire, as if he said 'your will is mine.' This leaves *fiat* so weak that it is little more than a future, and in fact *fiet* is also used (Men. 186, Merc. 302, M. G. 908) in the same sense, as *mos tibi geretur* is used, Ps. 22, for the subjunctive. With passives, 45.

The 3d person singular is also used, though not frequently, of a supposed case. In six or eight passages the hypothetical tone is set by a protasis and is continued through the following sentences. These passages are not counted. There are also 12 cases where there is no distinct protasis in the immediate context. Ba. 139 non par uidetur neque sit consentaneum, . . . , praesens paedagogus una ut adsiet, is an excellent illustration of the meaning of this use of the mode. *par uidetur* is equal to *sit consentaneum*, the meaning of *uideri* exactly expressing the opinion or view which in the second phrase is expressed by the mode. Ba. 97 ego opsonabo: nam id flagitium meum sit, mea te gratia . . . facere sumptum; Truc. 221 stultus sit, qui id miretur; M. G. 736 qui deorum consilia culpet, stultus inscitusque sit; St. 24 ioculo istaec dicit: neque ille sibi mereat Persarum montes, . . . , ut istuc faciat (cf. *non meream*); M. G. 691 hoc numquam . . . audias: uerum priusquam galli cantent, . . . , dicat 'da, mi uir'; Capt. 208 nos fugiamus? quo fugiamus? || in patriam. || apage, haud nos id deceat fugituios imitari; Truc. 907 numquam hoc unum hodie eficiatur opus, quin opus semper siet; Ps. 432 fors fuat an istaec dicta sint mendacia; Amph. 1060 nec me miserior feminast neque ulla uideatur magis. In Trin. 441 hic postulet frugi esse: nugas postulet, the first verb is in sense a protasis and the subjunctive is not hypothetical; the second verb might perhaps be omitted from this list, as being influenced by the protasis. Asin. 465 Sauream non noui. || at nosce sane. || sit, non sit: non edepol scio, is very peculiar and perhaps unparalleled in Plautus, but the meaning is clear; cf. Capt. 964, St. 31 ff. In Most. 984 *possiet* is a conj. of Cam.

B. *Questions*.—The *quis* questions are introduced by *quis* (3), *quid* (3), *qui* 'how' (2), *unde* (1), and are all of one pretty well defined class, implying impossibility. The only cases which call for notice are *quid hoc sit hominis?*, Amph. 576, 769, and *quid hoc sit negoti . . . ?*, Asin. 407 (Cam. reads *est*, but *sit* is defended by the other cases). In these the relation to the subjunctive of desire is somewhat more apparent than in some of the other cases, though none is strictly potential.

The sentence questions have *ne* in 3 cases, and are without a particle in 8. All are repudiating exclamations, but all show the same leaning toward the potential which appears in the *quis* questions, and *non* is found three times. Rud. 728, where *dei*, not *det*, is the correct reading, and Men. 763 are not included.

Questions, 20.

C. *Parataxis*.—As the vagueness of the 3d pers. sing. of the subjunctive is chiefly in the undefined relation of the hearer to the will and the action, it will be found that the leading verb serves mainly to define what the mode alone leaves undefined. The classes below are arranged in the same order as those above, under A.

a) With *iube*, indicating that the hearer is to convey the speaker's will to the actor. Most. 930 dic me aduenisse filio. || . . . || curriculo iube in urbem ueniat; Pers. 605 iube dum ea huc accedat ad me; Rud. 708 iube modo accedat prope; with a more polite addition, Most. 680 euoca dum aliquem ocius, roga circumducatur. Cf. Amph. 951 euocate Sosiam: . . . arcessat . . .

b) With *fac*, *facito*, *facite*. The hearer is to cause the subject of the verb to act. Rud. 1219 et tua filia facito oret: facile exorabit; Pers. 445 facito mulier ad me transeat; Most. 854 age canem istam a foribus aliquis abducatur. Some cases with *fac* have a verb of passive sense, often with a thing for the subject, and correspond to the uses with passive verbs in which the hearer is the real actor. So Ps. 157 aquamingere: fac plenum ahenum sit coco; Men. 866 facitote sonitus ungularum appareat; Pers. 438, Men. 867, 992, Rud. 621, 1215.

c) With *sine*; the second person is to permit the third person to act. M. G. 1244 sine mulier ueniat, quaeritet, desideret, exspectet; Cas. 206 sine amet, sine quod lubet faciat; Cist. 734, Ep. 36, Ps. 478. With *sine modo*, Amph. 806, Cas. 437, Most. 11. In Ps. 159 at haec (securis) retunsast. || sine siet, and Asin. 460 ne

duit, si non uolt. sic sine adstet, the speaker is indifferent, as in the following class. Cf. Poen. 264 erus nos mantat. || maneat pol.

d) With *licet*; the speaker is willing or indifferent. Merc. 989 redde filio: sibi habeat. || iam, ut uolt, per me habeat licet; Capt. 303 the speaker is helpless.

e) With *uolo*, emphasizing the speaker's will and leaving the second person out of the action. Ps. 1123 leno argentum hoc uolo a me accipiat atque amittat mulierem, Asin. 77, Rud. 1332, Truc. 473. But in Poen. 1151 patruo aduenienti cena curetur uolo, as the verb is passive with a thing for subject, the hearer is to be the actor and the will is a command. Pers. 832 at enim quod ille meruit, tibi id obsit uolo, continues the curse expressed in 831, and therefore approaches the meaning of the subj. with *uelim*.

The cases with *malo* (M. G. 1333, with somewhat uncertain text) and *nolo* (Merc. 107, Ps. 436, St. 734) call for no comment.

uelim with the subjunctive has been given above. The passages are Aul. 670, Cas. 559, Most. 1074, Poen. 1288, Ps. 1061, Rud. 877, Truc. 481. With *malim* following an asseveration, Poen. 289.

With *faxo*, emphasizing the speaker's determination to bring about the act, Amph. 972, Ba. 864, Most. 68, Truc. 643. With *faxim* in an *ut* clause, Truc. 348. With *faciam*, Amph. 63, 876.

Scattering cases are St. 757 si quidem mihi saltandumst, tum uos date bibat tibicini (cf. *da bibam*); Merc. 1004 nihil opust resciscat; Curc. 461 leno, caue mora in te sit mihi. Capt. 961 quod ego fatear, credin pudeat quom autumes? is the only paratactic question. It gives a good basis for interpreting M. G. 614 quodne uobis placeat, displiceat mihi? and shows that these questions deal with an opinion. In parataxis, 60.

D. *With ne*.—The contract in Asin. 751 ff. contains 17 cases with *ne*, and a proclamation in Poen. prol. 17 ff. has 3 more. The rest are nearly all *ne quis*, *quisquam*, and call for no remark. With *ne*, 28.

Present, 1st person plural.

A.—The hortatory use is so well marked and so well known that nothing need be said of it here. There are 94 cases. The verb *eamus*, with its compounds, is used 42 times (evidently because of a recurring dramatic situation), *agamus* is used 4 times and other verbs once or twice each. *utinam* is used only

once, Asin. 615. The use of *age*, *agile*, and of a vocative (*eamus*, *mea germana*), and especially of *tu* (Truc. 840 *eamus tu in ius*), show that the sense of the 2d person was felt.

B.—Questions occur only 3 times: with *quo*, Capt. 208, with *uter*, deliberative, St. 696, and in a repudiating exclamation, Capt. 208.

C. *Parataxis*.—With *uolo*, Ba. 708, St. 670 *uolo eluamus hodie peregrina omnia*. With *censeo*, Merc. 1015 *immo dicamus senibus legem censeo*. With *suades*, Asin. 644 *proinde istud facias ipse, quod faciamus nobis suades*; cf. Trin. 681 *dem suades*. With *orant*, Amph. 257 *uelatis manibus orant ignoscamus peccatum suom*. There are 2 questions with *uin*, St. 736, Trin. 59.

The proportion of paratactic to independent uses, 7 out of 105, is much smaller than in other persons.

D.—There is one case with *ne*, Poen. 251.

Present, 2d person plural.

A.—Poen. 623 *fortunati omnes sitis* is a wish; M. G. 1341 is a petition or request; Curc. 632 *quid istuc ad uos attinet? quaeratis chlamydem et machaeram hanc unde ad me peruenerit*, follows two requests that he should tell where he got a certain ring, and is ironical, 'ask me where I got my cloak.' But the addition of *una opera* (as with *postules*) would bring out clearly the underlying sense, 'you might as well ask me.'

B.—There are no questions.

C. *Parataxis*.—The cases are so exactly like those in the sing. that I give only the numbers. *uolo* 3, *facite* 3, *oro obtestor* 2, *modo faciatis oro* 1, *caue* 1.

D.—With *ne*, 13 cases, of which 8 are addressed to the audience; *ne expectetis* 5, *(ad)miremini* 2, *uereamini* 1.

Present, 3d person plural.

The differences between 3d sing. and 3d plur. are: 1) the absence of cases in which the subject of the verb is a definite person; 2) the large number of wishes and curses; 3) the peculiar paratactic uses.

A. *Non-interrogative, independent*.—Wishes. With *utinam*, Asin. 841, Pers. 289, Ps. 108, all general in character. With *ut* and *di perdant* (*perduint*), Aul. 785, Merc. 710, Pers. 298, Fragm. (Boeot.) 21. Rud. prol. 82 ualete, ut hostes uostri diffidant sibi (cf. Poen. 912 ualeas beneque ut sit tibi); Cist. 202 (prol.) ualete et uincite . . . seruare . . . socios, . . . parite laudem et lauream: ut uobis uicti Poeni poenas sufferant; perhaps also Poen. prol. 128 ualete atque adiuuate: ut uos seruet Salus, though it is usually punctuated *adiuuate ut*. These seem to be all cases of *ut* in a wish, but I fear that my list is incomplete.

Wishes and curses with *di* (*deaeque*) or the names of gods.

There are 25 cases of *di te* (*illum, istam*) *perdant* and 5 of *di me perdant*; 11 of *di te* (*istum, illos*) *perduint* and 1 with *me*. Other forms are *di te infelicient* (5), *malum quod isti di deaeque duint* (1), *di deaeque . . . te . . . excrucient*. Of good wishes there are *di te ament* (14), *di te seruent* (1), *sospitent* (1), *di bene uortant* (7), *di tibi dent quaequomque optes* (*quae uelis*) (10), *di duint quaequomque optes* (2), *omnia optata offerant* (1), *di bene* (*male, melius*) *faciant* (8). Asseverations with *ita* are *ita me di ament* (20), *ita me di seruent* (1), and wishes *ita di faciant* occur 4 times.

Two other cases, Curc. 575 *ita me machaera et clypeus . . . bene iuuent* and M. G. 1316 *saluae sient*, show by their content and relation to other phrases that they are wishes.

The whole number of wishes in 3d plur. is 127, of which 118 contain the names of gods or the word *di*. With these *utinam* is used 3 times (in wishes of a general character), *ut* 4 times, *qui* 7, *quin* 2, *at* 6, *o* once, *ah* once, *ita* 27 times.

Beside the wishes the subjunctive is used 21 times in other expressions of will or desire. Most of these are active, and the subject is never inanimate and never definite individuals, but always a class, *reges, haruspices, matronae, inimici*, or, more vaguely, *alii, omnes*, or a class described in a *qui* clause. The person addressed is usually the audience or a person present on the stage and treated as a representative of the public; in a few cases it might be said that the third persons are really the persons addressed, indirectly and impersonally, as in laws (e. g. Poen. prol. 32 ff. *matronae tacitae spectent* etc.). As both actors and persons addressed are thus vaguely conceived, there is no possibility of cases of direct command, such as appear in 3d sing. The 3d plur. expresses only the more general kinds of desire, amounting usually to no more than a statement of obligation or

propriety. In two cases, Asin. 671 . . . , *ni genua fricantur*. || *quid uis egestas imperat: fricentur*, Ba. 1133 *cogantur quidem intro*, where the verb is passive, the person addressed is really the actor, and these express more direct forms of will, almost equivalent to *frices*, *cogamus*. So also in Capt. 115, where *uti adseruentur* expresses a command and is not a dependent clause.

The hypothetical uses are found chiefly in four long passages, Amph. 155 ff., Aul. 228 ff., Merc. 407 ff. (10 verbs), Rud. 978 ff., where a protasis has preceded or has been plainly implied. In M. G. 1369 f. the protasis is implied in *caue istuc feceris*; in Asin. 602 *qui sese parere adparent huius legibus* suggests a protasis; in Trin. 703, 740, 743 the implication is plain before the subjunctive verb is reached.

Counting all the verbs there are 23 cases, occurring in 8 passages.

B.—The 3d plural is used only twice in questions. Poen. 860 is a repetition of a preceding *di ament*; Ps. 205 is a repudiating exclamation.

C. *Parataxis*.—The cases are arranged as in 3d sing.

a) *iube*, Men. 956 *tu seruos iube hunc ad me ferant*; St. 396 *i intro . . . : iube famulos rem diuinam mi apparent* (cf. for acc. some cases of *ueniat uelim*).

b) With *fac*, *facito*, *facite*, Aul. 402 (BDJ, but Non. has a different tradition, which GS. follow); Aul. 407 *facite totae plateae pateant*; Cas. 521 *fac uacent aedes*; Cas. 527 *fac habeant linguam tuae aedes*. || *quid ita?* || *quom ueniam, uocent*; Ps. 166, 181, Fragn. 70 (Cornic. VII). With *uide*, Amph. 629 *uide ex nauis efferantur*.

c) With *sine*, Ba. 1134 *sic sine adstent*.

d) With *licet* there are no cases.

e) With *uolo*, Pers. 293 *eueniant uolo tibi quae optas*; *nolo*, Truc. 585 *uasa nolo auferant*; with *faxo*, Amph. 589, Men. 540; with *faciam*, M. G. 1399 *uin faciam quasi puero in collo pendeant crepundia?* (notice the double parataxis); with *faxim*, Aul. 495, Merc. 829, Pers. 73, Trin. 221, 222.

Thus far, with three or four exceptions, the verbs are passive in meaning or in form and the subjects are things. In the independent uses, on the contrary, the verbs are nearly all active and the subjects are classes of persons. The paratactic uses in 3d plur., therefore, are not parallel to the independent uses, extending

them along the same lines, but supplementary, expressing ideas which the independent uses express rarely or not at all. Plautus did not say *fac sese domi contineant*, *fac matronae tacitae spectent*, because the subjects of the verbs were both the persons addressed, though indirectly, and the actors; nor did he say *uacent aedes* or *ex naui efferantur quae imperavi omnia*, without *fac* or *uide*, because such phrases would omit the actor entirely.

A few other scattering cases are found. Ps. 938 si exoptem, quantum dignus, tantum dent; Capt. 694 nil interdo dicant (or *interdico aiant*, Fl. GS.); Ps. 207 prohibet faciant (a gloss); Poen. prol. 22 decet . . . stent . . . temperent; Ba. 1033 caue . . . fuant. Amph. 632 utinam di faxint, infecta dicta re eueniant tua is a paratactic wish. St. 31 ff. ipsi interea uiuant, ualeant, ubi sint, quid agant, ecquid agant, neque participant nos neque redeunt presents two curious indirect questions, *uiuant*, *ualeant*, depending paratactically upon *participant* without an interrogative particle.

D.—With *ne* there are only three cases, Poen. prol. 23, 29, 38, entirely like the other independent uses in this passage.

Imperfect, 1st person singular.

A.—In independent non-interrogative uses only wishes with *utinam* and expressions of desire with *uellem*, *mauellem* occur.

With *utinam*, Amph. 575 utinam ita (i. e. *ebrius*) essem; Rud. 533 utinam fortuna nunc hic anetina uterer. Both express a present wish contrary to the fact, impossible of fulfilment.

uellem is used 9 times:—with infin., Asin. 589, Poen. 681, Cist. 93; with perf. ptc., Cist. 506; with adj., Most. 980, Ps. 309; with obj., St. 713; with parat. subj., Poen. 1066 patrem atque matrem uiuerent uellem tibi. || an mortui sunt? || factum; St. 312 nimis uellem haec fores erum fugissent. Of these cases, Poen. 681 uidere equidem uos uellem, quom huic aurum darem expresses a desire in the past, but still felt by the speaker, in regard to a future act (cf. 682 illinc procul nos istuc inspectabimus). The rest are all like *uelim* in that they express a wish, but the implication that it will not be fulfilled is clear in some cases (Ps. 309, Poen. 1066, Cist. 506) and possible in all.

mauellem (*mallem*) is used 8 times:—with infin., Amph. 512, Ba. 198, 452, Ps. 1057; with perf. infin. act., Curc. 512; with infin. implied, Ba. 1201, Ps. 131; with parat. subj., Ba. 1047 ne ille

edepol Ephesi multo mauellem foret, . . . , quam reuenisset domum. The sense of desire or will is present in all; some express a curse (Ba. 198, Ps. 1057, 131); in a few cases (Curc. 512, Ps. 131, Ba. 1047) the suggestion of non-fulfilment is quite distinct.

B. *Questions*.—There are two *quis* questions, both referring to a past obligation or desire on the part of the second person. Cist. 94 I should take as a dependent clause.

Sentence questions are mainly rejections of an expression or implication of obligation in the past. In Trin. 177 *paterer* is balanced by *indicare me aequom fuit* in the preceding verse. In Most. 183 *ita ego istam amarem?* is an exclamatory repetition of *ita Philolaches tuos te amet* in 182. The negative in Most. 455 is *non*.

C.—In parataxis there is only one case, St. 177 *hoc nomen repperi eo quia paupertas fecit ridiculus forem*.

Imperfect, 2d singular.

A.—With *utinam* there is one case, Rud. 494 f. *utinam . . . in Sicilia perbiteres*, with distinct past reference.

In one case the subjunctive is plainly hypothetical; Men. 160 *edepol ne tu, ut ego opinor, esses agitator probus*. The reference to the past is certainly not clear, but cf. Merc. 125 *nimis nili tibicen siem*, where the future reference is apparent.

In all other independent 2d sing. cases (13) the subjunctive expresses an obligation which the actor should have felt in the past. Merc. 633 ff. *quid ego facerem? || . . . men rogas? requaereres, rogitares*; Merc. 637, Poen. 387, 391, Rud. 842 *quin occidisti extemplo? || gladius non erat. || caperes aut fustem aut lapidem*; Trin. 133 ff. (4 verbs); Pers. 710 *animus iam in nauist mihi. || cras ires potius, hodie hic cenares* deserves special mention, because it expresses a past obligation in regard to a future action; 'You should have made up your mind (then) to go to-morrow (not to-day).' Ba. 432 . . . *ubi reuenisses domum, . . . in sella apud magistrum adsideres* is in a passage describing old customs; the other verbs are in the impf. indic., and the subj. *adsideres* is due to the *ubi* clause. Ps. 494 should be printed with a period, as in GS., otherwise there is no justification for the past tense.

B. *Questions*.—With *quis*, Merc. 884 *quo nunc ibas? || exultum. || quid ibi faceres?* Goetz, ed. crit., supplies *ut*, but the text

as it stands (GS.) gives the proper sense, 'What were you intending to do there?'

There are no sentence questions. Capt. 713 is a continuation of a conditional sentence. For Ps. 494 see above.

C. *Parataxis*.—Asin. 503 si esses percunctatus . . . , scio pol crederes is not counted, and Ba. 635, if *non* is dropped from the text, is exactly similar. The only clear case is St. 624 ueni (impv.). || hucine? || immo in carcerem. || quid igitur? || dixi equidem in carcerem ires. This is really a quotation, *dixi* 'in carcerem i,' remarkable for the use of *dixi* instead of *iussi*.

D.—With *ne* there are 3 cases, expressing past obligation: Ps. 437, Ba. 29, 30 (16 f. in ed. crit.).

Imperfect, 3d singular.

A.—With *utinam*, Merc. 823 utinam lex esset eadem, quae uxorist, uiro. There are 2 cases in Rud. 379 f. of past obligation.

There are 3 passages where the mode appears to be hypothetical, Cas. 910, Rud. 1262 (2), Ba. 314. In the last, nimio hic priuatim seruaretur rectius, a slight sense of obligation is produced by *rectius*.

B.—The one *quis* question, Rud. 379, is a question in regard to a past obligation.

The sentence questions are all associated with a protasis in the context, though Ps. 288 is a repudiating exclamation. The others are Trin. 178, Capt. 714, Trin. 954.

C.—In parataxis, *mauellem* is used with *foret*, Ba. 1047, in a wish. Trin. 115 si inimicus esset, credo haud crederet is not counted. The rest are all of the nature of indirect quotations. Ba. 551 ille, quod in se fuit, accuratum habuit, quod posset mali faceret in me, inconciliaret copias omnis meas. The MSS have *ineonciliare*, which in such colloquial style is not impossible; *faceret* expresses a past intention, quoted by *accuratum habuit*. Pers. 634 tactus lenost, qui rogarat [rogabat?], ubi nata esset, diceret; that is, the *leno* asked (*dic*) *ubi tu nata's?* Trin. 591 tandem impetraui abiret is as if for uolui (*iussi*) abiret et tandem impetraui; Merc. 536 f. inter nos coniurauimus, . . . , neuter stupri causa caput limaret; in Epid. 316 me iussit senex conducere aliquam fidicinam . . . : dum rem diuinam faceret, cantaret sibi,

there are various conjectures, but I take *cantaret* to be a part of the order, *fidicinam conducas: ea mihi cantet*, as often in pres. tense.

D.—The only case of *ne* has a protasis.

There are no cases of 1st or 2d plur.

Imperfect, 3d plural.

A.—With *utinam*, Capt. 537 *utinam te di prius perderent, quam periisti e patria tua*, with distinct reference to the past. Trin. 1028 f. may perhaps also refer to the past, but is better taken as an ordinary unfulfilled wish.

The other cases all occur in passages where the speaker is giving the details of a plan made in the past. In M. G. 731 f. *itidem diuos dispertisse uitam humanam aequom fuit: . . . , uitam ei longinquam darent: . . . , is adimerent animam cito*, and in Epid. 386 *aequom fuit* clearly defines the meaning of the mode. Poen. 1139 f. *hodie earum mutarentur nomina, facerentque . . . quaestum corpore* is part of a plan made by the *leno*, not by the speaker, and would be introduced paratactically by *lenoni decretumst* or some similar phrase.

There are no hypothetical or interrogative uses.

C.—In parataxis, Poen. 1066 depends upon *uellem*; Merc. prol. 52 (48 G.) *pater clamitare . . . et praedicere* (histor. infin.), *omnes timerent mutuitanti credere*; M. G. 54 *at peditastelli quia erant, siui uiuerent*.

The temporal force of the imperfect is plain in those uses which most nearly resemble the direct expressions of will in the present; all expressions of obligation refer to the past, even when the act to be performed is still in the future. But in wishes the shift of temporal force, by which unfulfilled conditions and wishes in the present take an imperfect subjunctive, had already begun. Cases have been noted above where the reference to the past seemed most distinct. See also Blase, *Geschichte des Irrealis*, pp. 3-5.

Perfect, 1st person singular.

A.—Asin. 491 *praefiscini hoc nunc dixerim*. Cramer,¹ pp. 47 ff., doubts the genuineness of the passage, but calls it a subjunc-

¹F. Cramer, *de perfecti coniunctiui usu potentiali ap. prisc. script. Lat.* Marburg, 1886.

tive of will, correctly, translating "Dies wünsche ich jetzt unberufen zu sagen." Cf. the like uses of *dicam*, *haud dolo dicam*, etc.

Truc. 349 follows a *si* clause in 344 ff. and is hypothetical.

B.—In *quis* questions, Amph. 748 *ubi ego audiuerim?* repeats and rejects *audiuistin*. There are 3 cases of *nouerim*, Curc. 423, Men. 299, M. G. 923, which are classed here, though *noui* is present in sense.

In Truc. 625 there is a repudiating repetition of a subjunctive.

There are beside these few cases many perfects 1st sing. which are called potential (v. Brix, n. on Capt. 309), but they are all in subordinate clauses or in conditional sentences.

Perfect, 2d singular.

The functions of perf. subj. and fut. perf. indic. differ so slightly in independent uses, in any person except the 1st sing., that one set of forms suffices for both. The confusion which might be expected from this is, however, much less than that between fut. indic. and pres. subjunctive.

A.—In independent expressions of will *memineris* is used twice (M. G. 807, Pers. 856) and *noueris* once (Truc. 163 *dum uiuit, hominem noueris: ubi mortuost, quiescat*), both really present in sense. Ba. 840 *meretricemne esse censes? || quippini? || frustra's. || quis igitur opsecrost? || inueneris*, i. e. 'find out for yourself.' Trin. 1053 *duarum rerum exoritur optio: uel illud quod credideris perdas uel illum amicum amiseris* is exactly like a number of cases mentioned in the pres. tense.

Other cases have more of future meaning. They are Capt. 1028 (see Brix, note), Curc. 665, Trin. 760, Most. 1152 (see Lorenz³, note), Trin. 61. In Capt. 1028 and Curc. 665 there is a hypothetical tone, though it is not distinct enough to find expression in a clause; Trin. 61 is influenced by the preceding *faxo dederis*. Most. 1152 and Trin. 760 are the most distinct futures.

B.—There is only one question, a repudiating exclamation, Amph. 818 *tun mecum fueris?*

C.—In parataxis, *faxo dederis* (Trin. 60) and *faxo haud comederis* (Men. 521) lie between the subjunctive and the clearly future uses. So also *memineris facito* St. 47, though it is more closely related to the independent uses of *memineris*.

The remaining cases are all prohibitions, either with *caue* or with *ne*.

The verbs used with *caue* are *feceris* (Cas. 332, M. G. 1368, Poen. 1023, St. 285, Trin. 513), *dixeris* (Pers. 389, Trin. 555), *siueris*, *siris* (Ba. 402, Epid. 400, Most. 401), *praeuorteris* (Merc. 113), *rettuleris* (Epid. 439), *sumpseris* (Cist. 300), *fueris* (Aul. 618), *intromiseris* (Aul. 90), *responderis* (Amph. 608).

D.—With *ne* and its compounds the verbs are *fueris* (Asin. 839, Epid. 595), *dixeris* (Cist. 110, Merc. 402), *feceris* (Epid. 148, Men. 415), *parseris* (Pers. 572, Poen. 993), *attigeris* (Pers. 793), *induxeris* (Trin. 704), *destiteris* (Trin. 1012), *ostenderis* (Rud. 1155), *interueneris* (? M. G. 1333).

Other forms of prohibition are *nil monueris* Curc. 384, *minime feceris* Most. 272. In Rud. 1135, Pers. 395, the futures in the context seem to show that *nullum ostenderis*, *nullum acceperis* are also future.

Perfect, 3d singular.

A.—There are two cases with *utinam*, Cas. 398 f., Poen. 799, both referring to the past, and one, Trin. 753 *nam certo scio, locum quoque illum omnem, ubi situst, comederit*, which is hypothetical.

B.—There are two *quis* questions, M. G. 925, Trin. 1050.

C.—In parataxis: with *uelim*, Ba. 334, Poen. 1206; with *faxo*, Aul. 578, Poen. 346 (either might be called fut. perf.) and Capt. 801 (so far as the corrupt text makes a judgment possible); with *caue*, Men. 994 *caue quisquam uostrum . . . fecerit*, really a second person. The text of Curc. 27, M. G. 926, Truc. 429 is too uncertain for use.

There are no cases of the 1st person plural.

Perfect, 2d plural.

The only case is M. G. 862 *ne . . . dixeritis*, addressed to the audience.

Perfect, 3d plural.

Aul. 542 *meminerint* is an expression of propriety, like those in pres. 3d plur.; St. 385 *perierint* is a curse, and both verbs are in reality present in meaning. Poen. 617 is a future perfect.

In parataxis there are two cases with *uelim*, Poen. 570, Rud. 662, both curses.

ne di sirint (*siuerint*) is used in Ba. 468, Merc. 613, Merc. 323.

Of the forms with perfect ptc., Amph. 979 *fac conmentus sis* is deponent and perfect. The rest are all presents: *paratus sis* Trin. 1189, *occlusae sint* Asin. 759, *curata fac sint* Aul. 273, Amph. 981, *facito opsonatum sit* Ba. 96, *facite deductus siet* Capt. 736, *face occlusae sient* Most. 400, *fac sit delatum* Ps. 190. They do not differ in use from active forms.

Pluperfect.

In 1st sing., Rud. 497 f. *utinam cubuissem*. In 2d sing., *utinam parsisses* Truc. 375; *fuisses* (conj.), hypothetical, M. G. 1112. In 3d sing., Cas. 996, Poen. 1252 are useless. M. G. 721 *si ei forte fuisset febris, censerem emori: cecidissetue ebrius aut de equo uspiam, metuerem ne ibi diffregisset crura*, is a protasis without *si*, under the influence of the preceding *si* (cf. Pseud. 863). Epid. 628 is hypothetical. In 3d plur. Amph. 386 is a wish with *utinam* and St. 312 with *uellem*.

Subjunctive forms in -s-.

1st person singular.

haud (non) ausim, Aul. 474, Ba. 1056, Poen. 1358; all of hypothetical statement.

haud negassim, Asin. 503.

non empsim, Cas. 347, M. G. 316; also hypothetical.

ausim in questions, Merc. 154 *egon ausim tibi usquam quicquam facinus falsum proloqui*; Most. 923 f. *egone te ioculo modo ausim dicto aut facto fallere? || egone aps te ausim non cauere, . . . ?*; Poen. 149. These are, as the form of question shows, repudiating exclamations, and *ausim* is an insertion for fuller expression; in such a phrase as *egon tibi usquam quicquam facinus falsum proloquar?* the idea of wishing or desiring (the proper sense of *audeo*) is latent. Cf. the similar insertion of *patiar* and of *uis, uin*. But Merc. 301 *sed ausimne ego tibi eloqui fideliter?* is a true question, answered by *audacter*.

faxim is used in *male faxim lubens* Poen. 1091, 1093, and is hypothetical, though no protasis is found in the context. In all other cases of *faxim* a protasis is expressed in the context (Trin. 221, cf. 217-20) or in the sentence itself (Amph. 511, Aul. 494, Merc. 814 G. (826 GS.), Pers. 73); these cases are included in the list for completeness, though strictly they would be excluded by the protasis. In Truc. 63^a the text is somewhat uncertain, though *faxim* is sure. Truc. 892 *hostissim* is a conjecture and of no value.

All cases of forms in *-sim* are, it will be noticed, hypothetical.

2d person singular.

All forms are in prohibitions, either with *ne*, *neque*, *numquam*, *nil*, or in parataxis with *caue*. They are as follows: Asin. 839 *ne dixis*, Aul. 744 *ne dixis*, Capt. 149 *numquam dixis neque animum induxis*, Men. 611 *ne comessis* (Bx.; *comesses* MSS GS.), M. G. 283 *ne dixis*, 1007 *nil amassis*, Most. 526 *nil curassis*, 1097 *ne occupassis*, 1115 *ne faxis*, Poen. 553 *ne curassis*, Ps. 79 *ne parsis*, 232 *nil curassis*, Rud. 1028 *neque indicassis*, St. 149 *neque celassis*, Trin. 627 *neque occultassis*, Truc. 606 *ne responsis*.

With *caue*, Asin. 256 *faxis*, 467 *supplicassis*, 625 *faxis*, Aul. 608 *indicassis*, Ba. 910 *parsis*, 1188 *amissis*, Cas. 404 *obiexis*, Merc. 484 *dixis*, M. G. 1125, 1245, 1372 *faxis*, Most. 523 *respexis*, 808 *faxis*, Truc. 943 *faxis*, Vidul. 83 *dixis*, 91 *demutassis*. In Rud. 982 *ausis* (Seyff. Sch.) would have no precise parallel; Sonnenschein reads *ausu's*. Most. 518 is a conjecture. M. G. 669 *optassis* is conjectural, as apodosis to a *si* clause, and is not counted.¹

3d person.

haud ausit, M. G. 11, is hypothetical and exactly like *haud ausim*. In Ba. 697 *non ausit* has an expressed protasis.

All other cases, sing. and plur., are in wishes or asseverations. Capt. 622 *ita rex deorum faxit*, Cist. 742 *at uos Salus seruassit*, Most. 398 *ita faxit Iuppiter*, Ps. 14 *Iuppiter prohibessit*, 923 *ita faxit Iuppiter*, Pers. 330 *perennitassit*.

In the plur. all are with names of gods or *di*, *diui*. With *utinam*, Aul. 50 *adaxint*, Amph. 632 *faxint*. Also *di te (illum) faxint*, Most. 463, Vidul. 86; *di te seruassint*, Asin. 654, Cas. 324, Ps. 37, Trin. 384; *ita di me seruassint*, St. 505; *ita di faxint*, Aul. 149, 257, 788, Capt. 172, Pers. 652, Poen. 909, 911; *di faxint*, Cist. 151; *di meliora (melius) faxint*, Poen. 1400, Ps. 315, Merc. 285; *me amassint*, Curc. 578. There is a protasis with Cist. 523.

¹ Of the 34 cases of prohibition with perfect forms (19 with *caue*, 15 with *ne* or compounds), all but one, Curc. 384 *nil monueris*, are of the 3d conjugation. Of the 33 prohibitions with sigmatic aorist forms, 10 are of the 1st conjugation. In other words, the perfect in *-ui* is used in prohibitions only 4 times (*monueris*, *siueris*, *siris* 2) out of 67, though verbs which make their perfects in *-ui* are used 14 times. This can scarcely be accidental; it must indicate some relation between the aoristic forms and the prohibitory use.

It should be noted that of the forms in -s- all in the 1st pers. are hypothetical, all in the 2d pers. are prohibitions, and all but one in 3d pers. are optative.

	<i>Present.</i>						
	<i>Singular.</i>			<i>Plural.</i>			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	1st.	2d.	3d.	
A. Of will,	17	148	172	94	3	148	582
<i>uelim</i> ,	74						74
Hypothetical,	17	31	12	0	0	23	83
B. Questions,	212	24	20	3	0	2	261
C. Paratactic,	84	69	60	7	10	30	260
D. With <i>ne</i> ,	0	61	28	1	13	3	106
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	404	333	292	105	26	206	1366

<i>Imperfect.</i>							
A.	2	14	3			7	26
<i>uellem</i> ,	17						17
Hypothetical,	0	1	4			0	5
B.	8	1	6			0	15
C.	1	1	6			3	11
D.	0	3	0			0	3
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	28	20	19	0	0	10	77

<i>Perfect.</i>							
A.	1	5	2			2	10
Hypothetical,	1	0	1			0	2
B.	5	1	2			0	8
C.	0	19	6			2	27
D.	0	15	0	0	1	3	19
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	7	40	11	0	1	7	66

<i>Pluperfect.</i>							
A.	1	1	1			2	5
Hypothetical,	0	1	1			0	2
B.							0
C.							0
D.							0
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1	2	2	0	0	2	7
				With perf. ptc.,			9
							<hr/>
							16

<i>Forms in -s-.</i>							
A.	0		6			21	27
Hypothetical,	14		1			0	15
B.	4						4
C.	0	16					16
D.	0	16					16
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	18	32	7	0	0	21	78
							<hr/>
							1603

II.—TEXTUAL NOTES AND QUERIES ON PLAUTUS.¹

I. THE MOSTELLARIA.

Argum., vs. 5: et inde †primum émigratum etc.

So the editio minor. I would read *filium* for *primum*; -ILIUM and -MUM in a capital manuscript are rather close in ductus. The liability of P and F to confusion is shown by vs. 151, where all the manuscripts read *filia* for *pila*. For this confusion we must suppose the P to be only a little defective in its curve. The error may, however, be of semi-uncial origin, arising from a confusion of F with one of the ligatures *per* (Most., vs. 320 B), *pro* (ib. 95), *pr(a)e* (Rud. 947 B). A ligature for *pri* I have not observed in any Plautus manuscript, but we have *prmum* for *primum* at vs. 397 (D).

vs. 5: exi inquam †nidore cupinam quid lates?

So the editio minor. The best correction of this verse is Pylades's *nidor e culina, quid lates*, but, after all, *nidor-e-culina* is a questionable epithet. I suggest that the line stood as follows in *P:

EXIINQUAMEXI †AUDIO †HEMCUPINNAMQUIDLATES.

Now, supposing this archetypal manuscript to have had the K-form of H (cf. also Lindsay, The 'Palatine' Text of Plautus, p. 18), the mistake of AUDIOKĒ for NIDORE is accounted for by their similar ductus. The greatest difficulty for my reconstituted line comes from the omission of the blank spaces, left, we

¹ In the following study reference will be made to each separate editor of the Triumvirate edition. The practical consensus of all the Palatine manuscripts will be spoken of as the reading of *P. References to Leo's text of Plautus will simply run: Leo reads, etc.; Klotz's Grundzüge altrömischer Metrik will be abbreviated to Klotz. All other citations will be full enough to indicate their source at once. The manuscript variants and emendations of previous scholars that come up for discussion are derived from the critical apparatus of the Triumvirate or from Leo's edition. The Teubner text edition of Goetz and Schoell I will call the *editio minor*. Its readings for any passage will be generally understood as the practical consensus of the manuscripts extant for that passage.

may presume, in *P as in A, for the subsequent insertion of the notae personarum by the rubricator. Still, the reverse process is the more difficult; that is to say, to insert a nota personae in one of the minuscule manuscripts is easier than to drop one.

For the repetition of *exi* I compare Aul. 40 *exi inquam age exi*, and Curc. 275 *Heus Phaedrome exi exi exi inquam ocus*. A parallel to *audio* is Miles 217 *vigila inquam, expergiscere inquam; lucet hoc inquam | ‡audio. ‡viden hostis tibi adesse?* For *hem* introducing the question *cupin* I cite Asin. 445 *non etiam? ‡hem non?* There is a possible play between *audio* 'Well, I'm not deaf' and *haud eo* 'I won't come.' Thus *hem cupin* means 'You won't, eh?' I note that *cupio* 'I will' answers the question *Vin* 'Will you?' three times in Poen. 159 sq.

We might read our line

exi inquam <exi> nidóre— cupin? etc.,

in which case *cupin* implies a refusal from within, audible to the questioner but not to the audience. I prefer, however, either *exi inquam <exi> ‡áudió ‡he<m> cúpin etc.,* or *exi <éxi> inquam ‡áudió etc.* In either case there is hiatus with change of persons at *audio*.

vs. 6: *quid tibi malum hic ante aedis clam <it> atlost.*

Here <it> was inserted by Acidalius, following Camerarius. I propose to mend the line by reading *malum <me> hic etc.* A precise parallel is vs. 34 *quid tibi malum me . . . curatiost?* I compare Cas. 91 *Quid tu malum me sequere?*

The statistics of the expletive *malum* render this suggestion certain, I would say, as elision of either syllable of *malum* cannot be proved: 1) Before consonants *malum* occurs 13 times with the metrical value *ma|lúm*,¹ where °*lúm* is 7 times in the *second* thesis of a troch. sept. and 1 time (Most. 368) in the *fourth* thesis (the *second* after the beginning of a new speech). In the senarius °*lúm* forms a *second* thesis 2 times (Cas. 91, Most. 34) and a *fourth* 2 times (Cas. 472, Rud. 492); in the iamb. sept. (Rud. 945?) a *fourth* thesis 1 time; *quid hoc málum* makes a proceleusmatic 1 time in an anap. dim. catal. (Ps. 242 b). *Malum* is a pyrrhic arsis in the *second* anap. of the clausula Reiziana 1 time (Aul. 429); it forms the *first* arsis at Bacch. 696, and the *fifth* (with change of speaker at the fifth thesis) at Stich. 597, both verses being troch. sept.

¹ By the makron over a consonant I indicate length by position.

2) Before vowels we might read *mälüm* without elision in the *first* arsis of troch. sept. at Amph. 626, Cas. 262, Merc. 184, Truc. 801, where the pyrrhic *mälüm* is on the same footing as at Bacch. 696, when a consonant follows; in the *fifth* arsis at Epid. 710, Pseud. 1165 (with change of person as at Stich. 597), and in Men. 793 (without change of person); in the *third* arsis (with change of person on the third thesis) at Mil. 446. At Poen. 261 *quid hic malum* may be read as a proceleusmatic with *malum* in the first arsis (cf. Pseud. 242 *b*). The only occurrence of *malum* in arsis before a vowel outside of troch. sept. is Ps. 1295, an anap. sept. Here the 3d and 4th feet are composed of the words *quid tu malum in os*, and even here there is only quasi-elision, for *-um* is merged into the nasal syllable *in*. Such quasi-elision we have even with the monosyllabic *vae* in the phrase *vae aetati tuae* (Capt. 885, Stich. 594). Thus *malum* is followed 4 times by *im* (*in*) and 1 time by *hom-*. The vowel *e* follows *malum* 2 times (Merc. 184, Truc. 801), *a* (in *astas*) 2 times (Mil. 446, Poen. 261) and *i* 1 time (Pseud. 1165).

Still another element comes into consideration: *quid tu malum me* occurs at Cas. 91 (iamb. sen.), Most. 368 (troch. sept.), and *quid tibi malum me* at Most. 34 (iamb. sen.); at Rud. 945 we have *quid tu malum nam me*. The phrase *quid tu malum* without a following *me* is found only at Aul. 429 (claus. Reiz.) and Ps. 1295 (anap. sept.), and both these are rare measures. This constitutes a further ground for reading *quid tibi malum <me>* in our verse (iamb. sen.). My restitution is much better founded palaeographically than the restoration of *<it>*, now accepted, and constitutes besides a lectio difficilior; *clamatio* and *clam-<it>atio* are alike nonce-words.

vs. 13: *frutex*. This word seems to occur in the literal sense of 'stump' in Suet. Vesp. 5 *quercus singulos repente ramos a frutice dedit*. Typical, however, for the class *frutex* were *violae*, *rosae*, *arundines* (Col. Arb. I 2), and 'stump' seems to me an impossible definition. It is a small change to alter AFRUTICE to ABRADICE, and even easier to suppose that *ramos* was glossed by *frutices* 'shoots' or vice versa. For our present passage, seeing that *frutex* is parried in vs. 15 by *urbanus scurra*, I propose to interpret it as 'green-horn': cf. *rudis* 'rod switch' and *rudis* 'green' for the same metaphor. Columella is cited for *frutex olerum* (cf. Lewis and Short, Lat. Dict., s. v.). I compare the

French *chou* (Molière, L'Étourdi, I xi fin.) and our 'cabbage-head,' used figuratively for 'dunce,' etc.

vs. 21: *corrumpe erilem adulescentem optimum*.

Leo retains this, the manuscript reading, admitting two hiatuses. We must, it seems to me, admit the hiatus after *adulescentem*, for it recurs in the same metrical position at vs. 84 (*adulescente optumo*) and at Capt. 169 (*adulescentem Aleum*). Bentley's observation that Roman comedy showed a tendency to make the metrical ictus correspond with the prose accent may be aptly illustrated for Plautus from *adulēs|cens*, 57 times in the nominative, but oblique cases, say *adulēs|centem*, 43 times. There are 15 cases of the verse-ending *adules|cēns* and 4¹ cases of the same accentuation in initial position. Thus the deviations from the prose-accent in the nominative seem to be restricted to definite metrical positions. The accentuation *adulēs|centem* is found but 6 times; at Asin. 833 and Capt. 169 the ictus may be made to coincide with the word-accent by admitting hiatus before proper names (cf. Klotz, p. 109). At Trin. 771 the ictus will coincide with the word-accent by admitting hiatus in the semiquinaria of the senarius. This leaves only three offending passages: Rud. 664, where *adulēs|cente* is initial in the senarius; no mitigating circumstance occurs to me for Rud. 1197 and Truc. 99. With this state of things, it seems to me venturesome to disturb the coincidence of ictus and accent in this word in order to banish a hiatus.

I do not believe, however, that Plautus could have written *erilis adulescens* for 'master's young son.' I propose, therefore, to read *corrumpe eri <fi>li<u>m*, comparing vs. 27:

ut eri sui corrumpat et rem et filium.

The corruption of *ri<fi>li* was approximately haplographic.

vss. 38-9: *quam confidenter loquitur fue †at te Iuppiter
dique omnes perdant oboluisti alium*.

So the manuscripts, but the modern editors generally transpose *fue* to a position before *oboluisti*, where Goetz and Schoell read *<fufae>* and Leo *fu*. The metre of vs. 39 is good as the manuscripts read it, with semi-hiatus in the 5th arsis. In vs. 38 I propose to read *loquitur hui*, etc. For the change from *fui* (i. e.

¹ Men. 1025, 1066, Pers. 660, Trin. 968.

phui?) to *hui* we have to reckon with a confusion of native Latin *hui* and Greekish *phy*. I note Terence, Ad. 411-12, where *hui* and *phy* are alternating exclamations of astonishment. The Latin grammarians also state the fact of this relationship (cf. Diomedes in Keil's *Grammatici Latini*, I, p. 419, 10). If *hui* be read, its tone is the same as in Pers. 801 *Hui babae basilice te intulisti* etc. The elision of *hui* ought not to be more surprising than of *O!* (cf. Richter in Studemund's *Studien*, I, p. 598), or we may operate with semi-hiatus as with *ei!* (ib., p. 469).

We ought perhaps to read *fui* here and also at Pseud. 1295. For the latter line A seems to read *di te ament Pseudole ðhae ði in malam crucem*. In B there are no breaks, but *pfui* stands for the *hae* of A, where the *p* is, I surmise, derived from a P of the rubric of the manuscript prior to B, which may have indicated the character of Pseudolus by a P as B does. At Cas. 727 *P almost certainly had FYFY, and A seems to read *edepol*. Thus, in two cases the scribe of A seems to have been baffled by FY, FVI, possibly because *φῦ* was written in Greek characters in his exemplar, though Greek script occurs in A; or perhaps the scribes were at a loss how to register an onomatopoetic word amounting to a stage-direction.

It is perfectly clear at Pseud. 1295 that whatever Pseudolus may have *said*, what he *did* was to retch, and at Cas. 727 the interjection simulated vomiting. The outburst in vs. 39 of our text seems hardly justified by *quam confidenter loquitur*, but if to this be added *fy*, which we may render by the stage-direction 'pretending to vomit,' the outburst is accounted for. Here by *fy* we must understand 'your talk is sickening,' putting it on a footing with *fyfy foetet tuos mihi sermo* of Cas. 727. In all three of the passages under discussion *fy* (*fyfy*) has no necessary metrical value, and may be merely equivalent to a stage-direction, 'retching.'¹

¹ This suggestion, though original with myself, proves to be not altogether new. See Spengel, *Reformvorschläge*, etc., p. 80, note. Along with Spengel and Ussing, I accept it, spite of the words "insulsam Gruteri explicationem recoquentes" flung by Schoell at these two scholars (Appendix to *Most.*, p. 153). The English interjection of disgust is *foh!*, and in Congreve's *Old Bachelor*, IV iv, the stage-direction 'spits' accompanies *foh!* I do not know that there are any stage-directions in Latin comedy, but, considering the divergence of A's *Hae* and *P's *pfui* at Pseud. 1295, one is tempted to see in *pfui pfui* (so, in fact, C and D), a possible mistake for *spui* <*t*> 'he spits,' taken up from a marginal stage-direction or from a gloss.

vs. 40: germana inluvies rusticus hircus hara sui <s>.

So the manuscripts, but *rús|ticus* offends the metrical law that two shorts ending a polysyllabic word may form neither arsis nor thesis in iambic-trochaic metres. Bergk's correction of *rusticus* to *stircus* is not a bad emendation, but *ructus* seems to me better, as a lectio difficilior, and fadges precisely with the interpretation offered just above for *fy* (vs. 38). I note the use of *ructus* in the similar situation of Pseud. 1294-1301.

If Leo's contention that final *s* is treated like final *m* in the pre-classic period holds, then we might scan without change *rustic^m hircus*.

vs. 56: stimulis, si huc reveniat senex.

So the manuscripts. Leo reads *stimulis* <*carnufices*>, and Schoell, much more plausibly, *si huc* <*re bene gesta*> etc. I propose *stimulis si h* <*oc eveniēt*> *ut reveniat senex*, where the assumed haplography seems to me better warranted than in Schoell's emendation. For the construction *eveniet ut* I compare Pers. 535.

vs. 63: data es inonestis etc.

So B. Here Leo, and before him Ritschl, read most plausibly *date si non estis* (i. e. *editis*). The other minuscule manuscripts read *inhonestis*. I take my cue for the emendation of the passage from vs. 604-5:

daturin estis faenus actutum mihi?
datur faenus mihi?

So A, but in *P *date* mihi faenus, where the variant reading doubtless comes from a ligature for *-tur*. At Truc. 247 *dator* is unquestionably the reading, but *P has *datur*. Combining these facts, I propose to read here *dator* es in<h>o-nestis 'you are generous enough to your wicked associates.' For this sense of *dator es* compare Truc. 244 sq. Thus there is no difficulty in my reading except the change of number, and this is not more violent than the change in vs. 603 below.

vs. 73: venire quod moleste quam illud quod cupide petas.

So the manuscripts. Much nearer to the MSS than anything yet proposed is *veni|re quod | moleste <est> | quam illud quod | cupide | petas*. For *mölēst'ēst* I refer to Klotz (p. 82); *qu^m illūd quód* seems warranted by the trochee *nōn illūc* (Epid. 715). See also below on vs. 204.

vs. 84: videó, corruptum ex ádulescente óptumo.

Thus I would read the verse with the manuscripts, allowing hiatus in the 5th foot (see above on vs. 21).

vs. 104: sibi quisque simile suo is sua sumptu operam parcent suam.

This is B's reading. It makes sense and good metre to read the verse as follows: sibi quisque simile<s> suo *esse* SUMPTU; <NÓ> OPERAM parcent suam; or, as CD read *sumptū*, we may represent the archetypal reading as SUMPTUNONOPERAM, and the error consists only of haplography of NONO. The reading *suo issua* arose from *suo esse suo*, in which the repetition of *suo* represents a shift in position such as we have in vs. 235 *quidem absumpta quidem* (BCD), vs. 311 *cum amica cum* (BCD), vs. 529 *ut ibi hodie ut* (BCD).

vs. 119: <id> dicere ut hominis aedium esse similis arbitrémini.

The insertion I propose (taking *id*, of course, in the sense of *id quod dixi* and defining *dicere* by 'explain') makes the verse metrical. Leo scans it *dicere ut hómines*, etc., with hiatus between *-re* and *ut*! As I read the verse the 2d foot is a proceleusmatic and is not objectionable on the score of metre (cf. Klotz, p. 353).

vs. 124: et út in | usúm | boni et ín spe | ciem.

I propose to read this verse as an iambic dimeter, like vs. 902 *b*. The question is whether *bon' et ín spe-* can be read as a proceleusmatic. The shortening of *in* here is on precisely the same basis as the shortening of *ā* in Asin. 59, where there is a tribrach *ét ā m' in-* (cf. Klotz, 69), but in our passage, to be sure, *in* would get its shortening from the word-accent on *et*, not from an ictus there, as in *quid ā nō* | - (Capt. 206).

vss. 129-30: ad legionem †comita adminiculum eis danunt,
†tum iam áliquem cognatúm suom.

If we read *comita* <nt>, vs. 129 becomes an iambic senarius, and the sense is 'the fathers accompany them; they give them help (money?) and also (?) one of their relatives (as a companion).' It is doubtful, however, whether *tum iam* may be taken in the sense of *etiam*, though *tum* does approximate to *et* (cf. Lewis and Short, Lat. Dict., s. v. *tum*, C 1).

vs. 139 sq.: haéc verecúndiam mi ét virtutís modum
déturbavit †texit detéxitque a me flico
póstilla optígere ea[m] néglegens fuí.

This is the reading of the editio minor. Now it happens at vs. 583 of our play that A reads *domum* and *P *modo*, and at vs. 432 one of two successive lines ending in *modo* has been corrected to *domum*; and I propose in vs. 139 *domum* for *modum*, and would retain *eam* in vs. 141. There has been an elaborate comparison up to this point between a man's character and a house, and our verbs are mostly literally used in connection with a house. We must, however, take vs. 162 sq. into the count: *modestiam omnem detexit*, tectus qua fui; and the same figure seems to recur at Trin. 317: *sarta tecta tua praecepta usque habui mea modestia*. On the other hand, *modestiam* might be the occasion of *domum* having been changed to *modum* in our verse. This proposal demands *verecundiae*, perhaps, in vs. 139, and *domus verecundiae* is hardly a bolder figure than *aedes aurium* (Pseud. 469). In vs. 140 I suggest *ex<ci>it* for *texit*, with the orthography *extiit*; cf. Curc. 295, where B's *extiam* is probably for *exciam* (so Leo). As to definition, *exciit* is an intensive *ciere* = 'has shaken up thoroughly.' Metrically, vs. 140 will be, with my reading, a trochaic septenarius, like vs. 145; and vs. 141 a cretic dimeter + a trochaic tripod catal.

vs. 146: atque édepol ita haéc tigna úmidé <ex>pútent: nón
uideó<r> mihí.

I suggest <ex>*putent* on the basis of *exputescunt* at Curc. 242, and scan the verse as an iambic octonarius like the next verse. The hiatus at the end of the 4th foot is normal. The close syntactical connection of *umide* and *exputent* does not hinder hiatus (cf. Klotz, p. 147). We should possibly write <e>*putent* like *epoto*, though in Plautus manuscripts only *expoto* is preserved.

vs. 159: eventus rebus omnibus velut horno messis magna
fuit.

I am inclined to ask, recalling the *steriles orni* of Vergil (Georg. II 111), whether *orno* did not stand here originally; to be sure, *horno* would be the lectio difficilior, but might have crept in from some grammarian's handling of the text. Nonius, s. v. (121. 7), cites Lucilius, but does not cite Plautus. I cannot find,

however, that the *ornus* was proverbially disappointing, the sense in which it would stand here, for yielding flowers and the promise of fruit, but no fruit. If we read *orno* it suggests *ornare*, and the sentiment is 'all your beautifying will come to nothing in the end.'

vs. 200: nihilo ego quam nunc tu amata sum atque uni modo
gessi morem.

Exception has been taken to the construction here; the *minus* that seems to be lacking cannot be supplied without hurt to the metre. The editio minor, however, admits the construction. Perhaps we should read NIMIO or NIMIŪ for NIKILO, supposing H to have had the K-form as in A, and then change *quam nunc tu* to *quantum tu* <*m*>, but the admission of *ego* between *nimum quantum* I cannot support by a parallel. If we read *nimum ego, quam nunc tu, amata sum*, the *tam* correlative to *quam* is to seek.

vss. 204-5: [solam] illi me[o] soli censeo esse oportere obse-
quentem,
solam ille me soli sibi suo <sumptu> liberavit.

So the editio minor, which, however, inverts the order of the lines without a cogent reason, so far as I can see. The motive for clipping *solam* from the text is precisely counter to that for clipping -o from *meo*, for *me* stands precisely below it. Schoell questions *solam* as follows: "Philolachis erat, non Philematii censere 'solam' illam esse oportere obsequentem," but *solam* in the next verse is exposed *nominibus mutatis* to the same objection. I do not see why our verse does not mean 'I ought to be solely devoted to P. only.'

The assumption that *me* has been corrupted to *meo* seems to me to move on the lines of greatest resistance, for the omission of the personal pronoun with *oportere* is common in Terence (Heaut. 200, 247, Ad. 214).

According to Klotz (p. 62 sq.), the cretic may stand wherever the dactyl may stand in iambic-trochaic measures. Thus *sōl̄^m ill̄ⁱ* is an allowable 1st foot.

The further question arises whether *ill̄ⁱ* may not have the iambic shortening in this foot, and so be equivalent to a pyrrhic? Above, in vs. 73, *illūd̄* seemed to be a pyrrhic. Further cases are *illām* (Merc. 380) and *illū^m* (Trin. 792). As for *ill̄ⁱ*, the motive for shortening may be derived from *illius* (Bacch. 494 et

al.). All of this is called in question by Mueller (Plautinische Prosodie, p. 337 sq.).

For vs. 205 I propose, not <sumptu>, but *Philolaches*, scanning

solam íllë me sóli síbi suó <Philólaches> líberávit.

For *suum* in the sense of property—especially with *sibi*—I note Trin. 156 reddam suom sibi. In the previous verse *meo* is euphemistic, like *quod suom esse nolit* in vs. 247; we may also compare *peculium* in its bad sense (vs. 253, cf. Pers. 192).

vs. 213. For the unmetrical *vivilena* I propose *viti*<*i*>-*lena* from an earlier *viti*<*u*>-*lena*, just such a compound as *sociu-fraude* (Pseud. 362).

vs. 241: edepol si summo Ioui †bo argénto sacruficassem.

This is the reading of the editio minor, following B. Here D reads *uiuo* and C reads *ioui* for the *bo* of B. The confusion of B and V is common even in A, and B's *ioui bo* may well be haplographic for *ioui uiuo*, though the variant in C renders this less probable. I believe that in *P we must assume a text *Ioui uiuo argento uiuo*, with the adjective repeated, a not infrequent phenomenon, and I would emend the line to read:

edepól si súmmo Ióui argénto úuo sácruficássem.

Here there would be semi-hiatus with *Ioui* in the thesis. The verse is broken by the seminovenaria caesura, and so a spondaic 4th foot is permissible. For the sense of *argento uiuo* I cite Cicero's commercial phrase, *de uiuo detrahare* (resecare) aliquid 'to take something from the capital.' Plautus is here probably playing on *caput* in the next verse, by way of *double entendre* between the senses 'person capital.'

vss. 274-5: nam istae ueteres, quae se unguentis unctitant, inter-
poles
vetulae edentulae.

B first read *istes ueteres*, and further on spells *uetule edentule*, with *e* for *ae*, as commonly. I propose to read *istae suetae* (*assuetae*? Asin. 217, 887) [*res*], defining *suetae* by 'experts.' The reading *ueteres* was due to a false division (as in B) or to a gloss.

vss. 284-5: . . . is nequid emat, nisi quod tibi placere censeat.

Schoell has corrected *tibi* to *sibi* and is followed by Leo and the editio minor. I cannot follow them; vss. 287-9 tell us that

'beauty unadorned 's adorned the most' in the lover's eyes, and surely the lover will not here be commanded to buy adornments to please himself.

vs. 301. The *oprobarier* of the MSS has been corrected to *opprobrarier*, but we know the Romans found difficulty with a succession of *r*'s, and reduced *percrebruit*, say, to *percrebuit*. Here we should read *opprobarier*, if we would reproduce Plautus's probable pronunciation. So also at Pers. 193 *P spells *opprobri* (but cf. Truc. 280 *opprobras* A, where, however, there are only two *r*'s).

vss. 313-14: *aduorsum uenire mihi ad Philolachem*
uolo temperi.

The editors change *uenire* to *ueniri*, which is not necessary for the metre nor for the syntax either, if we may suppose that *uolo* 'order' lapsed over to the construction of *iubeo*, where the standing ellipsis of the natural subject of the dependent infinitive amounts to using the active form as a passive (cf. the author in Am. Jour. Phil. XV 221). I note the close association of *uolo* and *iubeo* in the legal formula *uelitis iubeatis*.

vs. 319: *Ecquid tibi uideor mam-ma-madere.*

Here *P seems to have read *Hecquid*, and at vs. 339 the drunken Callidamates says *Eecquis*¹ (B) or *Hecquis* (CD). The orthography seems to me possibly to reproduce the hiccough and stammer of a drunken man, while the *ho-ho-hocellus* of vs. 325 is, I believe, certainly explicable in this way. Forms of *ecquis* with initial *h*- are rather common in MSS of this play, though in some of the cases they have been corrected: vs. 900 *hecquis ecquis huc*, vs. 445 *heus hecquis hic est*, vs. 907 *haecquid placent*; but *ecquis* is found in vss. 354, 899, 988.

Taking the statistics of *ecquis* and *ecquid* for all the rest of Plautus, there is no *h*- in 67 cases. At Bacch. 580 D reads *hecquis* 4 times, but also *hostium* (for *ostium*), and the *h*- possibly has some mimetic intention here; at Men. 163 *hecquid* (B) possibly represents the *whiffing* of odors; and at Mil. 993 *h*- may be due to *whispering*; (*heus*) *hecquis hic* is found at Men. 674 (B),

¹ I note an interesting *lusus rerum* from Truc. 505 . . . *ehecquit mei similest ? rogas ? | quin ubi natust <ma-ma> machaeram-fuscebat*. If <ma-ma> were not an ingenious insertion of Schoell, the orthography of *ehec* would conclusively indicate stammering.

Mil. 902 (B), 1297 (D), Trin. 870 (B), and at Cas. 166 *hecquis haec*; in all these cases *h-* may be due to an alliterative impulse. The following passages suggest to me no reason for their *h-*: Bacch. 980 (DC), Pers. 108 (B), Pseud. 370 (A), 746 (D), 748 (D), Truc. 584 (DC). Thus there are some 13 cases, taking all the manuscripts into account, of the spelling with *h-*, so that, after all, we may not make any cogent inference regarding the *h-* of vss. 319, 339.

vss. 320–21: *semper istoc modo moratus . . .
uitae debebas.*

So the editio minor. I propose *utie* <*r*> for *uitae*, and construe *istoc modo* as the *σχῆμα ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* with *moratus* and again with *utie* <*r*>. The metre is trochaic dimeter acatal. with troch. tripod acatal. The infinitives in *-ier* in Plautus are, however, restricted to final position (see Lorenz on Most. 963), and the only deviation (Men. 1006) hardly furnishes a warrant for the present passage, and nothing more can be claimed for the proposed *utie* <*r*> than for any emendation ad sensum. Perhaps we should read *uti e* <*o*> *debebas*, making *eo* refer to *istoc modo*. The lost <*o*> would be due to haplography with D in a capital manuscript.

vs. 328: *sine sine cadere me ‡sino* <‡> *sed hoc quod mihi in manu[se]st.*

So the editio minor. No instance of a repeated *sine* is known to me (at Poen. 375 each of the three *sine*'s has its own dependent verb), and I suggest *si-si-sine*, letting the drunken man keep up his stammering. Further in the verse B reads *me* ^{Del.} *sinos* & *hoc*, and, recalling the form *semol* of the inscriptions, I propose . . . *me*. <Del. *sino*. Cal.> *semol et hoc* etc., which seems to me a little nearer the manuscripts than Schoell's *simitu* or Hermann's *sines et*.

vs. 334: *quod ego eam.*

The reading of *P was indubitably *quod* and not *quo*, and a precise parallel is Asin. 864 *hoc ecastor est quod ille it ad cenam cottidie*. The same locution is used by Vergil (Aen. II 664), *hoc erat alma parens, quod me per tela . . . eripis*. In all these cases I take *quod* to be terminal. I do not agree with Lindsay (Lat. Lang., p. 568), who takes the terminal adverbs to be originally ablatives. I believe them to be either datives with the same

paragogic *d* shown by the accusatives *me-d te-d*, or, more plausibly perhaps, datives in *-o* plus the enclitic preposition *-d(e)*, which is retained also in Homer in a few archaic formulae. Possibly Most. 786 belongs here: *quod me miseras, adfero omne impetratum*, though we may, to be sure, interpret *quod me* (sc. *ut facerem*) *miseras* etc.

vss. 334-5: *quo[d] ego eam an scis? CAL. scio: in mentem venit [DEL.] modo: nempe domum eo co[m]missatum †CAL. immo istuc quidem iam memini.*

So B, substantially, in the editio minor, but with differences in the division of the lines. Instead of [DEL.] I propose to read the vocative <Delphium>, which makes the line a very good troch. sept., if we read *scīð* in thesis with semi-hiatus. In the next verse CAL is put in above the line by B, and I would eliminate it altogether, making *istuc* refer to some gesture on Delphium's part. This verse is also a septenarius with diaeresis and hiatus after the 4th foot. In the 7th foot we have a dactyl, which, though rare, is allowable.

vs. 358: *ubi aliqui quique denis hastis corpus transfigi solet.*

So the manuscripts, but *aliqui quique* seem certainly corrupt. We have in Cicero (Div. II 50, 104) *aliquidquam* and in Livy (41. 6) *alicuiquam*, but both have been emended by the editors. I venture to propose here *aliquiquam*, which is orthographic for *aliquoiquam* (cf. Pers. 489 A).

vs. 365: *quid ita? †pater adatest †quid ego e<x> te audio? †absumpti sumus.*

The *adatest* of the manuscripts I correct to *ad-ad-est* and B divides *ad at est*. Tranio is stammering with fright, and punning besides on *attat*. I agree with Leo in reading <adest> *adest* at vs. 363, where Philolaches announces the coming of dainties with the reiteration of joy.

Now, at vs. 366 the metre is again defective, and the defect seems to consist of an omission before the same word *adest*. The verse runs:

pater inquam tuos venit †ubi is est obsecro? TR. . . . adest.

So the editio minor. I propose to read <Tranio> before *obsecro* (cf. Poen. 1322, Truc. 503), and possibly <ad->*adest*, with *-crð* in semi-hiatus.

vs. 376: quaeso edepol exsurge.

I suggest <te> *exporge*, and compare Ep. 732 . . . lumbos porgite (*P *surgite*), and Pseud. 1 exporgi meliust lumbos. Still, *te exporge* means 'stretch yourself,' and not 'get up.' Perhaps we should read *te surge* or, with Ritschl, *te exsurge*, though I can furnish no citations of a transitive *surgere* earlier than Vergil.

vss. 412 sq.: uerum id uidendumst, id uiri doctist opus,
 quae dissignata sint et facta nequiter,
 niquid potiatur, quam ob rem pigeat uiuere,
 tranquille cuncta et ut proveniant sine[mo] malo.

The order of the two last lines has been needlessly inverted, it seems to me, by the editors. If we invert with the editors, or follow the manuscripts, an <ea> after *tranquille* or after *cuncta* is easy to insert palaeographically and lightens the syntax. I would take *ut* as subordinate to *niquid potiatur*, not co-ordinate.

vss. 451-2: . . . natus nemo in aedibus
 seruat, neque qui recludat neque qui[s] respondeat.

I propose, after Bothe, to drop *quis* entirely from the text. For the absolute use of *respondeat* I cite Cic. de Or. 3. 49. 191 respondebunt non vocati. Seyffert notes Rudens 226, where *responsorem* means 'ostiarius.'

vs. 469: vos quoque terram †obsecro hercle quin eloquere.

So the editio minor. If we may read *hērcle* (cf. Klotz, p. 47), I propose to read this verse as follows:

uos quóque terram [†] obsecro hērcle <†> quin eloquere
 <óbsecro> ,

and compare Curc. 308:

eloquere, obsecro hercle †eloquere te obsecro etc.

The metre can also be mended by inserting <tu> before *eloquere*, if we read with semi-hiatus and a shortened ē- (cf. Klotz, p. 73). For *quin* <tu> cf. Asin. 659, 868, and *tu* following *quin* would be liable to haplographic loss.

vs. 663: nisi ut in uicinum hunc proximum mendacium.

I would correct the *mendacium*¹ of *P to *mendax siem*. After *proximum* A has in Studemund's Apographum D—RD[?]IE[?]. For

¹ Schoell would have it that *mendacium* is picked up from vs. 665.

the first D alternative letters are P, and, with less probability, E I T, which shows that the perpendicular only of the D is clear, and this might be as well the first stroke of an M. Of R D only the lower half remains, so X is a plausible substitute for R (cf. Epid. 19 ^(x)R), and S for D (cf. Most. 722 ^[d]S, Mil. 34 ^sD), though Studemund omits S here in giving CGQTE as possible readings of D. The words *mendax siem* do not violate the only letters reported certain by the Apograph, and offer a plausible substitute for *P's *mendacium*. Nettleship is entitled to priority in point of this correction, but he has construed *in* here with the ablative. I do not see, however, that *in* with the acc. is necessarily of hostile intention, and so need not mean more than 'put a lie on.' Plautus elsewhere uses *aduorsum* (Aul. 690, Poen. 400).

vs. 701: nam et cenandum ei et cubandum est male.

So A; B omits *ei* and reads *cubandumst ni trahis male*; the editio minor reads *nam et cenandum et cubandumst ei male*, which does not account for *P's *ni trahis*. This we can do by treating A's *ei* as dittographic for *et* and reading *intra his* (sc. *aedibus*, ? *aedis*). The omission of the noun with *his* can be supplied by a gesture. The difficulties are that *intra* with the ablative seems not to have occurred, and while *his* could be justified for a nominative, no accusative *his* is known. Perhaps we should read, then, *intra has* or *intra hic*, accounting for the variant by the division *ni trahis*. We must then scan the end of our line *-dumst intra has male*, a troch. trip. catal., such as we have in the previous verse.

vss. 709-10: —haec sat scio quam me habeat male
peius posthac fore <et> quam fuit mihi.

Leo would have a gap between these lines and the editio minor suspects *quam habeat male* (omitting *me* with B). The difficulty Leo makes is removed by the insertion of *et* after *fore* [or, with Bothe, after *male*? : cf. Rud. 1169, Mil. 1132 (A)]. The postponement of *et* after *fore* is, however, harsh, unless we can consider it relieved by the position of *et* at the end of the second cretic.

vs. 731: uŕtam <iam> cŕlitis ŕimmŕ <ita> uit<a> antehac erat.

I insert *iam* and *ita*. I note Epid. 12 minus *iam* furtificus quam *antehac*. By supplying *ita* the retort means 'Nay, that's

how we used to live.' That this must be the sense the next verse, cited below, goes to prove. The subsequent retort (vs. 733), *ita oppide occidimus omnes*, plays upon *ita uita—erat*, taking *erat* in the sense of *fuit*. In vs. 731 something like *ita* is certainly needed for the predicate of *uita erat*.

vs. 732: nunc nobis †communia haec exciderunt.

So the editio minor. Here the metre seems undoubtedly corrupt. The verse will scan as a trochaic hexapody catalectic, like verses 704–5 above in the same passage, if emended as follows:

nunc nobis communia haec <hic c>e[x]cidērunt—

if we may employ Vergil's 3d plur. pf. ending. For the sense, *communia haec* means 'the common end,' as *communis locus* (Cas. 19) means 'the common place,' i. e. Hades.

vs. 756: quid consomniavit.

Here the metre is defective. Ritschl proposed <hem> *quid*, but as D reads *quis* and C *con somniavit*, I propose *quid* <se> *cum somniavit*, and compare Ter. And. 442 *secum reputavit*, and Cic. Off. 3. 1. 1 *secum loqui*, as general analogues for the construction. This correction would entirely banish the nonce-word *consomniare*.

vs. 873: bonis sum improbis sunt malus fuit.

So B, but the line is neither metrical nor sensible. Now, in a minuscule manuscript *fuit* may well stand for *sint*, and *sum* in a capital manuscript is close to *sint* in ductus. I therefore propose to read the verse as follows:

boní sint <bonís si> improbí sint, malí sint

'the masters would be good to good slaves, but if they were bad, bad.' I compare Amph. 659–61:

atque ita seruom par videtur sese instituere:

proinde eri ut sint, ipse item sit . . .

tristis sit si eri sint tristes; hilarus sit, si gaudeant,

which approximates our construction. A further parallel at Bacch. 660:

. . . bonus sit bonis, malus sit malis.

It would conform to these parallels better if we should read *bonus sit . . . malus sit*, but there is no cogent reason for the singular in this truism.

vs. 890: *ferocem facis quiate eratus amat uha*

So B. I propose to emend as follows:

ferócem facís <te> quia effártus ama<s> tu <†> ha.

As far as the ductus goes QUIAEFFARTUS is most similar to QUIATEERATUS, though there is an inversion (metathesis perhaps?, cf. Lindsay, *Latin Language*, p. 97) of *ar*. The inserted <te> would have been lost owing to the conversion of *quia ef-* to *quia te*. The bacchius *qu† effártus* is far from impossible (cf. Klotz, pp. 343, 352; 33). I interpret the verse: 'You are playing the rôle of one *swollen* with anger because you love *swellings-with-food*.' The noun *effartus* (*effertus*) would be formed like *partus*. Plautus uses *effercio* above (vs. 65) and uses *effertus* as a participle 3 times (twice in the superlative). At vs. 169 above, he uses the simplex *fartum* (MSS *fartim*, but see the editio minor, Praefatio, *sub versu*), where *vestis fartim* seems to mean 'the stuffing of the clothes.' For the sentiment I compare Bacch. 580, where a parasitus says to his boy-attendant: *comesse panem tris pedes latum potes*.

There can be no objection to reading *ha* (i. e. *ah*, cf. Epid. 540 in A) for *uah* at the beginning of the next line on the score of metre or meaning (cf. Truc. 525, where *ah* is used "ubi dolorem corporis mulier simulat": Richter in Studemund's *Studien*, I, p. 401).

vs. 904: *quid tibi visumst mercimoni †<totus> totus gaudeo.*

Gruter's insertion of <totus> is, I believe, correct; cf. Cas. 621 *tota tota occidi*.

vss. 905-6: . . . *nunquam* edepol ego me scio
vidisse *umquam* abiectas aedis etc.

I would let *nunquam*—*unquam* remain; it is certainly no worse tautology than *nemo homo* (Pers. 211) and *homo nemo* (Most. 901 in A, "ut videtur").

vs. 926: EGOENIMCAVIREC . . . AMBISGRATIAMATQ'ANIMOMEEO.

So A, while B reads *Eam dehis gratiam*, *dehis* being probably a spelling of *dis* as above at vs. 563. That A confuses B and D is clear from AEBIS for *aedis* at Truc. 252. I propose to read our verse as follows:

ego enim caui recte; tam dis gratia[m] atque animo meo.

B's *Eam* for *tam* is responsible for *gratiam*. The phrase *tam dis gratia* means 'great thanks to the gods.' I compare Ep. 10 *huic gratia* 'thanks to this hand of mine'; at Men. 387, Stich. 472 *tam gratias* means 'no, many thanks,' 'no' being inferred as in German *ich danke*, but *ich danke* is also positive.¹ I note in Terence the parenthetic (*est*) *dis gratia* (Ad. 121, 138).

vs. 984: Tranio: is uel Herculi conterre quaestum potest.

So the manuscripts, but B^a has corrected the second *r* of *conterre* from an original *e*. I believe that *P had the trisyllabic infinitive *conterer*, and I would read the verse:

Tranio: is uel Herculi <illi> conterer quaestum potest.

To supply <illi> makes a perfect diaeresis here, and it is thoroughly Plautine (cf. above *ille*—*Iuppiter*, vs. 398). The apocopated infinitive *dicer* is demanded by the metre at Merc. 282 (cf. Sonnenschein in Transactions of the American Philological Association, XXIV, p. 14), and *biber* for *bibere* is certainly genuine (cf. Charisius 124. 1, in Keil's Grammatici Latini); while Stolz's explanation of the infinitive in *-ier* as apocopated from *-iere* is after all the best.²

vs. 1012: quid a Tranione seruo? SI. †multo id minus.

So the editio minor. I propose to read SI. <immo> *multo* etc., assuming a haplography of *Simo immo*. I note vs. 807, where the manuscripts give SI. *immo*. The metrical value *immō* occurs again at vs. 1091.

vs. 1081: quid iam? †scio iocaris tu nunc [tu] nam ille <illud> quidem haud negat.

It is obvious that both *tu*'s cannot stand, and they are most easily accounted for as arising from a shift in order (cf. supra on vs. 104). Leo inserts <edepol> after *quidem*, but restitutions of *edepol* and its like seem to me idle where haplography cannot be made plausible. I propose <illud>, meaning 'his own act.'

¹ There is such an inferred 'no' at Epid. 638 non me nosti? †quod quidem nunc veniat in mentem mihi.

² I note my supplement to this explanation in the Classical Review, X 183, where I incorrectly declared *vider* to have manuscript warrant at Epid. 62, citing a previous error of mine in Am. Jour. Phil. XV, p. 372. A better example is our present passage, where *conterer* approximates to manuscript warrant.

vs. 1089: dat profecto <†> quin †et illum in ius si veniam mane.

So the editio minor. I believe the verse to make good sense and metre as it stands. After *illum* occurs the normal hiatus in the diaeresis. I interpret the verse: 'he doesn't intend to go to court any more than I do (who as a slave am debarred from court)'; or, literally, 'expect him too when (if) I come into court.'

vs. 1090: <TH.> experiar ut opinor TR. †certumst, mihi hominem cedo.

So A. Schoell, following a cue of Gruter's, reads *ut opino* TR. <'opino'?> etc. Leo assigns *certumst* to TH. and reads TR. <immo> *mihi* etc. I propose the following:

<TH.> experior ut opinor. TR. certum<n>est? <TH. certumst TR.> mihi hominem cedo,

and cite in illustration Stich. 482 *certumnest?* †*certum*, and Merc. 461 *certumnest?* †*censen certum* esse? . I note also the entirely satisfactory restoration of Camerarius at Most. 639 *certe?* <*certe,*> inquam .

vs. 1091: uel [hominem] iube aedis mancipio poscere †immo hoc primum uolo.

The sense here is excellent if *mancipio* may be construed with *poscere*, on the analogy of *mancipio accipere* 'take possession,' *mancipio dare* 'give possession.' Leo suggests that *hominem* has crept in from vss. 1090, 1093. If we eliminate *hominem*, as Camerarius did, the verse becomes metrical with only one questionable foot, the 5th—*cēr-immō*. The pyrrhic value of *immō* seems certain (cf. Lindsay, l. c., p. 603), and the only question is whether *immō* with hiatus or *immō* with its final shortened by semi-hiatus may stand in the arsis of a foot.

vs. 1113: nūquam edepol hodiē <di med> invitum destinánt tibi.

So I propose to read this verse; besides the insertion it only changes MS *invitus* to *invitum*. Schoell reads . . . *hodie* <*hinc abibo*> *invitus: desine aut abi*, and Leo . . . *hodie* <*hinc si vivo*> *invitus desistam abi*. For the usage of *destinant* in our passage I cite Aen. II 129 me destinant arae, and Cic. Off. III 45 cum alteri diem necis destinavisset.

vs. 1114: iam iubeo ignem et sarmen <arae> carnifex circumdari.

So the editio minor, following Seyffert's ingenious emendation. B reads *iubeo*, C *lubo* and D *iube*; these best resolve into a minuscule *lubet*,¹ and I would amend the line thus:

iam lubet <tibi> ignem et sarmen carnifex circumdari?

In this line the haplography of *libet* and *tibi* probably took place in a capital manuscript. I construe *tibi* with *circumdari* according to the σχῆμα ἀπὸ κοινοῦ.

vs. 1134: age mitte ista †facto ad me ad cenam †dic venturum, quid taces?

So the editio minor. I propose to emend as follows:

age mitte ista, ag<i>to ad me cenam etc.,

where the insertion of <i> is justified by the following *t*, and the interchange of *g* and *c* is of common occurrence in capital manuscripts. Ussing's ingenious correction *ac te* involves shifting *dic venturum* to the first speaker. While no great attention can be paid to the notae personarum, still, dropping one out demands some justification.

It is not, I take it, a jejune reiteration of *hic apud nos hodie cenes* (vs. 1129), when the would-be host renews his invitation by *agito cenam* 'I'm having a big dinner' (cf. Pers. 28 *agitare eleutheria*, ib. 769 — *meum natalem*, Asin. 834 — *convivium*). The [*ad*] I have dropped before *cenam* came in with the error in *acto*.

vs. 1141: numquid aliud feci<t> nisi quod [faciunt] summi<s> gnati generibus.

So the editio minor. I propose to read *faciunt* and drop *feci*. There is no more difficulty in inferring the verb of the leading clause from the dependent than vice versa (cf. Livy 34, 46 and 2, 32), and a diaeresis after *faciunt* would be easier, I take it, than after *quod*.

vs. 1166: dispudet <†> †istam ueniam: quid me fiet[†] nunciam?

So the editio minor. Assuming that the nota personae had been lost in *P, I suppose that manuscript to have read DISPU-

¹ The following are salient cases of the confusion involved here: Pseud. 1054 *iube nunc* (A), *lubet nunc* (*P); ib. 1125 *lubet* (CD), *iubet* (B); Truc. 585 *iubet*, corrected by Camerarius to *lubet*, by Buecheler to *iube*.

DETĒISTAM etc., and would read here *dispudēt* <†em> *istam* etc., referring for this metrical value of *em istam* to Richter in Studemund's Studien (I, p. 498), though at both the places cited (Curc. 212, Merc. 206) we might read *ēm ist*—, a resolved thesis, because of elisions complicated with change of speaker.

vs. 1172: mītte quaes<o> istum <†> †e vīden ut astat fūrcifer?

So the editio minor, but *restat* in the manuscripts. I propose to read as follows:

mītte, quaéso, ístum <†> é<m> vīden út res<ís>tat fūrcifér?

There is no palaeographic difficulty in reading *e<m>*. For *e<m> vīden* I cite Terence, Hec. 316 *em sensistin?* and Pseud. 872 *em subolem sis vide*. Perhaps, though, we should read *hem vīden*, like *hem cupin* above (vs. 5), and the passage cited from Terence has variants in *hem*. It is quite certain that *resistere* is used by Plautus in the same sense as *astare* (cf. Cas. 727).

The questionable point about the reading I propose is whether *quaeso* may be read with hiatus or semi-hiatus. It seems to be so read at Cist. 554 and Curc. 629.

LEXINGTON, VA.

EDWIN W. FAY.

III.—SUPERSTITIONS AND POPULAR BELIEFS IN GREEK COMEDY.

As to the scope of this paper and its governing principles, I refer the reader to the introduction of my paper on 'Superstition in Greek Tragedy.'¹ One word, however, should be said about the material on which it is based. The extended use which Plautus and Terence both have made of Greek originals might lead to the expectation that their plays have likewise been made use of in the following discussion. This has not been done, partly because I do not wish to extend this paper to an undue length, partly because I think it better, for reasons of method, to discuss this borrowing and adapting of beliefs in its proper place, viz. the discussion of Roman beliefs.

1.—In trying to define the extent of superstition² in antiquity I called attention to the fact that the word *δεισιδαιμονία* shows the origin to have been an exaggerated fear of divine spirits. From the comparatively late appearance of the word in Greek literature, and from the conditions of the age when it first appears, I ventured to argue that it had its origin about 400 B. C., in round numbers, in that seething cauldron of religious sectarianism which is marked by the preponderance of Orphicism and by the growing acceptance of the cult of Cybele by the lower classes. I tried also to show that such transformation of religious belief into superstition was not the product of isolated circumstances, but that it is subject to a law which, therefore, must be expected to work wherever similar conditions exist. To this I believe I am able to adduce additional testimony. Even in Menander's time the word *δεισιδαίμων* was not yet firmly established. In fact, the word *δολος* repeatedly occurs in its stead, not only here, but also in the Old Comedy.³ Now, this word can only refer to the enthusiastic shouts of some religious service—in one word, to the cult of the Great Mother. It is well known that Cybele priests

¹ Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc. XXVII 5 ff.

² Ibidem, XXVI 40 ff.

³ Menand. *Δεισιδαίμων*, 112 K., inc. 1046 K.; Theopomp. *Τισαμενός*, 61 K.

were no mere functionaries in the ritual, but that, beyond this, they were busily engaged in miraculous cures.¹ It can also be proved from Menander's comedies.² That the *ὀλολυγμός* played a prominent part in the rites of the Great Mother would be inferred from their enthusiastic character. But for this, too, we have an express testimony in the verses of Menander's *Μισόγυνος*³:

ἐθύομεν δὲ πεντάκις τῆς ἡμέρας
ἐκυμβάλιζον δ' ἐπταῖς θεραπείαις κύκλω,
αἱ δ' ὠλόλυζον.

The history of the word *μητραγύρτης*, likewise, tends to show that at a comparatively early stage the more exaggerated features of the cult had fallen into deep contempt. The rivalry between *δαισιδαίμων* and *ὄλος* enables us to witness, as it were, the slow decay of a true religion, or rather of some of its features, into superstition, an opportunity not often offered in antiquity.

It is, however, unsafe to speak too confidently. As I have urged in the paper referred to,⁴ the individuality of the writer is of the greatest moment in these questions, and we might sadly misjudge popular feeling by making the comedian our standard. An example of this is furnished by Aristophanes.⁵ In his *Amphiaraios* he had censured the credulity of the Athenians as regards the miraculous cures wrought in the *Amphiaraiion* at Oropos. This appeared to him to be superstition. But did the Athenians in general regard it as such? The sacred precinct of *Amphiaraios* certainly continued to give birth to innumerable miracles and to form the centre of a fervent worship down to much later times, as the well-known records unearthed at Oropos prove beyond doubt. As to Menander himself, not only the fact that he wrote a comedy called *Δαισιδαίμων*, but also his verses about the Syrian fish-taboo,⁶ show that he was considerably in advance of his own age as far as popular beliefs are concerned. Now, this should certainly

¹ E. Rohde, *Psyche*, 336 ff.

² Menand. *Ἰέρεια*, 245 K. About the time of the Rhea-Cybele cult cp. also Preller-Robert, I 651.

³ 326 K. = inc. 601 K. It is significant that the passage occurs in the *Μισόγυνος*. Women at all times have been the chosen agents of superstition and its most influential proselytisers. Compare the influence of the freed-women in imperial Rome, as shown in the poems of Horace, Ovid, Tibullus. See also Index s. prostitute.

⁴ Transact. Am. Ass. XXVI 43, 50.

⁵ See Bergk, *Ar. fgm.*, p. 951.

⁶ Menand. inc. 544 K.

warn us to exercise the greatest discretion in relegating a belief to the sphere of superstition. It cannot be repeated too often that the line of demarcation between superstition and religion fluctuates.

2.—Aristophanes, *Ἡρώες*, 306 K.:

μήτε ποδάνιπτρον θύραζ' ἐκχεῖτε μήτε λούτριον.

At first blush this looks like a measure of sanitation which must have been very welcome indeed where the streets were still unpaved. But the fragment had its place in a comedy which, by its very name, dealt with 'souls.' It is a hackneyed fact that such apparently sanitary measures almost always had their origin in religion. So it is here also. The sacredness of the door¹ hardly needs proving. It will be sufficient to quote Menander²:

μαρτύρομαι, ναὶ μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω τουτονὶ
καὶ τὰς θύρας.

This sacredness would be a sufficient reason for the prohibition. However, its root seems to lie deeper. At the door the souls have one of their habitual haunts, though I hardly recollect any reference to it from Greek soil.³ But among the Hebrews the seat of the Elohim of the family was at the door. When the Hebrew slave declared his willingness to remain a slave rather than to make use of the liberty offered him with the return of the jubilee year, he was led to the door and his ear was fastened to the door-post with an awl.⁴ Moreover, from German superstition we know of a custom that will admirably help to explain the Greek prohibition. Immediately after the coffin has been carried out of the house, the pail of water with which the corpse was washed is poured out after it. This is to prevent the return of the soul.⁵ Thus, to pour out the water of the bath would drive the spirits from their abode. Hence its prohibition by the *Ἡρώες*.

¹ Cp. H. C. Trumbull, *The Threshold-Covenant*.

² Menand. inc. 740 K.

³ Except, perhaps, the threshold sacrifice in Mag. Pap. V. III 27.

⁴ Deuteron. 15, 17. About the meaning of this ceremony cp. Pauly-Wissowa, I 30, 60.

⁵ Wuttke, *Volksabergl.*, §732. Cp. Grimm, *Mythol.*, App., 846. A similar custom prevails in modern Greece: C. Wachsmuth, *Das alte Griechenland im Neuen*, 119, 129. The slang expression 'to kick the bucket,' so widely used among English-speaking peoples, may possibly be connected with this custom.

3.—Aristophanes, *Τελμισῆς*, 532 K.:

πινακίσκον ἄπυρον ἰχθυηρόν.

Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ ἔοικε διαιρεῖν τινὰς ἀπύρους καὶ ἐμπύρους πινακίσκους.¹ Bergk compares Phrynichus²: ἄπυρον πινακίσκον· καινὸν μήπω πυρὶ προσενηνεγμένον. We may accept Phrynichus' explanation as correct; but Aristophanes certainly did not make this distinction from sheer arbitrariness. The *Telmessians* was a comedy dealing with the superstitious practices of the *Telmessians*, a people noted throughout antiquity for its witchcraft. The newness of earthenware is an important factor also in the magical papyri where the *χύτρα καινή* is repeatedly mentioned.³ A possible explanation of the word *ἄπυρος* would also be that the vessel was to consist of unbaked clay. This, too, finds its warrant in the magical papyri.⁴ In either case the reason for the prohibition lies in the enmity between fire, the pure, ethereal element, and magic.⁵

4.—Aristophanes, *Τελμισῆς*, 530 K.:

*τράπεζαν ἡμῖν εἰσφερε
τρεῖς πόδας ἔχουσιν, τέτταρας δὲ μὴ 'χέτω.
—καὶ πόθεν ἐγὼ τρίπουν τράπεζαν λήψομαι;*

In a paper on 'Folk-lore in Artemidoros,'⁶ I have tried to show that tables were fitted with three legs, not for any practical reason, but on account of some mysterious religious idea. The Aristophanic passage just quoted, while it shows that four-legged tables must at least have been considerably more frequent than the others, still confirms my view. For the express command, coupled as it is with an express prohibition and occurring, in all probability, in an act of witchcraft, can have no other reason back of it but a superstitious one.

5.—Alkaios, *Γανυμήδης*, 4 K.:

κατέχεσον τῆς Νηρηίδος.

Difficult as it is to interpret half a line from an ancient comedy which may have treated of everything under the sun, I neverthe-

¹ Pollux, X 82.

² In Bekker's An. Gr. I 14.

³ See the index of Wessely's *Zauberpapyrus*, in *Wiener Denkschriften*, XXXVI and XLII, s. v. *καινός*.

⁴ Paris. Pap., vs. 900 b, ed. Wessely.

⁵ Cp. also Soph. *Trach.* 607.

⁶ *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX, p. 184.

less think that this particular half-verse allows of an interpretation. Indeed, it enables us to state the existence of a belief in the fifth century B. C. which hitherto has been known only from the monuments and the literature of later times. I refer to the belief in the Nereids as evil demons. This assumption of their character has, in fact, mostly been based upon their modern significance.¹ It is only a few years since O. Crusius,² by interpreting a 'Hellenistic' relief, furnished proofs of the existence of similar beliefs, at least in Alexandrian times. Our fragment, however, takes us still farther back. The drastic treatment of the daughter of Nereus is eminently one of the means which were used against the evil eye, and as such reveals itself as good against evil spirits.³ Why the beautiful sea-nymphs became dangerous I do not know. Some inference, however, may be drawn from the behavior of water-nymphs towards Hylas⁴ and from the more modern mermaids.

6.—Krates, Ἡρώες, 10 K.:

τὸν αὐχέν' ἐκ γῆς ἀνεκὰς εἰς αὐτοὺς βλέπων.

What right have I to refer this passage to necromancy⁵? It is only a very slight justification that it occurs in a comedy of the title Ἡρώες. But it seems to me that the verse might almost stand as subscription to the well-known Teiresias vase.⁶ On this monument of the fourth century B. C. we see Odysseus sitting on a heap of stones; to his right and left his companions are standing, and between his feet the head of the ram killed as a sacrifice is lying. At his feet, furthermore, the shadow of Teiresias is visible. That is to say, we see his head and shoulders rising from the depth. He is certainly represented τὸν αὐχέν' ἐκ γῆς ἀνεκὰς εἰς αὐτὸν βλέπων, so much so that from crown to chin there is an almost horizontal line. It has long since been surmised that this masterly painting goes back to some cele-

¹ See espec. B. Schmidt, Volksleben d. Neugriechen, pp. 105, 118 ff., 123.

² Philologus, L 97 ff.

³ O. Jahn, Leipz. Sitzgsber. 1855, 86 ff. Cp. the way in which Luther used to treat the attacks of the arch-fiend. About the demoniacal nature of the evil eye see the remarks by Bloomfield, this Journal, XVII 400.

⁴ This point has been made by Schmidt, too, l. c., p. 99, n. 7. Cp. also V. Laistner, Rätsel der Sphinx, and Class. Rev. X 413.

⁵ See Index s. necromancy.

⁶ Mon. Inst. IV 19 = Baumeister, Denkm. II, fig. 1254.

brated original, albeit unknown to us.¹ The close resemblance between the verse of an Athenian poet of the fifth century and the Athenian vase seems to me one more proof of the correctness of such an hypothesis.

7.—Strattis, *Φοίνισσαι*, 46 K. = Aristoph. *Νῆσοι*, 389 K.:

ἔξεχ', ὦ φίλ' ἥλιε.

“Es liegt ein tiefer Sinn im kind'schen Spiel.” These words of the German poet, so often borne out by facts, are proved anew by our two passages. Nobody doubts, nowadays, that children's games and nursery rhymes are often the last refuge for older religious rites and songs.² The same process has taken place here. With all other nations of the earth, the Greeks too believed that eclipses of sun or moon were caused by some bad spirit or human being trying to attack or swallow the great luminaries.³ It behooved man, therefore, to come to their rescue. This was done by making a hideous noise or by shouting incantations and songs. Now, in Pollux,⁴ where the better of the two accounts of this game has been preserved, we read: *ἡ δὲ ἔξεχ', ὦ φίλ' ἥλιε, παιδιὰ κρότον ἔχει τῶν παίδων σὺν τῷ ἐπιβοήματι τούτῳ, ὅποτεν νέφος ἐπιδράμη τὸν θεόν.* There can be no doubt, to my mind, that in the cloud we must see the last incarnation of the evil spirit, which shall be disturbed and beaten off by the noise and shouts which are raised against it.

8.—Aristoph. *Ran.* 298 ff.:

*ἀπολούμεθ', ὦναξ Ἡράκλεις.—οὐ μὴ καλεῖς μ'
ὦνθρωφ', ἱκετεύω, μηδὲ κατερεῖς τοῦνομα.
—Διόνυσε τοῖνον.—τοῦτ' ἔθ' ἦττον θατέρου.*

There seems to underlie these verses the well-known idea of the power of the name, as old as the oldest incantations which we possess.⁵ When you know the name of a demon, you have gained complete control over him, and, contrariwise, you must take good care lest the sprites learn yours, or they will control

¹ Baum. II, p. 1040.

² Grimm, *Mythol.*, passim. Cp. Alice Gomme, *Traditional Games*.

³ Pauly-Wissowa, I 41, 4 ff.; cp. E. Rohde, *Psyche*, 379; W. Roscher, *Selene*.

⁴ Pollux, IX 7.

⁵ E. g. cp. A. Erman, *Aegypten*, p. 359 ff.

you.¹ Even the οὔτις pseudonym of Odysseus goes back to this belief, however remotely. Dionysos is just now on his way to the lower world and particularly anxious to avoid the dangers which beset his path. It is only natural that he should observe the rule; for, as Hall Caine puts it, custom must be indulged with custom or custom will weep.

9.—Com. anon. 85 K.: βλεπεδαίμων, ὁ διεστραμμένος τὰς ὄψεις καὶ οἶον ὑπὸ δαίμονος πεπληγός.² βλ., ὁ ὑπὸ νόσου κατεσκληκὼς καὶ κακόχρους ὑπὸ δαιμόνων.³ “Larvae similis,” says Kock. But all these explanations are at variance with grammar. For compounds which are formed by a verbal stem with noun following are objective compounds, viz. the noun is governed by the verb.⁴ The meaning of βλεπεδαίμων, therefore, would be, not ὁ βλεπόμενος ὑπὸ δαίμονος, but ὁ βλέπων δαίμονα. The first part of Eustathius’ gloss gives us the clue to its significance. Squinting has always been regarded as one of the surest marks whereby to recognize the ‘jettatore.’⁵ This much once granted, and βλεπεδαίμων is easily explained as ‘he who looks the demon.’⁶ Many circumstances prove the ‘evil eye’ to have been regarded as the action of a demon. We need not go back to Demokritos’ εἰδῶλα as the cause of vision, or to the clearly protective character of the amulets against the evil eye. Foremost among the marks of the βάσκανος is the ἵππος in his eye⁷; that is, the figure of a horse, believed to be discernible in his pupil. O. Jahn, it is true, thinks this due to the confusion with the name of a peculiar eye-disease,⁸ a theory foreshadowing, on a kindred field, M. Müller’s mythological ‘disease of the language.’ However, matters must be reversed. The very name of the sickness proves that its origin, too, was ascribed to the presence of a horse-shaped demon.⁹ Neither is it a far cry from this explanation of βλεπεδαίμων to the second part of the passages

¹ Cp. Laistner, Rätsel der Sphinx

² Eustath., p. 206, 27.

³ Hesych., s. v.

⁴ Kühner, Gr. Gramm. I 338, 5. Cp. also H. Osthoff, Das Verbum in der Nominalcomposition.

⁵ See Tuchmann, La Fascination in Mélusine, IV ff.

⁶ Cp. ‘torva videns’ in Latin.

⁷ O. Jahn, Leipz. Sitzgsber. 1855, 35. For modern instances see Tuchmann, l. c.

⁸ L. c., p. 35, 26.

⁹ On sickness, incarnated in the bodies of beasts, cp. Bienkowski, Malocchio, in Eranos Vindob.

from Eustathios and Hesychios; for the possessor of the evil eye is, of course, himself possessed by the spirit,¹ and, as frequently happens in such cases, himself harmed to some degree by him.

INDEX.

A.

- Abstinence, Menand. inc. 544 K.
 acorn, Nikochares inc. 15 K.; s. cabbage.
αἰγίθαλος, bird of bad luck, Alkaios Ganym. 3 K.
 Akko, Hermippos Ath. gon. 7 K.
 Amaltheia, horn of, Philemon Pter. 65 K.
 amulet, Aristoph. Ach. 964–965 (Gorgo); Eupolis Bapt. 87 K.
 Diphilos Pall. 59 K. (cunnus); Menand. Parakat. 387 K.
 (snake); s. bracelet.
ἀναλύται, Magnes Lyd. 4 K.; s. dreams; *ὀνειρόμαντις*.
 antipathy, schol. Aristoph. Eq. 539; s. cabbage.
 ants, gold-digging, Eubulos Glauk. 20 K.
 aphrodisiacs, Xenarchos Bupal. 1 K.; Alexis inc. 279 K.
ἀποτρόπαιον, schol. Aristoph. Ach. 284; s. amulet, Gorgo, evil eye,
 squilla, Ephesia grammata.
 Artemis = Hekate, Diphilos inc. 124 K.
 asphalt, in purification, Diphilos inc. 126 K.
 astrology, popular, Damoxenos Syntr. 2 K.; Nikomachos Eil.
 1 K.; Sosipater Kataps. 1 K.; Menand. inc. 531 K. (doubt-
 ful); Philemon Babyl. 16 K. (doubtful).

B.

- Babylonian, as astrologer, Philemon Babyl. 16 K. (doubtful);
 s. astrology.
βασκάνιον, s. evil eye.
βάσκανος, Aristoph. Plut. 571; Pherekrates inc. 174 K.; s. evil eye.
 bathing-water, must not be poured out at the door, Aristoph.
 Heroes 306 K.; s. door; s. p. 191.
 birds, and barbarians, Aristoph. Av. 199–200; 1681; Ran. 679–
 682.
 and soul, Aristoph. Vesp. 49–51; s. soul.
 bracelet, as amulet, Diphilos Pall. 59 K.; Menand. Parakat. 387 K.;
 s. amulet.

¹ O. Jahn, l. c., 34.

C.

Cabbage and wine, schol. Aristoph. Eq. 539; Eupolis Bapt. 74 K.; Nikochares inc. 15 K.; Telekleides Pryt. 27 K.; Alexis inc. 286 K.; Amphis inc. 37 K.; Anaxandrides inc. 58 K.; Eubulos inc. 127 K.; s. acorn; antipathy.

cathartes, Aristoph. Vesp. 1043; s. incubus; sickness.

cathartics, Aristoph. Pax 1250; Vesp. 119.

charm, Aristoph. Thesm. 430; Antiphanes Dipl. 86 K.; Menand. Her. 213 K.; inc. 559 K., 702 K.; monost. 313.

and counter-charm, s. moly.

or medicine, Aristoph. inc. 872 K.; s. ὠκυτόκιον.

produces mania, Aristoph. Thesm. 561.

charm-song, Aristoph. Ran. 1033 (s. Musaios); Amphiar. 29 K.; Daidal. 188 K.; Anaxandrides Od. 33, 12 K.; Antiphanes Philotheb. 217, 15 K.; com. dub. 1206 K.

Charon, identified with death, Antiphanes Dipl. 86 K.

χρηστός = pure, Antiphanes inc. 272 K.

Circe, as witch, Aristoph. Plut. 302.

cock, untimely crowing of, ominous, Com. anon. 341 K.; s. omen.

copper, material of a ring, Aristoph. Danaid. 250 K.; s. magical ring.

cross-roads, Eupolis Dem. 120 K.; Charikleides Halys. 1 K.; s. Hekate.

crumbs from the table, Aristoph. Heroes 305 K.; s. Heroes.

cunnus, Diphilos Pall. 59 K.; s. amulet.

D.

Day, lucky or unlucky, Eupolis Kol. 174 K.; Menand. Leuc. 315 K.

fourth of the month, Ameipsias inc. 28 K.; Aristonymos

Hel. rig. 4 K.; Plato Peis. 100 K.; Sannyrion Gel. 5 K.

dead, must not be slandered, Aristoph. Pax 648-656; Dionysios Soz. 6 K.

intercourse with living, Aristoph. Dram. 278 K.; s. Maimakterion.

death = Charon, Antiphanes Dipl. 86 K.

early d. is lucky, Menand. Dis. Exap. 125 K. = monost. 425.

defaecation, to drive away demons, Alkaios Ganym. 4 K.; s. Nereid; s. p. 192.

demon, sends sickness, Eupolis Mar. 191 K.

and fate, Alexis Asotod. 25 K.; Menand. inc. 550 K.; Philemon inc. 191 K.

demon and life, Anaxandrides Anchis. 4 K.

? Διάλαος, a spectre, Kratinos inc. 402 K.

διοσημεία, Aristoph. Ach. 170-171; Nub. 579; s. omen.

dog, incarnation of Hekate, Aristoph. inc. 82 M.

donkey, Aristoph. Av. 721; s. σύμβολοι.

door, sacred, Menand. inc. 740 K. (oath).

seat of souls, Aristoph. Her. 306 K.; s. bathing-water; s. p. 191.

dreams, significance of, Aristoph. Vesp. 24-25; Kratinos inc. 363 K.; Alexis Cithar. 103 K., inc. 272 K.; Menand. inc. 534, 734 K.; Com. anon. 185 K.

interpreted, Aristoph. Eq. 809; Vesp. 52-53; s. ἀναλύται.

E.

Earthquake, ominous, Aristoph. Eccles. 791-793; s. fire, γαλή.

east, in purification, Kratinos Cheir. 232 K.

eclipse, ominous, Aristoph. Nub. 584-586.

εἰρεσιώγη, kept in the house, Aristoph. Vesp. 398-399; cp. schol. Eq. 720.

ἐλαιομαντεία, schol. Aristoph. Ach. 1128.

Empusa, Aristoph. Eccles. 1056-1057; Ran. 288-296.

= Hekate, Aristoph. Tagen. 500-501 K.

Ephesia grammata, Anaxilas Lyrop. 18 K.; Menand. Paid. 371 K.; s. wedding.

Eudemos, vendor of magical implements, Aristoph. Plut. 883-884; Ameipsias inc. 27 K.

eunuch, foreboding ill, Com. an. 350 K.; s. σύμβολοι.

Eurykles, ventriloquist, Aristoph. Vesp. 1019.

evening, time of spectres, Aristoph. Av. 1484-1489; s. spectres.

evil eye, Aristoph. Eq. 103-104, inc. 592 K.; Pherekrates inc. 174 K.; Alexis Troph. 238 K.; Antiphanes Did. 80, 8 K.; Misop. 159 K.; Dionysios inc. 7-11 K.; Timokles Synerg. 31 K.; Menand. inc. 540 K.; Nikomachos Naum. 2 K.; Philemon inc. 131 K.; Com. anon. 85 K., 160 K., 359 K.; s. βύσκανος, squinting; s. p. 195.

F.

Fig-tree, wood of bad luck, Com. anon. 7 K.; s. portent, sixteen.

fire, ominous, Aristoph. Eccles. 792; s. earthquake.

ordeal by, Aristoph. Lys. 133-134.

destroys magical power, Aristoph. Telmes. 532 K.; s. p. 192.

flatfish, fairy-tale about its origin, Aristoph. Lys. 115-116.

footwashing, Aristoph. dub. 914 K.; s. right and left.

? foundation-sacrifice, Aristoph. Danaid. 245 K.

four, in burial ritual, Aristoph. Eccles. 1031; s. vine.

fourth day, s. day.

furnace, protection of, Aristoph. inc. 592 K.; s. evil eye.

G.

Γαλή, ominous, Aristoph. Eccles. 792; s. omen, σύμβολοι.

and loss of speech?, Aristoph. inc. 664 K.

γαστρομαντεία, s. Eurykles.

γλαῦκος (fish), ominous, Nausikrates Nauch. 1. 2 K.

and magic, Nausikrates Nauch. 1. 2 K.; s. omen,

Persephone, Sicily, τρίγλη.

gods, their appearance accompanied by light, Aristoph. Av. 1709-1713.

by scent, Aristoph. Av. 1715-1716.

Γόητες, title of a comedy by Aristomenes 5 K.

Gorgo, on a helmet, Aristoph. Ach. 964-965; s. amulet, ἀπορό-
παιον.

Gorgoneion, Aristoph. Pax 560-561; Lys. 560; s. shield.

H.

Hades' cap, Aristoph. Ach. 386-390; s. wizard.

haruspicy, Aristoph. Telm. 540 K.; Euphron. Ad. 1 K.; Theor.
7 K.

Hekate, her chapel in every house, Aristoph. Vesp. 805.

dog-shaped, Aristoph. inc. 594 K.

invocation of, Charikleides Hal. 1 K. (s. cross-roads).

= Artemis, Diphilos inc. 124 K. (s. Artemis).

= Empusa, Aristoph. Tag. 500-501 K. (s. Empusa).

title of comedies by Nikostratos 11. 12 K.; by Diphilos
28 ff. K.

hellebore, Aristoph. Vesp. 1489; Kallias inc. 28 K.; Diphilos
Helleb. 31 K.

from Antikyra, Diphilos inc. 126 K.

against mania, Menand. Aul. 69 K.

Hermes, protects from evil, Aristoph. Plut. 1153-1154; Philemon
dub. 226 K.

Heroes, seat of, at doors, Aristoph. Her. 306 K.; s. door.

Heroes do evil, Menand. Syneph. 459 K.; Com. anon. 257 K.
 punish neglect, Aristoph. inc. 692 K.
 live on crumbs, Aristoph. Her. 305 K.
 = souls, Aristoph. Her. 305. 306 K.; Myrtilos Titanop.
 2 K.; s. souls, spectres.
 title of comedies by Aristoph.; by Chionides, Kock, v. I,
 p. 4; by Philemon 30 K.
 Heros, title of comedies by Diphilos 47 K., by Menand. 209 ff. K.
 Hieronymos, Athenian wizard?, Aristoph. Ach. 386.
 Hippalektryon, sign of a ship, Aristoph. Ran. 932-933.

I, J.

Ἰκτίνος, protection against, Aristoph. Av. 500-503.
 incubus, Aristoph. Vesp. 1037-1042; s. cathartes; sickness.
 Isis, oath by I. and sickness, Ophelion inc. 6 K.
 ivy, Aristoph. Vesp. 480; s. ὀρίγανον.
 iynx, Aristoph. Lys. 1110-1111.

K.

Κερκομαντεία, Aristoph. Pax 1054-1055.
 κίθαρος (fish), Pherekrates Dulod. 39 K.
 κληδών, Diphilos inc. 100 K.; s. omen.
 κοσκινομαντεία, Aristoph. Nub. 373 (doubtful); Philippides inc. 37 K.
 Kotytto, Eupolis Bapt. 83 K.
 Kybele, her priests as miraculous healers, Menand. Hier. 245 K.;
 s. p. 190.

L.

Lamia, Aristoph. Nub. 555-556; Menand. Plok. 403 K.
 her ὄρχεις, Aristoph. Pax 758 = Vesp. 1035.
 breaks wind when caught, Aristoph. Vesp. 1177; Krates
 Lam. 18 K.
 title of comedy by Krates.
 lamp, its sputtering prophesies rain, Aristoph. Vesp. 260-263.
 lentils, healing, Menand. inc. 530 K.
 lettuce, makes impotent, Eubulos Astyt. 14 K.
 light, accompanies the appearance of gods, Aristoph. Av. 1709-
 1713.
 lightning, ominous, Com. anon. 49 K.
 -stroke makes sacred, Aristophon Iatr. 3 K.; Anaxippos
 Ker. 3 K.

lightning-stroke and perjury, Antiphanes inc. 233 K.

-tower (legend), Aristoph. Av. 1537-1538; cp. Aeschyl. Eum. 812-814.

love-charm, Aristoph. Ach. 1065-1066; Alexis Mandr. 141 K. (s. mandragora); Menand. inc. 259 bM., 646 K.

λυχνίας, Plato Soph. 146 K.

M.

Magic, evil?, Aristoph. inc. 793 K. = schol. Vesp. 288.

and Samothracian mysteries, Aristoph. Pax 277-279; s. prayer.

magical book, Aristomenes Goët. 9 K.

herbs and metamorphosis, Aristoph. Av. 654-655.

ring, Aristoph. Plut. 883-884; Danaid. 250 K.; Eupolis Bapt. 87 K.; Antiphanes Omph. 177 K.; s. copper, Eudemos, Phertatos.

magician, Ameipsias inc. 27 K. (Eudemos); Theopompos Alth. 2 K.; Anaxandrides Pharmakom. 81 K. (doubtful); Antiphanes Omph. 177 K. (Phertatos); Mnesimachos Pharmakop. 6 K. (doubtful); Diphilos inc. 126 K.

social estimation of, Alexis Tarant. 222, 7 K.

Maimakterion, mouth of the dead, Aristoph. Danaid. 278 K.; s. dead.

mandragora, Alexis Mandr. 141 ff. K.

mania, produced by spectres?, Menand. Phas. 502 K.

Μάντεις, title of comedy by Alexis 146 ff. K.

medicine, popular, Aristoph. Ach. 862-863.

and charms, Anaxandrides Pharmakom. 81 K.

and magic, Menand. inc. 530 K.

Megara, seat of magicians, Theopomp. Alth. 2 K.

miraculous cures, Menand. Hier. 245 K.; s. music.

moly, as counter-charm?, Com. anon. 641 K.

monkey, forebodes ill, Com. anon. 350 K.; s. σύμβολοι.

moon, influences action, Aristoph. Ach. 83-84.

drawn down by magic, Aristoph. Nub. 749-752; Menand. Thess.; s. Thessaly.

Mormo, Aristoph. Av. 1245; Eq. 693; Pax 473-474; Ran. 925; Krates Her. 8 K.

Mormolykeion, Aristoph. Thesm. 417; Amphiar. 31 K; Ger. 131 K.

mouse, its nibbling ominous, Com. anon. 341 K.; s. omen.

Musaios, and charm-songs, Aristoph. Ran. 1033.

music, subdues the gods, Menand. Hier. 245 K.; s. miraculous cures.

μύραινα, its relation to snakes, Com. anon. 219 M. (doubtful).

N.

Name, power of, Aristoph. Ran. 298-300; s. p. 194.

necromancy, Aristoph. Av. 1553-1564; Krates Her. 10 K.; s. p. 193; Alexis Thespr. 89 K.

Nereid, as evil demon, Alkaios Gan. 4 K.; s. defaecation; s. p. 192.

nursery-rhymes, Aristoph. Nes. 389 K.; Strattis Phoen. 46 K.; s. p. 194.

O.

Ὠκυτόκια, Aristoph. Thesm. 504; inc. 872 K.; s. charm.

omen, Aristoph. Ach. 170-171; Av. 720; Eccles. 791-793; Eq. 24-29. 638-640; Nub. 579 f. 584-586. 1128-1129; Vesp. 1086; Hermippos inc. 81 K.; Theopompos inc. 74 K.; Anaxandrides Agr. 1 K.; Nausikrates Naukl. 1. 2 K.; Diphilos inc. 100 K.; Menand. inc. 534 K.; Philemon inc. 100 K.; Com. anon. 49 K., 341 K.; s. cock, διοσημεία, γαλῆ, γλαῦκος, κληδών, mouse, owl.

‘accipio,’ Eupolis Dem. 119 K.

absit, Aristoph. Av. 61; Lys. 146-147; Plut. 114-116. 359. 855; Vesp. 161. 535-536; Anaxandrides Agr. 1, 4 ft. K.; Antiphanes Omph. 177 K.; Menand. Deisid. 109 K.; Methe 321 K. Cp. Transact. Am. Phil. Ass. XXVII 34.

omission, Myrtilos Titanop. 2 K.; s. silence, tombs.

ὄνειρομάντεις, s. ἀναλύται.

onions, Aristoph. Eccles. 1091-1092; Com. anon. 484 K.

ὀρίγανον, Aristoph. Eccles. 1030; Ran. 602; Vesp. 480; s. ivy; Anaxandrides Pharmakom. 81 K.

ὀρνιθομαντεία, Aristoph. Av. 593-601. 716-722; Plut. 63.

Orpheus, as healer, Antiphanes Orph. 180 K. (very doubtful); s. magic and mysteries.

owl, Aristoph. Vesp. 1086; Menand. inc. 534 K.; s. omen, σύμβολοι.

P.

Petosiris, Aristoph. Dan. 257 K.

Φαρμακόμαντις, title of a comedy by Anaxandrides 49 ff. K.

Phertatos, manufacturer or vendor of magical rings, Antiphanes
Omph. 177 K.; s. magician.

phthisis, sent by a god, Aristoph. Vesp. 158-160.

πομπυσμός, Aristoph. Plut. 732.

πορδή, Aristoph. Plut. 618.

portent, Plato inc. 257 K.; Com. anon. 7 K.; s. fig-tree; sixteen.

possessed, Aristoph. Vesp. 119; Alexis 87 K.; Menand. Heaut.
140 K.

women prophesy, Menand. Theoph. 223 ff. K.

prayer of *μύσται* can bind the steps of the runner, s. magic and
mysteries.

prostitutes, as witches?, Com. anon. 220 K.

purification, Kratinos Cheir. 232 K.; Araros 12 K.; Diphilos inc.
126 K.; Menand. inc. 530 K.

purity, of water, Aristoph. Amphiar. 32 K.

πυρομαντεία, Aristoph. Pac. 1026.

R.

Red, in miraculous cures, Aristoph. Plut. 730-732.

rejuvenation, in comedies by Philemon 8 K.; by Philippides 5 ff. K.

right and left, Aristoph. dub. 914 K.

rumor, Aristoph. Av. 720.

S.

Salt, in medicine, Menand. inc. 530 K.

sardonix?, Philemon inc. 73 K., 216 K.

scent, accompanies appearance of gods, Aristoph. Av. 1715-1716;
s. gods.

Scythia, seat of witches?, Xenarchos Scyth. 12 K.

sea-water, in purification, Diphilos inc. 126 K.

servant, meeting a s. forebodes ill, Aristoph. Av. 721; s. σύμβολοι.

seven, Aristoph. Lys. 698.

shield: device, Aristoph. Ach. 574 (Gorgoneion); Lys. 560 (do.).

shoe, and right foot, Aristoph. dub. 914 K.; s. right and left.

Sicily, seat of wizards, Nausikrates Naukl. 1. 2 K.; s. γλαῦκος.

sickness, as demon, Aristoph. Vesp. 1037-1042; s. incubus.

healed by charm-song, Aristoph. Ran. 1033.

- sickness, sent by demons, Eupolis Mar. 191 K.
 caused by witchcraft, Xenarchos Scyth. 12 K.
 silence, Myrtilos Titanop. 2 K.; s. omission, tombs.
 sixteen, Com. anon. 7 K.; s. fig-tree.
 snake, healing, Aristoph. Plut. 733-736; Kratinos Troph. 225 K.
 (doubtful).
 as amulet on bracelet, Menand. Par. 387 K.
 and stick, Com. anon. 486 K.; cp. Transact. Am. Phil. Ass.
 XXVI 53.
 sneezing, ominous, Aristoph. Av. 720; Menand. inc. 534 K.;
 Philemon inc. 100 K.
 soul, and star, Aristoph. Pax 832-833.
 as bird, Aristoph. Vesp. 49-51; s. Heroes.
 spectres, size of, Krates Her. 11 K.
 strike men, Aristoph. Av. 1490-1493.
 evening their time, Aristoph. Av. 1484-1489.
 hover in or over the coffin, Com. anon. 1151 K.
 title of comedies by Menand. 501 ff. K.; by Philemon
 84 K.; by Theognetos, Kock, v. III, 364.
 spitting, Aristoph. Pax 528.
 squill, buried at the door-sill, Aristoph. Dan. 255 K.
 purifying, Kratinos Cheir. 232 K.; Diphilos 126 K.
 squinting, sign of evil eye, Com. anon. 85 K.; s. p. 195.
 star, and soul, Aristoph. Pax 832-833.
 storm, sacrifice to, Aristoph. Ran. 847-848.
 sulphur, used in purification, Araros Kamp. 12 K.; Diphilos inc.
 126 K.
 used in healing, Menand. inc. 530 K.
 superstition, castigated in Aristoph. Amphiaraos and in Menand.
 Deisidaimon; s. p. 190.
 superstitious (δολος), Theopomp. Tisam. 61 K.; Menand. Deisid.
 112 K.; Misog. 326 K., inc. 601 K., 1046 K.; s. p. 189 ff.
 swallows, language of, Nikostratos 27 K.
 σύμβολοι, Aristoph. Av. 721; Eccles. 792; Alkaïos Gan. 3 K.;
 Menand. inc. 534 K.; Philemon inc. 100 K.; Com. anon. 350 K.

T.

- Table, three-legged, in witchcraft, Aristoph. Telm. 530 K.; s. p.
 192.
 Telmessians, title of comedy by Aristoph. 528 ff. K.
 Thessalian, title of comedy by Menander 229 ff. K.

- Thessaly, seat of witches, Aristoph. Nub. 749 ff.; s. moon.
 theurgy, Menand. Hier. 245 K.
 three, feet of a table, Aristoph. Telm. 530 K.
 the divine number, Antiphanes Myst. 165 K.
 calls of the dead, Aristoph. Ran. 1175-1176.
 springs, water from, Menand. inc. 530 K.
 third wave the highest, Menand. inc. 536 K.
 threshold, protection of, Aristoph. Dan. 255 K.; s. squill.
 thunder, makes idiotic, Aristoph. Eccles. 793; Menand. Georg.
 100 K.; Philemon Moich. 44 K.; Com. anon. 965. 995 K.
 tombs, passed in silence, Myrtilos Titanop. 2 K.; s. omission.
 torch, in purification, Diphilos inc. 126 K.
 τρίγλη (fish), sacred to Hekate, Plato Phaon 19. 20 K.; Charikleides
 Halys. 1 K.
 to Persephone, Nausikrates Naukl. 1. 2 K.; s. γλαῦκος.

V.

- Vine, tendrils used in prothesis, Aristoph. Eccles. 1031; s. four.

W.

- Water, against demoniacal diseases, Aristoph. Vesp. 119.
 and dreams, Aristoph. Ran. 1338-1340.
 from three springs, Menand. inc. 530 K.
 wedding, and Ephesia grammata, Menand. Paid. 371 K.
 white, lucky color, Menand. Leuc. 315 K.; s. day.
 wind-eggs, Aristoph. Daid. 185. 186 K.; Plato Daid. 19 K.;
 Araros Caen. 6 K.; Menand. Dact. 104 K.
 witch, s. prostitute, Thessaly, women.
 and sickness, Xenarchos Scyth. 12 K.
 witchcraft, Aristoph. Thesm. 534; Menand. inc. 535 K.
 wizard, Aristoph. Ach. 386; s. Hades, Hieronymos.
 women, as witches, s. Thessaly, prostitute.
 as miraculous healers, Menand. inc. 530 K.
 wood of unlucky trees, Eupolis Dem. 120 K.; s. cross-roads;
 Com. anon. 7 K.; s. fig-tree.
 word, power of, Aristoph. Av. 646-647; cp. κληδών; s. prayer.

ERNST RIESS.

IV.—ON THE DEFINITION OF SOME RHETORICAL TERMS.

During a course of reading in the Latin writers on rhetoric I collected the following words and definitions, either omitted or incorrectly given in our dictionaries. The dictionaries consulted were those of Lewis and Short; White and Riddle, 3d edition; Forcellini, English edition by J. Bailey; and Georges Handwörterbuch, 7th edition.

Cornificius and Cicero are cited according to the recension of Friedrich, the minor rhetoricians according to Halm's *Rhetores Latini Minores*.

ADFICTIO, *paronomasia*. Iul. Ruf. de Schem. Lex. Halm, p. 51: Παρονομασία est secundum praedictum verbum positio alterius, ipso poscente sensu, ut apud Terentium:

Nam inceptio est amentium, haud amantium.

Latine dicitur adnominatio vel adfictio. G. alone records this word and refers to *adnominatio*.

ANTICIPATIO, *the anticipation of an opponent's argument or objection*; a translation of προκατάληψις. De Schem. Dianoeas, Halm, p. 60: Προκατάληψις est schema dianoeas, cum id quod adversarius arrepturus est atque objecturus, praesumimus ac praecipimus, ut illud:

neque me Argolica de gente negabo:
Hoc primum. Et:
Scio me Danais e classibus unum
Et bello Argolicos fateor petiisse penates.

Latine haec figura dicitur praeceptio vel anticipatio.

ARTICULUS, *asyndeton*. Ad Her. IV 19, 26: Articulus dicitur cum singula verba intervallis distinguuntur, caesa oratione, hoc modo: "Acrimonia, voce, voltu, [adversarios] perterruisti." Item: "Inimicos invidia, iniuriis, potentia, perfidia sustulisti." Cornificius limits *articulus* to the omission of conjunctions between single words, and uses *dissolutum* to denote the absence of conjunctions between clauses. See Ad Her. IV 30, 41. L. and

S. incorrectly quote Ad Her. IV 19, 26 and IV 11, 16 under the definition *member, part, division*. In the latter passage, Qui in mediocre genus orationis profecti sunt, si pervenire eo non poterunt, errantes perveniunt ad confine genus eius generis, quod appellamus [fluctuans et] dissolutum, [quod est sine nervis et articulis, ut hoc modo appellem fluctuans,] etc., *articulis* means *joints*, i. e. connection.

ATTENUATIO, *a contraction of two letters into one*. Ad Her. IV 21, 29: Attenuatione aut complexione eiusdem litterae, sic: Hic, qui se magnifice iactat atque ostentat, venit ante quam Romam venit. Both W. and R. and L. and S. say that this word occurs only in the two following instances: Ad Her. II 2, 3 attenuatio suspitionis, *lessening*, and Ad Her. IV 11, 16 verborum attenuatio, *simplicity*. No other dictionary, so far as I can discover, gives more than these two meanings and instances.

COMMISERATIO, *pathos*. Cic. De Or. III 58, 217, 219: Aliud enim vocis genus iracundia sibi sumat, acutum, incitatum, . . . aliud molestia, sine commiseratione, grave quoddam et uno pressu ac sono obductum. Q. X 1, 107: Salibus certe et commiseratione quae duo plurimum in affectibus valent, vicimus. All the dictionaries quote the first passage under the definition *the part of an oration intended to excite compassion*; L. and S. also the second.

CONEXUM, *a figure of speech consisting of repeated questions with the same answer*; a translation of συμπλοκή. Aq. Rom. Halm, p. 33: Συμπλοκή, conexum. Haec figura ex utraque earum, quas supra demonstravimus, composita utramque orationi speciem circumdat. Nam et incipit saepius ab una parte orationis et totiens in unam atque eandem desinet, ut haec se habet: Quis legem tulit? Rullus. Quis tribus sortitus est? Rullus. Quis decemviros creavit? Idem Rullus [de Leg. Agr. II 9, 22]. Cornificius (IV 14, 20) calls the same figure *complexio*.

CONTENDERE, *to deliver a formal or labored speech*. Ad Her. III 14, 25: Cum autem contendere oportebit, quoniam id aut per continuationem aut per distributionem faciendum est, in continuatione, etc. Ad Her. III 15, 27: Si contendimus per continuationem, brachio celeri, mobili vultu, acri aspectu utemur.

CONTENTIO, *antithesis*. Defined by G., who cites Ad Her. IV 15, 21; Q. IX 1, 31. A better illustrative example is Q. IX 3, 81.

CONVERSIO, *apostrophe*. De Schematis Lexeos, Halm, p. 54: Ἀποστροφή est cum sermo a recto et instituto ordine in diversum

ac contrarium vertitur. . . . Latine conversio dicitur. Martianus Capella, Halm, p. 478: 'Αποστροφή est in aliquem districta conversio, frequens apud Ciceronem ac nobilis figura.

CONVERSUM, *a figure of speech in which the last word of a clause is repeated at the end of succeeding clauses.* Aquila Romanus, Halm, p. 33: ἀντιστροφή, conversum. Species huius figura cum eandem fere vim habeat, contraria est superiori, eo quod ibi ab eadem parte orationis saepius incipitur, hic in eandem partem desinitur. An example from pro Fonteio 4, 8 follows. Cornificius, Ad Her. IV 13, 19, calls this figure *conversio*, a name which is also used by Cicero and Quintilian.

DEFECTUS, *the omission of a word*; ordinarily denoted by *detractatio*. Schem. Dian. Halm, p. 75: Ἐκλείψις, defectus. Vergilius: "Haec secum"; deest loquitur.

DENOMINATIO, *paronomasia*. Schem. Dian. Halm, p. 75: Παρωνυμασία est denominatio, quae similitudinem verbi conflectit ad auditoris affectum. Cicero in invectivis: Qui de huius urbis atque adeo de orbis terrarum exitio cogitant (Catil. I 9), et Terentius: Nam increpatio est amentium, haut amantium (And. 218). Terence wrote *inceptios*.

DEPRECATIO, *the reply of the defendant*. Ad Her. I 11, 18: Constitutio est prima deprecatio defensoris cum accusatoris insimulatione coniuncta. Cic. de In. I 10, 13: Atque hoc eodem urgebitur, sive constitutionem primam causae accusatoris confirmationem dixerit sive defensoris primam deprecationem; nam eum eadem omnia incommoda sequentur. Q. III 6, 13: Alii statum crediderunt primam eius, cum quo ageretur, deprecationem. Forcellini says simply: Interdum simpliciter pro depulsiōe sine precibus, and quotes Cic. pro Rab. 9, 26: Huic quidem afferet aliquam deprecationem periculi aetas illa qua tum fuit, and Quintilian. While in both passages the meaning of the word corresponds to his definition, it has not the same meaning in the latter passage as in the former, inasmuch as Q. used it in a technical sense. The other lexicographers overlook this meaning entirely.

DETRACTATIO, *a mocking, a satirizing*. Schem. Dian. Halm, p. 75: Διασυρμός est delusio vel detractatio, cum inludentes ea quae ab adversariis sunt prolata dissolvimus, ut est pro Murena in Sulpicium de iure civile: Quoniam mihi videris istam iuris scientiam tanquam filiulam complecti tuam.

DISIUNCTUM, *a construction in which several successive clauses*

are each concluded with the appropriate verb. Aq. Rom. Halm, p. 36: Διεzeugμένον, disiunctum. Haec figura ita ornat et amplificat orationem, ut diversis redditionibus verborum membra, quae vocamus κῶλα, disiungat ac separet, sive duo sive plura, hoc modo: Capuam colonis deductis occupabunt, Atellam praesidio communient, Nuceriam, Cumas multitudine suorum obtinebunt, cetera oppida praesidiis devincient. Ad Her. IV 37: Disiunctum est, cum eorum, de quibus dicimus, aut utrumque aut unum quidque certo concluditur verbo, sic: Populus Romanus Numantiam delevit, Karthaginem sustulit, Corinthum disjecit, Fregellas evertit. The usual reading in the last example is *disiunctio*, and the passage is cited under that word in the dictionaries. Friedrich reads *disiunctum*, and this seems to have the better MSS support. *Disiunctum* would therefore appear to be the better reading, supported as it is by Aq. Rom. supra, and Mart. Cap. Halm, p. 482: Διεzeugμένον disiunctum appellamus, cum diversis redditionibus verborum cola disiungimus, sive duo sive plura, hoc modo: [same ex. as Aq. Rom.].

DISPARSUM, as a translation of διηρημένον. Carmen de Figuris, Halm, p. 65: Διηρημένον

Disparsum reddo, quod sparsum uno ordine reddo.

"Ambo Iovis merito proles, verum ille equitando
Insignis, Castor, catus hic pugilamine, Pollux."

DISSOLUTIO, *asyndeton*. Quint. IX 3, 50: Et hoc autem exemplum et superius aliam quoque efficiunt figuram, quae, quia coniunctionibus caret, dissolutio vocatur. . . . Hoc genus et βραχυλογίαν vocant, quae potest esse copulata dissolutio. Contrarium id est schema quod coniunctionibus abundat: illud ασύνδετον, hoc πολυσύνδετον dicitur. W. and R. and L. and S. define *want of connection*, and cite this passage. Georges defines correctly.

DISTRIBUTIO, *discourse delivered with frequent pauses*. Ad Her. III 13, 23: Contentio dividitur in continuationem et [in] distributionem. . . . Distributio est [in contentione] oratio . . . frequens [cum raris et brevibus] intervallis [acri vociferatione]. Ad Her. III 14, 25: Cum autem contendere oportebit, quoniam id aut per continuationem aut per distributionem faciendum est, . . . in distributione [vocem] ab imis faucibus exclamationem quam clarissimam adhibere [oportet] et quantum spatii per singulas exclamationes sumpserimus, tantum in singula intervalla spatii consumere [iubemur]. Ad Her. III 15, 27: Si contendimus per continuationem . . . sin contentio fiet per distributionem, porrectione

celeri bracchii, inambulatione, pedis dexteri rara supplausione, acri et defixo aspectu uti oportebit.

DIVISIO, *the dilemma.* Ad Her. IV 40, 52: Divisio est quae rem semovens ab re utramque absolvit ratione subiecta, hoc modo: Cur ego nunc tibi quicquam obiciam? Si probus est, non meruisti; si improbus, non commovebere. Quint. V 10, 64: Divisio et ad probandum simili via valet et ad refellendum. Probationi interim satis est unum habere, hoc modo: ut sit civis, aut natus sit oportet aut factus. This meaning is not in any of the dictionaries unless it is thought to be sufficiently covered by the definition *logical or rhetorical division*.

EVACUATIO, *a refutation of arguments*; a translation of ἀνασκευή. De Schem. Dian. Halm, p. 61: 'Ανασκευή est superiorum proxima figura qua ab adversariis maxima proposita destruimus ac redarguimus velut falsa . . . Latine dicitur destructio vel evacuatio. L. and S., citing *evacuatio fidei*, Tert. adv. Marc. 4, 24, star the word.

EXPEDIO in the sense *explain, narrate* is cited in prose before Tacitus only Sall. J. 5, 2; Asin. Pollio ad Fam. X 33, 5. Add Cornificius ad Her. II 26, 42; III 20, 33; IV 18, 26; IV 54, 68. L. and S. say it does not occur in this sense in Cicero. Krebs-Schmalz, Antibarbar., refers to Cicero ad Brut. I 15, 1, where the reading is doubtful, and adds: "jedenfalls ist es nicht sicher für Cicero erwiesen." It is found, however, Cicero de Or. III 66: Sed ea si sequamur, nullam umquam rem dicendo expedire possimus.

EXQUISITIO, *a figure of speech consisting of question and answer.* Schem. Dian. Halm, p. 74: 'Εξερασμός est exquisitio, cum res complures divisas cum interrogatione exquirentes singulis quae conveniunt applicamus, ut Cicero: Quid tandem te impedit? mosne maiorum? at persaepe etiam privati in hac re publica perniciosum hostem morte multarunt. Aut leges etc.

HOMOEON, *a simile in which the resemblance is confined to certain parts of the objects compared.* Iul. Ruf. Halm, p. 44: *Homoeon*. Haec figura fit, cum ex partibus aliqua similitudo colligitur, ut Vergilius:

Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora tenebat.

Etiam in actu fit *homoeon*, ut idem Vergilius:

Non aliter, quam si immissis ruat hostibus omnis
Carthago aut antiqua Tyros.

ICON, *simile*. Iul. Ruf. Halm, p. 44: Icon fit, cum perfectae formae similes conferuntur. Vergilius: Talis Amyclaei domitus Pollucis habenis. Cf. Beda de Tropis, Halm, p. 618: Icon est personarum inter se vel eorum quae personis accidunt comparatio, ut: Vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre. W. and R. and L. and S. do not recognize this word in a rhetorical sense. Georges gives it, citing Apuleius min. de Nota Aspirationis. Forcellini cites for it Diomedes.

INIUNCTUM, *a zeugma in which several phrases depend upon a common verb at the end*. Aquila Romanus, Halm, p. 36: 'Υπεξευγμένον, iniunctum. . . . Quale est hoc: Quorum ordo ab humili, fortuna a sordida, natura a turpi oratione abhorret. Hoc enim postremum abhorret ad tria refertur. Cf. Mart. Cap. Halm, p. 482: 'Αντεξευγμένον iniunctum. Haec figura a superiore hoc differt etc. [same ex. as above]. The reading 'Αντεξευγμένον is doubtful.

INTERROGATUM, *interrogation* (rhet. fig.). Aquila Romanus, Halm, p. 25: 'Ερώτημα, interrogatum. Eo utimur ubi exacerbandō aliquid interrogamus et augemus eius invidiam, hoc modo: Fuis-tine ne illo in loco? dixistine haec ita gesta esse? renuntiastine ea quibus decepti sumus?

INTERRUPTIO, *parenthesis*. Iul. Ruf. de Schem. Lex. Halm, p. 51: Παρένθεσις est, cum ordinata ac legitima sententia interrom-pitur per alienum extrinsecus diversamque sententiam, ut: . . . Latine haec figura dicitur interruptio vel interiectio.

OPPOSITUM, *antithesis*. Carm. de Fig. Halm, p. 64: 'Αντίθετον

Oppositum dico, contra cum opponimu' quaedam.

"Doctor tute, ego discipulus; tu scribe, ego censor;
Histrio tu, spectator ego; adque ego sibilo, tu exis."

PERMUTATIO, *transposition* (rhet. fig.). Carmen de Figuris, Halm, p. 64: 'Αντιμεταβολή

Permutatio fit vice cum convertimu' verba.

"Sumere iam cretos, non sumptos cernere amicos.—

Quod queo, tempus abest; cui tempus adest, nequeo, inquit."

This is noted only by Georges. It is used in another sense by Cornificius ad Her. IV 34, 46: Permutatio est oratio aliud verbis aliud sententia demonstrans. Ea dividitur in tres partes: similitudinem, argumentum, contrarium. Per similitudinem . . . sic: "Nam cum canes fungentur officiis luporum quoinam praesidio pecua credemus?" Per argumentum . . . ut siquis Drusum "Gracchûm nitorem obsoletum" dicat. Ex contrario ducitur sic,

ut si quis hominem prodigum et luxuriosum [imprudens] "parcum et diligentem" appellet. It is defined by the lexicographers as follows: Forcellini quotes the first two sentences of Cornificius' definition. White and Riddle: "An exchanging of one expression for another; permutation." Lewis and Short: "A substitution of one expression for another, permutation." Georges: "die Vertauschung der Ausdrücke." None of these definitions conveys any clear idea to the mind. From an examination of the examples we first arrive at a definite idea of what Cornificius meant. I would define as follows: *Allegory in its broad sense, including enigma and irony.*

PRAECEPTIO, *the anticipation of an opponent's argument or objection*; a translation of προκατάληψις. De Schem. Dian. Halm, p. 60: Προκατάληψις est schema dianoeas, cum id quod adversarius arrepturus est atque obiecturus, praesumimus ac praecipimus, ut illud:

neque me Argolica de gente negabo:
Hoc primum.

.

Latine haec figura dicitur praeceptio vel anticipatio.

PRINCIPIUM, *a kind of exordium, the direct beginning*, opp. to *insinuatio*. Ad Her. I 4, 6: Exordiorum duo sunt genera: principium, quod Graece προοίμιον appellatur, et insinuatio, quae ἔφοδος nominatur. Principium est cum statim animum auditoris nobis idoneum reddimus ad audiendum. Cic. de In. I 15, 20: Igitur exordium in duas partes dividitur, principium et insinuationem. Principium est oratio perspicue et protinus perficiens auditorem benevolum aut docilem aut attentum. Quint. IV 1, 42: Eo quidam exordium in duas dividunt partes, principium et insinuationem.

PRONUNTIATIO, as a figure of speech, a translation of ὑπόκρισις. De Schem. Dian. Halm, p. 61: Ὑπόκρισις est figura sententiae, cum adversarium gestu et pronuntiatione extollimus vel abicimus et spernimus, ut in illo:

.

Non ego Daphnim
Iudice te metuam.

Scilicet mihi iniquus es et non recte iudicaturus. Latine dicitur pronuntiatio.

REGRESSIO, *the repetition of the last word of a clause or verse as the first word of the next*. Iul. Ruf. Halm, p. 50: Παλιλογία est

cum verbum, quod in prima sententia est ultimum, in sequente est primum, ut :

Pierides : vos haec facietis maxima Gallo,
Gallo, cuius amor tantum mihi crescit in horas
. . . .

Latine dicitur regressio. The dictionaries give *regressio* only = *ἐπάνοδος* from Quint. IX 3, 35 and Iul. Ruf. de Schem. Lex. §19 (in Halm §21).

SOLUTUM, *asyndeton*. Aquila Rom. Halm, p. 35: Solutum ; sic enim voco quod *ἀσύνδετον* Graeci vocant. Mart. Cap. Halm, p. 482: 'Ασύνδετον est solutum, cum demptis coniunctionibus quibus verba aut nomina conectuntur etc.

TRADUCTIO, *the use of words of like form but different in meaning*. Ad Her. IV 14, 21: Ex eodem genere est exornationis cum idem verbum ponitur modo in hac, modo in altera re, hoc modo: 'Cur eam rem tam studiose curas, quae tibi multas dabit curas?' Item: Nam amari iucundum sit, si curetur, ne quid insit amari. Item: 'Veniam ad vos, si mihi senatus det veniam.' The name *traductio* is also given to the repetition of the same word in the sentence, and this is the only definition given by the lexicographers.

TRANSITUS, as a translation of *μετάστασις* or *μετάβασις*. De Schem. Lex. Halm, p. 54: *Μετὰσταςις* est vel *μετάβασις*, cum a loquentis persona ad personam aliam transitum facimus, ratione aliqua vel affectu, ut :

Non haec Evandro de te promissa parenti
Discedens dederam.
. . . .

Haec figura dicitur variatio aut transitus.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY,
CLEVELAND.

V. J. EMERY.

REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Beiträge zur historischen Syntax der griechischen Sprache, herausgegeben von M. SCHANZ. Band III, Heft 3 u. 4. Geschichte des Pronomen Reflexivum, von Dr. ADOLF DYROFF. Erste Abteilung, Von Homer bis zur attischen Prosa. Zweite Abteilung, Die attische Prosa und Schlussergebnisse. Würzburg, 1892 u. 1893.

The stem *sue-* (parallel form *seue-*) originally had a signification which was nearly identical with that of the English 'self.' It seems that this stem was not specially invented for reflexive purposes, but that it had a wider scope, which was gradually narrowed down to that of a pure reflexive. The conclusion of this narrowing process, or, in other words, the emergence of a distinct reflexive, antedates the period of the breaking up of the original mother-tongue. But whilst the reflexive signification of the stem *sue-* can readily be proved for the sister-tongues of the Greek, it is a remarkable fact that in the oldest documents of the Greek language—the Homeric poems—the pronoun of the 3d person is essentially anaphoric. Still, there are traces of the reflexive use of the substantive pronoun even in Homer, and these, together with the exclusively reflexive use of the adjective forms (*ὅς, ἐός*, etc.), point to the reflexive nature of the pronoun in the pre-Homeric language. The other dialects agree with the Homeric in the reflexive use of the pronominal adjective, the rare non-reflexive use of individual forms belonging to a much later date. In Attic, the substantive pronoun is undoubtedly reflexive, and there are indications that this was true also of the other dialects. Even in Homer the parallel form *ἐέ* is a reflexive. Furthermore, the plural forms *σφός* and *σφέτερος*, which are derived from the non-reflexive forms *σφώ* and *σφίν*, and the plural forms of the substantive pronoun were originally reflexive, and this cannot be otherwise explained than on the supposition that the singular forms (that is, what became the *singular* forms after the differentiation of the numbers), to which the above-mentioned plural formations attached themselves, must have been likewise originally reflexive. Finally, the substitutes for the simple reflexive pronoun and the forms by which it was supplanted in various dialects, show the correctness of the theory of the reflexive nature of the simple pronoun of the 3d person in the pre-Homeric language. For, not to mention other attempts that were unsuccessful, it was this very pronoun that was used in juxtaposition with a following *αὐτός*, or else merged with *αὐτός*, to form either complex or compound reflexive forms. Neither does the existence of similar complex and compound reflexive forms of the 1st and of the 2d person weaken the force of this argument, for these forms, when reflexive, are merely analogical formations, built after the pattern of the forms of the 3d person.

After this preliminary statement regarding the origin and nature of the Greek reflexive pronoun, there follows a historical survey of the use of the

reflexive in the various departments of Greek Literature from Homer down to Attic Prose, information being given as to the forms of the simple pronoun of the 3d person, the use of the complex (*σφῶν αὐτῶν*, etc.) and of the compound (*ἐαυτοῦ*, etc.) reflexive of the 3d person, the limitation of the pronominal adjective, the scope of reflexives of the 1st and 2d persons, including the possessive adjective, the nature and degrees of reflexion and the free use of the reflexive.

HOMER.

The language of Homer is characterized by a wealth of pronominal forms of the 3d person. In the first place, there are two stems, the one a demonstrative *μίν* (495¹) and the other a reflexive. The reflexive is split up into two branches, the one a dissyllabic stem represented by the forms *ἐοῖ* (2), *ἐέ* (2) and *έός* (90), and the other a monosyllabic stem with differentiated forms for the plural and represented by the forms *έο* (11), *οῖ* (753), *έ* (73), *σφέων* (4), *σφίσι(ν)* (48), *σφέας* (22), *ός* (206) and *σφός* (12). Furthermore, some of the cases have duplicate forms, belonging to different periods of the language. So *έο* has by its side an older *εῖο* (2), a younger *εῦ* (5) and an ablatival *έθεν* (17); *σφέων* has by its side *σφείων* (1) and *σφῶν* (2); *σφίσι(ν)* has the parallel form *σφί(ν)* (141); with *σφέας* is coupled *σφάς* (1), and with the possessive *σφός*, the form *σφέτερος* (9). *σφέτερος* was perhaps a dual, which number is certainly represented by the substantive forms *σφῶν* (8), and *σφῶέ* (5) with parallel form *σφέ* (4).

The reflexive has lost its strong force of 'self.' Hence the pronoun is sometimes strengthened by a postpositive *αὐτός*, rarely by a prepositive *αὐτός*. This combination is used preferably when the pronoun is used reflexively, but in all the 20 instances of the reflexive combination there is no governing preposition, and *αὐτός* *directly* follows the personal pronoun and forms a complex with it. The adjective pronoun is also occasionally accompanied by a genitive of *αὐτός*, there being three instances of *έῷ αὐτοῦ*, one of *ῶ αὐτοῦ* and one of *αὐτῶν σφετέρησιν*.

The Homeric epos lacks a general *substantive* reflexive, but the *adjective* pronoun of the 3d person refers in four instances to the 1st person and in five to the 2d. As this use belongs to the period preceding the time of the differentiation of the numbers, it is only the forms *έός* and *ός* that are thus found. In but one instance—to wit, Δ 142—does *ός* stand for the possessive plural—that is, it is equivalent to *ύμέτερος*, or rather *σφώϊτερος*. It is principally in stereotyped expressions that the general use of the reflexive has been preserved. The reason why the usage occurs only in the case of the adjective pronoun, and not in the case of the substantive, is due to the fact that in Homer the substantive pronoun is almost exclusively anaphoric, while the adjective remains strictly reflexive.

At this stage of the epic literary language, as has been stated, the simple pronoun of the 3d person is essentially anaphoric, for, with but two exceptions, the direct reflexive use is found only in prepositional phrases, and these phrases, as is shown by the frequent preservation of the effect of the original initial *σF* in lengthening a preceding syllable, belong to a period that antedates the main bulk of the Homeric poems.

¹ This and the following numbers in parentheses indicate the number of occurrences of the form in Homer.

The personal pronoun is the only means at Homer's disposal to express simple anaphora, for *αὐτός*, except in an insignificant number of passages in later portions of the poems, regularly preserves its intensive force.

αὐτοῦ is also used as a reflexive in Homer.

The possessive pronoun, as noted above, is strictly reflexive. For the anaphoric expression of the relation of the possessor, the Dative of Interest is used.

The Genitive of Possession is as yet very rare.

HESIOD AND THE HOMERIC HYMNS.

Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns show a reduction in the wealth of forms. *έοι* and *έέ* do not occur, but the corresponding genitive *έου* is found in Hesiod, Theog. 401. The genitive singular of the monosyllabic stem is practically dead, inasmuch as *έθεν* is missing and *εἰο* and *έο* occur only in borrowed expressions. The genitive plural is rare in Hesiod and found only in the form *σφέων*, while it is entirely wanting in the Hymns. Dual forms are not used. Hesiod employs the forms *σφᾶς* and *σφός* side by side with *σφέας* and *σφέτερος* respectively, and the doublets *έ* and *μίν*, *σφίν* and *σφίσιν*, and *έός* and *ός* are found both in Hesiod and the Hymns.

The simple pronoun lacks the intensive signification. Hence *αὐτός* is added to the personal pronoun, but only when the latter is used as a reflexive. The position of *αὐτός* is after the pronoun. In two passages compound forms of the reflexive are found: *έαυτῇ*, Theog. 126, and *έαυτόν*, Hymn. III 239. The simple personal pronoun of the 1st and 2d person, whether reflexive or not, may be combined with a following *αὐτός*, and *έμέ* is used as a direct reflexive. In Hesiod, the possessives *έός* and *σφέτερος* are usually emphatic and therefore are not combined with *αὐτοῦ* and *αὐτῶν*, while *ός* is used as an unemphatic possessive. In the Homeric Hymns, the possessive has lost its intensive force; *ός* is once combined with a following *αὐτοῦ*, and *έμός* and *σός*, a number of times.

The substantive pronoun is not used as a general reflexive. Interchange of persons in the case of the possessive occurs twice in Hesiod and once in the Batrachomyomachy; interchange of numbers is found four times in Hesiod and once in the Batrachomyomachy. That the feeling for the original use of the general reflexive had been lost is shown by Hesiod's use of *σφέτερος* for *ύμέτερος* and of the plural possessives *σφός* and *σφέτερος* for the singular *ός*. In the Hymns anaphoric *έ* is used for *σφέας* 4, 267, and anaphoric *σφίν* takes the place of *οἱ* in 19, 19.

The substantive pronoun is anaphoric. Remnants of the direct reflexive use are found only in the formulae *ές σφέας*, *έπὶ σφέας*, *ἀπὸ έο*, *ἀμφὶ έ* and *παρὰ σφίσι*, and the indirect reflexive use is preserved in the phrases *μετὰ εἰο* and *μετὰ σφέας*.

αὐτός almost everywhere is intensive.

Both Hesiod and the Hymns use *αὐτοῦ* as a reflexive. In addition Hesiod uses both the complex and the compound reflexive, but the Hymns lack the complex forms.

The possessive pronoun is regularly a direct reflexive, but it is twice found in Hesiod as an indirect reflexive.

LYRIC POETRY.

Melic Lyric poetry introduces new forms from the dialects, especially from the Doric. These forms are *ἐοῦς*, *ἰν*, *νίν* and *σφεός*; *ἔθεν* also has been preserved through the influence of the dialects. Elegy and Iambic poetry fall in line with Hesiod's usage, but omit antiquated forms. *ἐ* is very rare, *σφέας* is found only in Archilochus and Simonides Ceus, and *σφέ* is confined to Theognis, Simonides and Pindar. *νίν* and *ἰν* are the only new forms that Pindar uses in common with the other Lyric poets.

The simple pronoun is generally unemphatic, but in four instances Pindar uses non-reflexive *οἱ* and *ἐ* with special emphasis. *αὐτοῦ* is used as an emphatic reflexive of the 3d person, *ἐμᾶυτοῦ* and *σᾶυτοῦ* being used for the 1st and 2d singular. *ἐαυτοῦ* is found in Simonides. The difference between the strong and the weak stem is kept alive by Pindar in his use of the forms *έός* and *ός*. The possessive is nowhere accompanied by *αὐτοῦ* or *αὐτῶν*.

The instances of the erroneous interchange of numbers are further augmented by the plural use of the demonstrative *νίν* and by the singular use of *σφός* and *σφεός*. *σφέτερος* is freely used for *έός*, and Alcman even employs *σφεός* for non-reflexive *σφώτερος*.

The substantive pronoun is predominantly anaphoric in Pindar. It is nowhere used by him as a direct reflexive and very rarely as an indirect reflexive. The other Lyric poets preserve the reflexive use in the combinations *ἀπ' ἐοῦς*, *ἀπὲρ ἔθεν*, less frequently in *ἔθεν* and *σφίσιν* unaccompanied by a preposition.

σφίσιν αὐτοῖς and *αὐτοῦ* are found as reflexives in Pindar, elsewhere only *αὐτοῦ* is used.

The possessive is as yet reflexive, but *σφός* and *σφεός* are each once used anaphorically.

The Possessive Genitive of reflexive *αὐτοῦ* does not occur in Pindar, though that use is common in the other Lyric poets.

TRAGIC POETS.

In the use of the forms of the simple pronoun, the Tragedians show Lyric influence. The following is a tabular exhibit of this use:

	<i>ἰ</i>	<i>ἔθεν</i>	<i>οὐ</i>	<i>οἱ</i>	<i>σφίσιν</i>	<i>σφίν</i>	<i>σφᾶς</i>	<i>σφέ</i>	<i>νίν</i>	<i>ός</i>	<i>σφέτερος</i>
Aesch.	—	1	—	1	1	5	1	16	48	—	2
Soph.	2	—	1	4	1	6	5	24	87	5	—
Eur.	—	—	—	1	—	2	5	57	248	2	—

The absence of *ἐ* and *σφῶν* and the disappearance of *έός* are to be noted.

Only the rare forms of the simple pronoun when used reflexively have special emphasis. These forms are *ἔθεν* in Aeschylus, *ἰ* and *οὐ* in Sophocles, and *οἱ* in Euripides. The possessive pronoun is emphatic in Aeschylus, but lacks special emphasis in Sophocles and in Euripides. Sophocles once combines the genitive *αὐτοῦ* with *ός*, and in like manner *ἐμός* and *σός* are once each combined with *αὐτοῦ* by the same author.

The free use of the pronoun is quite extended. *σφέ* is frequently used for *νίν*, less frequently *νίν* for *σφέ*, the metre being the determining factor.

Aeschylus (once) and Sophocles (twice) use *σφίν* for *οἱ*, a use that was noted also for the Homeric Hymns. In his use of the word *σφέτερος* Aeschylus also preserved its use as a substitute for *ὅς*, thereby showing that he was subject to Lyric influence. Euripides in a choral passage uses *ὅς* in a plural sense.

σφᾶς and *σφίν* are exclusively anaphoric and *σφέ* and *νύν* are predominantly so. *οἱ* is anaphoric in the one instance in which it is used by Aeschylus and in two choral passages and one trimeter passage of Sophocles, but in another trimeter passage of Sophocles and in the only instance furnished by Euripides it is an indirect reflexive as in Attic. Sophocles follows Attic rule in using *σφίσιν* as an indirect reflexive, but Aeschylus uses it anaphorically with reference to the subject of the leading verb. In dependent sentences *ἐθεν* is used by Aeschylus and *ἱ* by Sophocles as an indirect reflexive. The only instance of a direct reflexive is that of *οὐ* in Sophocles.

There is no complex reflexive of the 3d person. Aeschylus once uses the combination *αὐταὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτάς*, and, for metrical reasons, Sophocles once employs the singular *σέ τ' αὐτόν*. *νύν αὐτάς* is once used by Euripides, but not as a reflexive.

The compound forms *ἐαυτοῦ* and *αὐτοῦ*, *σεαυτοῦ* and *σαντοῦ*, and *ἐμαντοῦ* gain in frequency. Dissyllabic *αὐτοῦ* and *σαντοῦ* are preferred to trisyllabic *ἐαυτοῦ* and *σεαυτοῦ*, which are only occasionally used when required by the metre. The plural of *ἐαυτοῦ* does not occur; that of *αὐτοῦ* is used by Aeschylus in the Genitive only (4 times), by Sophocles in the Dative only (2 times), and by Euripides twice in the Genitive and four times in the Accusative. Sophocles once uses the dual of *αὐτοῦ*.

αὐτοῦ, both in the singular and in the plural, is used as a free reflexive, and is used to represent both the 1st and the 2d person. Euripides is sparing in this use, showing only two instances of it.

ἐαυτοῦ and *αὐτοῦ* are almost exclusively direct reflexives. As an indirect reflexive, *ἐαυτοῦ* is once found in Aeschylus; *ἐαυτοῦ* and *αὐτοῦ* are thus used in Sophocles in phrases that are the equivalents of sentences; in Euripides, *ἐαυτοῦ* is an indirect reflexive once, and *αὐτοῦ* five times, in dependent clauses.

Whilst the reflexive forms are the rule in the case of the reflexive use of the pronoun of the 3d person, the reflexive forms are not always used when the pronoun of the 1st or 2d person is reflexive. In direct reflexion the compound forms are the rule and the signification 'self' is prominent. Enclitic forms are rarely admitted instead. So Aeschylus once uses *με* in a choral passage, and Euripides uses *με* and *σοι* even in the trimeter. The convenient conversational phrase *δοκῶ μοι* is first met with in Euripides. Both Aeschylus and Euripides use unemphatic *σέθεν* as a direct reflexive, Aeschylus doing so twice in choral passages, and Euripides 25 times as a metrical necessity at the end of verses, especially to afford a light close for the trimeter. More frequently used are the orthotone forms of the simple pronoun in sharp contrasts. For the indirect reflexive, the simple pronoun is the rule; only Sophocles thrice uses the compound forms in dependent sentences and Euripides 8 times in phrases that are the equivalents of a sentence.

The possessive of the 3d person is generally a direct reflexive. Aeschylus once uses it as an indirect reflexive in a dependent proposition and Sophocles so uses it once in a declarative sentence.

The possessive adjective of the 3d person is rare as compared with the possessive genitive of the compound pronoun, the ratio being that of 9 to 48.

In the 1st and 2d person, the simple possessives *ἐμός* and *σός* are far more frequent as direct reflexives than the corresponding possessive genitives of the compound pronoun.

ARISTOPHANES.

The simple pronoun is not used in Aristophanes, except for purposes of parody. The complex reflexive of the 3d person likewise does not occur. The compound forms are used as follows: *ἐμαυτοῦ* 48 times, *σαντοῦ* and *σεαυτοῦ* 71 and 27 times respectively, *αὐτοῦ* and *ἐαυτοῦ* 44 and 25 times respectively. The plural of the form *ἐαυτοῦ* is used in Aristophanes for the first time, and is relatively more frequent than that of *αὐτοῦ*. Except in the formula *μοι δοκῶ*, the reflexive forms are the rule also for the 1st and 2d persons singular in direct reflexion. The possessive adjective 3d person does not occur in Aristophanes except in parody, the possessive genitive of the reflexive being used instead, twenty times in the singular and twice in the plural. *ἐμός* as a direct reflexive occurs 29 times, possessive *ἐμαυτοῦ* 11 times; *σός* (*τέός*, *σιός*) as a direct reflexive occurs 13 times, possessive *σαντοῦ* 18 times and *σεαυτοῦ* 3 times.

HERODOTUS.

The simple pronoun is 19 times used as a direct reflexive: *σφέων* twice, *σφίσι* 16 times, and *σφέας* once. Of the indirect reflexive use there are about 400 instances. The purely anaphoric use of the simple pronoun (not counting *μίν*) is represented by more than one thousand examples. The form *σφίσι* is never anaphoric in Herodotus, but is always either a direct or an indirect reflexive.

The complex form of the reflexive pronoun is not found in the singular. The plural *σφέων αὐτῶν* occurs 21 times, *σφίσι αὐτοῖσι* 11 times, and *σφέας αὐτούς* 33 times. Of these 65 instances, only 8 belong to the indirect reflexive use, the simple pronoun and the compound forms being better adapted for that purpose. Complex forms of the 1st and 2d plural occur 14 times and are always used as direct reflexives. In addition to these plural forms, the singular *σέο αὐτοῦ* occurs once—I, 124.

In the singular number the compound pronoun of the 3d person is the only form used for direct reflexion, and it is the predominating form for indirect reflexion. In the plural number, however, the compound forms occupy a subordinate position, especially in the direct reflexive use. *ἐωντῶν* is regularly used as a possessive genitive (46 times) rather than *σφέων αὐτῶν* (4 times). Compound reflexive forms of the 1st and 2d person are also in use, but, as in the case of the 3d person, the simple forms are preferred in indirect reflexion.

Herodotus once uses *ἐωντῶν* for the 1st person and *σφίσι αὐτοῖσι* for the 2d.

Of the possessive adjective, only the form *σφέτερος* seems to have been used, if *ἦν* I, 205 is to be emended. *σφέτερος* occurs 64 times (42 times as a direct reflexive, including *σφέτερος αὐτῶν* twice), while possessive *ἐωντῶν* is used 46 times. *σφέτερος* is always plural. The possessive singular is represented exclusively by the possessive genitive *ἐωντοῦ*. *ἐμός* is a direct reflexive 19 times, but *ἐμεωυτοῦ* as a possessive genitive is used only 6 times; *σός* is used as a direct reflexive 5 times, while possessive *σεωντοῦ* is used 17 times.

ATTIC INSCRIPTIONS.

In the pre-Euclidean inscriptions, the form *σφῶν* is twice used as a direct reflexive. Complex forms are found 9 times, only in the plural and only as direct reflexives. There are no certain instances of compound forms. *ὅς* occurs once and *σφέτερος* twice, in poetry; in prose inscriptions *σφέτερος αὐτῶν* is found 5 times.

In post-Euclidean inscriptions, the simple pronoun is wanting. Of the complex reflexive, *σφίσιν αὐτοῖς* is the only form used and that only in the earlier inscriptions. The compound forms are found both in the singular and in the plural. The ratio of *ἐαυτοῦ* to *αὐτοῦ* is that of 31 : 23. *σφέτερος* no longer occurs. *ἐαυτῶν* is a possessive genitive 8 times and possessive *ἐαυτοῦ* (*αὐτοῦ*) is found 10 times. In the absence of reflexion, *αὐτοῦ* and *αὐτῶν* are used as possessives.

[XENOPHON] DE REPUBLICA ATHENIENSIIUM.

σφῶν and *σφίσι* occur as indirect reflexives. The complex and the compound forms are used both as direct and as indirect reflexives. The adjective pronoun is represented by two instances of *σφέτερος αὐτῶν*, both direct reflexives, and by one instance of *σφέτερος* used as an indirect reflexive. There are two examples of the possessive genitive, *ἐαυτῶν* and *σφῶν*.

THUCYDIDES.

As the simple pronoun of the 3d person, the complex forms and the compound forms are all used as direct and as indirect reflexives, the following exhibit of the relative frequency of their use will be of interest.

In the singular, the compound forms are the only forms that are used in direct reflexion. *ἐαυτοῦ* occurs 65 times, *αὐτοῦ* 31 times.

In the plural, the simple pronoun is used 9 times as a direct reflexive (*σφῶν* 4 times, *σφίσι* 3 times, and *σφᾶς* twice), the complex pronoun is thus used 94 times, and the compound 42 times (*ἐαυτῶν*, etc., 23 times, *αὐτῶν*, etc., 19 times). This does not include the use of the possessive genitive, which is represented by two instances of *σφῶν*, one of *σφῶν αὐτῶν*, and 103 (73 + 30) of *ἐαυτῶν* (*αὐτῶν*).

For the indirect reflexive use, the following figures indicate the frequency. The simple pronoun, excluding *σφεῖς* (10 times), occurs 439 times (*οἱ* 12, *σφῶν* 102, *σφίσι* 239, *σφᾶς* 86), the complex pronoun 14 times, *ἐαυτοῦ* (*αὐτοῦ*) 83 (48 + 35) times. The figures include the instances of the possessive genitives: *σφῶν* 46, *ἐαυτῶν* (*αὐτῶν*) 18 (13 + 5), but do not include the 67 (39 + 28) instances of the genitive and the accusative singular of *ἐαυτοῦ* (*αὐτοῦ*).

In the case of the compound reflexive, the question arises as to whether *αὐτοῦ* or *αὐτοῦ* is the correct reading. In the light of such criteria as the use of the complex reflexive in corresponding syntactical groups, the corresponding use of the simple pronoun, the frequency of passages containing *ἐαυτοῦ*, the aspiration of a preceding mute, the position of the possessive genitive between the article and the substantive, and the parallelism of pronouns of the 1st and of the 2d person, it is certain that the compound reflexive, and not *αὐτοῦ*, is used as a direct reflexive. It is also regularly used as an indirect reflexive, but in relative participial clauses, the pronoun *αὐτοῦ* seems to be

warranted in many instances, though the reflexive is not uncommon. So too, in most clauses introduced by conjunctions and in dependent sentences, reflexive and determinative appear side by side. This occurs in object clauses with *ὅτι*, in indirect questions, in the *ὥστε* w. inf. construction, in final and causal sentences, and in clauses forming an integral part of an infinitive sentence. Of the other dependent clauses, only the relative sentences introduced by *ὅσος* permit the reflexive, the rest require *αὐτοῦ*. The genitive absolute does not admit the reflexive. As to the use of the forms *ἐαυτοῦ* and *αὐτοῦ*, it is to be noted from the figures given above that Thucydides vastly prefers *ἐαυτοῦ* to *αὐτοῦ*. A difference in meaning between *ἐαυτοῦ* and *αὐτοῦ* does not exist, though of the two *αὐτοῦ* seems to have the greater emphasis.

Thucydides once (I, 82, 1) uses the plural compound reflexive of the 3d person in reference to the 1st person.

There is no consistent use of purely reflexive forms of the 1st and 2d person. In the plural, the simple pronoun is used as a direct reflexive, though the complex forms are also found. In the few cases of the direct reflexive use of the singular, the compound form is regularly used except in the formula *δοκῶ ἀν μοι* 6, 38, 4. For the indirect reflexive use, the simple forms are the rule for both singular and plural.

The pronominal adjective of the 3d person is found only in the form *σφέτερος*, which occurs 90 times, 62 times as a direct reflexive. *σφέτερος αὐτῶν* occurs 13 times, once as an indirect reflexive. *ἐμαντοῦ* and *ἡμῶν αὐτῶν* occur as possessives, and *ἐμός*, *σός*, *ἡμέτερος*, *ὑμέτερος* and *ἡμέτερος αὐτῶν* occur as reflexives.

ATTIC ORATORS.

Of the Attic Orators, Lysias, Aeschines, Dinarchus and Hyperides do not use the simple pronoun at all; the other orators use only *οἱ* 11 times, *σφεῖς* twice, *σφῶν* twice, *σφίσι* 12 times and *σφᾶς* 4 times. Only two of these 31 occurrences are instances of the direct reflexive use, the rest are indirect reflexives.

The complex reflexive is used only in the plural and is regularly a direct reflexive, very much less frequently an indirect reflexive. Like the simple pronoun, it disappears towards the close of the period of Attic Oratory. In Antiphon and Andocides, it predominates over the corresponding forms of the compound reflexive, the plural of the compound pronoun being found only in the genitive; in Lysias and Isocrates, it is as yet pretty frequent, especially in the accusative; in Isaeus, the rival forms are about equally divided; in Demosthenes and Hyperides the complex forms are rare, and they are entirely wanting in Lysias, Aeschines and Dinarchus. The genitive of the complex pronoun is found but twice as a possessive genitive, the genitive of the compound form being used instead.

The form *αὐτοῦ* is everywhere preferred to *ἐαυτοῦ* except in Andocides and Aeschines, where the two forms balance. In Isocrates, *αὐτοῦ* seems to have been the only form used. In this connection it may be noted that *σαντοῦ* likewise is more common than *σεαυτοῦ*, except in Andocides, who uses only *σεαυτοῦ*, and in Dinarchus, who has four instances of *σεαυτοῦ* to three of *σαντοῦ*.

The possessive adjective is found only in the form *σφέτερος (αὐτῶν)*. It is rare where the simple substantive pronoun is rare and is wanting where that

is wanting. The ratios of the direct and indirect reflexive use of *σφέτερος* and *σφέτερος αὐτῶν* are for *σφέτερος* 8 : 6 and for *σφέτερος αὐτῶν* 60 : 4. *σφέτερος* is never anaphoric in the Attic Orators. In Antiphon, Andocides and Lysias, the frequency of the adjective forms either excels or nearly equals that of the corresponding possessive genitive of the compound reflexive, whereas in Ps.-Lys., Isoc., Isae., and Dem., the possessive genitive far outstrips the adjective forms in point of frequency.

In direct reflexion, except in the formula *μοι δοκῶ*, which occurs 10 times, the compound forms of the pronoun of the 1st and of the 2d person are the rule for the singular and the complex forms are the rule for the plural; the simple forms are rare. In indirect reflexion the simple pronoun is much more common, the reflexive forms being the rule only when the indirect reflexive use borders closely upon the direct reflexive use.

There is no complex form of the possessive adjective of the 1st and 2d person singular, *ἐμαυτοῦ* and *σαντοῦ* (*σεαυτοῦ*) being used instead. In direct reflexion, *ἐμαυτοῦ* and *σαντοῦ* (*σεαυτοῦ*) are very much preferred to *ἐμός* and *ός*, whereas in indirect reflexion, the forms *ἐμός* and *μου* are used by preference. For the plural, there is a complex possessive adjective, and in direct reflexion this is very much more common than the simple forms, the possessive genitive *ἡμῶν* (*ὕμῶν*) *αὐτῶν* being very rare. In indirect reflexion, the complex possessive adjective is quite exceptional.

There is no instance of the interchange of numbers. Of the interchange of persons there are a few examples in the plural. *σφῶν αὐτῶν* is once used for *ὕμῶν αὐτῶν*, *αὐτῶν* is once used for *ἡμῶν αὐτῶν* and 8 times for *ὕμῶν αὐτῶν*. These instances are found in Andocides, Lysias, Demosthenes and Aeschines. In the singular *αὐτοῦ* is twice used for *ἐμαυτοῦ* and once for *σαντοῦ*. These examples are found in Antiphon and Andocides. Other instances of the use of *ἐαυτοῦ* (*αὐτοῦ*) for the 2d person are found in the MSS of Isocrates, Aeschines, Dinarchus and Hyperides, but these instances are very uncertain, inasmuch as tradition varies and *ἐαυτοῦ* is graphically close to *σαντοῦ*, and, besides, the MSS of Lysias, Isaeus, Lycurgus and Demosthenes furnish no such examples.

PLATO.

The simple pronoun is represented by the forms *οὐ*, *οἶ*, *ἐ*, *σφῶν*, *σφίσι* and *σφᾶς*. It occurs 109 times, and, with the solitary exception of *σφᾶς* in Legg. 782 E, which is used as a direct reflexive, its function is that of an indirect reflexive.

The complex reflexive is found 11 times in direct and 6 times in indirect reflexion.

The compound forms are used 2013 times, 1719 times as direct reflexives and 294 times as indirect reflexives. The form *αὐτοῦ* is preferred to *ἐαυτοῦ*, the ratio being 1212 : 801. *σαντοῦ* also is preferred to *σεαυτοῦ*, the ratio being 110 : 27.

The compound pronoun of the 3d person plural is twice used in Plato and twice in Ps.-Plato for the pronoun of the 1st person, and it is once used in Ps.-Plato for the pronoun of the 2d person. In the singular the reflexive of the 3d person is found only for that of the 2d, and in every instance *σαντοῦ* may be readily restored for *ἐαυτοῦ* (*αὐτοῦ*).

With but few exceptions, the singular of the simple pronoun of the 1st and 2d person is used as a direct reflexive only in the formula *μοι δοκῶ* or *δοκῶ μοι*, and even in this formula the reflexive is used when a contrast is involved. In the plural, the reflexive form is likewise the rule for direct reflexion. In indirect reflexion, the simple pronoun predominates, though the compound and complex forms are also used except in the genitive.

αὐτός is used in a number of instances both before and after non-reflexive *σέ*, etc., and *ἐμέ*, etc., without forming a regular complex pronoun.

Plato is the only one of the Attic prose-writers that uses the possessive *ός*, and he uses it but once, and that as an indirect reflexive in a paraphrase of the Iliad (Rpb. 394 A). Even the plural form *σφέτερος* (*αὐτῶν*) is rare in direct reflexion as compared with the possessive genitive *ἐαυτῶν*. In indirect reflexion, *σφέτερος* is more freely used, though not as often as *ἐαυτῶν*. The ratio of *ἐαυτῶν* to *σφέτερος* (*αὐτῶν*) is 202 : 20. *σφέτερος αὐτῶν* is used only as a direct reflexive. *ἡμέτερος* (*ὕμέτερος*) *αὐτῶν* and simple *ἡμέτερος* (*ὕμέτερος*) are each used 11 times as direct reflexives, while possessive *ἡμῶν αὐτῶν* occurs but twice. *ἐμός* (*σός*) is used 30 times in direct reflexion, but *ἐμαντοῦ* (*σαντοῦ*, *σεαντοῦ*) occurs 58 times.

The simple pronoun is found in but six of the admittedly spurious works, whereas it is wanting in only the Critias, the Crito, the Meno and the Parmenides of the genuine works. *οὐ* and *ἐ* are used only in the Convivium and in the Republic. The complex reflexive is confined to four of the genuine (Gorg., Politic., Rpb., Legg.) and to four of the spurious (Alc. I, Alc. II, Eryx., Menex.) dialogues. The form *αὐτοῦ* predominates in most of the works, but *ἐαυτοῦ* outnumbers *αὐτοῦ* in the Apol., Parmen., Euthyd., Protag., and in seven of the spurious dialogues. *σφέτερος* is restricted to the Rpb., Phaedr., Politic., Tim., Legg., Soph., Euthyd., Menex., Eryx. and Epist. III.

XENOPHON.

Xenophon uses the forms *οἱ*, *σφῶν*, *σφίσι*, *σφᾶς*, *σφεῖς*. They are indirect reflexives except in Cyr. 3, 2, 26, where *οἱ* is used anaphorically. The complex reflexive is rare in both direct (5 times) and in indirect reflexion (8 times), the compound form being the prevailing form, except in the dative plural, in which *σφίσι* is the most common form for indirect reflexion. *ἐαυτοῦ* is used 679 times (225 times in indirect reflexion), and *αὐτοῦ* 394 times (203 times in indirect reflexion), but *σεαντοῦ* (16 times) is less common than *σαντοῦ* (42 times).

σφῶν αὐτῶν, *αὐτῶν* and *ἐαυτῶν* are used once each for the reflexive of the 2d person plural. All three instances occur in the first book of the Hellenica. In the singular, the compound reflexive of the 3d person is found for that of the 2d person, but *σαντοῦ* should everywhere be restored.

The simple pronoun of the 1st and 2d person is used as a direct reflexive when there is emphasis; elsewhere, only in *μοι δοκῶ* and *δοκῶ μοι*. The compound forms are used in direct reflexion 103 times, but they are also used in indirect reflexion. The simple pronoun, however, is exceedingly frequent in indirect reflexion.

The use of the possessive forms becomes clear from the following figures: *σφέτερος* is used 13 times (once in direct reflexion), the corresponding possessive genitive 149 times (125 times in direct reflexion). *σφέτερος αὐτῶν* does not

occur. In direct reflexion, ἡμέτερος αὐτῶν is used once, ἡμέτερος (ὑμέτερος) 10 times, possessive ὑμῶν αὐτῶν once. ἐμός (σός) is used 32 times as a direct reflexive, possessive ἐμαυτοῦ (σαντοῦ, σεαυτοῦ) only 26 times.

Anab., Cyr., and Hell. II and III show a decided preference for the plural forms of the simple pronoun, and they use οἱ rather frequently. All but three of the complex reflexives of the 3d person are found in the Hellenica. αὐτοῦ is more frequent than ἐαυτοῦ in only the Cyneg. and Hell. I; in the other works ἐαυτοῦ preponderates.

C. W. E. MILLER.

Chrestomathie française, by A. RAMBEAU and J. PASSY. Henry Holt & Co. N. Y., 1897. Pp. xxxv + 250.

The phonetic method of teaching modern languages, while it has as yet scarcely gained a foothold in this country, has rapidly won favor in Germany and Scandinavia, and is gradually coming into notice in France and England. For the slow progress, in America, of a system that undoubtedly has much to commend it, there are at least two potent reasons: in the first place, our educators have seen, within the last twenty years, the rise and fall of so many new modes of linguistic study, each one loudly proclaimed as infallible, that they are inclined to look with distrust upon any apparently similar innovation; and, secondly, as a result of much experimenting, our ways of instruction, in the more enlightened regions, are really less antiquated than those of most other countries, and the need of a change is correspondingly less urgent.

The 'phonetic' or 'reform' program differs from nearly all other methods in that it is based on really scientific principles and advocated chiefly by men of learning and successful experience. With it are associated especially the names of Professor Vietor, of Marburg, and Dr. Paul Passy, of Paris. A large society of teachers, the Association Phonétique Internationale, is devoted to the propagation of the 'reform' creed. It has two thoroughly reputable organs, the *Maître phonétique* in France and the *Neueren Sprachen* in Germany. The principal articles of the new faith are these: modern language instruction should take as its first material the living, spoken tongue, reserving for later study the more or less obsolete speech of literature; pronunciation should be thoroughly, accurately and scientifically taught from the very outset. For these purposes various printed aids are required: charts of sounds, with well-chosen key-words; pictures that afford topics for questions and answers; dialogues and simple narratives in modern, idiomatic style and in phonetic spelling. This latter condition is indispensable; for the advocates of the system attach the greatest importance to the exclusive use of a phonetic notation until the pupil has become very familiar with the sounds of the language, considered both as artificially isolated phenomena and as elements of naturally combined phrases.

Amid the surprisingly copious literature that the new method has called into existence, two collections of phonetic texts have merited particular attention: Sweet's 'Elementarbuch des gesprochenen Englisch,' for Germans who are acquiring English, and the 'Elementarbuch des gesprochenen Französisch,' by Franz Beyer and Paul Passy, for Germans who wish to learn

French. To these is now added, for the special benefit of American and English students of the French language, the '*Chrestomathie française*' prepared by Professor A. Rambeau, of Johns Hopkins, and Jean Passy, a brother of the distinguished founder of the Association Phonétique. Professor Rambeau's linguistic and pedagogical works have long since made him known to philologists and phoneticians; and Mr. Passy has won himself a reputation as a teacher and as an investigator of French dialects. The present volume is, therefore, the product of men expert both in the theory and in the practical side of their science.

The *Chrestomathie* is not meant for beginners, but is intended for pupils who have already used some more elementary work of a similar character; hence the texts are given in two forms—the standard spelling and the phonetic transcription—on opposite pages. The book begins with a strong defence of the 'new method'; then follows, condensed into less than twenty pages, a description of French sounds and sound-groups. The rest of the volume is filled by the texts themselves; they are chosen to illustrate all sorts of styles in prose and verse, and are of various degrees of difficulty, some of them being very hard, and none particularly easy. The figured pronunciation of the poetry conforms to Paul Passy's theory of accentuation. The phonetic alphabet used by the authors is that of the Association Phonétique; though rather unsightly, as compared with Bell's 'visible speech' or Sweet's 'broad romic,' it can be quickly acquired and readily deciphered. The print is clear and sufficiently large. It is to be hoped that the *Chrestomathie*, which represents an immense amount of disinterested labor, will, even if not extensively used in America for years to come, at least serve to bring home to many of our French teachers the importance of phonetic study.

C. H. GRANDGENT.

JOURNAL OF GERMANIC PHILOLOGY. Editor: GUSTAF E. KARSTEN, University of Indiana. Vol. I, 1897, No. 1.

The first number of the *Journal of Germanic Philology* has recently appeared in very attractive dress on heavy paper; in general make-up it is above criticism, forming a pleasing contrast to similar journals in Europe. But not merely its exterior reflects credit upon Professor Karsten; its purpose and plan are especially deserving of the highest commendation. The problems of a journal of this kind in America are not only distinctly scientific, but are also decidedly practical. It ought not only to call forth and foster scientific study and scholarship amongst those engaged in such work at the larger institutions of learning, but try to raise the general average of scholarship in the country by disseminating the results of such investigations here and elsewhere amongst the larger body of students and teachers; amongst those whose time is so taken up by their routine tasks that they cannot hope to follow carefully all the latest literature in their lines of work, but who are forced to depend upon abstracts and digests, when they can get them, or who are not near libraries where they can obtain the latest literature, particularly such as is to be found in the scientific journals. It is an age of 'Reviews of Reviews,' and such a 'Review' of Germanic studies has been greatly needed. This need the

new journal intends to satisfy; in the first number it has made an excellent beginning with digests of the contents of *Anglia*, vol. VI; *Englische Studien*, vol. XXII; a general discussion of the purpose and aims of the *Euphorion*; and digests of the first three volumes of *Indogermanische Forschungen*. If a suggestion might be allowed, possibly in some of these digests a little more condensation would be advisable. Except where an article in a journal is of pretty general interest, the reader can hardly expect to find in a digest anything but the main points that he may be interested in; if he desires more detailed information, he must expect to go to the original.

The body of this first number of the Journal provides a variety of well-selected and scientifically interesting studies, hardly needing other vouchers for the quality of their contents than the names of the contributors. Horatio S. White of Cornell contributes the first article, a discussion and review of the various theories in regard to the home of Walther von der Vogelweide, which arrives at the only possible conclusion of the whole matter, that it is still inconclusive. The second article, by George Hempl of the University of Michigan, is on Middle English *-wȝ-*, *-wō-*, in which, after a careful study of Chaucer's rimes, he establishes a new rime-test for the determining of Midland and Southern texts, the latter riming *wȝ* with *gȝ* and *fȝ*, the former showing the rimes *wō* : *dō*, *tō*. The investigation further traces the history of the influence of *w* on a following *ȝ*, establishing definite dates for the change of *ȝ* to *ō* after *w*. Edward Payson Morton, of the University of Indiana, in the next article presents the results of a study of Shakespeare's popularity in the seventeenth century, as evinced by the number of different Shakespearian plays put on the stage during the century, and the frequency of their repetitions. He shows that Shakespeare was popular, notwithstanding the adverse opinions of literary critics of the times, and, at least as far as representations on the stage are concerned, was as popular as he is to-day, judging by a comparison with statistics from the Boston theatres. In an article on voiced spirants in Gothic, George A. Hench, of the University of Michigan, establishes by a careful investigation of all cases, first, that *b* after *r* and *l* is a voiced labial spirant; and, secondly, that the sandhi theory as stated by Streitberg (*Gotisches Elementarbuch*) for the explanation of *b*, *d* and *z*, where *f*, *þ* and *s* would be expected, is untenable, as are likewise the theories of Kock (*Zfda.* XXV) and Wrede (Heyne's *Ulfilas*, 9th ed.). The forms are to be explained rather by leveling, which at first was only a matter of spelling, but afterwards 'prepared the way for the representation of the real voiced spirant in sandhi, which is to be seen in the first eight chapters of Luke, perhaps in isolated cases elsewhere.' The *d* in the verbal endings is due to 'a sound-change in East Gothic, by which the voiceless spirant became voiced in an unaccented syllable.' In the fifth article, Otto B. Schlutter, of the Hartford High School, offers a number of corrections and criticisms of Sweet's edition of the *Oldest English Texts*. H. Schmidt-Wartenberg, of the University of Chicago, follows with a series of investigations (illustrated) made with the Rousselot apparatus on *r*-sounds, and on the quantity of labials in Finnic Swedish as determined with Rosapelly's lip observer. In the article on Teutonic 'eleven' and 'twelve,' F. A. Blackburn, of the University of Chicago, would substitute for the derivation and explanation of the ending *lif* of these two words, as

given by Kluge, a derivation from a nominal form *libi*, root *lip*, meaning 'addition.' *Ainlibi* would then mean 'having one as an addition,' a derivation which, however, fails to explain the Lithuanian forms. The last article, On the Hildebrandslied, is by the editor, Professor Karsten, who defends the theory that the original text was OS., explains the HG. forms by the dialect of the first scribe, and presents emendations for verses 48 and 30.

This first number as a whole fully comes up to the high expectations which were entertained of it, and augurs well for the future. The names of the co-editors, Professors Cook of Yale for English, White of Cornell for the History of German Literature, and Hench of Michigan for the Historical Grammar of the Germanic Dialects, together with Professor Georg Holz of Leipzig, and a large number of European scholars who have promised co-operation, guarantee that the following numbers will contain thorough and careful work, and that the scholarly character of the journal will be kept up to a high standard. Its continuance is provided for by the financial support of seven gentlemen in Indianapolis, to whom all friends of Germanic studies in America owe a debt of gratitude. It is a most encouraging sign for the future of learning in this country that those who stand outside of the body of scholars, strictly speaking, should so munificently show their interest in a distinctly scientific journal, and that in a way so free from selfishness or ostentatious display. Such generosity ought to call forth an equally generous spirit of support in the community of scholars and students more directly interested.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

GUSTAV GRUENER.

REPORTS.

REVUE DE PHILOGIE. Vol. XX.

No. 1.

1. Pp. 1-11. Paul Girard discusses two passages of Aeschylus. I. Pers. 527-31. After a brief examination of the views of others, M. Girard advances the theory that these verses are interpolated, and that they were at first inserted after v. 851.—II. Theb. 961 ff. He examines the arguments of those that reject this closing scene, and finds them unsound.

2. Pp. 12-22. Philippe Fabia investigates the conflicting accounts of the adultery of Nero and Poppaea, and gives the preference to that of the Annals of Tacitus.

3. P. 22. L. Havet proposes '*furatrina*' in Nonius, p. 63 M.

4. Pp. 23-35. Albert Martin publishes an article left nearly complete by Charles Graux on some unpublished fragments of Lydus *περὶ διοσημιῶν*, found in the Library of the King of Spain.

5. Pp. 36-7. C. E. Ruelle discovers that the fragment of 'Numenius on Matter' (*Νουμηνίου περὶ ὕλης*) in the Escorial, referred to by some writers, is nothing but an extract from Plotinus (pp. 308-22 ed. princeps).

6. Pp. 38-40. Notes on some MSS of Patmos, by J. Bidez and L. Parmen-
tier. I. Fragments of Dio Chrysostomus. (To be continued.)

7. Pp. 41-2. Louis Duvau reads, Phaedr. I 15. 1-2, *In principatu commu-
tando civium | nil praeter dominos inopes mutant saepius*. Id. Appendix 16, 7,
for '*facinoris*' he reads '*funeris*' = *cadaveris*.

8. P. 42. In Babrius LXI (75), Éd. Tournier proposes *οὐ παραπατῶ*.

9. Pp. 43-52. On the correspondence of Flavius Abinnius, by Jules Nicoles. Some sixty papyrus MSS found at Fayoum, and now partly in the British Museum, partly in the Library of Geneva, furnish an outline of the life of Flavius Abinnius from A. D. 343 to 350. Abinnius was commander of an *ala* of cavalry (*ἐπαρχος εἰλης*), and is sometimes called also *πραιπόσιτος κάστρους*. All the documents are in Greek except two in Latin. Only two are written by him. He may have forgotten to send these, or they may be rough drafts of letters sent. Half of the papers are official, half of them private. They throw important light on several questions. Nicoles publishes the text of two: the first, in Latin, dismissing Abinnius from his command (A. D. 344; in 346 he is found reinstated); the second, in Greek, an instrument conveying to him the possession of two cows, for which he has paid 1200 talents (in the depreciated currency of the times). One of the cows was named *σαλε*...

(two or three letters obliterated), the other *στεειαει*. Whatever may be said of the former, the latter, as a single word, belongs to none of the languages then used in Egypt—Latin, Greek, Egyptian. Nicoles suggests that the explanation may be furnished by a fact which M. René Bazin records in his *Italiens d'aujourd'hui* (pp. 224 ff.), that in various parts of Southern Italy cattle are called, not by single names, but by short phrases, such as proverbs, refrains of popular songs, hucksters' cries, etc. He thinks that *στεειαει* may be the beginning of such a phrase, *ὅτε εἰ ἀεί*, and that *σαλε* . . . may be *σαλεύει* (*ἡ ναῦς*, for instance). [One naturally recalls the analogous names of men of the good old Puritan days, such as *If-God-had-not-died-for-thee-thou-hadst-been-damned Barebones*.] The name of Abinnius is written 'Αβίναιος, 'Αβίνναιος, 'Αμίναιος, 'Αμίνναιος, 'Αμίννειος, 'Αμίννεος, 'Εβίννιος. The use of *μ* seems to indicate that *β* was already losing, or had lost, its full labial character.

10. Pp. 53-6. Georges Lafaye defends the reading of the *editio princeps* (i. e. of Cod. Sangallensis) in Statius, *Silvae* I, Preface, l. 28 (Baehrens). His defence seems conclusive.

11. Pp. 57-9. Critical notes by H. van Herwerden on seventeen passages of Callinicus, *Vita S. Hypatii*.

12. Pp. 60-64. Epigraphic notes, by Jean Negroponce. Discussion of a bilingual (Latin and Greek) inscription found near the railway station of Deirmendjik, and published (1895) at Athens; also of two or three other small inscriptions.

13. Pp. 65-7. L. Havet explains Lucilius 317 (Baehrens) and Phaedrus, V 7. 26. Pascal Monet emends Lucian, *Charon* 15.

14. Pp. 68-72. Book Notices. 1) Philo: *About the Contemplative Life, or The fourth book of the Treatise Concerning Virtue*, critically edited with a defence of its genuineness, by F. C. Conybeare; Oxford, 1895. Joseph Viteau gives a brief description of this work, which he finds full of valuable information, but objects to a very small number of statements. 2) J. P. Waltzing, *Étude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*, t. I, Louvain, 1895. F. C. considers this a much-needed work, and predicts that, when completed, it will add much to our knowledge. 3) *Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*. Under this head P. C. gives a brief and, in the main, favorable account of Herondas (2d ed.) by O. Crusius, the *Politica* of Aristotle by Susemihl, *Apollodori Bibliotheca* by R. Wagner, *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae* by H. Schenkl, and barely mentions Dion Cassius by Melber and *Plut. Moralia*, vol. 6, by Bernardakis. 4) P. C. commends Goodwin and White's *Anabasis* and White and Morgan's dictionary to the *Anabasis*. 5) P. C. pronounces *The Hecuba of Euripides*, by W. S. Hadley, Cambridge, 1894, neither the best nor the worst of the series to which it belongs.

No. 2.

1. Pp. 73-83. On *qu* in *liquidus*, *liquor*, *liquens*, *aqua*, by Louis Havet. The author retracts the whole of his article on this subject published in the *Revue de Philologie*, 1891, pp. 8 ff. He now denies that *liquidus* (four

syllables), *ἀϗῦα* (three syllables) and like resolutions occur at all. Moreover, some of the examples of *ἡϗu-* are not from *ἡϗui*, but from *liquēre*. The length of the syllable is simply quantity by position: *liq-uidus*. The same is true of *ἀϗua* several times. Had the Pisistratidae edited Homer with digamma written in such words as *ἐδϑεισεν*, *ἀϗua* would have been as common as *pātris*. As it is, only Lucretius and Laevius applied the principle to Latin independently of Greek models. Even *liquentia flumina* in Verg. Aen. IX 679 is no exception, although *liquentia* here cannot come from *ἡϗui*; for, as Servius expressly says, this is a proper name (in adjective form; cf. *stagna Aufida* and the like). The modern name is *Livenza*, though it seems probable that the earliest form of the name was *Liquetia*, and had nothing to do either with *liqui* or with *liquēre*. The insertion of *n* was due to analogy, and is illustrated by *Vicenza*, which was *Vicetia* in ancient times.

2. Pp. 84-8. P. Foucart, by means of two Greek inscriptions, fixes the reign of Tachos between 360 and 357, and discusses the dates of events connected with the contest between Samos and Priene, especially the arbitration of the Rhodians.

3. P. 88. K. D. Mylonas publishes an inscription giving the name of a hitherto unknown sculptor, *Μηνᾶς* of Pergamus.

4. Pp. 89-92. Critical notes on nine passages of Aristot. Poet., by Médéric Dufour.

5. Pp. 93-4. Louis Havet proposes, Plaut. Amphitruo 96, *Comoediai* dum huius argumentum eloquor, and shows how the corruption probably arose from v. 51.

6. Pp. 95-101. Epigraphic notes, by B. Haussoulrier. Discussion of a few inscriptions from the neighborhood of Heronda. These establish an *Ἀπόλλων Πεδανασσεύς*. An examination of *αὐτοέτης* shows that, contrary to what some had maintained, it has its ordinary meaning in certain inscriptions.

7. Pp. 101-2. Louis Havet writes an interesting note on C. I. L. V 1939 (Concordia).

8. Pp. 104-15. On the first two Ptolemies and the confederation of the Cyclades, by J. Delamarre. An inscription (containing 62 lines of about 35 letters each, and discovered in 1893 on the little island of *Νικουργιά* near Amorgos) is made the basis of an instructive investigation of the origin of the confederation of the Cyclades and its relation to the kingdom of Egypt. The inscription contains other valuable information, especially concerning the 'isolympic' games celebrated at Alexandria.

9. Pp. 116-25. Notes on some MSS of Patmos (continued), by J. Bidez and L. Parmentier. II. First a critical account of other MSS and editions of Evagrius' Ecclesiastical History is given, then a Patmos MS is described and a collation of many important passages is presented, illustrating the value of this MS. III. The same MS contains also the Ecclesiastical History of Socrates, which is briefly described.

10. Pp. 126-8. Book Notices. 1) J. J. Binder, *Laurion, die attischen Bergwerke im Alterthum*; Laibach, 1895; unfavorably criticised by E. A.

2) Carlo Pascal, *Il culto di Apollo in Roma nel secolo di Augusto*; Roma, 1895; favorably mentioned by Georges Goyau. 3) Carlo Pascal, *Acca Larentia e il mito della terra Madre a proposito di un passo dei Fasti Prenestini*; Roma, 1894. A work of 31 pages, considered by Georges Goyau a useful collection of passages relating to the subject. 4) Ettore Ciccotti, *La fine del secondo Triumvirato*; 1895. Georges Goyau gives brief summary. It is a question of chronology. 5) M. Deloche, *Le port des anneaux dans l'antiquité romaine et dans les premiers siècles du moyen-âge*; Paris, 1895; briefly summarized, with high commendation, by Georges Goyau. 6) C. Castellani, *Catalogus codicum Graecorum qui in bibliothecam D. Marci Venetiarum inde ab anno MDCCXL ad haec usque tempora inlati sunt*. Briefly described and pronounced very useful by C. E. R.

No. 3.

1. Pp. 129-45. Nero and the Rhodians, by Philippe Fabia. I. The relations of the Rhodians to Rome before Nero. II. The date of the restoration of their autonomy. Discussion of the accounts of Tacitus and Suetonius, showing that the preference is to be given to the former, and that the date was A. D. 53. III. The threat of Nero to escape his mother's yoke by abdicating and retiring to Rhodes, and his reasons for selecting that place. IV. Discussion of an inscription, recently published by Hiller von Gaertringen, relating to an embassy from the Rhodians to Nero in the first year of his reign. V. The escape of the Rhodians from pillage of works of arts at the hands of Nero's agent, Acratus.—An interesting and instructive article.

2. Pp. 146-8. Louis Havet critically discusses Phaedrus, IV 20, V 1. 10, V 5. 18-19.

3. Pp. 149-50. C. E. Ruelle collates two pages of the *Epitome prior* of the *Clementinae*, found written on the cover of a MS of Ptolemy (Paris, Greek MS 1403).

4. Pp. 151-4. A. Cartault declines to accept the conclusion reached by Louis Havet (Rev. d. Phil. XII, pp. 145 ff.) and approved by other scholars, transposing vv. 616-20 of Verg. Aen. VI so as to follow v. 601. He, on the contrary, places 602-7 after 620, shows how the transposition probably occurred, and that the proposed arrangement is in every respect satisfactory.

5. P. 155. L. Havet proposes *sacerrume* in Plaut. Trin. 540.

6. Pp. 156-8. C. E. Ruelle denies the correctness of *συμφωνίας* and *συμφωνία* in the disputed passage of Arist. Quintil., p. 26 (Meibom), and restores *ὁμοφωνίας*, *ὁμοφωνία*. The use of *συμφωνία* = *ὁμοφωνία* is shown to be inconsistent with the usage of Aristides himself. The converse change of *σύμφωνοι* into *ὁμόφωνοι* occurs in all the MSS of Martianus Capella, De Nupt. Phil. IX 947 (Kopp).

7. Pp. 159-64. Book Notices. 1) F. Robiou, *L'état religieux de la Grèce et de l'Orient au siècle d'Alexandre*. II. Les régions syro-babyloniennes et l'Éran; Paris, 1895; unfavorably mentioned by Ch. Michel. 2) Dionis Prusaeensis quem vocant Chrysostomum, quae extant omnia edidit etc. J. de Arnim; vol. II, Berlin, 1896; described and commended by F. C. 3) F. T. Cooper,

Word-formation in the Roman *Sermo Plebeius*; Boston, 1895. T., in a notice of some length, finds that this work exhibits learning and diligence, but otherwise his remarks are chiefly unfavorable. 4) P. Terenti Phormio, with Notes and Introduction, by H. C. Elmer; Boston, 1895. Philippe Fabia describes this work, on the whole favorably, but finds that in the Introduction the special study of the play is too much sacrificed to generalities. 5) The Adelphoe of Terence, by William L. Cowles; Boston, 1896. Pronounced "soigné et bien imprimé" by Philippe Fabia, though some slight strictures are made.

No. 4.

1. Pp. 165-75. P. Couvreur publishes a catalogue of the papyrus Greek MSS discovered in recent times. The names of authors, whose fragments or works are contained in these MSS, are given in chronological order in two lists—one for poetry, one for prose. The bibliography, except where it is very voluminous, as in the case of Hero(n)das, is added; also the date of each MS. Those that contain anything otherwise unknown are marked with an asterisk. The author requests scholars to inform him of any omissions he may have made. This catalogue must have cost much labor, and Hellenists cannot be too grateful for so useful a work.

2. Pp. 175-7. Paul Tannery proposes '*cacumen perlibratum cum oculo*' in Vitruvius Rufus, §39.

3. Pp. 178-84. Louis Havet critically discusses Phaedr. III, Prol. 38 (II Epil. 14); III 15, 20; III Epil. 2; V 5, 11-12 (and I 29, 3); Appendix 6, 6.

4. P. 185. In Ter. Eun. 588, A. Mace proposes *hiemem* for *hominem*.

5. Pp. 186-7. Otto Keller critically discusses Anecdota Bernensia, ed. Hagen, p. 187; Alexand. Aphrodis. 2, 16; Oros. VII 9, 14.

6. Pp. 188-90. J. Chauvin proposes *succurrit* for *quaerit* in Phaedr. IV 9, 2.

7. Pp. 191 foll. Book Notices. 1) Quelques notes sur les *Silvae* de Stace, premier livre, par G. Lafaye; Paris, 1896. Jules Chauvin gives numerous illustrations of the great value of this work. Of special importance is the happy use that the author has made of his knowledge of archaeology. 2) Thucydides, Book III, edited with Introduction and Notes, by A. W. Spratt; Cambridge, 1896. E. Chambry reviews this work at considerable length. Though he enumerates some details which he cannot approve, he says "*Non ego paucis offendar*," and pronounces the edition an excellent one and almost as exhaustive as it is possible to make a work of the kind. 3) De Flavii Josephi elocutione observationes: scripsit Guilelmus Schmidt; Leipzig, 1893. Briefly and favorably mentioned by J. Viteau. 4) J. J. Hartmann, De Terentio et Donato commentatio; Leyden, 1895. Philippe Fabia, after describing this book, says that, of its four chapters, only the second was worth writing. 5) P. Cornelii Taciti Ab excessu divi Augusti quae supersunt. Annales de Tacite, texte soigneusement revu, précédé d'une introduction et accompagné de notes explicatives, grammaticales et historiques. par MM. Léopold Constans et Paul Girbal; Paris, 1896. Philippe Fabia does not hesitate to pronounce this the best of all the editions of the Annals that have

ever appeared in France. He finds only the Introduction weak. 6) *Anthologia Latina, pars posterior, Carmina Epigraphica conlegit F. Buecheler; fascic. I, Lipsiae, 1895.* Georges Lafaye, after a brief history of other attempts to collect poetical inscriptions, gives an account of the origin of this valuable work, "worthy of the eminent master." This volume contains inscriptions in the Saturnian verse, iambics, trochaics, and the dactylic hexameter. The second volume will contain those composed in the elegiac form. 7) *Cassii Dionis Cocceiani Historiarum Romanarum quae supersunt edidit Ursulus Philippus Boissevain; vol. I, Berolini, 1895.* Briefly described by Dx., who says it merits the thanks of philologists and especially historians.

The *Revue des Revues*, begun in a previous number, is finished in this number.

MILTON W. HUMPHREYS.

ENGLISCHE STUDIEN. Herausgegeben von Dr. EUGEN KÖLBING, Leipzig.

XXI. Band, 1895.

I.—F. Graz, Contributions to the Textual Criticism of the so-called Caedmonian Poems. In his article, 'Die Metrik der sogenannten Cädmön'schen Dichtungen,' in Part III of *Studien zum Germanischen Allitterationsvers*, edited by Kaluza, Graz suggested emendations on the basis of the metre. The present article discusses those emendations more fully.

Ph. Aronstein, John Marston as a Dramatist. This article is a continuation of a study begun in vol. XX. Part II is devoted to the literary criticism of the poet's work, and Part III is a brief conclusion. The tragedies and comedies are treated separately. In the first group are *Antonio and Mellida*, Parts I and II, *The Malcontent*, *Sophonisba*, *The Insatiate Countess*. The comedies are *What You Will*, *The Dutch Courtesan*, *Parasitaster* or *The Fawn*. The order of discussion in each case is: a sketch of the plot; the sources; the idea; the plot-treatment; the characters; the language and style; final estimate. The second part of *Antonio and Mellida*, called *Antonio's Revenge*, was planned as a satiric comedy, but is really a tragedy of blood. The first part is evidently from some Italian novel, and the second follows Thomas Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy*, but we find suggestions of *Romeo and Juliet* and *Much Ado About Nothing*. The poet exercises little poetic justice. In diction this drama best illustrates Marston's excellencies and faults. He is a reflective lyricist. Passages of tenderness, such as IV. i. 12, are only oases in a wilderness of bombast. Jonson in the *Poetaster* scores Marston for his use 'of wild, outlandish terms' and his use of high-sounding diction in preference to simple Anglo-Saxon. The whole drama shows the need of a discipline. Of the *Malcontent*, the source may be some Italian novel, or it may have been constructed by Marston himself after the plan of *Antonio and Mellida*. Its style shows Jonson's influence. *Sophonisba* is a historical drama, taken directly from Livy, bks. 27; 28; 29; 30, §§1-16. The story is told also in Appian's history of Spain, and briefly in Polybius. The subject had been treated by Trissino in 1524, and Marston may have made some use of that treatment. The witch-scene comes directly from

Lucan, *Pharsalia* 6. 488 ff. With a few exceptions, the style is bombastic and repulsive. The *Insatiate Countess* contains two poorly joined plots. Its sources are the fourth and fifteenth novels of *Bandello*, but it is also heavily marked with *Shakespeare*. Of the comedies, *What You Will* is drawn directly from the *Amphitruo* of *Plautus* or through the Italian. It shows some skill in detail, but is without unity. *Lampatho Doria*, a mad scholar, is, *Aronstein* thinks, a caricature of *Jonson*, while *Quadratus*, the misanthrope, is *Marston's* self. The *Dutch Courtezan* is one of the best of the Elizabethan comedies. It is not only the contrast between a high and a low woman, but between the ascetic and the man of wide experience. Its characters and diction are the poet's best. *Parasitaster* is built upon a device of the *Adelphi* of *Terence*, which appears also in the third novel of the third day of the *Decameron*. It contains enough material for three or four better plays. *Marston* was well acquainted with Latin literature. *Seneca* was his inspirer. Of his contemporaries, he follows *Jonson* more closely in his comedies and in form, but *Shakespeare* is his help in ideas and motives, and in the tragedies. He is open to the criticism of immoderation. Plots and characters are in the extreme, though their range is small. His types of women are three: the lover and heroine, the emancipated woman, and the low woman. *Marston* is more of a dilettant than a poet, but the friends that he makes are faithful.

E. Nader gives an interesting report of the Sixth Summer-Meeting for University Extension at Oxford, 1894. He promises the historical sketch of the movement which appears later in the volume.

Under Book Notices are reviews of *O. Jespersen's Progress in Language* with special reference to English, *P. Cosijn's Concise Early West Saxon Grammar*, *Hall's Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary for Students*, the second volume of *Wülker's* revision of *Grein's Library of Old English Poetry*, *H. A. Vance's Late Old English Sermo in Festis S^{ae} Mariae Virginis*, *W. H. Hulme's Language of the Old English Recension of Augustine's Soliloquies*, *C. G. Child's John Lyly and Euphuism*. Under the continuation from vol. XX of reviews of the latest literature on the Elizabethan drama are *Brandl's Shakspeare*, *W. Oechelhäuser's Shakspeareana*, *S. von Milletich's The Aesthetic Form of the Conclusion (abschliessenden Ausgleiches) in the Shakespearean Drama*, *L. Wurth's The Pun in Shakespeare, Julius Caesar*, translated into German by *A. W. von Schlegel*, edited by *A. Englert*. Other books reviewed are the *Manchester Goethe Society Transactions*, *E. H. Lewis' History of the English Paragraph*, *E. Hausknecht's The English Student*, and *The English Reader*, *G. Krüger's Systematic English-German Vocabulary*, *V. Olsvig's Yes and No, Dialogues in English on Holzer's Charts*.

Jespersen's book is an enlargement and translation into English of his *Studier over Engelske Kasus*. He rejects the theory of *Schleicher* that the order of linguistic development was (1) isolated terms, (2) their agglutination, (3) inflection. In modern English, as compared with ancient speech, he finds that (1) its forms are shorter, (2) there are fewer forms, (3) fewer irregularities, (4) the more abstract character of words facilitates expression. Simplicity was not an original characteristic. An old language presents with simple forms a fixed order, and a fixed order is 'the highest, finest, and accordingly the latest

developed expedient of speech.' The second part discusses the question of the English plural in *-s*, and finds that its uniformity was not due to French influence. Case-questions of less interest are also treated.

Cosijn's Grammar would serve as a good introduction to Sievers'. The phonological chapter is commended by Nader for the abundance of corresponding Gothic forms, and the inflections for the references to phonology.

Hall's Dictionary will be used by the learner, where the specialist will use Bosworth-Toller.

Volume II of Grein's Library contains reprints of poems from the Vercelli Codex and the Exeter MS, including Andreas, the Fates of the Apostles, the Address of the Soul to the Body, a Homily on Ps. 28, the Dream of the Rood, Elene; in the second part, poems from the so-called Caedmon MS at Oxford and the Corpus Christi MS, the Caedmon Hymn, and the lately discovered inscription on the Brussels Cross. The concluding volume will contain the rest of the Exeter MS, the Metrical Psalms, Metres of Boethius, Solomon and Saturn, and several minor poems. Glöde gives a specimen of Wülker's work. Such a work as this is a safeguard against mistakes arising from a scholar's confinement to a narrow circle of originals.

Fränkel, in his review of the late literature on the Elizabethan drama, criticises the crowd of drivellers or demented laymen who have attempted the biography of Shakespeare. Shakespeare's biographer must possess both experience and scholarship. The object of Brandl's book is to show the personality of Shakespeare in its changing phases, and the apparatus of literary-historical research is used to serve this purpose. The poet's works fall under (1) the Falstaff period, (2) the Hamlet period, (3) the Lear period, (4) the Romances. Then follow Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale, Tempest. Fränkel inconsistently criticizes the book's obscure style. He finds some unwarranted inferences. The book, however, is a precipitate of the accumulated knowledge of Shakespeare, and marks a stage in the advance of critical work.

For thirty years Oechelhäuser has been active in the aesthetic and dramatic criticism of Shakespeare's plays. In the problems of their staging the internal evidence of the plays must be considered. His book contains eight essays, among which is a most careful analysis of Richard III. Most of the work is devoted to a consideration of the adaptability of the plays to the stage. The author looks forward to an advantageous adaptation of the plays to our boards.

Milletich, from the standpoint that the poet must in his conclusion set forth clearly and in harmony his view of life, treats his subject with much help from both Zimmerman and Knauer of Vienna. The book is guilty of diletantism and some inaccuracies. Wurth thinks Shakespeare's use of the pun is a worthy criterion of the poet's dramatic art.

Lewis' treatment of the paragraph was his doctoral thesis at Chicago. After a careful historical consideration, beginning with the oldest MSS, he concludes that Hunt's definition, 'a collection of sentences unified by some common idea,' is historically the most accurate. Glöde especially commends Lewis' skill of selection.

In the Miscellanea, Kölbing offers emendations to the text of William of Shoreham's most interesting though incomplete religious poem, 'In Holy

Sauter we may rede,' and points to the need of a well-edited edition of this poet's complete works. Emendations are also suggested to the text of A. W. Pollard's *English Miracle Plays, Moralities, and Interludes*, Oxford, 1890. This book of selections goes to fill a great want in a rather neglected period. Kölbing's notes on Byron explain that the dedication which now heads *Childe Harold*, 'To Ianthe' (Lady Charlotte Harley, second daughter of the fifth Earl of Oxford), appeared first in the seventh edition, 1814. The song 'Good Night,' immediately following Canto I. xiii, is shown, by a collection of interesting parallels, to be an imitation, both in matter and spirit, of the *Border Minstrelsy*, edited by Scott, and of Percy's *Reliques*. Other notes are by Fränkel, on the Legend of the Hermit and the Angel; Wülfing, on the meaning of M. E. *croud*; Gnerlich, on the etymology of *pedigree*. Gruber notes the discovery in Berlin of the oldest edition of Steele's plays. Its date is 1723, which is 38 years earlier than any hitherto known. Ellinger corrects Swaen (*Eng. Stud.* XX 266 ff.) in a note on the verb *to dare*. A. Schröer pays tribute to the service of Miss Laura Soames, who died Jan. 24, 1895. Her great service began in the use which she made of phonetics as a means of teaching foreign languages to children. In the science of language-history the phonology of the living tongue grows every day more important. Miss Soames' work is most valuable for its conscientious observation.

II.—J. H. Hall prints three short religious pieces from MS Cotton Galba E. IX, two of them for the first time.

J. Hoops, *Keats' Youth and Early Poems*. After a brief review of the Georgian poets and their position, the author says that the two whose spirit has stamped the Victorian poetry are Wordsworth and Keats. Both are little known in Germany: Wordsworth because of Anglo-Saxon peculiarities; Keats, who is more universal, through lack of a good translation and a stout champion. The translation is forthcoming from the hands of Marie Gothein. The present article proposes to meet the translation with a treatment for Germany of the biographical and literary side. It contains little that is new, and makes use of much second-hand material. The following sections are treated: parentage and early childhood; school at Enfield; apprenticeship at Edmonton; study of medicine in London; vacation at Margate; Keats and Leigh Hunt; the winter of 1816-17; the volume of 1817 and its reception. Naturally, the article deals mostly with the forces which entered into the development of the poet's art. On the evidence of some remarks by Hunt in an essay entitled 'Young Poets,' in the *Examiner* of Dec. 1, 1816, Hoops shows that Keats could not have met Hunt until shortly before this date, and not early in the year, as was hitherto believed. Detailed evidence from the volume of 1817 shows the influence upon Keats of Chaucer, Chapman, Browne, Milton, and Moore. Other poets whom Keats had read at this time, but whose influence cannot be traced in detail, are Shakespeare, Chatterton, Byron, and Wordsworth. The early poems forecast Keats' wonderful and deep familiarity with nature, as well as his inability to comprehend human passion and give it poetic expression.

A. Pakscher describes the theory and working of the Berlitz method of instruction in foreign languages.

In the Miscellanea R. R. de Jong shows that the distinction between *-ende* and *-ende* in rimes holds not only in Robert of Gloucester's Chronicle, as Bülbring (Eng. Stud. XX 149) showed, but also in Sir Beues of Hamtoun, probably in Guy of Warwick, and possibly in Sir Ferumbras. P. Bellezza points to the use of the plowman in Macaulay and Tennyson. Swaen rejects the old derivation of *Caliban* from *Cannibal*. It may be from Gipsy *kalo* = 'black' and *ban* (*ben*) = '-ness.' Cf. the epithets 'earth,' 'filth,' etc., in the Tempest. Sarrazin shows striking traces of Kyd's Spanish Tragedy in Macbeth. Macbeth was written about 1605, when Shakespeare was acting. The Spanish Tragedy had been often produced in 1603. A second note shows that about 1560 the state of affairs in the Danish court was wonderfully like the opening of Hamlet. Kölbing shows some interesting parallels between Byron and Chaucer. He remarks, too, that the grotto in Porto Venere, on the bay of Spezzia, did not inspire the Corsair, as commonly believed, but, according to Trelawney's Records of Shelley and Byron, II 86, it was the so-called Pirates' Isle, off Maina. Kluge publishes a note on the etymology of New English *proud* and *pride*, which he derives from O. F.

III.—M. Kaluza, Expanded Lines in Old English Poetry. This article purposes to reconcile, so far as possible, the already existing theories on this subject in a new theory of the author's. The existing theories are by two classes of authors: (1) Those who agree essentially in maintaining that expanded lines are only modified normal alliterative verses, scattered irregularly among the others. Such are Kaufmann, Möller-Heusler, Kögel, Fuhr, and Franck. (2) Those who hold that the expanded line is a development of the normal verse by a certain addition. The theory of each scholar is briefly reviewed, and its inadequacy or fallacy proved. Vetter considered the expansion as a suffix to the normal verse. Sievers made it a prefix, and held that the unstressed part of it might run to a length of three syllables. Luick agreed with Sievers that the verse had three stresses, but thought that expansion arose from a verse which began generally with the A-form of normal verse, and that the poet's feeling carried him into another form at the second stress. He discovers the forms AA, AC, AD, AE and CA. Such an accident would, however, be impossible in the Judith, where long lines of expanded verses are found. The Old Germanic verse-scheme of an even number of stresses must be preserved. Heusler suggests, therefore, that the increment, instead of adding a third stress, was subordinated to the two stresses of the normal verse. Cremer recognized an expanded line consisting of types A, D or E, with an anacrusis of several syllables.

Kaluza now submits the necessary exhaustive investigation of Old English poetry. As a result he finds that the expanded line is a normal line of four stresses to which is prefixed an increment containing a variable number of syllables. The number of syllables does not change the character of the line. Class A is best adapted for expansion, with 80 per cent. of first hemistichs, and 86 per cent. of second. The other classes in order are D¹ (7 per cent. to 4 per cent.), B, C, E, D². In the second hemistich the alliterative form *y/ay* predominates, where *a* is the alliterative and *y* the non-alliterative word. In the much less common *a/yy*, the alliteration was drawn to the increment by its

being a noun. This seems to show that alliteration is a comparatively late embellishment of the verse, and somewhat external to it. In the first hemistich the prevailing alliterative form is *a/ax*, where *a* is the alliterative and *x* the non-alliterative word. This analysis reveals the great flexibility of Old English verse. The quiet flow of normal verses might be broken at any moment by the more solemn or excited expansion.

The object of F. Maychrzak's elaborate study of Byron as a translator is twofold: (1) to furnish a critical treatment of Byron's translations: (2) to show their relation to his original poetry. The article falls into three parts: (1) Byron's acquaintance with foreign languages, (2) the translations and their relations to the originals, (3) the relation of the diction in his translations to his diction in general. (3) is to be treated in vol. XXII. In school Byron did not succeed with Latin, Greek, French, and German. His acquisition of a language came by 'rote and ear and memory' in its own home. Thus it was with what Spanish and Portuguese he knew. His modern Greek was begun in Albania. In Venice, in 1816, he applied himself to the study of Armenian in a cloister of Armenian monks. His knowledge and love of Italian were most important. His study of Bandello, Dante, the tragedies of Alfieri and Monti, as well as his translation, were inspired by the Countess Guiccioli. The translations are compared line for line with the originals, and separable amplifications, which generally amount to one-third or one-half the length of the actual translation, are collected at the end. In his treatment of the classics Byron merely paraphrases, though some passages, like the Anacreontics, are more literal. His Morgante Maggiore, and the Francesca da Rimini from Inferno V, are much finer work. The mournful ballad on the Siege and Conquest of Alhama is from uncertain Spanish originals.

E. Nader presents a short but interesting historical sketch of the University Extension movement, especially in England.

The Miscellanea contains a note on the name Ophelia by Sarrazin, one on Germanic legends in England by Kluge, a note on *pedigree* by Skeat, two notes of correction, a lately discovered letter of Charles Dickens, and an obituary notice by Kölbing of Julius Zupitza, who died July 6, 1895.

Ophelia, it seems, is not Greek, but Irish. It is the name of a barony invaded by Essex in 1599, the possible date of Hamlet's composition. There are evident references to Essex in the play. It is probable that Ophelia merely caught the poet's ear. Lord Burleigh may have suggested Polonius.

Julius Zupitza was born in 1844. His training at Breslau and Berlin, under Müllenhoff and Haupt, was most thorough. During his twenty-five years of teaching, he dealt with Gothic, German, Scandinavian, English, Old French, and Provençal. The first part of this time was spent in Vienna. In 1872 he visited England to do comparative work on Guy of Warwick. In 1876 he was called to Berlin as Professor of the English Language and Literature. He was most successful in rousing his students to scholarly efforts. His own great work was done in textual criticism. Appended to the notice is a complete bibliography of his publications.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

CHARLES GROSVENOR OSGOOD, JR.

RHEINISCHES MUSEUM FÜR PHILOGIE, Vol. LII, parts 1, 2.

Pp. 1-12. Der prodigiorum liber des Iulius Obsequens. O. Rossbach. The author of the liber prodigiorum was probably not a Christian, and the book may have been written in the time of Hadrian or of Antoninus Pius. Textual notes.

Pp. 13-41. Ueber den Cynegeticus des Xenophon. II (cf. vol. LI, 596-629; A. J. P. XVIII 115). L. Radermacher. The use of the word γνώμη in contrast with ὄνομα forbids us to refer the closing chapter to a later time than the others. Chapters 2-13 must be ascribed to the same author. The Cynegeticus cannot be a youthful essay of Xenophon, and it is not like his later writings: it is spurious. The sharp distinction between φιλόσοφος and σοφιστής suggests that the author was influenced by Plato. The proem was probably written by a later hand, not earlier than the third century B. C.: it is mere rhetoric.

Pp. 42-68. Die Begründung des Alexander- und Ptolemaeerkultes in Aegypten. J. Kaerst. Ptolemy Soter founded Ptolemais in Upper Egypt, and was worshipped as a god in that city. This was probably in imitation of the worship of Alexander at Alexandria. The worship of the Ptolemaic dynasty extended and developed its external ceremonial, but the consecration gradually became a simple form, and the title of 'god' a mere title.

Pp. 69-98. Die Ueberlieferung von 'Aeli Donati commentum Terentii.' P. Wessner. It is probable that all the 15th-century MSS are derived from two recensions, that of Mentz and that of Chartres. The former is the more valuable.

Pp. 99-104. Die Bukoliasten. E. Hoffmann. The various traditional accounts of the origin of pastoral poetry agree in making it the product of a people reduced to slavery by foreign invaders. The propitiatory sacrifice to Artemis took the form of a symbolic restitutio in integrum, and on that day the slaves seem to have enjoyed some such freedom of speech and action as the Roman slaves enjoyed during the Saturnalia.

Pp. 105-25. Delphische Beilagen. (S. Band LI, S. 580.) III. Die Thätigkeit der Alkmeoniden in Delphi. H. Pomtow.

Miscellen.—Pp. 126-9. O. Immisch. Vergiliana. I. The writer would transpose verses 40 and 41 of the fourth book of the Aeneid. II. The conception of the Helena taedifera of Aen. VI 518 is probably derived from Stesichorus. There may be lurking in it something of an old popular superstition. If the "fratres Helenae, lucida sidera" brought safety to the mariner, the flame of Helen, "ἑλέναυς, ἑλανόρος, ἑλέπτολις," may have indicated disaster.—Pp. 129-31. M. Ihm. Zum Carmen de bello Actiaco. The poem contains many reminiscences of Vergil and Ovid.—Pp. 131-5. M. Manitius. Handschriftliches zu Germanicus' und Ciceros Aratea.—Pp. 135-7. H. Schöne. Sechzehnsilbige Normalzeile bei Galen.—Pp. 137-40. C. Wachsmuth. Ein neues Fragment aus Lydus' Schrift de ostentis.—Pp. 140-43. C. Wachsmuth. Das Heroon des Themistokles in Magnesia am Maiandros.—P. 143. M. Ihm. Zu den graeco-syrischen Philosophensprüchen über die Seele. (Cf. vol. LI,

p. 529.) A parallel from Xen. Cyrop. V 1.—P. 144. R. Förster. Cyriacus von Ancona zu Strabon. Nachtrag zu LI, S. 490.—P. 144. R. Wunsch. Zu Band LI, S. 148.

Pp. 145–67. Studien zu Ciceros Briefen an Atticus (IX, X). O. E. Schmidt. Textual notes on forty passages.

Pp. 168–76. Zu attischen Dionysos-Festen. A. Körte. 1. *Διονύσια τὰ ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίῳ*. Dörpfeld, Das griechische Theater, p. 9, has accepted Gilbert's view that the Lenaea was the last day of the Anthesteria. It is clear from C. I. A. II 834 b that they were separate festivals. The official name in the fifth and fourth centuries was not *Ἀθναία*, but *Διονύσια τὰ ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίῳ*. This name seems to have been retained long after the place of celebration was changed. 2. Der Agon der komischen Schauspieler. The first hypothesis to Aristophanes' Peace speaks of a competition between comic actors at the 'City' Dionysia in B. C. 421. The earliest competition of this sort mentioned by the inscriptions occurred at the Lenaeon festival in B. C. 354. Possibly the first hypothesis has confounded the Peace with the other Peace which Aristophanes brought out at the Lenaea. 3. Der Kitharöde Nikokles. The inscription C. I. A. II 1367 cannot be earlier than the third century B. C. The Isthmian contest in music, in which Nicocles was the first victor, must have been introduced in the third century, not in the fourth, and the dithyramb, which was unknown to the Lenaea in the time of Demosthenes (XXI 10) and Aristotle (*Ἀθην. Πολ.* 57), was not added to this festival until the Hellenistic period.

Pp. 177–86. Anecdoton Fulgentianum. R. Helm. This is an allegorical explanation of the story of Thebes, with grotesque etymologies of the proper names, found in a 13th-century MS, Paris. 3012. The author is a Christian writer, who quotes from Vergil, Horace, Ovid, Lucan and the New Testament. It is probably the work of Fulgentius.

Pp. 187–204. Buphonien. H. von Prott. A study of the various legends as to the origin and significance of the *βομφονία*, the sacrifice of a bull to Zeus Polieus. It is possible that this represents an earlier human sacrifice. Cf. Ailianos, Hist. An. XII 34; Porphyrios, De Abst. II 55; Athenaios, X 456 C.

Pp. 205–12. Zu lateinischen Dichtern. M. Ihm. 1. *Vespae iudicium coci et pistoris iudice Vulcano*. This comic epyllion cannot be a *carmen infimae Latinitatis*. 2. Das *carmen contra Flavianum* (Cod. Paris. 8084). A list of the Vergiliana in the poem. The author seems to have made use of Petronius and of the eclogues of Nemesianus, and to have read some of the epigrams of Damasus. 3. Ein verschollenes Gedicht des Damasus? An anonymous glossary contained in Cod. Paris. Lat. 7598 (saec. XIII or XIV) refers to a poem of Damasus, "Prophetatio Nicei (*Nicaeni*?) Concilii."

Pp. 213–36. Beiträge zur Quellenkunde des Orients im Alterthum. L. Jeep. A study of the epitome of the church history of Philostorgios, III 4–11. The relation of Philostorgios to Agatharcides and Artemidoros.

Pp. 237–85. Zu den Assyriaka des Ktesias. (Cf. vol. L, pp. 205–40.) P. Krumbholz. 5. Inferences to be drawn from Justinus, Diodoros and Kephallion as to the statements of Ktesias. 6. The relation of Ktesias to earlier

historians (Herodotus, etc.) and to later writers. 7. Diodoros and Ktesias. Ktesias represents a Persian anti-Assyrian tradition.

Pp. 286-92. *Varia*. W. Kroll. Textual notes to Porphyrius, Stobaeus, Damascius, Galen.

Miscellen.—Pp. 293-4. J. Ziehen. Zwei Vermuthungen zur griechischen Kunstgeschichte. 1. The Vienna bronze statuette (Sacken, Bronzen in Wien, I 44; Dilthey, Taf. IX f.) probably represents Menelaus, not Ares or Achilles. 2. The "Alexander et Philippus in quadrigis" of Euphranor (Plin. N. H. XXXIV 77) was probably made at Alexander's command, after the death of Philip.—Pp. 294-6. O. Hirschfeld. Der Brand von Lugudunum. The burning of Lugudunum referred to by Seneca, E. M. 91, probably took place in 65 A. D. That Seneca does not directly mention the great fire at Rome in 64 may be due to the popular belief that it was caused by Nero.—P. 296. A. Wilhelm. Zum Carmen de bello Actiaco. The epithet "pars imperii," III 25, recurs in Propertius, I 6, 34.—Pp. 296-8. R. Förster. Expletur lacuna in Libanii declamatione quae inscribitur *μάγον κατηγορία*.—Pp. 298-9. R. Förster. Zur Ueberlieferung der Physiognomik des Adamantios.—Pp. 299-302. C. Heldmann. Ein neuentdecktes Priscianbruchstück. A new fragment of the Instit. Gram. (XIV 33/34), apparently written in the 8th century.—P. 302. C. Weyman. Zur Anthologia Latina Epigraphica. The 'sinergima' of Carm. Lat. Epigr. 1356, 19 B is not for *συνέργημα*. The *s* belongs to the preceding word. For 'inergima' cf. Prud. Apoth. 400 f.—Pp. 302-3. F. B. Carmen Epigraphicum. A short poem from a stone recently discovered at Cologne.—Pp. 303-4. E. Lommatzsch. Carpus. The name of Trimalchio's carver (Petron. 36) appears frequently in Latin and Greek inscriptions. The Greek name, *Κάρπος*, is derived not from *καρπός* 'fruit,' but from *καρπός* 'hand.' It is a name which denotes dexterity. There is no direct evidence of a word *carpus* in Latin, but the word *carpo* 'hand' exists in Italian; whence the word *carpone* (Körting, Latein.-roman. Wörterbuch, 1688). *Carpere* is the technical expression for 'carving' (Friedländer on Mart. III 13, 1); *Carpus*, which is formed from the same stem, corresponds to the *carptor* of Juv. IX 110. *Carpere* is for an older **scarpere*, which was retained in popular speech (Löwe, Coni. Plaut., p. 209; Stowasser, Archiv, I, p. 287; cf. Usener on *coruscus*, **scoruscus*, Rh. Mus. XLIX, p. 463). The initial *s* shows that *carpere* has nothing to do with *καρπός* 'fruit,' but belongs rather to *καρπός* 'hand.' The proper name *Scarpus* is rare, but some coins of a certain Pinarius Scarpus show the device of an open hand (Cohen, Méd. Imp. I², p. 136). We may thus assume the loss of an initial *s* from *καρπός* 'hand, wrist.'

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

WILFRED P. MUSTARD.

BRIEF MENTION.

Professor MAX SCHNEIDEWIN has presented the world with a bulky volume of 558 pp. entitled *Die antike Humanität* (Weidmann), in which he has brought together, without any attempt at literary finish, many facts and reflexions in regard to a theme of permanent and universal interest. The author does not profess to have ransacked every nook and corner of antiquity for documents, and the draughts he has drawn on Cicero, whom he sets up as the accepted type of antique 'humanity,' are so considerable that this book may be regarded as a companion-piece to the slighter performance of the same writer published in 1890, 'Die Horazische Lebensweisheit.' No wonder, then, that the work revives for the reader the charm of Cicero and Cicero's circle, which is not less real because it is exotic, which, like the charm of the winter palaces of Russia, is only heightened by the rigor of the atmosphere without. When we are with Cicero we are in good society, society that is redolent of Scipionic traditions, and it would be rude to scratch the skin of this and that Roman grandee and compare the fine Greek sentiments with the merciless downright-ness of Italian action. Doubtless Cicero, the *novus homo*, and Horace, *libertino patre natus*, were saturated with Greek 'humanity,' but the Greek must have the credit of it all, directly or indirectly, and there is evidence enough that the Hellene or Hellenist, Greek or Greekling, whichever you choose, was fully alive to the essential hardness of the Roman character and was fully aware of his own success and his own failure in the emollient process.

But there are other sides to Cicero than the Greek side, the ethical, the philosophical, the humane side. He was much more than a translator of Panaetius, though the *de Officiis* has proved itself a potent book; much more than a clever lawyer, though the French Revolution is said to have been the work of lawyers; and in an essay which takes the form of a discourse in celebration of the second millennium of Cicero's birth, Professor ZIELINSKI has produced a sketch of Cicero's influence on the ages which forms a striking contrast to the work just mentioned, both in bulk and, if it must be said, in brilliancy. With such a champion as Professor ZIELINSKI is, the friends of Cicero may well take heart, for, as one reads this masterly summary of Cicero's after-life, *Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte* (Teubner), Drumann's savagery and Mommsen's sarcasm, the bludgeon of the one and the rapier of the other, lose weight and point. The salient features are tipped with light, and the test-question, 'What thinkest thou of Cicero?', is most effectively put to the leaders of human thought and action. Cicero's immense influence on style is generally recognized after a vague fashion, though perhaps few are aware that every penny-a-liner on the daily press is swayed by his

example and his precepts; but his influence on the course of history at its critical points is a matter that only such a cross-section as ZIELINSKI has given us can bring to the consciousness. What Cicero did for Christianity, what for the Renaissance, for the Reformation, for the French Revolution,—how he affected the leaders of those great transitional periods, this is the theme of an essay which combines the rhetorical swing of the panegyrist with the sober merits of historical research. That Augustin was converted by reading Cicero is a familiar story, and no one that has once read is likely to forget the passage in Luther's Table-talk in which he extols the man who has wrought and suffered above that 'ass of leisure, Aristotle'—'weit überlegen,' he says, 'dem müssigen Esel Aristoteli'; but the influence of Cicero the humanitarian on Voltaire, of Cicero the orator on Mirabeau, of Cicero the republican statesman on the leaders of the French Revolution is not always present to the average mind. Vergniaud was the Cicero of the Gironde and denounced Robespierre in phrases borrowed from the Catilinariae, and Robespierre defended his cause and prolonged his power by a telling use of passages taken from the *Oratio pro P. Sulla*. With the close of the French Revolution ZIELINSKI bids the procession stop and contents himself with citing Taine to show the estimate in which Cicero is held by that penetrating student of history and literature, and with reinforcing in a brief summary the important lesson that with every advancing stage of culture the vision for the antique becomes wider and deeper and that the value of the antique is enhanced from stage to stage.

All who admire the scholarship, the precision, the balance of M. HENRI WEIL will be glad to have in a convenient volume the collection of his papers entitled *Études sur le drame antique* (Hachette). Nearly all these studies belong to a recent period. One, it is true, goes back to the remote date 1847, one to 1864, but of the remaining eight there is none older than 1886, and the eighth deals with the important work of M. MASQUERAY, *Les formes lyriques de la tragédie grecque*, which was published as late as 1895 and is still awaiting the notice it deserves in this Journal. It is a book which M. WEIL justly praises for the exhaustive command of the literature, its wide scope, its fine appreciation of the *ἦθος* of the lyric measures of tragedy. M. WEIL's admiration of Wilamowitz's *Herakles*, the subject of another chapter, is frankly expressed, while he preserves the independence of his judgment in details, a hard thing to do, if one yields at all to the rush of that fervid genius. Zieliński's *ἀγών* with all its minute subdivisions M. WEIL cannot bring himself to accept, but he recognizes, as some have refused to do (A. J. P. X 383), the popular element that lies at the basis of the comic debate, and compares the quarrel between tanner and sausage-seller in the Knights with the altercation of the modern carnival. "On pense," he says, "à notre carnaval: deux masques se provoquent, se criblent de lazzi; on fait cercle autour d'eux, on les encourage, on les excite, comme fait le chœur de l'antique comédie. De pareilles scènes n'étaient sans doute pas rares dans les joyeux ébats des Dionysiaques." In another article M. WEIL takes up M. Decharme's book, *Euripide et l'esprit de son théâtre*. M. Decharme is especially emphatic on the

atheism and rationalism of Euripides, and here, as elsewhere, M. WEIL has a wise word of caution. True, every scholar knows that atheism does not mean the same thing in Greek as it does in English (A. J. P. XVII 362), but it was well worth the while to say (p. 105): "Si l'on dit que le théâtre d'Euripide agit comme un dissolvant sur les vieilles fables et les croyances populaires, on dit vrai, mais on ne dit pas tout. Euripide n'a pas seulement ébranlé les opinions reçues, il a puissamment contribué à répandre une conception plus haute du divin, qui devait être celle de l'avenir." In the same paper Dörpfeld's theory of the stage comes up. M. WEIL minimizes the difference between the old view and the new, but holds after all to the raised wooden stage, and the words ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς are to him a stone of stumbling, as they have been to many philologists (A. J. P. XVIII 119). "Il faut vraiment," he says, "beaucoup de bonne volonté pour traduire [ces mots] par *près de la scène* plutôt que par *sur la scène*," and after the appearance of Dörpfeld and Reisch's book he adds: "Tout le monde ne se persuadera pas non plus que les acteurs sont appelés οἱ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς parcequ'ils sortaient de la σκηνή."

Mr. MARCHANT has added *Book VI* to the three books of *Thukydides* he has already edited, II, III, VII (Macmillan). The text is based on Hude's, but the editor shows his wonted independence in minor matters. There is a chapter of new explanations headed 'Some *Cruces*' which will be read with interest by Thukydidean scholars. An adjutant and admirer of Dr. Rutherford's, Mr. MARCHANT has learned from his master the importance of a sharp formulation of Attic usage, and his work shows advancing appreciation of syntactical phenomena. As he has referred to this Journal (XIII 259), *à propos* of the negative in c. 81, 5, it may be as well to say that I cannot see any call for 'mobility' in order to understand so simple a case as τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐχθραν μὴ ἂν βραχεῖαν γενόμενῃν. The article with the participle gives, as it often does, the impulse to the negative μὴ, and the resolution is not what Mr. MARCHANT has, ἡ οὐκ ἂν βραχεῖα γένοιτο, but ἡ μὴ ἂν βραχεῖα γένοιτο, the so-called characteristic relative (ἡ = ἥτις) taking μὴ. See A. J. P. I 54, 56, and for rel., μὴ ἂν, opt. comp. Dem. 19, 313; 20, 161; 21, 203; Plato, Phileb. 20 A; Legg. 839 A, 872 D. For a parallel use of μὴ ἂν c. partic. see Dem. 54, 40 ὁ μὴδὲν ἂν ὁμύσας, with Sandys' note. This is one of the many points that show the importance of an historical survey for the appreciation of syntactical phenomena. It was only when the participle was consciously employed as the shorthand of a hypotactic sentence that the neg. μὴ could be used with it. Pindar's ὁ μὴ συνιείς (N. 4, 31) is a distinct advance not only on Homer, but also on Hesiod, whose βοὸς . . . μὴ τετοκνίης (O. et D. 591) is under the domination of the imperative opt. εἴη.

Dr. RUTHERFORD's Introduction to his *Scholia Aristophanica* (Macmillan) is a prolonged growl over the uncongenial work that has cost the leisure of no less than seven years. Αἰάζω Διότιμον. The subject-matter of the scholia of the Codex Ravennas, he says, would not have tempted him to edit them. In

fact, "the direct value of any corpus of scholia as a commentary upon the text to which it belongs is in no degree commensurate with its indirect value as evidence, on the one hand, of the manner in which classical texts have been manipulated at different periods in the history of learning, and, on the other hand, of the kind of corruption and interpolation to which they have been exposed." We know the note from the Introduction to his Fourth Book of Thukydides. Still, a man might be worse employed than in laboring over the Greek scholia. It is higher work than the preparation of an index, and the preparation of an index is better than making canons of Greek usage on the basis of imperfect induction. It is something to have to one's credit two such stately volumes as these. The third volume is still due, the volume that is to contain Dr. Rutherford's conclusions, drawn from his seven years' study of the scholia; and while we are grateful for all that these two volumes hold, it is the third volume in which we shall behold the flower of the Scottish thistle.

The most striking characteristic of Professor TYRRELL's edition of the *Troades* (Macmillan) is the sympathetic discernment with which he has brought out the poetic vein of Euripides. In so doing he has made free use of translation—now an apt rendering of his own, now an extract from Mr. Way's brilliant version. The book is meant for boys, and, as Professor TYRRELL justly remarks, 'a boy should not be encouraged to think that the Greek poets were bald and frigid.' How soon the attention of the student should be called to the dissonances of Euripidean style, designed or not, is another matter. Dr. Verrall's 'Euripides the Rationalist' would not be a good book to put in the hands of a beginner in Euripides, and the young student would be rather puzzled than edified by a demonstration of the contrarieties of the diction and the syntax of Euripides, the matching of cloth of gold with cloth of frize. The metres are not neglected, as in so many English editions, but it is to be regretted that Professor Jebb's example has not been followed and that Schmidt's schemes have not been reproduced. It seems rather late in the day to cite Dr. Kennedy's views in the matter of Greek metres.

Dr. SANDYS' edition of the *First Philippic and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes* (Macmillan) is marked by his unfailing adequacy. Every side of his author is treated with sound judgment, excellent taste and rare command of the literature. The proof-reading is good. An odd mistake occurs p. 36, §25 (critical note), where read 'μω locus est infinitivo supra §12, Bl.' By the way, if Blass means to differentiate between participle and inf. in the two passages, he sees too much. §12 reads: τί τὸ κωλύον ἐτ' αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται; §25: τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζοντα; As βαδίζοντα is conditional, = ἐὰν βαδίζῃ, the difference is naught. In conditional relations inf. and part. often meet. αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἀντιλέγων (X. Mem. 2, 6, 37) = εἰ ἀντιλέγοιμι = ἀντιλέγειν. See Hertlein (1853) on X. Cyr. 3, 2, 16.

An esteemed correspondent sends to the Journal the following note on FÜGNER'S *Lexicon Livianum, Fasciculus III, s. v. ad, cum gerundio vel gerundivo*, which seems to belong to the black list of *Brief Mention*:

"The following incorrect references have been noticed: 28, 9, 1 for 28, 29, 1, p. 432, 8; 44, 19, 4 for 41, 19, 4, p. 441, 1; 10, 55, 4 for 10, 35, 4, p. 447, 16; 25, 35, 4 for 25, 36, 4, p. 448, 24; 31, 47, 2 for 31, 46, 2, p. 448, 38; 23, 34, 9 for 29, 34, 9, p. 457, 23. In a few instances the Lex. fails as a guide for the Weissenborn ed.: 4, 11, 5 triumviri ad coloniam Ardeam deducendam is not given p. 428, 2 (creo), nor p. 457, 40 (triumviri). 40, 24, 5 ad quod celebrandum is not given p. 434, 39. 42, 10, 8 ad quam pestem frugum tollendam . . . missus, ingenti agmine hominum ad colligendas eas coacto. The first gerundive is not given s. v. *mitto*; the second is not given p. 426, 19, where is given 9, 21, 3 magno exercitu coacto ad eximendos obsidione socios."

Brief Mention has received the following note from Dr. J. KEELHOFF, of Antwerp: "Sur l'expression *εἰ μὴ διὰ* cf. Rost, Griech. Gram., 7te Aufl., p. 641, note: 'Zu ergänzen (Plat. Gorg. 516 E) οὐκ ἐνέπεσεν, also der reine Gegensatz des im Hauptsatz enthaltenen Praedikates, wie *immer bei dieser Wendung*.' Votre explication [A. J. P. X 124, XVI 396, XVII 128] se rencontre donc avec celle de Rost, ce qui augmente encore les chances de probabilité. On trouve de bien bonnes choses dans cette syntaxe qu'on ne consulte plus guère." To my mind the explanation is so evident that it only needs to be stated, and I am not surprised that so sensible a grammarian as Rost was had reached the same formula, which, however, does not occur in the earlier editions, to which alone I had access.

NECROLOGY.

The double blow that has fallen on Harvard University in the last few weeks will be felt throughout the scholarly world, will be felt with peculiar poignancy by those who were privileged to know personally the two masters whose names are henceforth to be a memory. The forces they set in motion will never die, but their living presence is to inspire and to guide us no more. The thirtieth of June closed the career of America's greatest Latinist, **GEORGE MARTIN LANE**. The end was not unexpected, yet when it came, it came with a sudden pang to those who had watched the bulletins of his failing health. It seemed a hard fate that he was not to bestow on the world with his own hands the summary of his long life of keen observation, of loving study. And yet to those who can sympathize with the temper of the man, who understand as he did the inexorableness of the ideal, his life as a rebuke to pretentious ignorance, to hasty performance, to rash generalization, has served a high purpose. The best text-books must pass away, but the lessons of a great teacher become incarnate in generations of living men. **LANE** faded out of life. Five short weeks afterwards, Aug. 4, his dear friend, **FREDERIC DE FOREST ALLEN**, fell without warning, struck down in a moment, snatched rudely from the midst of an active career, at an age when the intellectual faculties are in their happiest balance and most successful play. Born to a time when American classical scholarship was ripe for advanced work along the whole line, **ALLEN** had taken his place at once among the leaders in university study, and what he wrought for his wide domain as teacher and as author showed the mind and the will of a true master. There is no space in this number of the *Journal* to set forth the work and the character of these departed scholars. In the next issue a more fitting tribute will be paid to their great services. Standing, as I do, between the two in years, the one who was intimately associated with my own student life in the dear Göttingen days, the other for whom I foresaw the accomplishment of ever greater work for classical philology in its widest, highest, noblest sense, I look backward and forward with a sense of bereavement which all the teaching of old experience will not school into resignation.

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Thanks are due to Messrs. Lemcke & Buechner, 812 Broadway, New York City, for material furnished.

AMERICAN.

Cicero (Marcus Tullius). The Correspondence of; arranged according to its chronological order; with a revision of the text, a commentary, and introductory essays, by Rob. Yelverton Tyrrell and L. Claude Purser. In 7 v. V. 5. (Dublin University Press Series.) New York, *Longmans, Green & Co.*, 1897. 75 + 422 pp. 8vo, cl., net \$4.

— The Fourth Verrine; ed. for schools by F. W. Hall. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 60 + 187 pp. 16mo, cl., net 90 cts.

Collar (W. C.) Via Latina. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. c. 6 + 203 pp. Map, 12mo, cl., 85 cts.

Comba (T. E.) Compendium of Italian Pronunciation. New York, *Truslove & Comba* [1897]. 2 + 47 pp. Sq. 12mo, cl., 75 cts.

Hall (J. R. Clark). A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. New cheaper ed. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 369 pp. 4to, cl., reduced to net \$1.75.

Jackson (E. Hilton). Law Latin. Washington, D. C., *J. Byrne & Co.*, 1897. c. 14 + 219 pp. 12mo, shp., \$2.

Thucydides. Book 6; ed. by E. C. Marchant. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 54 + 299 pp. 16mo, cl., net \$1.10.

Xenophon. The Fifth Book of Xenophon's Anabasis; ed. by Alfred G. Rolfe. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. c. 5 + 115 pp. Map, 16mo, cl., 45 cts.

ENGLISH.

Barrère (A.) and Leland (C. G.) Dictionary of Slang, Jargon and Cant. 2 vols. London, 1897. 8vo, 950 pp. 15s.

Evans (D. L.) Welsh Dictionary. Geiriadur Cymraeg. Pt. 4. D-Dd. London, 1897. 8vo, 564 pp. S. 1893, Nr. 1062. 14s.

Kohut (G. A.) Semitic Studies in Memory of A. Kohut. London, 1897. 8vo. £1 4s.

MacCauley (C.) Japanese. An Introductory Course. London, 1897. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Morfill (W. R.) A Short Grammar of the Bulgarian Language. London, 1897. 8vo. 5s.

Murray (J. A. H.) A New English Dictionary. Vol. III. Distrustfully-Doom. Vol. IV. Flexuosity-Foister. London, 1897. 4to. 2s. 6d.

Northall (G. F.) A Warwickshire Word-book. London, 1897. 8vo, 300 pp. 15s.

Papyri, Greek. Series II. New classical fragments and other Greek and Latin papyri. Edited by B. F. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt. London, 1897. 4to. 12s. 6d.

Pegge (S.) Two Collections of Words and Phrases peculiar to the Natives and Inhabitants of the County of Derby. London, 1897. 8vo, 162 pp. 12s. 6d.

Petrie Papyri. The Hieratic Papyri from Kahun and Gurob. Edited by F. L. Griffith. Autotypes, Kahun, plates 1-37, Gurob, plates 38-40. Part I. London, 1897. 4to, 18 pp. Compl., £2 12s. 6d.

Temple (G.) Glossary of Indian Terms relating to Religion, Customs, Government, Land, etc. London, 1897. 8vo, 332 pp. 7s. 6d.

Thimm (C. A.) Egyptian Self-Taught (Arabic). London, 1897. 8vo, 71 pp. 2s.

Wyatt (A. J.) An Elementary Old English Grammar (Early West Saxon). London, 1897. 8vo, 170 pp. 4s. 6d.

FRENCH.

Harlez (de). Le Yi-King, traduit d'après les interprètes chinois avec la version Mandchoue. In-8. *E. Leroux*. 7 fr. 50.

Henry (V.) La relation locative dans les langues italiennes. In-8. *Maisonneuve*. 1 fr. 50.

Houdas (O.) Précis de grammaire arabe. In-8. *J. André et Cie*. 6 fr.

Lexique de la langue de Molière. T. III et dernier. In-8. *H. Welter*. Les 3 vol., 45 fr.

McCarthy (R. P. Laurent). Capucins. Grammaire Hindoustani-française. In-8. 1 vol. Bruxelles, *Société belge de Librairie*. 4 fr. 50.

Meillet (A.) Recherches sur l'emploi du génitif accusatif en vieux slave. Gr. in-8. 1 vol. *E. Bouillon*. 6 fr.

Nouveau Larousse illustré. Dictionnaire encyclopédique universel en six volumes. In-4. *Hollier-Larousse et Cie*. Prix de souscription, 150 fr.

Passy (J.) et Rambeau (A.) Chrestomathie française. In-8. *H. Le Soudier*. 5 fr.

Rousselot (Abbé). Principes de phonétique expérimentale. 1re partie, avec fig. In-8. *H. Welter*. 15 fr. en souscrivant.

GERMAN.

Aristophanis equites, recensuit Adph. v. Velsen. Ed. II, quam curavit Konr. Zacher. gr. 8. xxii, 109 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 3.

Beiträge, Berliner, zur germanischen u. romanischen Philologie. Veröffentlich. v. Emil Ebering. XIII. Romanische Abtlg. Nr. 7. gr. 8. B., *E. Ebering*.—7. Schayer (Siegb.) Zur Lehre vom Gebrauch des unbestimmten Artikels u. des Teilungsartikels im Altfranzösischen u. im Neuf Französischen. viii, 152 S. m. 4.

— Münchner, zur romanischen u. englischen Philologie. Hrsg. v. H. Breymann u. J. Schick. XII. Hft. gr. 8. L., *A. Deichert Nachf.* m. 2.80. —XII. Klein (Frdr.) Der Chor in den wichtigsten Tragödien der französischen Renaissance. xx, 144 S. m. 2.80.

Bibliothek, assyriologische, hrsg. v. Frdr. Delitzsch u. Paul Haupt. XIII. Bd. 2. Hft. gr. 4. L., *J. C. Hinrichs' Verl.*—2. Craig (James A.) Assyrian and Babylonian Religious Texts, etc. Vol. II. With corrections to vol. I. xi S. u. 21 Bl. m. 7.

— romanische, hrsg. v. Wendelin Foerster. XIV. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*.—XIV. Estoria, La, de los quatro doctores de la santa eglefia. Hrsg. v. Frdr. Lauchert. xiv, 443 S. m. 12.

Brock (Arth.) Quaestionum grammaticarum capita duo. gr. 8. 184 S. Jurievi (Dorpati). L., *K. F. Koehler Sort.* m. 3.

Brugmann (Karl) u. Delbrück (Berthold). Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen. 1. Bd. Einleitung u. Lautlehre. 1. Hälfte. Von Karl Brugmann. 2. Bearbeitg. 1. Bd. Einleitung u. Lautlehre. 1. Hälfte (§1 bis 694). gr. 8. xlvii, 622 S. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 16.

— — 4. Bd. Vergleichende Syntax der indogerman. Sprachen v. B. Delbrück. 2. Thl. gr. 8. xvii, 560 S. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 15.

Callimachi hymni et epigrammata. Iterum ed. Udalr. de Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. 8. 66 S. B., *Weidmann.* m. —80.

Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca. Edita consilio et auctoritate academiae litterarum regiae borussicae. Vol. XIV, pars 2. gr. 8. B., *G. Reimer*.—XIV 2. Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis libros de generatione et corruptione commentaria. Ed. Hieron. Vitelli. x, 356 S. m. 14.

— Vol. XV. gr. 8.—XV. Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria. Edidit Mich. Hayduck. xix, 670 S. m. 27.

Corpus inscriptionum graecarum Graeciae septentrionalis. Vol. III. Fasc. I. Fol. B., *G. Reimer*. Kart.—III 1. Inscriptiones graecae Phocidis, Locridis, Aetoliae, Acarnaniae, insularum maris Ionii. Ed. Guil. Dittenberger. vii, 212 S. m. 22.50.

Deussen (Paul). Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda. gr. 8. xxvi, 920 S. L., *F. A. Brockhaus.* m. 20.

Dörwald (Paul). Die Formenbildungsgesetze des Hebräischen. gr. 8. vii, 123 S. B., *Mayer & Müller.* m. 2.40.

Eranos. Acta philologica suecana. Ed. Vilelm. Lundström. Vol. II. 1897. 4 fascc. gr. 8. 1. fasc. 48 S. Upsaliae. Leipzig, *O. Harrassowitz in Komm.* m. 6.

Gassner (Armin.) Das altspanische Verbum. gr. 8. viii, 208 S. Halle, *M. Niemeyer.* m. 5.

Gröber (Gust.) Grundriss der romanischen Philologie. II. Bd. 3. Abtlg. 2. Lfg. gr. 8. S. 129–256. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 2.

Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde. Hrsg. v. Geo. Bühler. III. Bd. 1. Hft. A. u. 2. Hft. gr. 8. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.*—III 1. Macdonell (A. A.) Vedic Mythology. 176 S. m. 9.—2. Hillebrandt (Alfr.) Ritual-Litteratur. Vedische Opfer u. Zauber. 189 S. m. 9.50.

Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft, hrsg. v. Iwan v. Müller. III. Bd. 3. Abtlg. 1. Hälfte. gr. 8. München, *C. H. Beck.*—

III 3, 1. Jung (Jul.) Grundriss der Geographie v. Italien u. dem Orbis romanus. 2. Aufl. Mit alphabet. Register. viii, 178 S. m. 3.50.

Heusler (Andr.) Zwei Isländer-Geschichten, die Hønsna-póres u. die Bandamanna saga, m. Einleitg. u. Glossar hrsg. gr. 8. iv, lxii, 164 S. B., *Weidmann*. m. 4.50.

Homeri Odysseae carmina cum apparatu critico ediderunt J. van Leeuwen J. F. et M. B. Mendes da Costa. Ed. II. Accedunt tabulae III. Pars I. Carm. I–XII. gr. 8. xxvii, 292 S. Leiden, *A. W. Sijthoff*. m. 3.

Jacobi (Herm.) Compositum u. Nebensatz. Studien üb. die indogerman. Sprachentwicklg. gr. 8. x, 127 S. Bonn, *F. Cohen*. m. 3.

Koschwitz (Ed.) Anleitung zum Studium der französischen Philologie. gr. 8. viii, 148 S. Marburg, *N. G. Elwert's Verl.* m. 2.50.

Lamer (Joa.) De choriambicis Graecorum poetarum versibus. Diss. gr. 8. 142 S. L., *E. Gräfe*. m. 2.

Lexer (Matthias). Mittelhochdeutsches Taschenwörterbuch. 5. Aufl. 8. vii, 413 S. L., *S. Hirzel*. m. 5.

Litteraturdenkmäler, lateinische, des XV. u. XVI. Jahrh. Hrsg. v. Max Herrmann. 13. 8. B., *Weidmann*.—13. Macropedius (van Langveldt) (Georgius). Rebelles u. Aluta. Hrsg. v. Johs. Bolte. xlii, 104 S. m. 3.

Martin (E.) u. Lienhart (H.) Wörterbuch der elsässischen Mundarten. Im Auftrage der Landesverwaltg. v. Elsass-Lothringen. (In ca. 6 Lfgn.) 1. Lfg. gr. 8. xvi, 160 S. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 4.

Neue (Frdr.) Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache. 3. Bd. Das Verbum. 3. Aufl. v. C. Wagener. 10. u. 11. (Schluss-)Lfg. gr. 8. ii u. S. 577–664. B., *S. Calvary & Co.* Subskr.-Pr., m. 2.40; 3. Bd. kplt., m. 21.

Parmenides' Lehrgedicht. Griechisch u. deutsch v. Herm. Diels. Mit e. Anh. üb. griech. Thüren u. Schlösser. gr. 8. 164 S. m. 49 Fig. B., *G. Reimer*. m. 5.

Pedersen (Holger). Aspirationen i Irsk, en sproghistorisk undersøgelse. 1. del. Med et tillæg: Thesen til den indoeuropæisk sproghistorie. gr. 8. viii, 200 S. L., *M. Spirgatis*. m. 4.50.

Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, edd. Leop. Cohn et Paul. Wendland. Vol. II. Edidit Paul. Wendland. gr. 8. xxxiv, 315 S. B., *G. Reimer*. m. 9.

— Ed. minor. Vol. II. Recognovit W. 8. xiii, 306 S. Berlin, *G. Reimer*. m. 2.

Rerum normannicarum fontes arabici, edidit Alex. Seippel. Fasc. I, textum continens. Progr. gr. 4. 148 S. m. 4 farb. Karten. Christiania, *Universitäts-Bibliothek*. m. 22.20.

Simon (Joh. Adph.) Exoterische Studien zur antiken Poesie. 1. Tl. Zur Anordng. der Oden, Epoden u. Satiren des Horaz. Lex.-8. iv, 80 S. Köln, *Kölner Verlags-Anstalt u. Druckerei*. m. 2.

Studien, romanische, veröffentl. v. Emil Ebering. 1. u. 2. Hft. B., *E. Ebering*.—1. Pillet (Alfr.) Die neuprovenzalischen Sprichwörter der jüngeren Cheltenhamer Liederhandschrift. gr. 8. 131 S. m. 3.60.—2. Erdmannsdörffer (E.) Reimwörterbuch der Trobadors. 8. vii, 199 S. m. 5.

Testamenti, Veteris, prophetarum interpretatio istro-croatica saeculi XVI.

Ed. V. Jagić. Lex.-8. vii, 316 S. Wien, *A. Holzhausen. B., Weidmann.* m. 10.

Trombetti (Alfredo). Indogermanische u. semitische Forschungen. gr. 8. vii, 78 S. Bologna, *Fratelli Treves.* m. 3.20.

Winckler (Hugo). Altorientalische Forschungen. V. Zur babylonisch-assyr. Geschichte. Zur phönicisch-karthag. Geschichte. Zur Geschichte des alten Arabien. gr. 8. iii u. S. 371-468. L., *E. Pfeiffer.* m. 6.

Zupitza (Jul.) Alt- u. mittelenglisches Uebungsbuch, m. e. Wörterbuche. 5. Aufl. v. J. Schipper. gr. 8. viii, 311 S. Wien, *W. Braumüller.* m. 6; geb. in Leinw., m. 6.40.

ITALIAN.

Angiolini (Francesco). Vocabolario milanese-italiano. Torino. 8vo, 1091 pp. L. 6.50.

Borsari (L.) Topografia di Roma antica. Milano, 1897. 16mo, 442 pp. Con 7 tav. L. 4.50.

Caruselli (G.) Sulle origini dei popoli italici. I. Italianismi della lingua greca. Palermo. 16mo. L. 1.

Decia (G.) Florilegio greco. Parte II-III. 2a impressione. Firenze. 16mo, pp. 275-797. L. 3.

De Sanctis (Fr.) La letteratura italiana nel secolo XIX. Napoli. 16mo, 619 pp. L. 5.

Librandi (V.) Grammatica albanese. Milano, *Man. Hoepli.* 16mo, 214 pp. L. 3.

Monaci (Ernesto). Crestomazia italiana dei primi secoli. Città di Castello. 8vo. Fasc. II. L. 10.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Anderson (Jessie M.) *A Study of English Words.* New York, etc., *American Book Co.*, 1897. 40 cts.

Andocides. *The Oration De Mysteriis.* Transl. by a committee of the Philomathean Society of the University of Pennsylvania. *Printed for the Society*, 1896.

Beatty (Arthur). *Browning's Verse-form: Its Organic Character.* (Columbia Diss.) New York, 1897.

Bréal (Michel). *Essai de Sémantique.* Paris, *Hachette et Cie.*, 1897. 7 fr. 50.

Brugmann (K.) *Beiträge zur Wortforschung im Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen.* Sonderabdr. a. d. Berichten der Königl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften. Sitzung vom 6. Febr. 1897.

— u. Delbrück (B.) *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen.* Erster Band. Einleitung u. Lautlehre v. Karl Brugmann. Erste Hälfte. (§1–694.) Zweite Bearbeitung. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner*, 1897. 16 m.

Ciceronis (M. T.) *Cato Maior de Senectute*, with notes by Charles E. Bennett. Boston, *Leach, Shewell & Sanborn*, 1897. 60 cts.

Dictionnaire général de la langue française, par MM. Hatzfeld, Darmesteter, Thomas. Fascicule 21. Paris, *Delagrave*.

Dion Chrysostom. *The Hunters of Euboea.* Ed. by W. K. Prentice. Boston, *Allyn & Bacon*, 1897.

Dittmar (Armin). *Studien zur lateinischen Moduslehre.* Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1897. 8 m.

Dottin (Georges). *Les désinences verbales en r en sanskrit, en italique et en celtique.* Rennes, *Plihon et Hervé*, 1896.

Educational Review. Ed. by N. M. Butler. June, 1897. New York, *Henry Holt & Co.* \$3 per annum.

Elter (Ant.) *De gnomologiorum graecorum historia et origine.* Bonn, 1897.

Freytag (Gustav). *Die Journalisten.* Edited for school use by J. Norton Johnson. New York, *American Book Co.*, 1897. 35 cts.

Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft herausg. von Dr. Iwan von Müller. Band V. Zweite Abteilung: Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte. Von Dr. O. Gruppe. Erste Hälfte. München, *Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung*, 1897. 7 m.

Hanssen (Federico). *Miscelánea de versificación castellana.* (*Anales de la Universidad de Febrero.*) Santiago de Chile, *Imprenta Cervantes*, 1897.

Hempl (George). *German Orthography and Phonology.* Part First. Boston and London, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. \$2.10.

Hill (G. F.) Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1897.

Huizinga (J.) Die Vidûsaka in het indisch toonell. (Proefschrift.) Groningen, *P. Noordhoff*, 1897.

Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 18, second half. New Haven, 1897.

Jung (Julius). Grundriss der Geographie von Italien u. dem Orbis Romanus. 2te umgearb. u. vermehrte Aufl. (Handbuch der klass. Altertumswissenschaft herausg. von I. v. Müller. Dritter Bd. 3. Abt. 1. Hälfte.) München, *Oskar Beck*, 1897. 3 m. 50 pf.

Kuhns (L. Oscar). The Treatment of Nature in Dante's Divina Commedia. New York and London, *Edwin Arnold*, 1897. \$1.50.

Macdonell (A.) Vedic Mythology. (Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde. III. Bd. 1. Heft. A.) Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner*, 1897. 9 m. Subscript., 6.50.

Merrill (Elmer T.) Fragments of Roman Satire from Ennius to Apuleius. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, *American Book Co.* 75 cts.

Mooney (W. D.) A Brief Latin Grammar. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, *American Book Co.*, 1897. 75 cts.

Muret-Sanders. Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der englischen u. deutschen Sprache. Teil II (Deutsch-Englisch.) Lfg. 2: Anbau-anprägen. Berlin, *Langenscheidtsche Verlagsbuchhandlung*. New York, *The International News Co.* 24 Lfgen. à 1 m. 50 pf.

Neue (Friedrich). Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache. Dritter Band. 3te Aufl. von C. Wagener. 10te u. 11te Lief. Berlin, *Calvary & Co.*, 1897. 2.40 m.

A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles. Edited by James A. H. Murray. Doom-Dziggetai. (Vol. III.) Oxford, *Clarendon Press*. 5s.

Rambeau (A.) et Passy (J.) Chrestomathie française avec prononciation figurée. New York, *Henry Holt et Cie.*, 1897.

Ramsay (W. M.) Impressions of Turkey during Twelve Years' Wanderings. New York, *G. P. Putnam's Sons*. London, *Hodder & Stoughton*, 1897.

Schmid (Wilhelm). Der Atticismus. Registerband. Stuttgart, *W. Kohlhammer*, 1897. 6 m.

Spencer (Frederic). Chapters on the Aims and Practice of Teaching. Edited by F. S. Cambridge, *University Press*. New York, *Macmillan & Co.* \$1.75.

Talmud, Babylonian, New edition of. By Michael L. Rodkinson. Vol. IV. New York, *New Talmud Publishing Co.*

Thucydides. Book VI. Edited by E. C. Marchant. London, *Macmillan & Co.*, 1897.

Toepffer (Johannes). Beiträge zur griech. Altertumswissenschaft. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897. 10 m.

Williams (Ralph Olmsted). Some Questions of Good English. *Henry Holt & Co.*, 1897.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. XVIII, 3.

WHOLE No. 71.

I.—THE ETHICS AND AMENITIES OF GREEK HISTORIOGRAPHY.¹

The great Bishop of the fourth century, the Christian Herodotus, "making it his object to show that heathen lore was generally false and foolish," quotes first from Clement of Alexandria proofs that Greek literature was full of plagiarism (*Praepar. Evang.* X 2). He then more gladly draws his proofs from Porphyry, the great antagonist of Christianity in the third century. Porphyry describes a symposium to commemorate the name of Plato, held in Athens at the home of his master, the great Platonist, Longinus. The literary chat at this symposium may well give us the best Athenian opinion of the third century of our era. As the symposium advances a lover of Ephorus and a lover of Theopompus get by the ears in advocacy of their favorite historians. The heated debate proves that both Ephorus and Theopompus were wholesale thieves, Theopompus particularly. He stole a good story about Pythagoras from Andron of Ephesus, merely changing name and place. He stole large material from Xenophon's *Hellenica*, changing only for the worse. "Yes," said Apollonius the grammarian, and he surely knew, "Ephorus and Theopompus, being lazy men, stole as a matter of course. But catalogues have been made of the thefts of such men as Sophocles and Menander. Hyperides stole from Demosthenes, Hellanicus took chapters of barbarian customs from Herodotus, as Herodotus had taken much from Hecataeus

¹ President's Address at the 28th annual session of the Am. Phil. Ass., Bryn Mawr, Pa., July 6, 1897.

with trifling changes. Hesiod's primal testimony—'Nothing better than a good woman, nothing worse than a bad one,' is stolen by Simonides and Euripides. Nay," said Apollonius, "there is a library of writers on literary theft—" a library of *klopedias*, "that I may not be found out to be a thief myself on theft. There is Lysimachus—two books on the thievery of Ephorus, Polio—a book on the thievery of Herodotus," etc.

Then up spake the banqueter Prosenes, "Ye have shown all the rest to be thieves," said he, "but I declare that even the divine Plato himself, whose memory we honor in this banquet, made great use of his predecessors, not to call it thievery." "What sayest thou!" cried one aghast. "I not only say," replied the sacrilegious Prosenes, "but I can prove what I say, though Plato's predecessors wrote few books." And he does so by many instances.

To a company of Platonists, then, gathered at a banquet in Athens towards the middle of the third century of our era, the most salient feature of Greek literature in general, and of Greek historiography in particular, was its *klepticism*. And this opinion of Athenians of the third century is urged by Christian writers of the fourth century in their crusade against pagan literature as such.

Lucian will represent for us the opinion of a versatile and gifted cosmopolitan Greek of the second century. His criticisms apply mainly, it is true, to the historiography of his day. But his historians are Greek, with Greek models and literary inheritances. And Lucian's attitude toward the great models of his victims is seen incidentally. He brings very serious charges against the historians of his own day (*Quomodo Hist. Conscr. passim*).

First, servile flattery of generals and leaders, encomium instead of history, whereas—and here sounds the oft-recurring Thucydidean tone in Lucian—posterity should be the approvers of a historical work, not contemporaries.

Second, poetical instead of prose canons; one law, viz. the pleasure of the author and his audience, and in obedience to this law every species of poetical embellishment; epic invocations to muses; such dangerous Homeric comparisons as that of the Roman general to Achilles, and his Parthian antagonist to Ther-sites; tedious epic descriptions.

Third, self-praise, exaltation of the historian's native city, and of his opportunities as a historian.

Fourth, indiscriminate appropriation of the successful compo-

sitions of predecessors; Herodotean and Thucydidean *exordia*; the funeral oration of Pericles adapted to a new funeral.

Fifth, invention of extravagant exploits; false statistics of armies engaged and of losses in battle, altogether regardless of official reports.

Plagiarism and falsehood, then, are prominent in Lucian's charges against the historians of his day. Theopompus he calls a general vilifier, Ctesias a general liar. Ctesias is blamed, however, not for lying, but for supposing that people would not know that he was lying (*Vera Hist.* 4).

Josephus, the learned Hebrew warrior, statesman and historian of the first century, whom Jerome calls the Greek Livy, whom we may call the Hebrew Polybius—Josephus had occasion to review critically the historiography of the Greeks (*Contra Apion.*). Their lack of agreement on the same subject is what he specially emphasizes, and the acrimonious correction of each by his successor. Hesiod is accused of falsehood and corrected by Acusilaus, he says, Acusilaus by Hellanicus. Then Ephorus shows that Hellanicus lies in most that he says, Ephorus in turn is attacked and corrected by Timaeus, Timaeus by his successors, and Herodotus by everybody. Not plagiarism or *klepticism*, then, is the burden of the arraignment which Josephus makes of the Greek historians, but falsehood. They are not only κλέπται, but ψεύσται, and Herodotus is the arch-liar. The *Atthides*, Josephus says, all differ from each other, so do the Argolic annals, and the histories called κτίσεις. Above all, in the histories of the Persian wars the most famous historians are widely at variance. Even Thucydides, he says, is accused by many of lying.

This sweeping charge of Josephus is only an echo of charges made by the Greeks themselves. Strabo complains (p. 341) that the ancient writers, like Hecataeus, "say much that is false," because they were reared on falsehood in their mythography. Therefore they do not agree with one another on the same theme. This is significant from a man who regarded Homer as an epitome of all knowledge. But we find no better agreement among the later writers whom Strabo uses. They not only do not agree with one another, but each in turn accuses his predecessor of falsehood. Starting with Timaeus, the arch-censor, Timaeus-Epitimaeus,—Timaeus says that the greatest fault in history, by which he means the Greek historians, is want of truth. And he accordingly advises all whom he has convicted

of making false statements in their writings, to find some other name for their books, and to call them anything they like except history (Polyb. XII 12). Now Timaeus convicted all his predecessors of falsehood, to say nothing of other faults, and seems to have spared no contemporary. "He makes such a parade of minute accuracy," says Polybius, "and inveighs so bitterly when refuting others, that people come to imagine that all other historians have been mere dreamers, and have spoken at random in describing the world" (Polyb. XII 26, Shuckburgh's translation). But this arch-censor found his own censor, judge and executioner, all in one. What historical sin is not charged upon Timaeus in that fearful book which Polybius devotes especially to him? Malevolent, deliberate falsehood; mendacious omissions; coarse, partisan abuse; simulated veracity; manufactured evidence; childish ignorance; neglect of personal inquiry; incomplete study of his subjects; great professions and scant performance. He is inaccurate and untrustworthy even when reporting the evidence of his own eyes; he is ill-informed and easily misled about localities where he was born and bred; he is uncritical, undignified, swayed by personal jealousies and animosities; he is a carping, false, impudent, unphilosophical, paradoxical, obstinate, vituperative word-juggler.

Polybius may have found a severe judge in his successor, Posidonius, and Posidonius in Strabo. Plutarch may say of Duris of Samos (Pericles, 28) that he lied even when he had no conceivable motive for lying, and much more when he had personal grievances. But surely the grand climax in the critical depreciation of a predecessor is reached in this twelfth book of Polybius. All else of this nature in the long line of further historical transmission has the diminishing intensity of a dramatic *exodos*.

It is the culmination of a long practice, so long as to have become a literary tradition. To the Hesiodic poet, the Homeric poet is a liar. He sings of what never was. Didactic poetry must teach men the truth. But the truth is just what Acusilaus and the earliest logographers miss in Hesiod and didactic poetry. They will therefore tell the truth in prose. But their effort seems to have been vain, for Hecataeus begins his genealogies with a scornful reference to their lack of veracity. "These things I write, as I think them to be true. For the stories of the Hellenes are many and ridiculous." By "the Hellenes" he means Acusilaus particularly, his predecessor and main source, a literary

mannerism which can be traced from Hecataeus through Herodotus to Pausanias.

But Hecataeus in his turn is found ridiculous by his great successor, Herodotus, for whom he served as an important source. How the Father of History makes merry at the expense of the Father of Chartography, and of his absurd theory of ocean currents! "It makes me laugh," he says (IV 36), "to see so many people drawing maps of the world, and not a man of them describing it sensibly. They draw Oceanus flowing round the earth, which is a perfect circle, and they make Asia and Europe of the same size." It is well that Herodotus had his laugh before his successors took hold of him. For everybody corrects and ridicules Herodotus, as Josephus says, and "everybody," for us, includes Professor Sayce.

And who does not know the magnificent scorn which Thucydides has for Herodotus? The great trait of the *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεὶ* should be its truth, even though it lacked the charm of the mythic falsehood. But neither Thucydides, the father of what the modern world calls history, who invented the art of determining from what is handed down what really was, nor his great contemporary Hellanicus, the founder of scientific chronology, escape the charge of falsehood from their successors, Ephorus and Theopompus, who, in their turn, as we have seen, come under the sweeping censures of Timaeus-Epitimaeus. And of him Polybius says (XII 25), "Those who are most ready at finding fault with others are most prone to error in their own life." This general principle may safely be applied to the long line of celebrities in Greek historiography, especially since we find Polybius sharply criticising Fabius Pictor, Philinus and Phylarchus for the very defects which are most conspicuous in himself.

To the early Christian scholars, then, to the cosmopolitan Lucian, to Josephus, Greek historians are thieves and liars, and the successive Greek historians themselves have this same opinion of their predecessors. On the ethical side, therefore, Greek historiography, judging from the opinions of those who knew it best, left much to be desired. The studies of our own later times lengthen this list of its ethical shortcomings, and find in it, besides, a surprising lack of the fine amenities which characterize modern historical transmission, even when it is polemical or controversial.

This constant depreciation, this contempt for a predecessor, is always most pronounced when that predecessor is most generously

utilized. Hecataeus treated with bold and harsh scepticism the oral and literary tradition on which he based his genealogies. Herodotus could hardly have written his second and fourth books had it not been for the pioneer work of Hecataeus, and yet he mentions Hecataeus only once by name, and that to mock at his aristocratic lineage. He refers to him often by vague plurals or gentile adjectives, but then only to correct, complete, or ridicule. The note of obligation is never sounded. The tone of contemptuous superiority is never absent.

So Thucydides makes his stately introduction a labored depreciation of the great work of Herodotus, by which, more than by anything else, his survey of the history prior to his own point of departure is made possible. That great work was the tale of a chronicler who sought to please the ear rather than to speak the truth (I 20). Thucydides will not so much as write the name of Herodotus, but denies the greatness of his theme, and refuses to admit the essential truth of his narrative. He protests also against the seductive charm of his manner. He does once break this contemptuous silence about his literary sources, and scornfully accuses Hellanicus of insufficiency and inaccuracy, but at just the point where he is obliged to use Hellanicus most freely (I 97, 2). Ephorus and Theopompus in their day and generation despise both Herodotus, Thucydides and Hellanicus, and yet they often merely rewrite the material furnished them by these predecessors. And so on down the line. Even Polybius devotes a book to the crushing of Timaeus-Epitimaeus at just the point where his obligations to Timaeus become greatest. Polybius can rise to a much higher level, it is true. He can even approach the best modern sentiment of obligation toward a predecessor. "Judging from their lives and principles," he says of his sources Philinus and Fabius (I xiv), "I do not suppose that these writers have intentionally stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were characterized by wisdom, honor, and courage; those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite." "One must not shrink, however, either from blaming one's friends or praising one's enemies; nor be afraid of finding fault with and commending the same persons at different times." "For it is impossible that men engaged in public affairs should always be right, and unlikely that they should always be wrong."

And yet this same Polybius speaks in his polemic against Timaeus as though the profit one got from one's predecessors was the malicious joy of detecting their errors. "Study of documents," he says, "involves no danger or fatigue, if one takes care to lodge in a city rich in such records, or to have a library in one's neighborhood. You may then investigate any question while reclining on your couch, *and compare the mistakes of former historians* without any pain to yourself" (XII 27). But it needs no further citation to show that the fine sentiment of obligation to pioneer predecessors, a sentiment which permeates the best modern writing, and which we find also in Pliny, Jerome, and Plutarch, is wholly lacking in Greek historiography. The note of obligation is never sounded; the tone of contemptuous superiority is seldom absent.

Aggressive ingratitude, like that now described, is of course more striking, but perhaps no more objectionable to the best modern spirit than the ingratitude of silence. In Greek historiography, before as well as after the days of compilations and compends, there is steadfast reluctance to name a source at all. This is one thing that makes source-criticism at once so fascinating and, in the main, so fruitless. The feeling is even more than mere reluctance to name, it is desire to conceal a source. And the charge must not be laid at the doors of Herodotus or Pausanias, or other great scape-goats of criticism alone. It is equally true of Aristotle. "Seinen Autor zu verschweigen," says Diels, "das ist ja antike Sitte." Herodotus treats Hecataeus in this matter exactly as Aristotle treats Herodotus. The great chronographers built further on the system of Eratosthenes, giving him either no thanks at all, or blame. The practice has been found to be so fixed and constant, that what Ernst Curtius said of Pausanias early in the century must now be exactly reversed, till it takes on paradoxical form. The fact that Pausanias does not mention certain authors, instead of proving that he did not use them, proves rather that he did.

Having thus noticed the tendency in the Greek historians to depreciate or conceal the literary sources to which they are most largely indebted, it is natural to refer next to the tendency to parade special sources, oral, written or monumental, which do not exist, perhaps never did exist, or at least did not exist when the author claims to have used them. Fictitious witnesses are quoted, impossible documents are cited, long-vanished monu-

ments are restored by the magic formula *ἐτι καθ' ἡμᾶς*—"down to my day." Instances abound from Herodotus to Plutarch. Cephalion in Hadrian's time cites a letter from Priam to the Assyrian king Teutamus, begging for succor now that Hector was slain (Eusebius, Chron. p. 41, *apud* Müller, F. H. G. III, p. 626). This we may perhaps explain as a bold extension of the *demegoric* principle which developed the speeches of Thucydides and Livy. But Dio Chrysostom, writing at Rome toward the end of the first century (Or. XI 148 f.), tells us that he heard a Mede say that the Persians do not agree at all with the Hellenic accounts of the Persian wars. The Persians say that Darius sent Datis and Artaphernes against Naxos and Eretria, and they took those cities and returned straightway to the king. As they lay at anchor near Euboea, a few ships—not above twenty in all—straggled off toward Attica. Their crews had a skirmish with the people who lived on shore. Such was the Persians' Marathon. After this, they say, Xerxes made an expedition against Hellas, conquered the Spartans at Thermopylae and slew their king, then took Athens, destroyed it, and sold its inhabitants into slavery. Then he imposed tribute on the Hellenes, and returned to Asia. For the Persians, then, there was no Salamis at all.

Now who was this Mede, the informant of Chrysostom? An imaginary person, and his version of the Persian wars is the version Dio imagines that a Persian might give. But here is a rather startling parade of oral source.

So when Plutarch tries to solve that great puzzle of Athenian wisdom, from what teacher did Themistocles get his wonderful training? he takes refuge from two dubious answers which he finds proposed—Anaxagoras, Melissus—with "those who say that Themistocles was a disciple of Mnesiphilus, who was a sort of practical, natural statesman, inheriting from Solon and bequeathing to the Sophists" (Them. II 4). Now who are these who say this of Mnesiphilus, that malicious invention of Athenian local tradition to rob Themistocles of the glory of Salamis, whom Herodotus all too willingly adopts? None say this save Plutarch. It is his own delightful *γνώμη* which he here parades before us under the cloak of a vague "they say."

Akin to this parade of fictitious authorities is the ostentation of entire originality, like that so suspiciously claimed by the Father of History. "Others have written of this," he says (VI 55), "I will therefore omit it. But what others have not touched upon,

of this I will make mention." Had not others "touched upon" Egypt and Scythia and Libya, how would the Father's great geographical excursus have looked? In just this way, if we may trust Clement, Acusilaus translated Hesiod into prose, καὶ ὡς ἴδια ἐξήνεγκεν, "and published it as his own" (Strom. VI, p. 629 A). Here belongs also in our list of literary sins the constantly recurring claim of *autopsy* by the historian, where we know that autopsy was impossible. Here, too, the claims of special advantages never enjoyed, of extensive travels never undertaken, of long periods of time never spent upon the work. A typical example will suffice. Diodorus begins his immense *bibliotheca* with a long elaboration of the theme of the great lack of general histories and universal compends, in spite of their great usefulness. He claims to have spent thirty years of unremitting toil upon the work, and to have journeyed over Asia and Europe, protected by the ægis of the Roman Empire, in order to secure the advantages of autopsy. But thirty years is a fabulously long time for the preparation of such a work as that of Diodorus is seen to be, there is no trace of autopsy in the work, and no claim to it elsewhere, except in the borrowed words of his sources, and the whole is a mechanical copy of a famous passage of Polybius (III 59). "Ctesias," says Lucian (V. H. I 3), "wrote many things about India and its peoples which he had never seen himself, nor heard another tell." But Ctesias claimed both to have seen himself and to have heard from others.

When quotations and citations are made by the Greek historians, how unsatisfactory to modern ethical standards, which are perhaps never too high, the procedure is! The practice of citing at second or third hand confuses all our science. Even the encyclopaedic Aristotle takes quotations from Plato, or at least alludes to them because Plato had. He mentions Herodotus only once in the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, but either uses him freely elsewhere without citing him, or quotes him here only because his immediate source so quotes him. Citation is made, as we have seen, for unimportant details, or else for controversial minutiae, when the whole context as well is borrowed. Specific authors are hidden behind nebulous plurals or gentile adjectives. Real sources are concealed, and others suggested. Eldest sources of late compends are cited from the compends, with archaistic effect, ignoring the compends. This may be a valuable practice for us, and the fruit of a learned and scholastic spirit, but it is contrary

to our ethics. And when at last we come to the compilers, and to Diodorus their chief, how the ethics and amenities stagger us! Large inheritances of questionable practice from original sources are here employed without attempt at concealment. "The only privilege of the original man," says Lowell, "is that, like other sovereign princes, he has the right to call in the current coin and reissue it stamped with his own image." In this sense Herodotus is original. He restamps before reissuing. So do Ephorus, Timaeus, and Polybius, to great extent. But the compilers simply reissue. They reissue with the personal judgments, local colors, political combinations, and architectural monuments of bygone centuries still intact and unchanged. And over all the gaping seams they try to cast the mantle of some master's grand manner.

On either side of this long list of what, from the modern point of view, seem to be literary malpractices, let us hang the two portraits of the true historian drawn by Polybius and Lucian. The true historian, says Polybius (XII *passim*), will be a man of action, versed in political and military affairs. He will not confine himself to the study of documents and monuments merely, although he will not neglect these. He will study carefully and in person the topography of the actions he describes. He will ask questions of as many people as possible who are connected in any way with the events or places which he is describing, and he will believe those most worthy of credit, and show critical sagacity in judging all their reports. He will be a man of dignity and good sense. When he resolves to retaliate upon a personal enemy, he will think first, not of what that enemy deserves, but of what it is becoming in himself to do to that enemy; what his self-respect will allow him to say of that enemy.

The true historian, says Lucian (Quomodo Hist. Conscr. *passim*), will be a man of natural gifts, with an interpretative power cultivated after the best models. He will have acquaintance with politics and armies. He will be *μηνυτής* rather than *ποιητής*, transmitter rather than producer. He will not try to determine what it was that happened, but how it happened, inasmuch as it has already happened (*πέπρακται γὰρ ἤδη*). He will aim to be understood by the many, and will therefore call figs *figs* and spades *spades*, but he will aim to be praised by the cultured. The best preparation for his work will be personal experience; but if this is impossible, he will follow the best and most incorruptible narra-

tors. Above all things he will be ελεύθερος in spirit—a freeman, knowing no fear and courting no favor. He will convert the ὕλη of historical material into the fair shape of history, as Phidias his gold and ivory and wood into the Athena Parthenos.

Of the Polybian standard Josephus may have thought when he said of his own qualifications for writing a history of the Jewish war, "Of many things I was myself the cause, of most the eye-witness, and I am ignorant of nothing said or done." Before Lucian the great work of Thucydides seems to have stood as model. And at the very opening of scientific Greek historiography we have that great master's severe conception of the work and calling of the true historian. "If he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten" (I 22). This conception surely was in the mind of Mommsen when he closed the introduction to the fifth volume of his great history with the words: "mit Entsagung ist dies Buch geschrieben, und mit Entsagung möchte es gelesen sein."

Greek historiography, then, constantly alleges against itself falsehood and theft while professing truth and originality. It uniformly depreciates the predecessor and main literary source. It labors to conceal or openly denies obligation to predecessors when obligation is the strongest. It assumes qualifications, advantages, originality, sources and methods which are fictitious. And yet early in its development it presents, and it constantly reverts to, the loftiest ideals. How can this anomaly be explained?

No one can claim that the sense of truth and the instinct of obligation for benefits received were as keen in the best ancients as they are in the best moderns. With the increased richness of content in modern life and thought has come also increased sensitiveness in matters regarding truth and honor. We have plagiarisms still: whole sermons in the New York pulpit, whole books in the New York publishers' lists, thoughts and expressions consciously and unconsciously appropriated everywhere. But the practice is not tolerated, much less is it canonized, and the practitioner is pilloried when detected. We have historical frauds still, as all will admit who remember the elaborate paper on "The Secession of Jones Co., Missouri," in the *Magazine of*

American History for October, 1886 (pp. 387-90), exposed in the New York *Nation* six years later (March 24, 1892, March 31, 1892). But such frauds are not common, and are certainly not encouraged. They do not add to the reputation of a historian who perpetrates them. But it would be gross injustice to attribute the superiority in the ethics and amenities of modern historiography over the ancient Greek merely and wholly to the higher ethical tone of modern life and its increase in justice and politeness. There were certain special causes, no longer existing, which produced in ancient Greek historiography features which seem to us so reprehensible.

In the first place, Greek historiography was rooted and grounded in poetry and mythography, as Strabo says in a passage already quoted (p. 341). Between the epos and Thucydides came logography, which to us seems hardly more than a transfer of poetical to prose narration. To the logographers themselves, however, it was evidently much more. It was truth as opposed to fiction, fact rescued from overwhelming fancy. Indeed, that development of epic poetry which we call Hesiodic was itself an appeal from the exuberant fancies of the Homeric poems to a soberer truth. Not ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, but ἀληθεία λέγειν was its aim. This desire to speak the truth must have been the leading motive in the early logographers, taking the place to a great extent of the poet's desire to please, or, better, they sought to please by telling the truth rather than by telling fanciful inventions. Hence they could abandon the poetic form for simple prose. Their reliance was upon other charms than those of rhythm. But Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us (de Thuc. jud. V 4) that even their simple prose had a "nameless grace." The stern appeal to pleasing truth as opposed to pleasing fiction, made already in the Hesiodic poems as they competed for favor with the Homeric, made by Acusilaus and Hecataeus as they attempted to improve upon both—this reliance upon the charm and value of facts as opposed to the charms of fancy, coupled with annalistic form and neglect of dramatic evolutions, culminates in Thucydides. His mechanical "summer and winter" remind us of the Hesiodic principle of composition by annexation. But the "nameless grace" of early logographic prose was brought into the service of the Homeric spirit by Herodotus. Upon vast stores of fact and fancy gathered alike from the speech and the writings of men he imposed the Homeric principles of artistic narration.

The *form* of narration became again in him the chief thing, but the *truth*—"I am obliged," he says (VII 152), "to say what is said to me, but I am not obliged to believe it in all cases, and I wish this remark to apply to my whole work."

Gradually, then, and very slowly, Greek historiography emerged from poetic, fictitious narrative in prose and verse—from mythology. What corresponded to our Saxon Annals began with the mythical foundings of cities. Myth was the soil of history, and exhalations from this soil cover the initial periods of history. It was impossible for any generation before Aristotle to draw the line between myths and facts. It is impossible for us. "The better Greek history is known," says Wilamowitz, "the later it begins." Each generation accused its predecessor of credulity and blindness, each claimed to know and speak the truth. Hecataeus was a radical sceptic. Diels calls him the "enlightener of the sixth century." But to Herodotus, Hecataeus is a laughable old pedant, and to Thucydides merely a credulous logograph. To him as well as to Herodotus and the whole class he applies the same scornful characterization—omission of research, acceptance of what comes ready to hand, admixture of the fabulous, aim at effect first and truth afterward. Scepticism and enlightenment thus go hand in hand with the severest depreciation of the predecessor, till such depreciation becomes norm and sign of progress. Two great quests also become dominant in historiography, the quest of form, with Homeric traditions, and the quest of truth, with Hesiodic traditions. Each quest becomes dominant and classic in the work of a master, the form-quest in Herodotus, the truth-quest in Thucydides. In neither is either quest entirely exclusive of the other, though in each the one quest is supreme.

The gradual emergence of Greek historiography from mythology in verse and prose, together with the lack of the finer sentiments of obligation to a predecessor whose standpoint may have been outgrown, will account for much of the falsehood charged upon Greek historians down to Herodotus and Thucydides. The charges of plagiarism in the same period may be accounted for in the same way. For, through most of the period, it is not new facts or fancies which are stated by successive historians, rather the same facts or fancies are stated in a different way. Whether the daughters of Proetus were afflicted with madness because they refused to honor Dionysus, as Hesiod says, or because they offended Hera, as Acusilaus says, is imma-

terial. They were punished, if at all, for impiety. But just such items of mythography led to charges both of mendacity and plagiarism.

A second special reason for many of the peculiar phenomena we have noted in Greek historiography is the fact that earliest Greek tradition was almost wholly oral, in the time of Herodotus and Thucydides was both oral and written, and never became so capable of literary and documentary control as in modern times. Josephus contrasts scornfully the age of the Hebrew sacred records with the comparative youth and dearth of Greek records. Thucydides and Polybius lay far more stress on oral testimony, especially the oral testimony of eye-witnesses, than the modern historian will consent to do. For the Homeric and Hesiodic poets, tradition was originally wholly oral, and the persistence of oral renditions and oral publication of literature even long after the introduction of writing, together with the late and slow growth of reading, a reading class, and libraries, kept the air and mannerisms of oral tradition natural and even necessary in an attractive literary style. The great dramatic literature was long meant for public oral rendition rather than for reading. At some early period of necessarily oral tradition, the first reducer to writing might have expressed himself toward his various and indefinite oral sources much as Hecataeus in his genealogies expresses himself toward Acusilaus and Hesiod. Demosthenes and the orators *hear* the history they quote. Aelian, in the *Varia Historia* (XII 43) *hears* that Darius the son of Hystaspes was a quiver-bearer of Cyrus. The remove from this literary mannerism, this reminiscence of oral tradition, to Dio Chrysostom's Median informant, is not a violent one. The freedom of transmission which characterized oral tradition imparted itself to literary tradition. Plato's citations of Homer often have the air of *viva voce* reminiscence. Even Polybius recasts the spirited reply of the Greeks to Gelo (Hdt. VII 161 = Polyb. XII 26). They do not say as Herodotus makes them say—"Hellas sent us to thee for troops, not for a leader," but rather—"Come to our aid and the logic of events will give the command to the bravest."

We find proof of the awakening of a sense of accountability for romantic oral testimony as early as the 12th book of the *Odyssey* (389-90). The conversation between Helius and Zeus about the slain cattle of the sun-god Odysseus claims to have heard from Calypso, who heard it from Hermes, who was presumably present

in person. And far down into the age of literary tradition we can trace the feeling that oral tradition was really superior. The ideal historian of Polybius will ask questions of as many people as possible, will believe those worthy of credit, and will show critical sagacity in judging their reports. A phraseology of original oral transmission, kept natural and effective by oral renditions and reminiscences even in the literary period, explains much apparent falsity of claim. Continuity of method and apparatus is eagerly sought by the historian under the impulse of a keen love of form. Old formulae are superimposed upon new material, until we can have a Pausanias collecting oral and ocular evidence like a Polybius, amassing literary evidence like a Timaeus, and clothing the combination with Herodotean mannerisms.

Thirdly, the agonistic spirit in Greek literary production accounts for many of the amenities which we find so questionable. Greek life had no word of sympathy for the vanquished. Success was not so much the success of positive achievement as the glory of comparative personal triumph over rivals. The court bard of Odysseus (a 351) found that his audience liked the newest things best, and the standing of rival bards must have depended largely on their ability to present novelties in matter or form. And must not Homer and Hesiod, Pindar and Corinna, vie with one another in prize contests? Did not Aeschylus and Sophocles, Sophocles and Euripides, Cratinus and Aristophanes contend with each other for a prize? So the *λογοποιός* competed with the *ἑποποιός*, truth-quest with form-quest, Thucydides with Ephorus, for popular acceptance. As enlightenment spread and knowledge increased, they led to contempt of previous stadia, as the victor and his admirers despised the vanquished. "All the Greek historians," says Josephus, "seek not truth, but λόγων δύναμιν—*powerful expression*, and each writer applies himself to eclipse in fame his predecessor." "In rhetoric," he says, "all must yield to the Greeks, but not in truth about antiquity." "The reason for their ignorance is lack of travel and intercourse. The reason for their lying is their desire to get the reputation of telling *more* history than their rivals." "The abuse of their predecessors is due to the repute of their victims, to jealousy of that repute, and desire to eclipse it" (contra Apion. *passim*). The scorn which Thucydides feels for Herodotus was due not only to a natural dislike of the broad and flowing Ionian narrative, but also to the

influence of a literary tradition of long standing. If Thucydides yielded to this influence, much more all following historians, who, able to correct details, proclaimed their superiority to their great source. And so Herodotus is criticised by everybody because used by everybody, and the degree to which he is criticised is a fairly safe criterion of the extent to which he has been used. The sense of obligation toward even the imperfect achievements of the past is one of the choicest flowers of modern life.

Fourthly, with Herodotus and Thucydides, and for all historians after them, whether given chiefly to the quest of form or the quest of truth, certain literary conventions were established. Dramatic conventions must be understood before we can mount a play. They become bolder and more startling as we go back in the history of the drama. "What's bad unless it seem so to the spectator?" asks Dionysus in the *Frogs*. In dramatics certainly, if not in ethics, the pleasure of the spectator is the commonest standard of right and wrong. So in all literary compositions, but particularly in the historical, the pleasure of the hearer or reader is to a great degree the writer's standard of right and wrong. This attitude of superiority over his predecessor on the part of each succeeding ancient Greek historian; this correction of error under the form of accusation of falsehood, while merely recasting a material already furnished, became literary conventions. In the presentation of new historical material also, the accumulations of the advancing centuries, other great literary conventions were tacitly assumed. They are all more or less distinctly traceable to the domination of the old form-quest. For the Greek after all was more concerned for the manner than the matter. Herodotus, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Epist. ad Cn. Pomp. III 7), did not avoid the same material as Charon and Hellanicus, but he believed he could produce something better than they had, and he did so. Ephorus and Theopompus recast the material of Herodotus and Thucydides, not in the interest of truth but of form. Like Curtius Rufus, they used their historical basis as a *corpus vile* on which to practice their rhetorical art. They could say the same things in a better way. And since the Greek public cared not so much for correct report as for free and effective description of the writer's personal impressions, the rhetorical age impressed upon their work all the conceits of refined rhetorical craft. So epic and heroic influences had triumphed in Herodotus, political and diplomatic oratory in

Thucydides, as later the Alexandrian imperial sentiment dominated in Callisthenes, the Roman imperial sentiment in Polybius—all at the sacrifice of the strictest truth. The testimony of hearsay was less sure and true than that of an eye-witness, but often pleasanter, according to Polybius (XII 27). And just as Timaeus chose the pleasanter testimony, so the successive generations of Greek historians strove to please. The great protests of the Hesiodic poems and of Thucydides did not prevail. The form-quest as exemplified in Herodotus carried the day, till even truth-quest became largely matter of form, always excepting Polybius, and the severer truth-seekers, on whom Herodotus and Livy both relied, were relegated to oblivion by the very triumphs of these great artists.

Other literary conventions might be enumerated which grew up in consequence of the mythical beginnings of Greek history, its originally oral tradition, its agonistic spirit, and its quest, in the main, of form rather than of truth.

Foremost of all, and most prolific in minor devices of a similar nature, is the literary embellishment of the set speech—*demegoria*. It is already a great feature of epic poetry, we find traces of it in the fragments of the logographers, it is dramatically developed by Herodotus, adapted to the political spirit of his time by Thucydides, and it becomes a historical mannerism ever after, reflecting the dominant influences of each succeeding age. But it tends even in its simplest form to distort history, as most reflection distorts, and it is a breeder of inferior devices subversive of the truth of tradition, such as the citation of impossible letters and documents. No sooner therefore do genuine historical documents begin to abound in the period of Alexander, than spurious documents yet more abound. The modern feeling toward this literary device of the set speech is well shown in a citation from Voltaire's preface to his *History of Russia*, made by Professor Jebb. "If one put into the mouth of a prince a speech which he had never made, the historian would be regarded as a rhetorician. Set speeches are a *sort of oratorical lie*."

"A lady once told me," wrote the late Master of Balliol, "that Lord Westbury was an *esprit faux*, but I do not think that this was true, although, like Plato, he could invent Egyptians, or anything else." The great convention of the set speech, itself designed to promote the sense of verisimilitude, led, as has been said, to numberless other devices of a similar nature. But the writers who used them were not necessarily *esprits faux*. They

are not deceiving, are not trying to deceive their readers. And it is only fair to say that charges of deceit on these scores come mainly from modern critics, for whom such literary conventions no longer exist. The professions of superior truthfulness, or superior advantages; claims of autopsy, travel, study, discovery; the use of fixed schemes for descriptions of battles, scenery, or speeches; the adaptations of great models of historical achievement to new surroundings—all these become conventional. "Former historians," says Polybius (XII 25), "showed their sense of the necessity of making professions of personal experience in matters about which they wrote. When the subject was political they were careful to state that the writer had of course been engaged in politics, and so had had experience in matters of this sort." A historian who, as Lucian knew, had never set foot out of Corinth, began his history of the Parthian wars with the sententious phrase which had already done duty for Heracleitus and Herodotus—"Eyes are more trusty than ears; I shall write therefore only what I have seen, not what I have heard" (*Quomodo Hist. Conscr.* 38). And Lucian ridiculed merely for barrenness of invention another historian who borrowed Thucydides' description of the plague at Athens in order to tell about the disease which afflicted Nisibis in Mesopotamia for closing its gates to the Roman armies. The historian omitted the *Pelargikon*, and the Long Walls of Thucydides, but his plague started in Aethiopia, then descended upon Egypt and Persia, exactly as Thucydides had made his plague behave, and Lucian left this poor historian "burying Athenians in Nisibis," and knew by heart all the rest of his description.

The step from the invention of ornamental details to the invention of vital facts is a natural one—in the course of human nature an inevitable one. The oldest of the younger school of Roman annalists, we are told (*Wachsmuth, Alte Geschichte*, pp. 622 ff.), was true to matters of fact, did not invent his facts outright, but did invent speeches, documents and letters, not to deceive, but to enliven. Later annalists, however, invented their facts outright, invented statistics corroborative of their invented facts, and reported the actual words of legendary characters. They deceived no one, it is true, *i. e.* no one for whom they wrote. But it is hard for us moderns to differentiate them from Cato's Ligurians, who were "uneducated liars, with no power of recollecting facts." Duris of Samos, whom Plutarch never tires of

discrediting, criticises his predecessors, Ephorus and Theopompus, in words which seem to our modern ethics rather praise than blame. They fell far behind their predecessors, he says, "for they did not cultivate the art of dramatic imitation and of pleasing invention, but devoted themselves to the mere recital of what had happened" (Photius, 176, as cited and emended in Schaefer's *Quellenkunde*, I, p. 83).

Another, and the last literary convention to be here mentioned, is the borrowing of famous *mots* or phrases, and weaving them into new narrative, *mutatis mutandis*, for fresh conquests. The practice is as early certainly as Herodotus. Some maladjustment of context, or lack of perfect application to the new situation, reveals the device. How ill the exquisite Periclean funeral metaphor of war's robbery of the spring from the year is put by Herodotus in the mouth of Gelon of Syracuse when he declines to reinforce the allied Greeks (VII 162)! How imperfectly the capital parable of the assorted evils of mankind is applied by the same historian to the malevolent charges of Argive Medism (VII 152)! One is even tempted to believe that his famous story of the wife of Intaphernes and her choice is skilfully adapted to Persian context from the *Antigone* of Sophocles, instead of *vice versa* as is generally held. But the audience were well aware of the real ownership in all these cases. There was no deception, rather a confident and flattering appeal to the literary culture of the hearer, such as those which so amaze us in Aristophanes. Polybius finds this same literary device in Timaeus (XII 26). Timaeus puts into a great speech of his Hermocrates such well known literary gems as—"In peace sleepers are waked by cocks, in war by trumpets"—"In peace the old are buried by the young, as nature directs, in war the young are buried by the old." Such arguments, Polybius says, would have been employed by a youth who had devoted himself to scholastic exercises and studies in history. Precisely so. They are borrowed literary finery. But every one knew their owner, even in an age when the sense of literary ownership was not keen. And we should remember when we consider the wholesale charges of plagiarism among the ancients, that literary productions are the last form of property for which the modern world is devising adequate safeguards.

A word should be said of the great safety-valve for modern historiography afforded by the distinctive literary form of romance. Romance existed in Greek poetry and historiography

long before it became a distinct species of composition. Even after mythography came to be clearly distinguished from history, the romantic tendencies which had produced an epos and a *Sage* remained imbedded in historical composition. Both romantic history and historical romance were classed as history. Imagine the safety-valve of modern fiction closed. What would become of our historiography?

Another word should be said of the immense relief to modern historiography afforded by the footnote. The ancient artist knew not this form-conserving device, and yet most ancient artists had their hearts set mainly on form. Imagine a Busolt's *History of Greece* with footnotes artistically blended with the main text!

The oppressiveness of accumulated historical material has been felt by the world many times before this age of compends and encyclopedias and handbooks and "Libraries of the World's Best Literature." The great Alexandrian scholars felt it. Marius the Epicurean felt it under Marcus Aurelius. The great Byzantine compilers felt it in the tenth century. Periodical attempts will always be made to strip off from historical tradition the accretions due to fancy and the desire for pleasant form. But each age must do its own work here. It will not be satisfied with the work of any previous age. Even the ultimate facts of history will be constantly restated. If this were not so, where were the charm of historical research? What would become of source-criticism? Toward historical truth, as toward the higher truth which Lessing so bravely sought, we may feel as he felt—"If God held all truth shut in his right hand, and in his left nothing but the ever restless instinct for truth, though with the condition of for ever and for ever erring, and should say to me, 'Choose!' I should bow humbly to his left hand and say, 'Father, give! Pure truth is for Thee alone.'"

B. PERRIN.

II.—THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN INDEPENDENT SENTENCES IN PLAUTUS.

II.—FORCES.

The presentation of the facts of usage in the preceding part of this paper should make upon any reader who may have patience to follow it the same impression that is made by the facts themselves, the impression that, in the last analysis, the subjunctive use consists of a great variety of more or less specialized usages, differing often but slightly, yet distinct and deserving separate treatment. Some are narrow in range and clearly defined, like *haud dicam dolo, egone ausim, ueniat uelim*; others are broader and of more general application, like the use of the 2d singular of the present, and have scarcely crystallized into definite meaning. These varieties of usage are, it is true, connected not only by the unity of the mode, but also by resemblances which justify somewhat more specific terms: jussive, hortatory, deliberative. But it must, I think, be acknowledged that the study of resemblances, the grouping and re-grouping of usages which are for the most part ill-defined, has not greatly advanced our knowledge of syntax during the last quarter of a century. The search for a *Grundbegriff* has not been fruitless in suggestion, but it has been less productive of real advance than might have been hoped. What we call 'the subjunctive' is not an entity; it has no objective existence. Only the individual subjunctive forms—*sim, dicam*—exist, and the term 'the subjunctive' is the result of a generalization by which we endeavor to include in a single idea all that is common to the many individual forms or the narrow and clearly defined usages. No single form or usage exactly corresponds to the type; each falls short of the type in some particulars and in other particulars each may have acquired suggestions of meaning which are not found in the type. By a process analogous to natural selection, a process partly of exclusion, partly of acquisition, indiscriminate and therefore shifting applications of the modal forms have crystallized into definite and therefore expressive usage. The understanding of this

process—and this is the true work of the student of historical syntax—must begin with detailed and precise description and definition of usage, such as I have attempted to give above; the second step is the discussion of the forces which have been at work to produce such usages.

These forces are of two kinds:—*first*, each subjunctive has person, number, tense, voice, and the stem of the verb has its own proper meaning. *Second*, each subjunctive stands in a particular setting, in a sentence of a particular kind, interrogative or not, with particles or adverbs which limit it and at the same time suggest additional meanings, often in a paratactic relation to another verb, sometimes with a negative, preceded by other sentences and conditioned by all the preceding course of thought, and, in the spoken language, made definite by the circumstances, by inflection and by gesture. Of these two kinds of forces, the first are of course inseparable from the form; the influence of person and number upon the modal meaning, whatever it may be, must always have accompanied and modified the subjunctive. In part this is true also of the forces of the second kind, but the additions to the subjunctive, especially the paratactic verbs, are later and are at the same time definitions of the subjunctive and evidence of the need of definition.

In the study of these forces I have two objects in view. *First*, a conscious and deliberate weighing of the various elements which make up what we call the 'context' ought to give greater precision to our interpretation. *Second*, in so far as it can be shown that the usages described above are the result of known forces, working along traceable lines, the necessity and, indeed, the scientific propriety of referring such usages to supposed I.E. functions falls away. If, for example, any other forces can be found which of themselves are sufficient to limit *di te perduint* to a curse or *saluos sis* to a greeting, then it is not permissible to explain them as survivals of an I.E. optative function or to attempt to show how the optative function extended to the subjunctive forms *di te perdant* and *ualeas*.

The discussion of these forces is not in any case complete, but I have hoped that it might be suggestive of a point of view somewhat different from the usual one. Only the more salient points are brought out under each head, and no attempt has been made to trace the influence of each force upon every kind of subjunctive usage. Thus, under person and number the hypothetical cases

and the questions are not touched, because they are chiefly influenced by other forces.

1. *Person and Number.*

Four acts are connected in thought with every subjunctive: speaking, willing, hearing and performing the action expressed by the verb. These four acts may be done by one, two, three or, rarely, by four persons.

In the 1st person singular these acts may be performed by one person; the speaker may express his own will to himself about an act which he is to do. These cases, however, are rare, partly because the occasion is rare, partly because other expressions like the periphrastic are more precise. Where such forms do occur, it is evident that the function of the mode is much restricted. The will of the speaker cannot take the form of command or entreaty; it is limited to ideas of propriety or necessity or determination. And even for these ideas the bare subjunctive form is an inadequate expression, needing to be supplemented by a paratactic addition like *optumumst, necessest*. In general, either the speaker divides himself and by a fiction, a dramatic doubling of his personality, addresses himself in the forms of the 2d person, which can express command or entreaty, or else the sentence is addressed to another person. In the latter case the verb is not really an expression of will, but a statement to the other person of the speaker's determination—that is, it is a future. This is, of course, a very common situation, and most of the 3d-conjugation forms in Plautus show by their context that they are of this kind. The line of division, however, is faint. Asin. 605, sermoni iam finem face tuo: huius sermonem accipiam, is like Trin. 1136, quid ego cesso hos conloqui? sed maneam etiam, opinor, in expressing desire rather than determination, but it shades toward the future because it is half addressed to the other person. So also in Asin. 719 ecastor ambae sunt bonae. || sciam, ubi boni quid dederint.

In the large majority of cases in 1st sing. the willer is the person addressed, the speaker and actor being one person. These cases are in questions and will be treated below.

The very fact, then, that a verb is used in 1st sing. of the subjunctive restricts the possible meaning of the mode within narrow limits and tends to produce a well-marked though infrequent usage. So strong, in fact, is the force of person and

number in this case that it, as it were, compels the subjunctive to express ideas of necessity and propriety which are more naturally expressed by other forms.

In the 2d pers. sing. the speaker and willer is one person, the hearer and actor another person, who is present. The relation of willer and actor is the most direct and simple possible. It needs no definition; its definiteness even helps to define the nature of the will. For the kind of will exerted, though it is not defined by the verb, is of necessity fixed by the relation of the persons—father to son, master to slave, friend to friend—and by the circumstances, which are, so to speak, visible to both and unconsciously taken for granted in the selection of expressions. Definiteness of language is unnecessary where the hearer must understand sufficiently the sense in which the speaker, standing before him, wills the action. On the one hand, therefore, the use in 2d sing. is limited to the more direct expressions of will, and on the other hand there is no need of distinct forms to differentiate advice from command or entreaty from demand, because this distinction is implied in the circumstances. The wish without *utinam* is almost unknown; the two cases, in the marriage song in Cas. and in the curse in Trin. 351 (if *malum* be read, with GS.), are only half-wishes.¹

In the 3d sing. three persons are involved, the speaker and willer, the hearer, and the actor, not present or treated as not present. The bare subjunctive (without paratactic additions) is therefore indefinite in two respects. First, in all cases where the subject of the verb is not a definite person, and occasionally even when the actor is definite, there is nothing in the relation of the persons to define the mode, either by the exclusion of many kinds of will, as in 1st sing., or by a direct and evident relation of willer to actor, as in 2d singular. Second, the separation of hearer from actor leaves the part which the former is to play undefined. For the details I will refer to what has been said above in describing the uses of the 3d sing. present. The vary-

¹ It may be noted in passing that the gap in meaning between 1st sing. fut. and 1st sing. pres. subj. is much less than in 2d sing. In 1st sing. determination runs into futurity (English *will* into *shall*), and many futures like *ibo* express determination. But in the 2d pers. the subjunctive expresses clear forms of will, while the future expresses futurity with little trace of will. Therefore, while *dicam* serves for both modes, the 2d person selects the two differing forms *dicas* and *dices*.

ing relations of the hearer to the action are of course not expressed in the mode; they are indeed not expressed at all in language except in the paratactic uses, but the fact that they exist and are in the mind of both speaker and hearer tends, by a common law of language, to associate them with the form. In other words, the 3d sing. vaguely suggests to the hearer that he also is to act. If *ferat* alone is used in the sense of *iube ferat*, it comes to mean *iube ferat*. And this comes out more plainly when the subject is a thing and the verb is passive; by necessary implication *efferrantur omnia* means *fac efferrantur*.¹

Further evidence of the way in which the meaning of the mode seems to be shifted by causes which lie outside the mode may be had from the cases of 3d pers. where the subject is not a definite person. With an ideal or typical person (Amph. 960 *proinde eri ut sint*, ipse [the slave] *item sit*; Pers. 125 *cynicum esse egentem oportet parasitum probe: pallium, marsuppium habeat*) the subjunctive expresses only propriety, the direct forms of will being excluded. So when persons of a class are the subject (*reges, inimici*), especially if they are in the audience and are addressed indirectly (*matronae tacitae spectent, tacitae rideant*, Poen. prol. 32). When the subject is a thing and the verb is passive, the hearer becomes the real actor, and the direct forms of will reappear, as in the 2d person.

In one class the 3d pers., sing. as well as plur., is rather narrowly defined. The wishes containing the word *di* or the name of a god are definite in respect to the nature of the desire and to the actors. The nature of the desire is partly fixed by the meaning of the verb, which will be discussed later, but the fact that the gods are to be the actors, not only in wishes like *di me ament*, but also in the impersonal expressions *male sit tibi, quod bene uortat*, excludes advice or command and confines the mode to the expression of that kind of desire whose attainment is beyond human power. The fact, also, that the gods are not directly addressed excludes prayer and entreaty.

¹ It is perhaps not speculating too freely to hazard the guess that it is the vagueness of the 3d pers. which rendered possible the wide extension of usage in the subordinate clause in narrative Latin. I am very sure that in tracing the origin of subordinate clauses careful attention should be paid to the person of the verb. Clauses in the 1st or 2d pers. are more likely to be idiomatic and to be directly connected with independent uses, while it is the 3d pers. which swings away most widely from independent uses and develops special subordinate functions.

Of all the varieties of subjunctive, none is more clearly defined than the 1st plural. In it the speaker and willer is an actor and the person addressed is also an actor; it combines, as has often been remarked, the 1st person with the 2d, and can therefore be used only in those senses which are common to both. This excludes almost entirely all uses like command, permission, entreaty, advice, and leaves only the special sense which we call exhortation. No name in all our imperfect grammatical nomenclature is more suitable and more precise than Hortatory, if it be confined, as I think it should be, to the 1st pers. plural.

In a few cases in 1st plur. the subjunctive has somewhat the effect of a command, where *tu* (Truc. 840 *eamus tu in ius*) or a vocative (Poen. 1342 *leno, eamus in ius*) is expressed. That is, where the 2d person is brought forward into prominence, the direct shades of will which are associated with the 2d person also appear.

The forms of the sigmatic aorist afford a striking proof of the effect of person upon mode. All cases in 1st sing. are hypothetical, all in 2d pers. are prohibitive, all but one in 3d pers. are optative. It seems certain that the force which produced this curious difference between *faxim*, *faxis* and *faxit* can have been nothing else than the person. It is true that the 1st sing. in general is not always hypothetical, but it leans more strongly that way than the 2d or the 3d, while the 2d pers. in general leans toward the direct forms of command and the 3d pers. contains by far the largest number of wishes. These general tendencies, working upon forms which were becoming obsolete and were therefore preserved only in idiomatic uses, brought about an absolute uniformity of usage in the sigmatic aorist, which would be impossible with forms which were in free and general use.

These illustrations will, I hope, show sufficiently how greatly the modal meaning is influenced by the force of person and number, and how necessary a recognition of this force is to precise interpretation. It is in the main an exclusive or selective force. Of the whole range of possible applications, certain ones are excluded when the speaker addresses himself about his own action, certain others when the hearer is to be the actor. But it is also capable of leading to an expansion of modal meaning by association and suggestion. The idea of propriety or conformity to an ideal implied in some of the 3d-pers. uses is such an extension, and in the forms of the sigmatic aorist these added conceptions have become permanently associated with the mode.

2. *Tense.*

The influence of tense-force upon the modal meaning is slight. Tense-force in the subjunctive is in general less clearly marked than in the indicative, partly because the very nature of the subjunctive removes it somewhat from time limitations (e. g. in the hypothetical uses, which are often timeless), partly because in a considerable number of cases the will and the act belong to different times. So Ps. 131 *ostium lenonis crepuit. || crura mauellem modo*, Curc. 512 *tacuisse mauellem*; in neither case is *mauellem* parallel to *malebam*. Pers. 710 *cras ires potius* is an extreme case; it means 'You ought (some time ago) to have decided to go to-morrow,' i. e. the obligation is past, the act future.

In one respect, however, the tense-force is well marked and strongly affects the meaning of the mode. The impf. 2d sing. (and in some cases in other persons) expresses an obligation which should have been felt in the past; e. g. Rud. 842 *caperes aut fustem aut lapidem* 'you should have taken . . .' The same thing is true of several questions in the 1st sing., the connection of which with 2d sing. is close. Obligation is one of the many meanings of the subjunctive in the present, though it is somewhat infrequent, and it is the only one which has, so to speak, survived the transfer from present time to past. The other shades of will or desire cannot be used of a past feeling. Command, entreaty, advice, permission, determination are excluded; only obligation remains. The influence of tense, therefore, though it is not wide, is especially clear and, when put into comparison with other influences, especially instructive.

The use of *non* with these cases will be considered later.

It is worth while to note, also, in connection with the question of tense, how infrequent the subjunctive of the past is in Plautus. There are 77 instances of the impf. and 7 of the plupf., against 1366 of the present. The subjunctive in the spoken language is a direct and simple expression of desire, dealing with the present or the immediate future. It is only in a complicated style, in the complexity of the conditional sentence or the subordinate clause, that the plupf. finds a place.

3. *Voice.*

The simplicity and directness of the feeling which lies behind the subjunctive is also shown by the infrequency of passives. They occur as follows: pres. 1st sing. 4, 2d sing. 1, 3d sing. 17,

3d plur. 5, impf. 3d sing. 1, 3d plur. 1. Of these, 6 are hypothetical, 4 are in parataxis, 4 are in the statement of a plan (a kind of half-paratactic use), 4 are in the peculiar phrase *mos geratur*, two or three are without context or are doubtful in text, and not more than half a dozen are in ordinary expressions of desire. It is impossible to tell without more trouble than the point is worth whether this proportion (29 out of 1600, less than 2 per cent.) is smaller than in the indic., but it seems probable that Plautus found the mode to some extent inconsistent with the passive voice, as it was inconsistent (though to a less degree) with the past tenses. It was a living expression of desire, not a mere symbol, as it became, for example, in the *cum* clause. Of these 29 cases, all but 5 are in the 3d pers., where the personal relations are least direct. And where the passive uses are nearest to the directness of the active, it is because a 2d-pers. use really lies behind the 3d pers., as *fac proferantur* is almost the same as *proferas*.

4. *The Meaning of the Verb.*

In Amph. 928 *ualeas*, *tibi habeas res tuas*, *reddas meas*, the three subjunctives are evidently, so far as the mode is concerned, identical; the close connection makes any other interpretation impossible. But if *ualeas* stood alone, as it often does, it would be called a wish, while *habeas* in 10 out of the 15 passages where it occurs expresses a permission, as here, and *reddas* is a demand. In modal force the three verbs are alike; the difference in effect is due to the difference in the meaning of the verbs.

The same thing appears in a few other cases where two verbs are used together: Cas. 611 *missurun es ad me uxorem . . . ? || ducas* (permission) *easque in maxumam malam crucem* (curse); Pers. 352 *inimici famam non ita ut natast ferunt. || ferant eantque in maxumam malam crucem*; Ps. 1015 *quid nunc ? || argentum des, abducas mulierem*, a demand or expression of will and a permission or expression of willingness. A few other cases occur here and there, the difference growing slighter as the two verbs approach in meaning.

The classification of acts of will according to the nature of the action willed appears to rest upon a good psychological basis. The attitude of the mind in willing that another person shall retain an object which belongs to him is different from the attitude of willing that he shall give up what is not his. Through all the long succession of choices and determinations, the mind is

constantly changing its tone by slight and almost imperceptible degrees. Language, it is true, does not find distinct expression for each of these varying shades of will, but they exist in the mind of the speaker and are felt, by suggestion, by the hearer, and therefore become a restricting and modifying force, shaping the modal meaning.

The same conclusion follows from the modal behavior of single verbs. *mereo* (-or) is used 5 times, all in the limited sense *non* (*quid*) *merear* (*mereat*), like the English 'I would not do it for the world.' The meaning of the verb inclines it, though it does not necessarily confine it, to expressions of hypothetical determination, excluding the ordinary jussive uses. *patiar* is found only in 1st sing., in repudiating sentence questions; Asin. 810 *egone haec patiar aut taceam?*, Men. 559 *egone hic me patiar esse in matrimonio . . . ?* In these cases it is an insertion, like *uin* or like *dicam* in *quis* questions. Its sense does not exclude it from other uses (*perpetiare* is used once in advice), but it makes it peculiarly fitted for a single use. *habeas* is usually an ironical permission, though it is also used in other ways. *dicam* occurs 33 times, but only twice in expressions of will, both in repudiating sentence questions. It is inserted in *quis* questions 16 times, is used in parataxis 8 times and 7 times in hypothetical (or perhaps here I may say potential) uses. *dicat* is used once and *dicant* 4 times in hypothetical senses; that is, out of 55 cases of *dicere* in the subjunctive, 12 are hypothetical, much beyond the ordinary proportion, which is about 1 : 50. This tendency toward the hypothetical may be like the English 'I should think'; but I am not concerned here with the explanation; whatever that may be, the fact of the tendency of *dicere* away from the ordinary uses is plain. The verbs used in the 1st person plural are all verbs of activity; there are no cases of *esse*, *scire*, *dicere*, *habere*, *velle*. The marked subjunctive force of this person almost excludes verbs which are strictly *verba sentiendi et declarandi*. The verb *esse* might be expected to show an equal distribution over the whole range of subjunctive use. It is, however, limited in three directions:—a) It is essentially passive in meaning and therefore unfitted for the more direct and vigorous expressions of will. Among the 11 cases where it is used of desire, there is no case of demand or command. The two cases in 2d sing. are the mildest kind of permission; the seven cases in 3d sing. are either concessions (*sit per me quidem*) or expressions of propriety, of the

character that a type should have (*improbis sit cum improbis*). *b*) Its general and vague sense calls especially for paratactic additions, which are used in 29 of the 92 cases and by which greater directness and force can be given to the verb (*fac sis frugi*). Other defining words, adverbs and particles, are also unusually frequent with it. *c*) The fact that *esse* combines with a predicate shades its sense in various ways and gives rise to some narrowly restricted idioms, especially in wishes like *saluos sis, male sit tibi*.

No single usage of the subjunctive is more distinctly marked than the wishes which contain *di* or the name of a god: *di te perdant, Iuppiter te perdit, ita me di ament*, etc.; they have been given above in some detail. One of the forces which bring about this distinctness has been spoken of above, under person and number; the fact that the gods are to be the actors shuts out many kinds of will. To this restricting agency another is added by the meaning of the verbs. The situation in which it would be natural to exhort or command or entreat a person to destroy himself would be very rare, and the natural result of the working of two restricting forces is to produce a group of sharply defined idioms.

One verb, *uelle*, is so remarkable in its modal behavior as to call for special notice, although the uses are not due so much to its limiting force as to its peculiar adaptability to the subjunctive mode. It is used in the present tense 78 times, of which 73 (or 74) are *uelim* and compounds. All other verbs together are used in 1st sing. pres. of desire or will not more than 20 or 30 times. In the impf. 1st sing. *uellem* and compounds are used 17 times, while other verbs are not used at all except with *utinam* or in questions or parataxis. That is, *uelle* is used three or four times as often as all other verbs together in expressions of will in the 1st person singular. The cases are classified above according to their syntactical relations, and the meaning of each group is given. *uellem* differs from *uelim* only in tense, expressing a present wish about a past act; it is never the subjunctive of *uolebam*.

As to the force of *uelim*, the following points deserve notice:

1) *uelim* is not in Plautus a subjunctive of 'mild assertion' or of 'modesty.' The proof of this is in the cases themselves, of which full lists are given above. In most cases any such meaning is absolutely excluded, for example, in the cases which express a

curse (*pulmoneum edepol nimis uelim uomitum uomas; perii. || uerum sit uelim; in anginam ego nunc me uelim uorti*). In a few cases, taken alone, such an interpretation is not impossible, though it is not anywhere necessary. As all these cases must be essentially alike, we are bound to adopt that interpretation which is possible for all, not that which is possible for only a part of the cases. The instances which seem most like a mild assertion are those with *malim*, which are really influenced by the comparative degree (cf. *potius*).

2) There is no stronger evidence that *uelim* is potential. The closest parallel should be *faxim*, which is always hypothetical, but *faxim* regularly has a protasis either in the same sentence or in the immediate context, while *uelim* has a protasis in only 5 cases (these are not included in the lists above), 4 with *si possim* (*possit*). In the large majority of cases the sense excludes a potential meaning just as clearly as it excludes the idea of modesty or politeness.

3) *uelim* is in Plautus a sign of a wish, an optation, parallel in the main to *utinam*. This usage is mentioned in some of the grammars,¹ as a secondary use of *uelim*. It may have been secondary in classical Latin, but in Plautus it is the first and the prevailing use. I should explain it as having arisen by attraction through parataxis. The simple subjunctive, *ueniat* for instance, is frequently so indefinite as to call for a defining addition (see below, on parataxis). Alone *ueniat* might mean 'tell him to come,' 'let him come,' 'make him come,' 'I desire (will) that he should come' or 'I wish he would come.' Of the various paratactic additions which supply the needed definition, *uolo* emphasizes the will, while *uelim*, repeating the mode of *ueniat*, emphasizes the modal force, the optative, and differentiates (*uolo*) *ueniat* 'I will that he should come,' from (*uelim*) *ueniat* 'I wish that he would come.' In the same way *patiar* is inserted into a repudiating sentence question, assuming the mode of the verb, which then becomes an infin., and *dicam* is inserted into *quis* questions. Cf. Verg. Aen. IV 24 sed mihi uel tellus optem prius ima dehiscat, X 443 cuperem ipse parens spectator adesset. In this way *uelim* became, like *utinam*, a sign of the wish. In contrast with *uolo* it is a milder word, and it became finally almost a separate verb, meaning 'I wish,' and is used in this sense increasingly in later Latin with scarcely any feeling of its original optative force. But

¹ A. and G., 267, c; Gildersleeve, 261, 546, 2.

the continuance of its paratactic use in familiar style (*uelim existimes*, Cic. ad Fam. I 9, 24; *uelim uerum sit*, ad Att. XV 4, 4) is a reminder of its origin.

If this hypothesis as to the origin and use of *uelim* is correct, the meaning of *uelle* determines its modal use, not, as in the case of some verbs, by its unfitness for certain uses, but by its peculiar adaptability to other (the wishing and willing) uses.

A further illustration of the effect of the meaning of the verb upon the modal force may be found by comparing the similar influence of verb-meaning upon other constructions. Blase, *Geschichte des Plusquamperfekts im Lat.*, pp. 9 f., 35 f., has shown how the shifted sense of the plupf. tense extends along the line of verbs of obligation, *oportuerat*, *debuerat*, *aequom erat*. Foth, *Verschiebung lateinischer Tempora*, in Boehmer's *Roman. Stud.*, 1876, pp. 243 ff., shows that the peculiar present sense of the perfects *fui* 'I am no more,' *habui* 'I have no longer,' is the result of verb-meaning. A still better, because more distinctly independent, support may be found in the discussion of Greek tenses by Hultsch, *Die erzählenden Zeitformen bei Polybios*, which I know only through the review in *A. J. P.* XVI 2 (62), by C. W. E. Miller. Exactly as the inherent temporal force of Greek verbs modifies and limits the meaning of tenses, so that the aorist of one verb is not the same as the aorist of another, so does the different modal meaning of verbs modify and limit the modal force.

From these suggestions, imperfect and superficial as I am conscious that they are, I draw two conclusions. In the first place, it is obvious that a consideration of the effect of the verb-meaning upon the mode, intensifying or lessening or shifting the modal force, may be of considerable service in accurate interpretation. In the second place, though the verb-meaning alone may not be the cause of idioms or of restricted and precise usages, it may combine with other forces to produce such usages. The most marked illustration is in the wishes like *saluos sis*, *di te perdant*. And when several forces are thus combined, a very distinct influence may be exerted upon a great number of subjunctive usages.

The influences thus far considered, from person, number, tense, voice and verb-meaning, are inherent in the form. No subjunctive can exist without feeling some or all of them. The forces which remain to be considered are exerted upon the subjunctive by

other words in the sentence. These are apart from the subjunctive form, but, as a bare subjunctive, without other words, is of rare occurrence, and even then the preceding sentences influence the mode, we may say that the form of the sentence, which is to be treated next, is almost as necessary and inherent an influence as person and number.

5. *The Interrogative Sentence.*

The first and most striking fact is the difference in extent of usage between the subjunctive in questions and the subjunctive in non-interrogative sentences. Omitting *uelim* and cases with *utinam*, but including the hypothetical uses and the indefinite 2d pers., the statistics stand thus :

	Non-interrog.	Interrog.
1st sing.,	34	212
2d sing.,	177	24
3d sing.,	179	20

These figures, with the ratio of 1 : 6 in 1st sing. more than reversed in the 2d and 3d sing., are in themselves proof that the relation of the subjunctive to the sentence differs with the form of the sentence, or, in other words, that the interrogative form is a force which favors the use of the 1st sing., while it partially excludes the 2d and 3d sing. The difference is in the changed relation of speaker and willer in the question. In the non-interrogative sentence in 1st sing. the speaker, the willer and the actor are one person; in the question the speaker asks (or exclaims) about the will of the other person in regard to his (the speaker's) action. The speaker and the willer are two different persons. *sed maneam etiam* means, in full, 'I will (judge, decide) that I should remain'; *maneam?* means 'do you will that I should remain?' The first situation is rare, the second is very common. We must therefore note that in questions in 1st sing. we are dealing with a subjunctive which seems to be the same as the 1st sing. in non-interrogative sentences, but which is in reality different in the very important point of the relation of speaker and actor to willer. The situation in questions in 1st sing. in fact corresponds (with some exceptions, which will be noticed) rather to the 2d sing. in non-interrogative sentences. And, on the other hand, the question in 2d sing. corresponds to the non-interrogative 1st sing., in that the willer and actor are one, though the speaker

is a different person. That is, *abeam?* may be said to be the interrogative form of *abeas*, and *abeas?* 'you want to go away?' the interrogative of *abeam* 'I want to go away.'

But beside this general effect produced by the interrogative form, the particular kind of question also affects the mode in narrower but equally distinct ways.

The sentence question with simple subjunctive (without parataxis) is largely exclamatory. Of the 77 sentence questions, all but six or eight are repudiating. The repudiation is not a matter of mode; questions of the same form, with *egone*, etc., or exclamatory repetitions without a particle are always repudiating, even with the indicative. When the previous sentence contains a statement, the statement is rejected; when it contains an expression or implication of will, the repudiation is directed upon the will. Occasionally special emphasis leads to a separation of the will and the repudiation, as in Poen. 149 *egone istuc ausim facere?*, where *faciam* is expanded into *ausim facere*, in order to make the repudiation stronger, as 'I should not wish (venture) to do that' is stronger than 'I would not do it.'

In these cases the subjunctive is not dubitative or deliberative. It is a simple subjunctive of will or desire, repeated with the necessary change of person and corresponding in general to the 2d sing. non-interrogative.¹ There are, however, a few cases which correspond to the 1st sing. in soliloquy in non-interrogative sentences. They are the disjunctive questions in Cist. 641, Curc. 589, Merc. 128 (but this is better taken as an indirect question); in form Pers. 26 *deisne . . . aduorser? cum eis belligerem . . .?* is deliberative and in soliloquy, but the sense is repudiating. In a few cases, where *quid agam (faciam)?* precedes, there is a slight pretence of deliberation. But the whole number is small, certainly less than one-twelfth of the sentence questions.

It has been said that the repudiating exclamations reject the expressed or implied desire of the other person. But will can be repudiated only by will. In the brief and typical form *abi. || abeam?* the exclamation means 'You want me to go away!', but it also implies 'I don't want to go away.' The will of the person addressed is repeated in the mode, the will of the speaker is indicated by the form of the sentence. Now, in many cases the previous implication of will is not strong, while the repudiation is

¹ Cf. the latest and best discussion of these questions by Wilh. Guthmann, Ueber eine Art unwilliger Fragen im Lat., Nürnberg, 1891.

definite and positive. In such cases the force of the mode is weakened to a claim or an expression of obligation, so that it might, at first sight, be overlooked entirely, and the sentence might be called deliberative because only the will of the speaker is apparent. E. g., St. 297 *nunc ultro id deportem?* is in a soliloquy; the idea has occurred to the speaker, as if it were a suggestion from without, that he might offer his good news unasked. But he at once rejects the idea by the form of the exclamation, and makes the rejection plainer by the next words, *hau placet neque id uiri officium arbitror*. It is only when the suggestion is faint and there is no rejection in the form of the sentence, that the question can properly be called deliberative. There are few cases as near the line as St. 297; usually a fairly careful examination of the context makes the case plain. The will of the speaker, in all such exclamations, is suggested by the form of the sentence and has nothing whatever to do with the mode.

None of these forms is a true question, asked in order to have a reply. The subjunctive alone was too vague, too liable to confusion with repudiation or deliberation. For a true question, clearly expressed, the will must be separated from the act willed. A question in regard to the act would be either a simple form of sentence question (with *-ne* appended to the verb) or a *quis* question; a question in regard to the will was expressed by the insertion of *uin* in parataxis, as in Men. 606 *uin hunc rogem?*, Poen. 990 *uin appellem hunc Punice?* This form of question occurs 26 times (lists above). It must of course be supposed that there was a time when the bare subjunctive, *appellem* or perhaps *appellemne*, was capable of expressing this sense, but the form *uin appellem* expressed it so much more clearly that *appellem* alone fell back into the more restricted function of repudiation, and the intermediate forms (*appellemne*) fell out of use.

With the *quis* question the matter is somewhat more complicated, since the variety in the form of the question is greater. In general, there are here also two lines of usage, differing according as they relate to the will of the speaker or to the will of the person addressed. They are well illustrated in the *quid faciam?*, *quid agam?* forms, which are given in some detail in the lists. *quid faciam* is usually a question for advice or direction, following an *impv.* or its equivalent, and answered, if at all, by an *impv.* or equivalent. At the other extreme *quid ego nunc faciam?* is

usually in soliloquy and deliberative, and *quid ego nunc agam?* is invariably so, with no reference to the will of another person. Between these extreme uses *quid ego faciam (agam)?* and *quid nunc faciam (agam)?* are used either way, perhaps leaning a little more toward the deliberative. There is but one explanation of these facts. They illustrate the gradual advance of language, by the formation of special idioms, from a single widely inclusive expression to more specialized and precise expressions. *quid faciam?* was once used for both functions, to ask for advice or to express deliberation. But as the difference between these functions was felt, *quid faciam?* was expanded into *quid ego nunc faciam?* for the deliberative, and *quid faciam?* retained only the more direct function. For the most precise expression of a question in regard to the will of another person it was expanded, as the sentence question was, by the insertion of *uis* into *quid uis faciam?* or, as in Most. 556, into *quid nunc faciundum censes?* That these are all one and the same 'subjunctive' seems to me beyond question, and that subjunctive use is the same that is found in all exclamatory repetitions of an expression of will, i. e. is itself a subjunctive of will. It is modified, first, by the fact that it is in a question and therefore is concerned with the will of the person addressed, and, second, by the use of a question that is originally meant for dialogue in monologue, where the speaker addressed the question to himself. *quid faciam?* 'What do you want me to do?' then becomes 'What do I want myself to do?,' and, as in soliloquy in non-interrogative sentences, the self-address confines the will to narrow limits, to ideas of determination or choice or propriety, as in *sed maneam etiam* or *taceam optimumst.* Further, such a question, 'What am I to do?,' spoken in soliloquy, suggests ideas like 'What can I do?,' which have sometimes led to the use of the term potential for this kind of subjunctive; not improperly, if the fact is kept in mind that it is directly connected with the subjunctive of will. The name deliberative also applies well to these questions, though not so well to the mode. The deliberation is in the question more than in the subjunctive, and is expressed even in questions which have the indicative (*quid ago?*), where we do not speak of the 'deliberative indicative.'

The same general distinction between questions of will addressed to another person and questions of deliberation in soliloquy runs through all the *quis* questions. The forms are not so well marked

as in the idiomatic *quid faciam?*, nor can the connecting forms be pointed out so distinctly. In questions like *quem te diuom autem nominem?*, *quam ob rem ego argentum enumerem foras?* the force of the mode is obscured by various other ideas and is not so easily felt as in an empty form like *quid faciam?* The number of questions that can properly be called deliberative is small, but the distinction is a real one. It is supported, too, by the usage in indirect *quis* questions. These, omitting the cases where a question is not asked, but the statement is made that a question was asked (Becker in Studemund's Stud. I, p. 211 f.), depend either upon an inserted *uis* or upon *nescio* or its equivalent (Aul. 730, nunc mi incertumst quid agam. abeam an maneam an adeam an fugiam: quid agam edepol nescio).

Beside these general characteristics, common to all *quis* questions, there are certain peculiarities which are due to the form of *quis*. These have been given in the lists, and I note here only the more striking.

quo modo is in all cases but one an appeal implying *nullo modo*, e. g. M. G. 1206 *quo modo ego uiuam sine te?*, and this runs easily into a translation by *can*, as in some cases of *quid faciam?* Cf. Ps. 236 *quonam uincere pacto possim animum?*

Questions with *quid* 'why' and *quor* regularly imply a negative answer. A question in regard to the motive or reason for acting is of necessity argumentative, and the argumentative tone excludes command, so that the subjunctive expresses only a vague sense of obligation, imposed by the person addressed and repudiated by the speaker. Cf. the same tendency in repudiating sentence questions.

In *qui ego istuc credam?* (the only use of *qui* 'how') there is the same argumentative and rejecting sense, but it is here modified by the meaning of the verb *credere*. Belief is not under the control of the will; *credas* would inevitably slip into 'You should (ought to) believe'; even *crede mihi* is an appeal. And *qui . . . credam?* rejects the implied obligation to believe by the implied answer 'I cannot.'

On the other hand, the forms *quem*, *quo* 'whither,' *quid* as object, do not modify the force of the subjunctive, except in the general ways noted above for all questions.

From what has been said I hope it may be clear that the interrogative form of sentence is a most potent force in influencing the meaning of the mode. That mode is the same, in origin and

in essential meaning, in questions as in non-interrogative sentences, but the question form excludes or greatly restricts the more direct expressions of will, introduces the reference to the will of another person, and implies by the repudiating form an exertion of the speaker's will. In certain idioms with specialized forms of *quis*, the idea of will is diminished to a sense of obligation, and by association and suggestion the subjunctive so far approaches the potential meaning that it may be translated by *can* and negated by *non*.

With the following sections I come to consider the meaning and effect of added words, not at all a part of the mode, which help out the mode where it lacks clearness and add related meanings.

Looked at historically, the sentence is the result of gradual accretions gathering about a nucleus. The single cries or words which were the primitive signs of emotion and thought corresponded in their vagueness and inclusiveness—in their applicability to a wide range of different occasions and objects—to the vagueness of primitive thought. The words which gradually added themselves to the nucleus were the signs of the gradual rise into consciousness of one or another modifying or defining aspect of the general idea. Such new features of the thought and the new words which represented them were on the one hand related to the original germ and had elements of likeness to it, and on the other hand they added something which was not contained in the original sentence. This process of sentence-growth, which must have been infinitely complex, still continues in language as long as the language is in a formative stage, repeating itself on a small scale in the growth of idiomatic phrases. The expansion of *quid faciam?* to *quid ego nunc faciam?* is of this sort. And along the line of this general principle is to be found the explanation of nearly all subjunctive parataxis in Plautus.

6. *Parataxis*.

There are some 315 or 320 cases of paratactic use of the subjunctive, occurring as set down in the accompanying table. The group at the end, mainly of verbs of saying and causing, comprises the cases of indirect quotation, in which the leading verb states that an expression of will has been used. The remaining cases, about 300 in number, are all of one kind. The

leading verb is rarely modified by adverbs or phrases ; it usually stands next to the subjunctive, either before or after it, and it frequently comes in the middle of the sentence. An examination of a few of these cases, of which full lists have been given, will make it entirely clear that what is called the leading verb, syntactically, is not the leading verb in thought, but an addition,

	<i>Present.</i>						
	1	2	3	1	2	3	
sine,	18	1	14			1	
fac, facito, facite, 9	20	10			3	8	Perf. 2d sing., 1.
iube,			3			2	
uide,		2				1	
roga,			1				
cedo,	2						
da, date,	1		1				
mane,	1						
caue,	1	10	1		1	1	Perf. 2d sing., 16 ; 3d sing., 1 ; Sigm. aor. 2d sing., 16
uolo,		8	7	2	3	1	
malo,		1	1				
nolo,		5	3			1	
opsecro, etc.,					3		Lists entirely incomplete.
credo, etc.,				1			Incomplete. Impf. 2d sing., 2 ; 3d sing., 1.
nil interdico,						1	
faxo,		8	4			2	Perf. 2d sing., 2 ; 3d sing., 3.
faciam,			2			1	
uelim,		4	7				Perf. 3d sing., 2 ; 3d plur., 2.
malim,		1	1				
uellem,							Impf. 3d plur., 1 ; Plupf. 3d sing., 1 ; 3d plur., 1.
mallem,							Impf. 3d sing., 1.
(si) exoptem.						1	
faxim,		1	1			5	
(utinam) faxint,						1	
optumumst,	6	1					
necessest,	1						
decretumst,	1						
certumst,	5						
nil opust,			1				
licet,		4	2				
decet,						1	
censen.	1						
(quid) uis,	3						
uin, uis,	26	1		2			
credin,			1				
potin,		2					
Other indic..	4			2		1	Scattering, 8.
	<u>24</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>28</u>	Present, 259 ; other tenses, 52. Total, 317.

an insertion, into a sentence already formed. The germ of the sentence is the subjunctive verb; to it almost all the modifying words—subject, object, adverbs—belong, and the sentence would be intelligible, though not equally precise, without the indicative verb. In many cases sentences very similar or even absolutely identical occur without the added verb. With the few exceptions spoken of above—and I think it could be shown that these are not really exceptions—all cases of paratactic subjunctive in Plautus are of this kind.

It has been said above of the sentence in general that the additions to it have always something in common with the germ out of which they come, some element which is a repetition of an element in the central idea, and that they also bring something new, which was not before in the sentence. This is true also of the added paratactic verbs; they both repeat and amplify.

The idea which is taken up from the subjunctive verb and repeated may appear in the form of the added verb or in its meaning or in both. It appears in the form when an impv., *sine*, *fac*, *uide*, is used with a subjunctive in 1st or 2d pers. Thus *amem* means 'I want to love you,' and *sine* repeats and emphasizes the expressed desire; *uideas* expresses a command which the impv. *fac* repeats; and so in *fac sciam*, *fac sis frugi*, *praecepta sobrie adcuras face*, *linguam conpescas face*, and many more. Any of these subjunctives might stand alone, but the jussive force would be less clearly expressed than it is when it is strengthened by the impv. verb.

The meaning of the subjunctive is repeated in the meaning of the leading verb by *uolo*, *malo*, *nolo* (together about one-tenth of all the cases), by *opsecro*, *quaeso*, *oro* (the lists of which, I regret to say, are entirely incomplete), used with the 2d and 3d pers. chiefly, where the speaker is emphasizing or defining his own will, and by *licet*, *nil opust*, *decet*, which define the nature of the desire. Thus *animum aduortas* may stand alone as an expression of will, but the will of the speaker is doubled when *uolo* is added. So *taceas malo quam . . .*, *habeas licet*, *hoc agas uolo*, *iuris iurandi uolo gratiam facias*, and many more. The phrases in the impersonal group, *optimumst*, *necessesst*, *decretumst*, *certumst*, are used almost exclusively with 1st sing. and repeat those modified kinds of desire which are latent in these infrequent forms. *sed maneam etiam* might perfectly well have been explained by *optimumst*, as *sed taceam* (Epid. 59) would have

been intelligible without *optumumst*; or *quod perdundumst properem perdere* might be glossed by *necessest*. These all belong to the subjunctive of will. The subjunctive of view or opinion is occasionally repeated in *censeo*, *credo*, *scio*, though these verbs, used with the subjunctive, may express an opinion as to what is best, as in *sed maneam etiam*, *opinor*, where *opinor* is nearly the same as *optumumst*. As the more direct expressions of will imply a determination on the part of the speaker to see that the command is obeyed, they are emphasized by *faxo*, *faciam*.

In a few cases the idea of the mode is repeated both in the form and the meaning of the added verb. So especially *sine*, and also *roga*, *iube*, though these have more to do with defining the relation of persons. The group of subjunctives, *uelim*, *malim*, *uellem*, *mallem*, also belong here, repeating by their meaning the will-force of the mode and by their form defining the will as a wish. *faxim* is used only in apodosis, where the subjunctive verb was or would have been the apodosis if *faxim* had not been thrust in; e. g. Pers. 73 *si id fiat*, *faxim* *nusquam* *appareant*, Amph. 511 *si sciat . . .*, *ego faxim* *ted* *Amphitruonem* *esse* *malis*. The hypothetical idea is doubled. The one case of *faxint* is perhaps clearer; Amph. 632 *utinam* *di faxint* *infecta dicta re eueniant tua*, where the added thought, *di faxint*, is a wish because *utinam eueniant* alone would have been a wish. These cases afford, I think, some independent support to the explanation of *uelim* given above. The use of *uis* in *quis* questions and of *uin* in sentence questions may also be mentioned here. The verb by its meaning repeats the meaning of the mode and by its combination with *quis* or *-ne* repeats the question.

Repetition, however, is not the function of these added verbs; it is only the condition which makes their close union with the subjunctive possible. Their function is to define, to bring out more clearly the particular kind of will or desire which is expressed too vaguely in the mode, or to express with precision something in the relation of the persons involved which the subjunctive merely suggests.

As to the meaning of the mode, to illustrate the definition of it by examples would be to repeat the lists already given. Will in its more direct forms is defined by *uolo*, *uis*, *uin*; wish (optation) by *uelim*; preference by *malo*; determination and choice by *faxo*, *decretumst*, *certumst*; entreaty by *opsecro*, *oro*; permission by *licet*; propriety by *decet*; necessity by *necessest*; decision and

sense of obligation by *optumumst*; belief, opinion by *credo, censeo, scio*. The expressions of desire which appear infrequently or not at all in parataxis are those which are in themselves most explicit, the 1st plur. and the 2d sing. of command: the latter, however, is frequently intensified by *fac* or *uolo*. The variety and extent of these uses, defying precise classification, indicate the variety of application of which the subjunctive was capable.

It is chiefly in the 3d person that the relation of the persons involved needs definition, because here the hearer may be concerned with the action, though his part is left to suggestion. In many cases this makes no difference. When the subject is in the plural or is one of a class, and, generally, when the hearer is merely a bystander, other forces, chiefly due to person and number, limit the range of the mode so that further definition is unnecessary. But when both hearer and actor are definite persons, it is often necessary for the sake of clearness that the hearer's part should not be left to suggestion. The varieties of usage and the corresponding paratactic forms have been sufficiently illustrated above. Amph. 951 *euocate huc Sosiam: . . . Blepharonem arcessat*, suggests the same idea which is definitely expressed by the addition of *iube*¹ in Most. 930 *dic me aduenisse filio . . . iube in urbem ueniat*. Most. 920 *hodie accipiat* implies that the slave is to attend to the matter, and in Pers. 445 *facito mulier ad me transeat*, this idea is important enough to find expression in *facito*. But, as has been said, many verbs with *fac* are passives and have few or no parallels outside of parataxis. Compare also M. G. 1100 *aurum habeat sibi . . . : sumat, habeat, auferat*, with M. G. 1244 *sine ultro ueniat, quaeritet, desideret*. In all these cases it is the need of more precise expression of the hearer's part in the action which has led to the addition of the imperative.

Some of the sporadic cases of defining parataxis are especially interesting. Of the nine cases in 1st sing. with *fac*, all are with verbs of knowing, *noscam, uideam, sciam*; a phrase meaning 'I desire to know' and addressed directly to another person is in effect an appeal for information. The phrases *da absorbeam*

¹Occasionally *iube* loses its proper sense, as in Ter. Adelph. 914 f. *iube nunciam dinumeret ille Babylo uiginti minas*; see Spengel's note. So in Most. 426 *iube uenire nunciam*, like Engl. slang 'now bring on your man,' and this is the sense once with a paratactic subjunctive, Rud. 708 *iube modo accedat prope*.

(Curc. 313), *cedo bibam* (Truc. 367, Most. 373, where the MSS give *ut bibam*, which may be right), *mane sis uideam* (Most. 849), and perhaps *concede inspiciam* (Curc. 427) illustrate a connection between the added verb and the subjunctive in which the amount, so to speak, of addition greatly exceeds the repetition. That is, *mane uideam* is a brief expression for *mane et sine uideam*, and *cedo bibam* is for *cedo et fac bibam*. Cf. Most. 344 *da illi quod bibat*, where the thought is somewhat more expanded, and Verg. Aen. IV 683 f. *date uolnera lymphis Abluam et extremus siquis super halitus errat Ore legam*. Capt. 961 *quod ego fatear, credin pudeat quom autumes?* is an expansion by the insertion of *credin*, as *uin* is inserted with a slightly different meaning; cf. also M. G. 614 *quodne uobis placeat, displiceat mihi?* In the same way *potin* is prefixed to *abeas* in Pers. 297, Cas. 731, a phrase which later expands into *potin ut abeas*. In Most. 679 f. *euocadum aliquem ocus, roga circumducat*, *roga* is substituted for the more common *iube* because the *aliquis* was not the speaker's slave.

The group of cases in which the leading verb is an indicative (other than *uolo*, *credo*, *faxo*, etc.), in all about a dozen cases, differ somewhat from the ordinary parataxis and have been passed over in the foregoing remarks. They approach more nearly the usual conception of parataxis as the joining in thought of two sentences, each of which is complete in itself. Yet in most cases a distinct relationship to complementary parataxis can be traced. Thus in Amph. 257, *uelatis manibus orant ignoscamus peccatum suom*, the mode is repeated in the meaning of *orant*. In M. G. 54, *at peditastelli quia erant, siui uiuerent*, there is combined a quotation of a past thought ("I said to myself '*uiuant*'") and a repetition of the subjunctive in *sino*. So in nearly all the verbs which quote a subjunctive, *uoltis*, *suades*, *impetraui*, *rogarat*, *coniurauimus*, *accuratum habuit*, there is an element of meaning which harmonizes with the mode. In Stich. 624, *dixi in carcerem ires*, there is no repetition of the mode, such as would be expressed by *iussi*, but simple quotation. The greatest expansion of the prefixed verb, so great that it would perhaps be correct to speak of it as an independent sentence, appears in St. 177 *hoc nomen repperi eo quia paupertas fecit ridiculus forem*, and Rud. 681 *quae uis (the noun) uim mi adferam ipsa adigit*.

I have said nothing thus far of the negative verbs, *nolo*, *nil interdico* (*interduo*), *nil opust*, or of *caue*. The process of accre-

tion cannot have produced the negative sentence out of the affirmative; every negative sentence must have been negative in thought from the beginning of its conception. Such a phrase, therefore, as *nolo ames* (Cas. 233) does not begin with *ames* and then prefix *nolo*; it begins with the prohibition, *ne ames*, and expands that by the insertion of *uolo* into *ne-uolo ames*. With *caue* the matter is more complicated. It is used 47 times; 10 times with pres. 2d sing., 16 with perf. 2d sing., 16 with the sigmatic aorist 2d sing., the rest scattering. These are the forms which are also largely used with *ne* in prohibitions, and in many uses *caue* and *ne* are exactly parallel. Thus Capt. 439 *caue fidem fluxam feras* (*geras* GS.), and 443 *infidelior mihi ne fuas quam ego sum tibi*; Capt. 431 *horunc uerborum causa caue tu mi iratus fuas*, and Amph. 924 *ignosce, irata ne sies*; Pers. 816 *caue sis me attigas, ne tibi . . . malum magnum dem*, and Truc. 276 *ne attigas me*. So *ne feceris* and *caue feceris*, *ne dixeris* and *caue dixeris*, *ne istuc dixis* and *caue tu istuc dixis*. On the other hand, there are no cases of *caue* parallel to the frequent *ne postules* (*censeas, frustra sis*) and none like *molestus ne sis*, which is common. The sentences with *caue* are generally longer and are more frequently accompanied by *sis* (*si uis*). It would appear that while *caue* has in a considerable number of cases sunk to a mere negative, not to be distinguished from *ne*, it has also retained enough of its proper verbal force to prevent its use in certain forms of prohibition. It is not likely that the sinking to a negative force can have occurred except through the use in combination with another verb, for a prohibition implies an action to be prohibited. As long as it was used alone, *caue* would mean 'take care!' or 'beware!' It could mean 'don't' only when some definite action was proposed. The prohibition with *ne* must be older than the prohibition with *caue*, and that in its turn is probably older than *caue ne*, which is rare in early Latin (only half a dozen times in Plautus). All this would be explained if we suppose that *caue* was prefixed to the subjunctive, chiefly in 2d sing., on the analogy of other impvv., *sine, fac, iube, uide*, as a periphrasis of the *ne* prohibition, but with a slightly different force, emphasizing the watchfulness and the activity of the person addressed, in accordance with the proper meaning of *cauere*. This would be analogous to the prefixing of *uelim* to differentiate the wish from the expression of will by means of *uolo*. The natural sphere of such a use would be in the more elaborate and

formal prohibitions, but it would tend to degenerate into an equivalent of *ne*, though never so far as to be used at all frequently in blunt prohibitions like *molestus ne sis*.¹

The term parataxis, which has been used above of the prefixing of a verb to a subjunctive, is commonly employed to designate the dependence of a sentence complete in itself upon another complete sentence, without any sign of the subordination. It is in this sense that the word is used by Draeger, §§368–75, and by Stolz-Schmalz, §208, and this is sometimes regarded as the only proper use of the term.² But this kind of parataxis is only the most obvious form of dependence without subordinating sign, which has been accepted as representative of parataxis in general. It needs to be broken up, to be analyzed, so that the different varieties of the process which has produced all subordinating words may be more accurately understood. The program of Weissenhorn (*Parataxis Plautina*, Burghausen, 1884) and the dissertation of Weninger (*de parataxis in Ter. fab. uestigiis*, Erlangen, 1888) follow the lines of Draeger, and the fuller work which seemed to be promised by Becker's program (*Beiordnende und unterordnende Satzverbindung*, Metz, 1888) has not yet appeared. Lindskog (*de parataxi et hypotaxi ap. prisc. lat.*, Lundae, 1896) deals chiefly, though not wholly, with what may be called *correlative* parataxis, where the two sentences are balanced by the repetition of like words or by some other similarity in the structure (Tac. Ann. I 28 *tarda sunt, quae in commune expostulantur: priuatam gratiam statim mereare, statim recipias*). This variety of parataxis must be fully studied in order to reach an understanding of the relative or of protasis and apodosis. In what has been said above I have dwelt upon the facts at greater length because the prefixing of the verb seems to be a different and hitherto little noticed variety of the subordin-

¹ It is possible that *caue ne* may have an independent origin from *caue: ne facias*, but it is also possible (and to me it seems more probable) that it is an expansion of *caue facias* by the insertion of *ne*, after *ne* had acquired conjunctive force. So I should explain some phrases with *ut* (e. g. *fac ut ualeas* as an expansion of *fac ualeas*), though doubtless in many cases both *ne* and *ut* were a part of the subordinated sentence. Another explanation of, e. g., *caue cadas* as meaning originally 'look out! you may fall' is difficult because *cadat* alone in Plautus would never mean 'you may fall,' and, if it had that meaning, would not take a prefixed imperative.

² So Earle, Proc. Amer. Phil. Assoc., Dec. 1894, p. 50. The prefixing of *βούλει, θέλεις*, which is like the insertion of *uis, uin*, he calls *verbal preposition*.

ating process, and to be of some value for the explanation of certain subordinate clauses. It will explain, in part, the limitation of the *ut* clause to certain kinds of leading verbs, the presence of the negative in the leading clause upon which a *quin* clause depends, and it has been largely instrumental in producing the indirect question. Any process through which subordinating force is acquired may fairly be called parataxis; this variety might be called *defining* or *complementary* parataxis.

Nothing could show more clearly than these constructions the wide applicability of subjunctive forms, or—if we attempt to group them and to speak of the meaning of the subjunctive—the inherent vagueness of the mode. In spite of the effect of person and number, of tense, voice, form of sentence, verb-meaning, all working more or less effectively toward precision, a paratactic addition is needed in about one-fifth of the cases in Plautus to bring out clearly the latent meaning. And the more one examines the cases, the more will the variety and beauty of this means of attaining to precise expression be apparent. They are a running commentary on the meaning of the mode, showing both by what they repeat and by what they add how the mode is to be interpreted. They show where and how the mode seemed inadequate to those who used it, and for correct interpretation, at least in colloquial Latin, they are of more service than any other means at our disposal.

Of other words, adverbs and particles, which limit and define the meaning of the mode it is not necessary to speak in detail. Most of them are well known, and for the present purpose it is necessary only to allude to the need of distinguishing between the function of the mode and that of the particle. In Pers. 542, *uideam modo mercimonium*. || *aequa dicis*, the restrictive force is not in the mode; *uideam* alone might have any one of the meanings possible in the 1st sing., 'I want to,' 'I had better,' 'I must,' but *modo* adds a restrictive idea which is contained, it is true, in the mode, but not expressed by it. So *ita* in *ita di me ament* may be taken to be a sign of the asseveration. With *utinam* the precise steps by which it became a sign of the wish are unknown, but its use shows the need and function of such defining words. With the most distinct and vehement forms of wish it is used very rarely or not at all. Thus in the 3d plur. it is used three times, but not at all with the 118 cases which

contain the word *di*. With these *ut*, a less distinct sign of the wish, is used four times and *at*, *quin*, *qui* still more frequently. In the 3d sing. the forms *quae res bene uortat*, *bene (male) sit*, *Iuppiter te perdat*, never have *utinam*, though *ut te Mercurius perdat* occurs once. The function of *utinam* is to distinguish wishes of a general character, not already specialized by verb-meaning or by direct mention of the gods, from other uses of the subjunctive with which they might be confused. The reference of *proin*, *proinde* to the preceding thought gives it a certain argumentative force, which makes it unfitted for use with the more intense expressions of will. It is found especially with the 2d sing., though somewhat with other persons, in advice or direction, and may be said to be to some extent a mark of such uses of the subjunctive. In the same way other words, especially comparatives, are associated with the potential uses, which will be discussed below.

E. P. MORRIS.

III.—CAECILIUS OF CALACTE.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF GREEK LITERARY CRITICISM.

In the time of Augustus the two leading critics in the literary world of Greece and Rome were Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Caecilius of Calacte. Of the merits of the former it is easy to judge from his extant works. The task is more difficult in the case of the latter, whose remains are few and fragmentary. Yet the figure of Caecilius is so interesting, and in some ways so significant, that it seems worth while to review the scattered notices of his life, and to form such general notions as we can of the nature of his writings. In this work of reconstruction not a little help may be obtained from a careful examination of the *Treatise on the Sublime*, a book attributed, by a tradition long since challenged, to Longinus, the minister of Queen Zenobia.

Suidas, our principal authority with regard to the life of Caecilius, tells us that he was a Sicilian rhetorician who practised at Rome in the time of Augustus Caesar, that he was according to some accounts of servile birth, that his original name was Archagathus, and that he was 'in faith a Jew.'¹ Suidas, it will be seen from the extract given below, adds (if the words are to be regarded as genuine) the surprising statement that his life extended till the advent of Hadrian, whose reign began more than a century after the death of Augustus. This inexactitude has led Blass to assume that Caecilius, the rhetorician, has here been confused with Q. Caecilius Niger, the quaestor of Verres, about whom Plutarch makes statements similar to those of

¹Suidas, s. v. Καικίλιος· Καικίλιος (κεκίλιος codd.) Σικελιώτης Καλαντιανός, Κάλαντις δὲ πόλις Σικελίας, ῥήτωρ, σοφιστεύσας ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἐπὶ τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ Καίσαρος καὶ ἕως Ἀδριανοῦ, καὶ ἀπὸ δούλων, ὡς τινες ἱστορήκασιν, καὶ πρότερον μὲν καλούμενος Ἀρχάγαθος, τὴν δὲ δόξαν Ἰουδαῖος. There seems little doubt (cp. Athen. VI 272, f; XI 466, a) that Καλακτῖνος and Καλάκτη should be read for Καλαντιανός and Κάλαντις. *Archagathus*, it may be added, seems to have been a specially Sicilian name: see G. Kaibel, *Inscriptiones Graecae Siciliae*, 210, 211, 212, 330 (conjecturally), 376.

Suidas.¹ It has led an earlier writer to go further still, and to assume the identity of the rhetorician and the quaestor.² But however much or however little truth there may be in these hypotheses, or in C. Müller's conjecture (F. H. G. III 331 *a*) that his ancestors had been brought as slaves from Syria to Sicily, it is not disputed that Caecilius Calactinus taught rhetoric at Rome, wherein he resembled Dionysius, of whom he was in fact an intimate friend.³

The biographical notes thus given by Suidas reappear, almost without variation, in the *Ἰωνιά* (*Violarium, bed of violets*) attributed to Eudocia, who flourished in the eleventh century, and was successively the wife of the emperors Constantine XI (Ducas) and Romanus IV (Diogenes). There is a like correspondence also in the lists of Caecilius' writings as supplied by Suidas and by Eudocia. The same works are mentioned, and in the same order.⁴ Departing from this order for the sake of convenience, we may classify the productions of Caecilius under the two heads of *history* and *literary criticism*.

Of the historical writings of Caecilius we know little. But the fact itself that he attempted history is not without an interest of its own, quite apart from the further point of contact which it affords between him and Dionysius. Athenaeus, who is here our principal informant, says that a history of the Servile Wars in Sicily was brought out by Caecilius the rhetorician of Calacte.⁵ When we remember that Caecilius was himself, according to the story, of servile origin, and when we remember, further, that his town of Calacte had been founded by the rebel leader of an earlier era, Ducetius, we can imagine that he would recount the exploits of Spartacus with peculiar zest. Athenaeus also refers to a treatise of his on history, which contained an anecdote of

¹ Plut. Cic. VII: ἀπελευθερικὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἐνοχὸς τῷ ἰουδαίῳ, ὄνομα Κεκίλιος.—Friedrich Blass, *Die griechische Beredsamkeit in dem Zeitraum von Alexander bis auf Augustus*, p. 174. But cp. Th. Reinach, *Revue des Études Juives*, XXVI 36.

² G. Buchenau, *De scriptore libri περὶ ὕψους*, pp. 41, 42.

³ Dionys. Hal., *Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium*, p. 777 (ed. Reiske): ἐμοὶ μέντοι καὶ τῷ φιλτάτῳ Καικιλίῳ δοκεῖ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα αὐτοῦ (sc. Θουκυδίδου) μάλιστά γε καὶ ζηλῶσαι Δημοσθένους.

⁴ On the spuriousness of the *Ἰωνιά* see Pulch, *Hermes*, XVII 177; A. J. P. III 489, IV 109, V 114 f., VII 104.

⁵ Athenaeus, VI 272, *f*: σύγγραμμά τε ἐκδέδωκε περὶ τῶν δουλικῶν πολέμων Καικίλιος ὁ ῥήτωρ ὁ ἀπὸ Καλῆς ἀκτῆς.

the Sicilian tyrant Agathocles.¹ Whether the work in question was theoretical or practical we cannot say. It may have been identical with one given under a somewhat different title in Suidas' list.²

And now we approach Caecilius in his special rôle, that of a literary critic. And first of all it is worth notice that his more purely literary, or aesthetic, judgments rested on a sufficiently solid foundation of verbal scholarship. He was not wanting on the technical, philological, grammatical side. The key-note of his literary activity was sounded in his *κατὰ Φρυγῶν*, which was, as its title indicates, a kind of *Antibarbarus*.³ His energies were chiefly spent in waging war against the licence of the Asiatic school, and in inculcating a pure Attic style. As a means to the same end he prepared that 'select glossary' of Attic phrases to which Suidas refers, and also a lexicon of rhetorical terms (*λεξικὸν ῥητορικόν*). Both of these were destined to have many subsequent imitators, the latter being the prototype of Harpocration, from one of whose articles, indeed, its existence is chiefly inferred. Caecilius seems also to have written an *art of rhetoric*, and a work on *figures*.⁴ The latter is frequently quoted by other Greek rhetoricians and by Quintilian.⁵

¹ Athenaeus, XI 466, a: Καικίλιος δ' ὁ ῥήτωρ, ὁ ἀπὸ Καλῆς ἀκτῆς, ἐν τῷ περὶ ἱστορίας Ἀγαθοκλέα φησὶ τὸν τύραννον, ἐκπώματα χρυσᾶ ἐπιδεικνύντα, τοῖς ἐταίροις φάσκειν, ἐξ ὧν ἐκεράμευσε κατεσκευακέναι ταῦτα.

² Suidas, l. c., περὶ τῶν καθ' ἱστορίαν ἢ παρ' ἱστορίαν εἰρημένων τοῖς ῥήτορσιν. This title would seem to show that Caecilius was well aware that the rhetorician did not always make an ideal historian.

³ Suidas' enumeration of Caecilius' writings may be conveniently given here in full from Imm. Bekker's edition, p. 555: βιβλία δὲ αὐτοῦ πολλά, κατὰ Φρυγῶν β'. ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ στοιχεῖον ἀπόδειξις τοῦ εἰρῆσθαι πᾶσαν λέξιν καλλιρρημοσύνης· ἐστὶ δὲ ἐκλογὴ λέξεων κατὰ στοιχεῖον· σύγκρισις Δημοσθένους καὶ Κικέρωνος· τίτι διαφέρει ὁ Ἀττικὸς ζῆλος τοῦ Ἀσιανοῦ· περὶ τοῦ χαρακτῆρος τῶν ῥητόρων· σύγκρισις Δημοσθένους καὶ Αἰσχίνου· περὶ Δημοσθένους, ποῖοι αὐτοῦ γνήσιοι λόγοι καὶ ποῖοι νόθοι· περὶ τῶν καθ' ἱστορίαν [ἢ παρ' ἱστορίαν, codd. et G. Bernhardius] εἰρημένων τοῖς ῥήτορσιν, καὶ ἄλλα πλεῖστα.—In the section at present under consideration Blass suggests: κατὰ Φρυγῶν β'. ἐστὶ δὲ ἀπόδειξις τοῦ (δεῖν) εἰρῆσθαι πᾶσαν λέξιν ἐν καλλιρρημοσύνῃ· ἐστὶ δὲ ἐκλογὴ λέξεων κατὰ στοιχεῖον. M. H. E. Meier (*Opuscula Academica*, I 131) proposed μετὰ καλλιρρημοσύνης. By καλλιρρημοσύνη 'elegance of diction' seems to be meant.

⁴ τέχνη ῥητορικὴ and περὶ σχημάτων. For the former cp. Quintil., *Inst. Orat.* III 1, 16.

⁵ By the rhetoricians Alexander περὶ σχημάτων (*Spengel, Rhetores Graeci*. III 7-40), Phoebammon σχόλια περὶ σχημάτων ῥητορικῶν (*ibid.* III 41-56), and Tiberius περὶ σχημάτων (*ibid.* III 57-82). By Quintilian, IX 3, 89: haec

Next come two works of a more distinctly literary cast, one illustrating the differences of the Attic and the Asiatic style, and the other characterising the ten (Attic) orators.¹ In both these writings Caecilius was on ground which he had made specially his own. Atticism as opposed to Asiaticism was his great pre-occupation, and it is in him that we find the first specific reference to the so-called canon of the ten Attic orators. That he was the first to frame the canon, we are hardly entitled to assert, though many good authorities have held that view. The probability, rather, seems to be that it should be referred neither to Rome and Caecilius, nor yet (as the traditional opinion among scholars since Ruhnken's time has been) to Alexandria, but to Pergamus and the end of the second century B. C.² Pergamus, like Alexandria, was a notable centre of learning. Rhetoric in particular flourished greatly there, as in Asia Minor generally, whereas at Alexandria it was but little studied. Over and above this general treatise on the distinctive features of the ten Attic orators, Caecilius wrote separately on the authenticity of the speeches of Demosthenes, on Antiphon, and on Lysias.³

omnia (viz. the whole question of rhetorical figures) copiosius sunt exsecuti, qui non ut partem operis transcurrerunt, sed proprie libros huic operi dedicaverunt, sicut Caecilius, Dionysius, Rutilius, Cornificius, Visellius alique non pauci, sed non minor erit eorum qui vivunt gloria. The same treatise is probably indicated in Quintilian, V 10, 7; IX 3, 38, 46, 91, 97.

¹ Suidas, l. c.: τίνι διαφέρει ὁ Ἀττικὸς ζῆλος τοῦ Ἀσιανοῦ and περὶ τοῦ χαρακτηῖρος τῶν ῥητόρων. Liddell and Scott interpret ζῆλος of Asiatic *extravagance*. But the title of Caecilius' book seems to suggest a more general meaning, such as *emulation, imitation, manner*. At the same time the word appears to be used specially of the Asiatic school. Cp. Plut., Anton. Vit. 2: ἐχρήτο δὲ τῷ καλῶμένῳ μὲν Ἀσιανῷ ζήλῳ τῶν λόγων ἀνθοῦντι μάλιστα κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον, ἔχοντι δὲ πολλὴν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ κομπῶδη καὶ φρυαγματίαν ὄντα καὶ κενοῦ γαυριάματος καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἀνωμάλου μεστόν, and Strabo, 648: Ἠγησίας ὁ ῥήτωρ, ὃς ἤρξε μάλιστα τοῦ Ἀσιανοῦ λεγομένου ζήλου, παραφθείρας τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἔθος τὸ Ἀττικόν.

² See Brzoska's learned and ingenious dissertation, *De Canone Decem Oratorum Quaestiones*, Vratislaviae, 1883. H. Usener, however, declares for Alexandria: *Dionysii Hal. librorum de imitatione reliquiae*, p. 132.

³ Suidas, l. c.: περὶ Δημοσθένους, ποῖοι αὐτοῦ γνήσιοι λόγοι καὶ ποῖοι νόθοι. [Plutarch], X *Oratorum Vitae*, 832 E: Καϊκίλιος ἐν τῷ περὶ αὐτοῦ (sc. Ἀντιφώντος) συντάγματι. [Longinus], περὶ Ὑψους, XXXII 8: ὁ Κεκίλιος ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ Λυσίου συγγράμμασιν. In this last passage the plural and the preposition are to be noted. Caecilius, it seems to be implied, often dealt with Lysias, and in the spirit of an advocate rather than a judge. Cp. Baudat, *Étude sur Denys d'Halicarnasse et le Traité de la Disposition des Mots*, p. 16.

Photius has preserved a passage from the book on Antiphon in which Caecilius remarks that that orator seldom uses the 'figures of thought,' and only where nature herself is his prompter.¹ By 'figures of thought' (σχήματα διανοίας) Caecilius denoted irony, rhetorical question, and the like, as distinguished from 'figures of language' (σχήματα λέξεως), viz. assonance, balance of clauses, and so on. The whole passage is interesting, and it forms the longest fragment we possess of Caecilius.²

The consideration of Caecilius' attitude towards another Attic orator, Lysias, brings us, as we have already noted, into direct contact with the *De Sublimitate*. In the thirty-second chapter of that treatise we read: 'Fastening on such defects [as have previously been mentioned], Caecilius, in his writings in praise of Lysias, ventured to make the assertion that Lysias was altogether superior to Plato. In so doing he gave way to his feelings, unlike a true critic, in two respects. Loving Lysias better than his own person, he nevertheless hates Plato more perfectly than he loves Lysias. He is carried away by the spirit of contention, and even his premises are not, as he thought, admitted. For he prefers the orator, as faultless and immaculate, to Plato as one who has often made mistakes. But the facts are not of this nature, nor anything like it.'³

If we accept this passage without qualification, we shall certainly feel bound to form a poor opinion of Caecilius as a judge of great literature. But we must not forget that the *De Sublimitate* is a polemical treatise. As its opening words show, it is directed against those shortcomings of Caecilius which suggested its preparation. Moreover, the author of the treatise cannot, surely, himself wish to imply more, at the most, than that Caecilius compared the two as writers solely, and not as thinkers and artists. The author (whoever he was) and Caecilius were, both of them, opposed to Asianism; and Caecilius may well have held

¹ Phot., Cod. 259, p. 485 B. 29, Bekker.

² Cp. R. C. Jebb, *Attic Orators*², I 28; F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*², I 118.—The following definition of a figure is attributed by Phoebammon (Spengel, *Rhett. Gr.* III 34) to Caecilius: Κακίλιος δὲ ὁ Καλακτίτης (codd. καλανδίτης) ὥριστο οὕτω· σχῆμά ἐστι τροπή εἰς τὸ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ τῆς διανοίας καὶ λέξεως. Is this to be harmonised with the passage in Photius on Shakespeare's principle that it is sometimes natural to be unnatural? 'This is an art | Which does mend nature, change it rather, but | The art itself is nature,' *Winter's Tale*, IV 4.

³ περὶ ὑψους, XXXII 8.

that, from this and other points of view, Lysias was a safer model for the young student of composition than Plato. So to hold would simply be to recognise that average humanity should choose more modest standards than those presented by the loftiest and most daringly original genius. But, however interpreted, the critic's words can hardly be acquitted of the charge of exaggeration; they seem to show that he was himself 'carried away by the spirit of contention.' At all events, we know from another source that Caecilius was no such blind and uncritical admirer of Lysias as is here suggested. On the contrary, he found fault with him on the ground that he was less skilful in the arrangement of arguments than in invention.¹

It will be well here to quote, without abridgment, from the *De Sublimitate* its opening sentence, for in the original it is all one sentence, though rather a long one: 'You will remember, my dear Postumius Terentianus, that when we examined together the treatise of Caecilius on the Sublime, we found that it fell below the dignity of the whole subject, while it failed signally to grasp the essential points, and in consequence conveyed to its readers but little of that practical help which it should be a writer's principal aim to give. In every systematic treatise two things are required. The first is, to indicate what the subject is. The second in order ranks higher in importance. It concerns the means and methods by which we may attain our end. Now, Caecilius essays to show the nature of the sublime by countless instances, as though our ignorance demanded it, but the consideration of the means whereby we can avail to bring our own natures to a certain pitch of elevation he has, in some strange way, passed by as unnecessary. However, it may be the man ought not so much to be blamed for his omissions as praised for his happy thought and his enthusiasm.'

It is clear from this preface that Caecilius had written a treatise—apparently a short one—of which the subject, and probably the title, was *περὶ ὕψους*. This treatise his successor in the same field, a writer who is now generally supposed to have belonged to the first century of our era rather than to the third, had examined in conjunction with his young Roman friend Postumius Terentianus.²

¹ Phot., Cod. 262, p. 489 B. 13.

² It should be noted that the MSS, in this passage, give the name as Ποστούμιο Φλωρεντιανέ. I hope to discuss this reading elsewhere, in connexion with the general subject of the authorship of the *περὶ ὕψους*.

They had found in it much to desire, but due credit is given to its author for originality in his choice of theme.¹

The work of Caecilius on the Sublime has been lost entirely, and that of his successor exists only in a mutilated form, about one-third of it having disappeared. It is therefore impossible to speak with any certainty about the two books and their relation to one another. But it seems open to question whether the later treatise was not guilty, to some extent, of the omission which, in its proëmium, it imputes to the earlier. In any case, it seems to have trodden closely in the footsteps of Caecilius, especially when treating of *figures* and *tropes*. The references to Caecilius are either direct or indirect. The direct references, besides those already mentioned, are the following. In the eighth chapter we are told that he had omitted some of the five sources of elevated speech, passion (*πάθος*) being specially mentioned. Towards the end of the chapter we have the same criticism driven home thus: 'If, however, Caecilius considered that passion never contributes at all to sublimity, and if it was for this reason that he did not deem it worthy of mention, he is altogether deceived. I would affirm with confidence that there is no tone so lofty as that of genuine passion, in its right place, when it bursts forth in a wild gust of mad enthusiasm, and fills the words, so to say, with frenzy.' In c. XXXI Caecilius is again taken to task: 'In this way, too, that original expression of Theopompus merits praise. Owing to the correspondence between word and thing, it seems to me to be very expressive; and yet Caecilius, for some unexplained reason, finds fault with it. "Philip," says Theopompus, "had a genius for *stomaching* (*ἀναγκοφαγῆσαι*) things." Now, a homely expression is sometimes much more telling than eloquent language, for it is understood at once, since it is drawn from

¹ There seems no valid reason for questioning this originality, though from the nature of the case we cannot demonstrate it. At first sight it might seem likely in itself that a man with Hebrew inclinations should conceive the idea. But we do not know precisely what was Caecilius' attitude to his theme. It would, however, appear probable, from the character of his own fragments and from his known regard for Lysias, that he favoured a plain rather than a heightened style. But we suffer everywhere from want of information. For instance, we cannot tell whether he confined (as he might almost seem to have done) his investigations to prose-writers, and excluded the poets, who figure so largely in the *De Sublimitate*. Nor yet can we assert that he did, or did not, agree with so many of his Greek and Roman contemporaries and successors in associating literary criticism with art-criticism.

common life, and the fact that it is familiar only makes it the more convincing. So the words 'stomaching things' are used most strikingly of a man who, for the sake of attaining his own ends, patiently and with cheerfulness endures things shameful and vile.' In the next chapter it is mentioned, apparently in an approving rather than in a merely critical spirit, that 'with regard to the number of metaphors to be employed, Caecilius seems to assent to the view of those who lay it down that two, or at the most three, should be ranged together in the same passage.' Finally, when in c. IV the author is illustrating the vice of *frigidity* from the writings of the historian Timaeus, he excuses himself from a lengthy enumeration of examples on the ground that 'most of them have already been quoted by Caecilius.'

Thus the direct references are, as usually happens when a new writer is treating a subject previously handled by some one else, of a rather controversial nature. But this is not all. The general contents of the treatise, and its sequence, or want of sequence, seem to be influenced by the fact that the author had the book of Caecilius before him, and assumed the same of his reader or readers. This is probably also the explanation of the rather abrupt way in which some of the literary illustrations make their appearance. And we may possibly include among indirect allusions to Caecilius such expressions as τὸν γράφοντα in c. XXXVI 3, where the passage runs: 'In reply, however, to the writer who maintains that the faulty Colossus is not superior to the Doryphorus of Polycleitus, it may be readily said, among many other things, that,' etc.; and the words ὁ τοῖς χρηστομαθοῦσιν ἐπιτιμῶν in c. II 3, where the complete sentence is: 'If, I say, the critic of those who desire to learn were to turn these matters over in his mind, he would no longer, it seems to me, regard the investigation of the subject as unnecessary and useless.' It has also been maintained that in c. II 1 the word φησί should be understood of Caecilius, but this does not seem altogether probable. There is a more likely instance in XXIX 1.¹

¹ On the whole question see M. Rothstein in *Hermes*, XXIII 1-20; L. Martens, *De Libello Περὶ Ὑψους*, Bonnae, 1877; Morawski, *Quaestiones Quintilianae*, Posnaniae, 1874, and *De Dionysii et Caecilii Studiis Rhetoricis* in *Rheinisches Museum*, XXXIV, pp. 370 seqq.; Burckhardt, *Caecili Rhetoris Fragmenta*, Basileae, 1863; Weise, *Quaestiones Caecilianae*, Berolini, 1888; F. Caccialanza, *Cecilio da Calatte e l'Ellenismo a Roma nel secolo di Augusto* (*Rivista di Filologia*, XVIII 1-73).

Suidas, it will have been noticed, ascribes to Caecilius a comparison between Demosthenes and Aeschines, and another between Demosthenes and Cicero. On the subject of the latter comparison, Plutarch in his *Life of Demosthenes* has some caustic remarks. We will forego, says he, the task of contrasting the two orators, and of pronouncing upon their superiority in charm or intensity. We must remember, he continues, the proverb about *a fish out of water*, which 'the all-accomplished Caecilius overlooked when he had the hardihood to publish a comparison between Demosthenes and Cicero. However, it may well be that if the saying *Know thyself* were always present to everybody's mind, it would not have been thought a divine behest.'¹

These severe strictures upon Caecilius recall the equally severe remark, already quoted from the *De Sublimitate*, that 'although he loved Lysias better than his own person, he nevertheless hated Plato more than he loved Lysias.' Clearly, Caecilius was unpopular. He may have been one of those men who are described, by those who like them, as original and versatile, and by those who like them not, as self-confident and audacious. We cannot disregard the mild irony of Plutarch, whose attitude is usually kindly; yet neither can we fail to recognise in Caecilius a pioneer in the fruitful region of comparative literature. And he must have been doubly a pioneer if there is truth in the suggestion that the author of the *De Sublimitate* owes to him, as being 'in faith a Jew,' his celebrated reference to the 'legislator of the Jews' and to a passage 'at the very commencement of his Book of Laws.'² There must have been originality, and true scientific instinct, in the man who, probably for the first time, compared, in however rudimentary a way, three several literatures. The *De Sublimitate* itself has a comparison—this too, very possibly, suggested by Caecilius—between Demosthenes and Cicero, in which the author likens the former to a thunderbolt, the latter to a conflagration. But it is there prefaced by an apology: *if we too, as Greeks, are permitted to form an opinion upon the point.*³ This, seemingly, is also Plutarch's doubt. If the doubt were caused by the con-

¹ Plut., Vit. Demosth., c. III: τὸ δὲ τοὺς λόγους ἀντεξετάζειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι, πότερος ἡδίων ἢ δεινότερος εἶπειν, εἰάσομεν. κακεῖ γάρ, ὡς φησιν ὁ Ἴων, δελφίνος ἐν χέρσῳ βία, ἣν ὁ περιττός ἐν ᾧ πασι Κεκίλιος ἀγνοήσας ἐνεανιεύσατο σύγκρισιν τοῦ Δημοσθένους καὶ Κικέρωνος ἐξευεγκεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἰσως, εἰ παντὸς ἦν τὸ Γνώθι σεαυτὸν ἔχειν πρόχειρον, οὐκ ἂν ἐδόκει πρόσταγμα θεῖον εἶναι.

² De Subl. IX 9.

³ Ibid. XII 4.

sciousness of imperfect knowledge of Latin, it was creditable to those who felt and owned it; but if it were due to any awe of the Roman conqueror, it would be spurned by Caecilius, who hailed from Sicily, the birthplace of rhetoric, and who had chronicled the intrepid resistance there offered to the Roman power by Spartacus.¹

It is in the independence of mind which led Caecilius, if we are right, to bring three literatures into comparison, that we seem to detect his true significance and originality. The historian of ideas—especially of rhetorical or literary ideas—must always speak with due diffidence. He is not entitled to affirm more than that, as far as his researches have gone, this or that thinker was the parent of this or that idea. With this substantial reservation, it may be claimed that Caecilius inaugurates the era of comparative literary criticism. And this, if it stood alone, would be enough to make him the man of mark he clearly was among his contemporaries and successors.

But he was also, together with his friend Dionysius, in the thick of a great movement for the purification of literary taste, the movement comprehensively known as *Atticism*. He was one of the leaders in the revolt against the tendency to prefer the florid writers (broadly termed *Asiatic*) of the age between Demosthenes and Cicero to the Attic writers of an earlier and a better time. In this controversy some originality, as well as much vigour, may safely be attributed to him. It is possible, as Wilamowitz von Moellendorff maintains, that the Atticist revival began with Apollodorus of Pergamus, who was the teacher of Octavianus and probably of Caecilius.² But it would appear that

¹ It would be interesting to determine, if we could, what knowledge of Latin was possessed by Caecilius, Dionysius Halic., Plutarch, and the author of the *De Sublimitate*. Egger's essay *De l'étude de la langue latine chez les Grecs dans l'antiquité* (contained in his *Mémoires d'histoire ancienne et de philologie*) may be consulted in the matter.—I do not think it has previously been remarked that Vaucher's elaborately developed theory that Plutarch was the author of the *De Sublimitate* seems to break down (even if there were no other objections to it) in the presence of the set comparison which the treatise contains between the oratory of Demosthenes and that of Cicero. At the same time, the evidently close relation in which the treatise stands to Caecilius is one of the chief reasons for rejecting the tradition of its third-century authorship.

² *Hermes*, XII 333; but see, on the other hand, Rohde in *Rheinisches Museum*, XLI 176.—*Suet.*, Aug. 89, and *Quint.* IX 1, 12.

Apollodorus approached the whole question in a somewhat narrow scholastic spirit. That is, at all events, the impression we form of the schools headed by Apollodorus and his rival Theodorus of Gadara.¹ They lost themselves in rhetorical rules and subtleties.² Dionysius and Caecilius seem to have stood on an altogether higher plane. They were true men of letters, not mere masters of technic. Their view of literary criticism was not mechanical, but aesthetic. They had something of the wide outlook and sympathy possessed by the best Roman writers, such as Cicero, for whom the adoption of a pure Attic standard had a living, and not simply an antiquarian interest.

W. RHYS ROBERTS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES, BANGOR.

¹Theodorus was the teacher of Tiberius, of whom he gave the famous definition *πηλὸς αἵματι πεφυραμένος* (Suet., Tiber. 57); and probably also of the author of the *Treatise on the Sublime* (cf. the use of *ἐκάλει* in the reference to him in *De Subl.* III 5).

²Strabo, p. 625; *καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ ῥήτωρ ὁ τὰς τέχνας συγγράψας καὶ τὴν Ἀπολλοδώρειον αἵρεσιν παραγαγών, ἣτις ποτ' ἐστὶ πολλὰ γὰρ ἐπεκράτει, μείζονα δὲ ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔχοντα τὴν κρίσιν, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ Ἀπολλοδώρειος αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ Θεοδώρειος*. Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, XIX: iam vero longa principiorum praeparatio et narrationis alte repetita series et multarum divisionum ostentatio et mille argumentorum gradus et quidquid aliud aridissimis Hermagorae et Apollodori libris praecipitur, in honore erat.

IV.—ARE THE LETTERS OF HORACE SATIRES?

Students of Horace have doubtless often observed that his allusions to his own satirical muse seem to give it a character of violence and acerbity which in fact it does not reveal. This is most conspicuous in those satires which deal more or less directly with questions relative to his own literary work, notably the fourth of the first book and the first of the second. The real nature of this inconsistency is not far to seek. It does not represent so much the momentary mood of the writer as it does the difference between the narrow generalizations of the literary criticism of antiquity and the wider facts of literary practice.¹ Thus, from whatever source, whether from suggestions of Lucilius himself or from the criticism, childishly imitative of Greek models, of scholars soon after his time, we find in Varro (whether in these words or not) the fixed formulation of satire as a *carmen maledicum . . . archaeae comoediae caractere compositum* (Diom., p. 485).² Horace passes the coin on without change in his allusion to Lucilius in the beginning of Serm. I 4, but in II 1 he shows that he has a very genuine appreciation of other and better qualities in the earlier satirist than those in which the critics had comprehended his genius. Yet in the same poem, for the purposes of the situation he has created, he plays with the traditional doctrine of the acerbity of satire, and threatens vengeance on his enemies with a vehemence which is un-Horatian in all but its sly fun.

The facility with which literary judgments became fixed and then, regardless of correspondence with fact, went on to affect subsequent practice, is one of the most remarkable features of ancient literary history. That only the smallest proportion

¹ It is my purpose at another time to consider in some detail the attitude of Horace toward the literary criticism of his time relative to satire.

² In this identification criticism may have been influenced not only by the ὀνομαστὶ κωμῶδειν of Lucilius, like that of the old comedy, but also by the fact that Lucilius criticised and ridiculed the work of the chief contemporary tragedian, Accius, in a manner analogous to the parody of Euripides by Aristophanes. Cf. Horace, Ser. I 10, 53 and scholia ad loc.

of the satires of Horace betray even remotely a character of personal attack did not affect or modify the theory of satire, and, living up to it as the times would allow, Persius "broke his milk teeth on Alcibiades and Dama,"¹ and Juvenal would cause the chills to course through the conscious vitals of the evil-doer. Though Persius has given us a true and admirable characterization of Horace, he still pays his tribute to the tradition of satire (I 107 ff.). Juvenal is not so discriminating, and confuses the tradition with the poet; for when, after setting forth the wrongs that burn in his heart and feed his wrath (I 45), he continues: *haec ego non credam Venusina digna lucerna, haec ego non agitem?* (vs. 51), he is of course thinking rather of the stereotyped character and function of satire than of the practice of the bard of Venusia. In Horace the theory, though frankly expressed in various places, had least effect on his practice, and he gradually worked farther and farther away from it in the development of that mild philosophical humor and playful wit which culminated in the perfect urbanity and charm of his Letters. These are so far removed from the tradition of the censorious nature of satire that it seems to have been forgotten, for the most part, that they were ever looked upon as representatives of this department of Roman poetry. Some scholars will perhaps recall that Casaubon protested with energetic emphasis against the habit of his time of considering the Letters a form of poetry separate from satire, but his words were not supported by sufficient evidence to carry conviction, and apparently the prevailing belief to-day is not different from that which he attacked three hundred years ago.² The question which I have put in my title is therefore not a new one, and a warning is due to the reader of much-abused benevolence, that it would not be summoned into court again if the writer did not hope that the use of new evidence and a different presentation of some older observations might lead us nearer to a settlement of the matter.

While editors are not yet agreed whether the first two books of Horace's poems in hexameters are to be called *satirae* or *sermones*,

¹ Gildersleeve, Persius, Int., p. xxii, q. v. See also article 'Satire' in Johnson's Cyclopaedia (new edition).

² Casaubon, De Satyrica Graecorum et Rom. Satira, ed. Rambach, p. 229: Ferendi non sunt qui epistolarum libros satirarum appellatione ac numero censerint excludendos. Casaubon does not support his view by appeal to ancient evidence.

it does not appear that there is any disposition to designate the last two books otherwise than *epistulae*. To my knowledge, indeed, only one attempt has been made in recent years to claim another designation for the Letters or a part of them, viz. by O. Müller,¹ who endeavored, with most futile arguments, to prove that Epp. I 20 was an epilogue to three books of satires or *sermones*. Before him, Heinrich, the celebrated editor of Juvenal, was wont to claim in his lectures and in some published utterances that the general title *Sermones* was the only correct designation of the poems of Horace in hexameters.² But, though there has been agreement in practice, it is doubtless generally known that the oldest evidence on this point has been thought to render uncertain the designation of the Letters at the time of their publication and in the century or more succeeding the author's death. In consequence, editors have very wisely been content to follow tradition as embodied in the superscription of the MSS. The status of the question is given clearly by Ribbeck in his introduction to the Letters, and what there is of older discussion is alluded to and reported by Düntzer.³

For the name *epistulae* no internal evidence is available, and if there are any allusions by Horace to his Letters, they are included by him with his earlier works under the designation *sermones*, chosen to characterize their style, approximating to that of prose. Of external evidence, the earliest hitherto used includes *Sermones* and *Epistulae* under the term *satirae*. Thus Suetonius, in his life of the poet (early in the second century), confirms his statement that Horace was short and fat by the words *ut a semet ipso in satiris describitur*, where his data are derived from Epp. I 4, 15; I 20, 24, and Sat. II 3, 309. The same view seems to be shared by Quintilian, who, while alluding to Horace as a writer of lyric, iambic and satirical poetry, does not make separate mention of the Letters. Are we to infer that he meant to include the Letters in his allusion to satire, or did he pass over them either thoughtlessly or intentionally, as irrelevant to his purpose?⁴ Ribbeck and others have thought that they are included in the

¹ Ein Begleitschreiben des Horaz zu seinen Sermonen. Prog. Berlin, 1876.

² Düntzer, Kritik und Erkl. d. Hor., vol. III, p. 70 and note.

³ Des Q. Hor. Flaccus Episteln, ed. O. Ribbeck, Berlin, 1869, p. 79. Düntzer, l. l. ✓

⁴ Orelli-Hirschfelder, Prolegomena, p. xxxiv: Quintilianus cum carmina Horatiana recenset satiras iambos lyrica affert, epistulas omittit.

mention of satire; to whom Schütz has made answer, not without appearance of probability, that Quintilian is not professing to give complete lists and might well have passed over the Letters, as he has omitted mention of the Bucolics and Georgics of Virgil. While it will be granted that this point is incapable of positive demonstration, I think that a consideration of the matter will show that Quintilian very probably meant to include the Letters in his mention of Roman satire. In the first place, he enumerates with needless fulness, from the whole range of classical poetry, all those writers who will be of service to the orator in the formation of style. Now, it is obvious that for his purpose the Letters of Horace were quite as valuable as his Satires, nor is it likely that, as an avowed lover of the poet (*nisi fallor amore eius*), he would have neglected to mention them through oversight. That he recognized in them a particular character different, let us say, from the Sermones, which rendered them unfit for his purpose, no one would contend. As for Schütz's observation, that with equal reason we might argue analogously from the omission of the Bucolics and Georgics, let us see. Quintilian, following an Alexandrine canon of *scriptores classici* more or less completely, does not admit as serviceable for imitation all whom he mentions and characterizes. Thus he alludes to Theocritus in these words: *Admirabilis in suo genere Theocritus, sed musa illa rustica et pastoralis non forum modo, verum ipsam etiam urbem reformidat* (X 1, 55). Now, that Quintilian does not refer to the Georgics and Bucolics (*musa rustica et pastoralis*), which must have been dismissed in almost the same words, will not cause surprise. Of important classical Latin poetry, only the minor works of Virgil and, presumably, the Letters of Horace are not mentioned. The reason for the omission of the former has been shown: that the latter were also omitted is *a priori* improbable; nor is their omission susceptible of any explanation analogous to the case of the Bucolics and Georgics. We shall consider it therefore as highly probable that Quintilian included the Letters of Horace in his treatment of Roman satire. From late antiquity there is finally the harmonious evidence of two witnesses, the scholiast Porphyrio (third or fourth century) and the Gallic writer Sidonius Apollinaris (middle of the fifth century). Porphyrio ad Serm. I 1, 1: *quamvis saturam esse opus hoc suum Horatius ipse confiteatur, cum ait 'Sunt quibus in satira videar nimis acer et ultra legem tendere opus,' tamen proprios titulos*

voluit ei accomodare. nam hos priores duos libros Sermonum, posteriores Epistularum inscripsit. Sidonius *carm.* IX 221 ff.: *non quod per satiras, epistularum sermonumque sales, . . . voluit sonare Flaccus.*

A word in explanation of this evidence before going further. If the error had not been made by many scholars, it would scarcely seem necessary to warn the reader that, because certain works were looked upon as satires, they did not therefore necessarily bear this title. Now, none of this evidence shows that any one of these four witnesses believed that the Letters of Horace bore the title *Satirae*. It only shows that they considered that the Letters *were* satires. Quintilian touches on satire as a form of poetry. He does not mention separate works, but only writers. He does not, therefore, concern himself as to whether various collections of satires were called *sermones*, *epistulae*, *Menippeae*, or what not, any more than in his treatment of the elegy he is concerned about particular titles, which obviously could be chosen according to the author's fancy, *amores*, *tristia*, etc. Suetonius cites with the formula *in satiris*; but it is significant that the facts, for the verification of which he makes this reference, are not contained in a single one of the two groups, i. e. in either the *sermones* or in the *epistulae* (as Ribbeck implies in citing only Epp. I 4 and I 20), but in both, as pointed out above.¹ If the data to which he refers had been contained alone in either the *Sermones* or the *Epistulae*, he might have referred to either group conceivably by its particular title. But because he referred for verification of his statement to data which were derived from both *Sermones* and *Epistulae*, he writes *in satiris*. I would not seem to know the impossible about Suetonius' intention; my purpose is only to point out that his formula of citation does not mean that he only knew the Letters as *Satirae*, nor that, on the other hand, he thoughtlessly attributed to the *Satires* what was due to the Letters; for these have been the two explanations offered. What has already been said in explanation of Suetonius' allusion to the Letters as satires, and of Quintilian's inclusion of them in his treatment of Roman satire, is expressly given us by Porphyrio. His words, so far from indicating that both *Sermones* and *Epistulae* bore a common title *Satirae*, explain rather the absence of that title. 'Although Horace himself

¹ As evidence for the poet's shortness of stature, *Serm.* II 3, 309 is a much more emphatic utterance than Epp. I 20, 24.

professes that his works belong to the poetical genus satire, nevertheless he (did not call them so but) gave them special titles, *Sermones* and *Epistulae*'—a paraphrase of the words of Porphyrio which I think will not be disputed, and which is confirmed by his note ad Serm. II 1, 1: *hos duos libros cum Sermonum inscripserit, tamen de his sic loquitur quasi de satura Lucilium sequens*. Finally, in Sidonius we have the same point of view, *per satiras, epistularum sermonumque sales*, the generic name followed by the specific titles, as if he had said of Ovid, *per elegos, tristium epistularumque maestitiam*. I have stated the problem and explained the evidence hitherto employed with perhaps unnecessary fullness, in order to place in intelligible setting a bit of evidence for the antiquity of the sub-title *Epistulae* and the relation of the Letters to the Satires, which has not to my knowledge been employed in this question.

Statius. in *Silv.* I 3, describes with elaborate and obscure detail the charms of the villa of Manilius Vopiscus at Tibur. The poem is not without Horatian reminiscences, as would be expected, but I shall not endeavor to point them out in detail. I will only say that in general the poem is a detailed and diffuse commentary on Horace's *me nec tam patiens Lacedaemon . . . percussit . . . quam domus Albunae resonantis* (*Carm.* I 7), which it recalls and alludes to clearly in vss. 83–9, where other places famed in story are bidden to yield before its charms: *cedant Telegoni, cedant Laurentia Turni iugera* etc.—this apparently with conscious allusion to Horace's *laudabunt alii*, of the poem just quoted, in reference to the same place. In this very fact we have suggested by implication, not very subtle, a comparison between Vopiscus and Horace. That such comparison lay near at hand for the poet is obvious. Vopiscus was a man of literary ambitions who had apparently dabbled in poetry enough to give some shadow of support to the flattering suggestion, of which Statius, in writing of Tibur, the favorite country residence of Horace, could scarcely fail to avail himself.¹ It will therefore, I think, be obvious to every reader that the comparison thus

¹ Concerning the literary activity of Vopiscus, aside from the passage about to be discussed, we have only the following mention, Statius, *Silv.* I, pref.: *Manilius Vopiscus vir eruditissimus et qui praecipue vindicat a situ litteras iam paene fugientes*. And in this poem, vss. 20–23: *ipse Anien . . . ponit | murmura, ceu placidi veritus turbare Vopisci | Pieriosque dies et alentes carmina somnos*.

suggested is carried out in the following passage, where after a series of philosophical reflections in Horatian style, these lines occur :

- 99 Hic tua Tiburtes Faunos chelys et iuvat ipsum
 Alciden dictumque lyra maiore Catillum ;
 Seu tibi Pindaricis animus contendere plectris
 Sive chelyn tollas heroa ad robora sive
 Liventem satiram nigra rubigine vibres
 104 Seu tua non alia splendescat epistola cura.
 Digne Midae Croesique bonis et Perside gaza,
 106 Macte bonis animi !¹

In these verses we have first (vss. 99 and 100) a general statement of poetical activity followed by the alternatives of form which it might assume. The general statement would, it will be

¹ In explanation of the literary form of this passage, it is perhaps worth while to point out that it may be a reminiscence of Horace, Epp. I 3, 23 :

Seu linguam causis acuis seu civica iura
 Respondere paras seu condis amabile carmen,
 Prima feres hederæ victricis præmia—

an observation which would suggest that in the vss. of Statius a period is not to be placed after *cura*, as is done by all editors, but that a period (or colon) should be placed after *Catillum* (vs. 100), and that the various *seu* (*sive*) clauses should be carried over to the following vss.: *digne . . . macte bonis animi*.

Statius, with all his versatility, was not able to give much variety to the same theme, and we are not therefore surprised in *Silv.* II 2 (Villa Surrentina Pollii Felicis), among many other resemblances to this poem, to find these lines (vss. 112-15):

Hic ubi Pierias exercet Pollius artes,
 Seu voluit monitus, quos dat Gargettius auctor,
 Seu nostram quatit ille chelyn seu dissona nectit
 Carmina sive minax ultorem stringit iambon.

Finally, our passage has been imitated by Ausonius, *Commemoratio Professorum Burdigalensium*, I 12 (to Minervius):

Teque canam de te, non ab honore meo.
 Sive panegyricis placeat contendere libris
 In Panathenaicis tu numerandus eris ;
 Seu libeat fictas ludorum evolvere lites,
 Ancipitem palmam Quintilianus habet.

In this passage the idea of comparison with, or emulation of, illustrious predecessors, which we have seen is contained by implication in Statius, is given direct expression. Both are modifications of the motive furnished by Horace.

seen, only suggest epic poetry—a circumstance to which I shall return. Of the various poetical forms which succeed and with which the poet imagines Vopiscus as occupied, it will be observed that the reference to lyric poetry is made with obvious allusion to Horace's *Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari* (Carm. IV 2). Concerning the second form (vs. 102), a word presently. The characterization of satire in vs. 103 is thoroughly conventional in content, with phraseology drawn from reminiscence of Serm. I 4, 100: *hic nigrae sucus loliginis, haec est aerugo mera*, from which passage (l. l. 92) the conventional epithet *liventem* might also have been drawn. Verse 104 is a locus vexatus of long standing, because of the supposed obscurity of the words *non alia . . . cura*. Lindenbrog and Gevartius conjectured *non alta*, which Markland and many others accepted. Hand ad loc. says: Omnes libri antiqui exhibent *non alia*, quod non cum Barthio explicuerim, 'non alia cura quam quae epistolarum stilum decet,' sed ita ut sententia in laudem Vopisci dicta sit: si tua epistola, quamvis levius carminum genus, eadem diligentia, quam in altiori genere miramur, adhibita splendescat. Both of these explanations call for an ellipsis of thought: that of Barth revolving in circular absurdity, that of Hand unnatural and tortuous, suggested in well-known philological manner by the conjecture *non alta*. There is, of course, commonly with *alius* a slight ellipsis of variable character, yielded by the immediate context. Here it is simplicity itself, and *non alia* is nothing more than a litotes for *eadem*, with immediate reference to the characterization of satire which has preceded, i. e. *cura non alia atque in satira conscribenda adhibita*. But one must have a better opinion of the latinity of commentators on Statius than to believe that they have failed to see so obvious a thing. The difficulty, I fancy, has been that the sense thus naturally yielded seemed to involve them at once in a literary question of still greater difficulty, viz. the assumption that satire and the poetical epistle were the same in stylistic character. That this difficulty is a genuine one we may grant, if these words are to be thought of as a general characterization of the poetical epistle. But, obviously, they are not general, but make specific allusion to the relation which the poet (in conformity with our other witnesses from antiquity) understood the Epistles of Horace to bear to the poetical genus satire. The whole attitude of mind is given for us succinctly enough by Porphyrio ad Epp. I 1, and his words are a sufficient commentary

on the passage of Statius: *Flacci epistularum libri titulo tantum dissimiles a sermonum sunt. nam et metrum et materia verborum et communis adsumptio eadem est.* Thus, in the correct and simple interpretation of the words of Statius we have confirmed the view expressed above of an implied comparison between the literary dilettante Vopiscus, in his villa at Tibur, and Horace, who by his residence and his verse had given the place its literary associations.

I know that scholars, so far as published utterances are known to me,¹ have universally used this passage as evidence that Vopiscus was the versatile author of lyric, epic, satirical and epistolary poems. But to interpret such allusions of the flattering poet to the trifling literary labors of men, whose petty attempts ranged the whole gamut of literary forms,² as cold facts for the reconstruction of literary history displays a singular lack of imagination. The words are no more than a general and flattering definition of literary activity drawn from the suggestion of a comparison with Horace which Vopiscus' residence at Tibur afforded. That to the literary activity of Horace the epos is added may have been due to some more ambitious effort of Vopiscus in this direction which called for special allusion—a supposition which would explain the fact above alluded to, that we can only understand the first general mention of his literary work (vss. 99 and 100) to refer to the epos. For the period and for the circle in which Statius moved nothing would be more probable.³

From this passage, therefore, we gain with reasonable certainty an allusion to the designation *Epistulae* as applied to Horace's Letters, accompanied by a recognition of their intimate relation to the poetical form satire. It remains, therefore, to consider whether this piece of evidence can be put in harmony with the other data from antiquity bearing on this point and already considered.

Concerning the original title of the two books of satires, scholars are not yet agreed as between *Satirae* and *Sermones*.

¹ Forcellini-De Vit, *Onam. s. voc. Manilius (Vopiscus)*; Dölling, *Prog. Plauen*, 1838, p. 13; Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, vol. III, 453; Teuffel-Schwabe, paragraph 324, 2.

² Cf. Martial, III 20, V 30, XII 94; Pliny, *Epp.* IV 3, VI 21.

³ "Von allen Gattungen aber dürfte die epische diejenige gewesen sein, der sich die Meisten zuwandten," Friedländer, l. l.

The MSS of Keller and Holder without exception present *sermonum libri*, while the oldest Blandinian is reported to have contained the title *eclogarum*. But, on the other hand, the latest editors, Kiessling, Orelli-Mewes and Hertz, have chosen the title *Satirae*, which is plausibly defended by Kiessling and put in relation to *Sermones* thus: "Following Lucilius, Horace entitled these poems *satirae*. The poetical genus to which they belong he designates as *satira* by beginning the second book with *sunt quibus in satira videor nimis acer*; *satirae* are the single poems: *quid prius illustrem satiris* (II 6, 17). Not until later, when lyric poetry had become the central point of his poetical productivity, did he designate them, in contrast to his *carmina*, as *sermones*, in order to characterize thereby their form, verging on that of prose" (Hor. Satiren, p. xii). But, clearly, it does not at all follow that because Horace alluded to his own works as *satirae*, that he therefore gave them this title. The truth is that *satira* is a definite poetical genus comparable to other departments of poetry, such as, for example, the elegy; but it was no more necessary that a collection of satires should be entitled *satirae* than, for instance, that a collection of elegies should bear the title *elegi*. Let us illustrate. The (*Epistulae*) *ex Ponto* are elegies. In the fifth elegy of book four we read *ite leves elegi doctas ad consulis aures*, and I doubt not if we had no other or uncertain evidence for the title, we should from this passage construct *elegorum libri*. Now, the relationship between *satirae* (the name of the poems as representatives of the poetical genus satire) and *sermones* (the title chosen to indicate their form) is exactly the same as, in our example, between *elegi* and *epistulae*—that is, between the generic and the specific. Horace was at liberty to refer to his poems by either name, just as Ovid does. Therefore, while we grant that Horace might have entitled his satires *satirae*, we must deny that this is a correct inference from the fact that he makes use of the word in allusion to them. But is *sermones* better attested? It seems to me clear that it is. Our MSS afford it and Porphyrio certainly found it, and no other title, not only in his MSS, but in the general literary tradition of his time (v. supra, p. 316).

In fact, just as the title (*Epistulae*) *ex Ponto* was applied by Ovid to his last four books of elegies from Tomi because of their form, so the titles *Sermones* and *Epistulae* may have been given by Horace to his different books of satires, as indicating in a

general way the different forms of the *musa pedestris* which he had chosen.¹ Because in his later satires he had chosen a more personal form of utterance for his reflections on life and literature, he may have employed for them the name *epistulae*, the writings themselves differing, to be sure, in the maturity and perfection of their thought and execution, from the earlier works, but not essentially in range of matter or method of treatment.² That both were considered in antiquity, so far as our scanty record enables us to determine, to be representatives of the department of poetry known as *satira*, we have seen from the unanimous testimony of Quintilian, Suetonius, Porphyrio and Sidonius Apollinaris, to whom we may now add Statius, who also affords us the separate designation *epistula*, for which hitherto Porphyrio has been esteemed the earliest witness. Final confirmation of the correctness of this view is afforded, I believe, by Horace himself in a well-known passage (Epp. II 2, 58):

Denique non omnes eadem mirantur amantque :
carmine tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis,
ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro.

Here we have a threefold division of the poet's literary work corresponding exactly to that afforded by Quintilian. That the satires (by which I mean the *Sermones* and *Epistulae*) are designated *sermones* is due to the contrast with *carmine* which the antithetical structure of the passage demands, and perhaps also to the epithet *Bioneis*, suggesting an equivalent for *διατριβαί* or *λόγοι*. Finally, in the words of characterization, *sale nigro*, we have the last, and in the *Epistles* perhaps the only, expression of that inconsistency, to which I alluded at the beginning of this paper, between the conventional phraseology of literary criticism

¹ On the prose *sermo* and *epistula* Quintilian has some very good observations which in many respects afford an admirable characterization of the corresponding works of Horace. Inst. Or. IX 4, 19: Est igitur ante omnia oratio alia vincta atque contexta, soluta alia, qualis in sermone et epistulis . . . quod non eo dico, quia non illud quoque solutum habeat suos quosdam et forsitan difficiliore etiam pedes; . . . sed non fluunt nec cohaerent nec verba verbis trahunt, ut potius laxiora in his vincla quam nulla sint.

² Compare the words of Porphyrio above cited: *titulo tantum dissimiles sunt*. Ovid in the beginning of the *Epistulae ex Ponto* (I 1, 16) says of them in relation to the *Tristia*:

Non minus hoc illo triste, quod ante dedi.
Rebus idem, titulo differt.

relative to satire and literary practice. Certainly, the Letters are not 'caustic potash' (Greenough), and there is not more than a bookish suspicion of it in the Sermones. But the characterization belongs to satire, and since the Epistles and Sermones were satires, they must therefore, though innocent, bear the opprobrium of their class.

Our estimate of the literary activity of Horace is scarcely affected by this result. For him it has mattered little that the Letters have most commonly been treated as a separate literary form. But for the history of Roman satire it cannot be without significance that in antiquity the Epistulae were reckoned with the Sermones as representatives of the poetical form *satira*.

G. L. HENDRICKSON.

V.—NOTES ON HORACE.

Carm. IV 3. 17–20:

O testudinis aureae
dulcem quae *strepitum*, Pieri, temperas,
O mutis quoque piscibus
donatura cycni, si libeat, sonum.

The words *dulcem* . . . *strepitum* deserve more attention than they have thus far received from editors. Wickham, Schütz, Kiessling, Maclean, Smith and Gow are silent concerning them. Dillenburger remarks simply that *strepitum* is used here “de grato citharae sonu, ut Ep. I 2, 31. 14, 26.” With this the comment in Orelli-Mewes is practically identical. Page speaks at greater length: “*strepitus* being almost invariably used of a ‘din,’ ‘noise,’ e. g. *fori, Romae, valvarum, januae strepitus*, there is a tendency to take *dulcem* proleptically here, and construe ‘that dost modulate into sweetness the lyre’s sound,’ but, as Ep. I 2, 31 *ad strepitum citharae cessatum ducere curam*, the word is clearly = ‘music,’ it is perhaps simpler to render here ‘that dost rule the sweet music.’” This utterance seems at once inadequate and erroneous. I believe that Horace’s full thought can be felt only by taking *strepitum* in its strictest sense, and *dulcem* as strongly proleptic. In this view *strepitum* will supply the foil to *mutis* in v. 19. The lyre, left to itself, can produce nothing but inharmonious din, even as the fish in their natural state can make no articulate sound. It is in reducing this inharmonious din of the lyre to harmony that the power of the Muse is shown, even as she *might* show her power, should she feel so disposed, in giving voice to the fish.

Let us begin by examining the use of the word *strepitus* in Horace. In Odes, I 15. 18 it is used of the din of battle; in III 19. 23 of the noise of a carouse; in III 29. 12 of the din and bustle of Rome (cf. Epp. II 2. 79; Verg. Aen. I 422). Cf. also Odes, III 10. 5 *Audis quo strepitu ianua, quo nemus . . . remugiat ventis*; Sat. I 2. 127 ff. *Nec vereor ne . . . Ianua frangatur, latret canis, undique magno Pulsa domus strepitu resonet*; Sat. II 6. 112

subito ingens Valvarum strepitus lectis excussit utrumque; Epp. I 17. 7 pulvis strepitusque rotarum; Epp. II 1. 202 Garganum mugire putes nemus aut mare Tuscum, Tanto cum strepitu ludi spectantur; A. P. 80 ff. pedem . . . populares vincentem strepitus. In these ten passages *strepitus* unmistakably denotes an inharmonious, unpleasant noise. The verb *strepere* occurs twice: Carm. II 1. 17 Iam nunc minaci murmure cornuum Perstringis auris, iam litui strepunt; IV 12. 3 nec fluvii strepunt Hiberna nive turgidi.

Two passages remain, besides the one with which this note is especially concerned. One is Epp. I 2. 27 ff.:

Nos numerus sumus et fruges consumere nati,
sponsi Penelopae nebulones Alcinoique
in cute curanda plus aequo operata iuventus,
cui pulchrum fuit in medios dormire dies et
ad strepitum citharae cessatum ducere somnum.

Surely *strepitum* is 'din' here. Note in proof of this assertion the irony that marks the whole passage. Cf. especially *sponsi* '(would-be) spouses,' the colloquial *in cute curanda*, and *pulchrum*. The same irony appears in Epp. I 14. 25, 26, where Horace says to his *vilicus*, "You long for the town, simply because you can find no meretrix tibicina, cuius Ad strepitum salias terrae gravis, "to whose *clatter* you can dance like a lout." In every passage thus far considered we have but one meaning, that of 'din, noise, clatter.' Why, then, should we assume for this one passage a meaning that Horace nowhere else exhibits? Further, there can be no question that by taking *strepitum* here as we *must* take it everywhere else in Horace, we get the most effective interpretation. *strepitum* will then suggest the adversative notion which is so clearly present in *mutis*, and the proleptic *dulcem* will be the antithesis to *donatura . . . cycni sonum*. The whole thought will then be: "O thou, who dost attune to sweetness the sounds of the lyre, musicless though they are by nature, O thou who standest ready to give to the fish, even voiceless though they are, the swan's song," etc.

If we look to the usage of *strepitus* in other authors, we find such phrases as *strepitus, fremitus, clamor tonitruum; strepitus, crepitus, sonitus, tonitrus; inter strepitum tot bellorum*. Vergil's usage, as that of a contemporary of Horace, is especially interesting. Cf. Aen. I 422 (cited above), I 725 (of the din of conversation), VI 559 (of the horrid sounds in Tartarus); see also VI

865, IX 394, G. II 492. *strepere* occurs in Ecl. IX 36; Aen. VI 709, VIII 2, IX 808, X 568, regularly (save perhaps Aen. VI 709 *strepit omnis murmure campus*, said of bees), of a decidedly unpleasant noise. How, I ask, could a Roman have understood *strepitum* in our Horatian passage save as has been maintained in this paper?

In Petronius, §33, there is a phrase which, at first sight, seems to support Mr. Page's view. The passage runs thus: *gustantibus adhuc nobis repositorium allatum est cum corbe, in quo gallina erat lignea patentibus in orbem alis, quales esse solent quae incubant ova. Accessere continuo duo servi et symphonia strepente scrutari paleam coeperunt erutaque subinde pavonina ova divisere convivis.* But here again allowance must be made for the narrator's tone, which is ironical. That Encolpius did not enjoy the everlasting music in Trimalchio's house appears plainly from §31, especially the words: *Paratissimus puer non minus me acido cantico excepit . . . pantomimi chorum, non patris familiae triclinium crederes.* We must interpret *acido* here in the light of §68: *Servus qui ad pedes Habinnae sedebat, iussus, credo, a domino suo proclamavit subito canora voce: . . . nullus sonus unquam acidior percussit aures meas* ("Nie verletzte ein widrigerer Ton mein Ohr," Friedlaender). The spirit of *strepente symphonia*, §33, is well given by Friedlaender's rendering: "unter rauschender Musikbegleitung."

Another passage that resembles ours is Vergil, Aen. III 69, 70 *Inde, ubi prima fides pelago, placataque venti Dant maria et lenis crepitans vocat Auster in altum*, but the idea in *crepitans* is plainly that of 'rustling, noise,' not 'music,' and the emphasis is on *placata* and *lenis*. A far closer parallel is to be found in Sophocles, Ajax 1199 ff., where it is said of the man "who first taught the Greeks to wage confederate war with hateful arms" that

ἐκεῖνος οὔτε στεφάνων
οὔτε βαθειᾶν κυλίκων
νεῖμεν ἐμοὶ τέρψιν ὁμιλεῖν,
οὔτε γλυκὺν αὐλῶν ὄτοβον.¹

Jebb (edition of 1896) compares Aeschylus, P. V. 574 *κηρόπλαστος ὄτοβεῖ δόναξ*. The references in Liddell and Scott show that *ὄτοβος* = *strepitus*. In language, then, *dulcem strepitum (lyrae)* is a

¹ For convenience I give Jebb's text throughout.

close equivalent of γλυκὺν (αὐλῶν) ὄτοβον. Cf. further Pindar, *Pyth.* X 39 (Gildersleeve) παντᾶ δὲ χοροὶ παρθένων | λυρᾶν τε βοᾷ καναχαί τ' αὐλῶν δονέονται; id. *Olymp.* III 8 βοᾶν αὐλῶν; id. *Nem.* V 38 καλάμοιο βοᾶ; *Soph. Trach.* 640 ff. ὁ καλλιβόας τάχ' ὑμῖν | αὐλὸς οὐκ ἀναρσίαν | ἀχῶν καναχὰν ἐπάνεισιν, ἀλλὰ θείας | ἀντίλυρον μούσας. L. and S. say that καναχή is used of the *lyre* in the (Homeric) Hymn to Apollo, vs. 185.

It is quite possible that Horace had some one of these expressions in mind, adapting it, however, to his own immediate purpose. He knew his Homer well. He had also some knowledge of Pindar. On this point it will suffice to refer to Kiessling's notes on *Carm.* I 1. 3, I 3. 34, I 12. 1 ff., and his introductory remarks on I 35. Some interesting parallels, in language and in thought, between Horace and Sophocles may be noted. Compare *C.* I 3. 9 ff.:

Illi robur et aes triplex
circa pectus erat, qui fragilem truci
commisit pelago ratem
primus, nec timuit praecipitem Africum, etc.,

with *Antig.* 332 ff. πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει, κ. τ. λ., and *Ajax* 1192 ff.:

ὄφελε πρότερον αἰθέρα δῦναι μέγαν ἢ τὸν πολύκοινον Ἄϊδαν
κεῖνος ἀνὴρ, ὅς στυγερῶν ἔδειξεν ὅπλων Ἑλλάσι κοινὸν Ἄρη

(see Jebb's note); *C.* II 15. 9, 10 fervidos . . . ictus (sc. solis) with *Ajax* 877 τὴν ἀφ' ἡλίου βολῶν κέλευθον (see Jebb ad loc.); *C.* II 16. 21 ff.:

Scandit aeratas vitiosa naves
Cura nec turmas equitum relinquit,
ocior cervis et agente nimbos,
ocior Euro

and *C.* III 1. 37-40:

Sed Timor et Minae
scandunt eodem quo dominus, neque
decedit aerata triremi et
post equitem sedet atra Cura

with *Antig.* 951-4:

ἀλλ' ἂ μοιριδία τις δύνασις δεινὰ
οὔτ' ἄν νιν ὄλβος οὔτ' Ἄρης, οὐ πύργος, οὐχ ἀλίκτυποι
κελαινὰ νᾶες ἐκφύγοιεν.

C. III 24. 31, 32:

Virtutem incolumem odimus,
sublatam ex oculis quaerimus invidi

with Ajax 961-5:

οἱ δ' οὖν γελώντων κάπιχαιρόντων κακοῖς
τοῖς τοῦδ'. ἴσως τοι, κεί βλέποντα μὴ 'πόθουν,
θανόντ' ἄν οἰμώξειαν ἐν χρεῖα δορός.
οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ γνῶμαισι τὰγαθὸν χεροῖν
ἔχοντες οὐκ ἴσασι, πρὶν τις ἐκβάλῃ.

C. III 30. 4, 5 innumerabilis Annorum series et fuga temporum
with Ajax 646:

ἄπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος
φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται

(cf. also Hor. Epp. I 6. 24, 25); C. IV 7. 16 pulvis et umbra
sumus (said of the dead) with Ajax 1257 ff.:

ὅς ἀνδρὸς οὐκέτ' ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἤδη σκιᾶς,
θαρσῶν ὑβρίζεις κἀξελευθεροστομεῖς

(see Jebb's notes); and finally C. IV 13. 6-8:

Ille virentis et
doctae psallere Chiaie
pulchris *excubat in genis*

with Antig. 781-3:

Ἔρως ἀνίκατε μάχαν, Ἔρως, ὅς ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις,
ὅς ἐν μαλακαῖς παρειαῖς νεάνιδος ἐννυχεύεις.

Satires, I 1. 9:

Agricolam laudat iuris legumque peritus,
sub galli cantum consultor ubi ostia pulsat

Wickham calls *sub galli cantum* an exaggeration, comparing Cic. Mur. 22 Vigilas tu de nocte ut tuis consultoribus respondeas . . . te gallorum . . . cantus . . . exsuscitat. Kiessling takes the same view, remarking, among other things, that "die *salutatio* begann doch erst nach Sonnenaufgang; (prima salutantes atque altera continet hora, Martial. IV 8)." Mewes, in his revision of Orelli, characterizes *sub galli cantum* as a "ridicula hyperbole."

Similarly Greenough. Schütz and Palmer evidently regard the words as seriously meant, but their notes are very brief. Kirkland is silent on the point.

Several considerations may, I think, be urged against the view that there is any great degree of exaggeration here. (1) There is proof that the regular *salutatio* might begin before daylight. Cf. e. g. Cic. Cat. I 9 dixisti paulum tibi etiam nunc morae, quod ego viverem. Reperti sunt duo equites Romani, qui te ista cura liberarent et sese *illa ipsa nocte paulo ante lucem* me in meo lectulo interfecturos pollicentur. Put beside this passage the words of Sallust, Cat. 28 constituere *ea nocte . . . sicuti salutatum* introire ad Ciceronem. Had calls before daylight been glaringly unusual, any attempt to visit Cicero at such an unheard-of hour would have awakened his suspicions at once, and so have defeated its own end. The conspirators would hardly have been likely (stupid though they proved themselves in other ways) to frustrate this particular scheme themselves by essaying a call at an hour not sanctioned, to some degree at least, by common custom. If, on the other hand, calls even *ante lucem* were not unusual, the conspirators could rest assured that, unless Cicero's suspicions were aroused in some other way, there would be nothing in so early a visit itself to excite him and afford him a chance to frustrate their designs. (On the subject of very early calls see Mayor's notes on Juvenal, III 127 and V 19-23; Becker-Göll, Gallus, II 194 ff.; Marquardt, Privatleben, p. 228, n. 2, and p. 259.)

(2) It might be fairly held that the reference in our passage is not to the regular *salutatio*, but to *extraordinary business calls* made upon the lawyer by distressed clients. By this supposition the case of the lawyer is made more closely parallel to that of the merchant, whose encounters with severe storms are somewhat out of the line of his ordinary experiences, and to that of the farmer whose experience with the law's vexatious processes are quite foreign to the ordinary tenor of his existence. If this be granted, it follows that no hour would seem too early to a thoroughly frightened client.

(3) The exaggeration postulated by the editors named above would be wholly out of place. Horace is dwelling on the universality of human discontent. Four men, distributed into pairs, are taken as types of all mankind. Each is brought before us when the hardships or disadvantages of his lot press most heavily upon him. In speaking of the first, second and fourth characters,

Horace is unquestionably keeping to the facts, real or potential, of their experience. Why assume that he is exaggerating in connection with the third? Such a proceeding would have been inartistic, and would have weakened, needlessly, the whole passage.

Sat. I 1. 93-6:

finire laborem
incipias, parto quod avebas, ne facias quod
Ummidius quidam—non longa est fabula—dives
ut metiretur nummos

Bentley's *qui tam* for *quidam* is indeed tempting, but I cannot forbear to enter a protest against Palmer's method of supporting it. He declares that "Hor. never uses *quidam* with his proper names." This statement is, of course, a *petitio principii*, for it becomes true only when Bentley's emendation is accepted. If we emend Palmer's statement to read "Horace *nowhere else* uses *quidam* with proper names," it will still be in order to ask "What of it? Is the fact that he nowhere else uses the word in this way sufficient proof that he cannot have so used it here?" The truth is that the emendation must be supported on other grounds—those, for instance, urged by its author.

The same sort of *petitio principii* is perpetrated elsewhere in commentaries, e. g. by Kiessling on Hor. C. I 26. 3 *quis sub Arcto Rex gelidae metuatur orae . . . unice Securus*. He takes *quis* as nominative, giving as the *ground* of this declaration the statement that Horace uses "die veraltete und darum vulgäre Ablativform *quis*" only in the Epodes and the Satires. This statement ought not to be made at all, much less cited here as a convincing proof, until it has been shown on good evidence that *quis* does not stand here for *quibus*.

Now, if Vergil could use *quis* for *quibus* in the Epic style (e. g. Aen. I 95, V 511), the form was surely not too commonplace or 'vulgar' to be admitted by Horace into his Odes, especially in view of the fact that he is not always at the pains to keep the language of those poems clear of a prosaic or even vulgar tone (see Teuffel, §238, 6). It is the part, therefore, of the critic to show that it is preferable, even if not absolutely necessary, to take *quis* here as nominative. This successfully done, it is allowable to remark that Horace nowhere uses *quis* as = *quibus* in his Odes.

Sat. I 1. 106:

Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,
quos ultra citraque *nequit consistere rectum*.

Cf. Cic. Cato Maior, §41: Nec enim libidine dominante temperantiae locum esse, neque omnino in voluptatis regno *virtutem posse consistere*.

Sat. I 1. 108:

Illuc unde abii redeo, qui nemo ut avarus
se probet ac potius laudet diversa sequentis

There can be no doubt that *qui nemo* is the right reading. How shall we interpret it? Palmer's view, that *fiat* is to be supplied after *qui*, is, at the first blush, the most tempting. Its great advantage lies in the fact that by assuming such a construction we make Horace go back, in form of utterance at least, to the point whence he started. But it is extremely doubtful whether such an ellipsis is possible. *fiat* is not the kind of verb to be easily omitted, especially when, as here, the context in itself gives no hint of such an ellipsis. Again, the ellipsis of the subjunctive mood is uncommon. If the omission of *fiat* is to be justified at all, it must be done, I think, by the argument that since Horace is so manifestly referring back to the opening line of the Satire, he can omit here the essential verb of that line, which the reader or auditor would inevitably recall. But, admitting the ellipsis to be possible, we meet another and more serious difficulty. We must then render either "I come back to my starting-point, and ask why no avaricious man praises himself," or "why no man, because he is avaricious, praises himself." Neither view gives the point from which Horace started. Palmer, who adopted the former, saw this point, and so wrote: "the insertion of this word (*avarus*) is necessary to fuse Hor.'s two subjects into one. At the beginning Hor. simply said *nemo*; but having developed discontent altogether from the example of the *avarus*, he here adds that word as a sort of correction to his exordium." The other interpretation is even feebler, since it makes Horace answer his question actually before he has fully asked it. Precisely the same objection applies to the view (held by Orelli-Mewes, Müller, Kiessling, Kirkland) which takes *qui nemo* directly with *probet*, and regards *ut avarus* as a causal phrase to be compared with *ut*

capitis minor, Carm. III 5. 42, *ut neque . . . porrectus . . . nec . . . prodigus*, Epp. I 7. 41, or *utpote pluris* culpari dignos, Sat. I 4. 24.¹

Since I have objected to all the proposed solutions of the problem presented by our passage (all, at least, that can be said to have any degree of plausibility), it devolves upon me to venture to offer a substitute. For the past four years I have suggested to my classes that *qui nemo se probet* = *qui omnes se improbet*—that is, that the clause, though negative in form, is affirmative in sense. If this be true, we shall have to supply *improbat se* with *ut avarus*, and we shall thus have merely an example of the ordinary comparative *ut*-clause which is so common in connection with affirmative clauses. I am inclined to think that this explanation is tenable. The fact that *ac*, not *sed*, is the connective seems to afford it support.

Recently I noted the following passage (Cic. Fin. II, §18): *Sed dum dialecticam, Torquate, contemnit Epicurus, quae una continet omnem et perspiciendi quid in quaque re sit scientiam et iudicandi quale quidque sit, et ratione ac via disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem videtur, nec ea, quae docere vult, ulla arte distinguit, ut haec ipsa, quae modo loquebamur*. Only two explanations of *ut haec ipsa* are (to me, at least) conceivable. One is that *nec . . . distinguit* is in spirit affirmative: "he fails to distinguish . . . as, for instance, in the case just mentioned"; the other is that with *ut haec ipsa* we must supply *neque* or *non distinguit*. If we take the latter course, we get the very construction which has been declared—e. g. by Palmer—impossible for our Horatian passage. In either case the passage from Cicero seems to me to be a complete parallel to that in Horace. The explanation applying to the one will apply, then, to the other. It goes without saying that none of the explanations of Horace's words, rejected above, could be forced to apply to Cicero's sentence.

Another general parallel, as it seems to me, to our Horatian passage is to be found in Terence, *Phormio*, 279–81 (Demipho is the speaker):

¹ If we read *nemo ut avarus se probet*, we are confronted by two difficulties: (1) the harsh hiatus in *nemo ut*, and (2) the difficulty of satisfactory interpretation, for we must take *ut* as 'how,' and closely join *nemo* and *avarus*. Such an interpretation would be practically identical with Palmer's and so be open to the objections urged above against that view.

An quisquam iudex est, qui possit noscere
tua iusta, ubi tute verbum non respondeas,
Ita ut ille fecit?

Here *fecit* = *non respondit*. Had the sentence concluded with a simple *ita ut ille*, its close resemblance to our passage would be more immediately apparent.

With either of the proposed explanations, we get a view simple in the extreme. The framework of Horace's question here, *qui nemo . . . se probet*, will be identical with that of the query with which the Satire opens, *qui fit . . . contentus vivat*, and the illustration, "just as the miser fails to praise himself," will be entirely in point, since for seventy or eighty lines he has been using the *avarus* as the most typical example of discontent.

Sat. I 5. 43:

O qui complexus et gaudia quanta fuerunt.

No editor (at least in recent times) has made any comment on *complexus*. It may be interesting, therefore, to compare Cic. Acad. Post. I 1 In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi . . . Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, paulumque cum ab eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus; atque *illum complexi, ut mos amicorum est* . . . ad suam villam reduximus. See Reid ad loc.

Sat. I 5. 7:

Hic ego propter aquam, quod erat deterrima, ventri
indico bellum

Neither Schütz, Kiessling, Kirkland, Wickham, nor Greenough makes any comment directly on the words *ventri indico bellum*. Mewes defines them by *cena abstineo*, comparing Cicero, Cato Maior, §46: ne omnino bellum indixisse videar voluptati. Does not *indico bellum*, here as elsewhere, mean 'I make a formal declaration of war against,' and was it not meant to suggest to Horace's contemporaries the fetial ceremonies traditionally connected with such a declaration, as described later by Livy, I 32. 5 ff.? If this is right, we get added humor in the ridiculously exaggerated tone of the passage. The mock heroics will then run through four full verses, and the drop to the 'Dutch picture' (Wickham) in *Tum pueri nautis*, etc., will be all the more

marked. The mock heroic tone is resumed in vss. 51 ff.: Nunc mihi paucis Sarmenti scurrae pugnam, etc., and in vss. 73, 74: Nam vaga . . . tectum. Cf. also Sat. II 6. 100 Iamque tenebat Nox medium caeli spatium, etc. See also Juvenal, e. g. IV 29-39, and Friedlaender ad loc., also his *Einleitung*, p. 57. One cannot help thinking that Juvenal had in mind the passages of Horace quoted above.

Sat. I 5. 51 ff.:

Nunc mihi paucis
Sarmenti scurrae pugnam Messique Cicirri,
Musa, velim memores

The mock heroic character of these verses (cf. preceding note) has often been remarked by editors. To their comments, however, something can be added. Horace pretends to be here the mere *recorder* of the strains sung by the muse. Cf. then the *thought* of Carm. I 1. 32 Si neque tibiae Euterpe cohibet neque Polyhymnia Lesboum refugit tendere barbiton, and the *language* of Carm. I 12. 1 ff., I 24. 2-4, and III 4. 1 ff. This fiction, whereby the muse is represented as the real singer and the poet as merely her mouthpiece, is the true Homeric or Epic attitude.¹ Cf. the *Iliad*, I 1, *Odyssey*, I 1, and the opening of *Paradise Lost*. Though Vergil begins self-consciously with *Arma virumque cano* (see Conington on *cano*), he nevertheless comes back in vs. 8, *Musa, mihi causas memora*, to the Homeric model and throws himself, as it were, wholly on the muse. We may compare also appeals to the muse for special help in special connections, e. g. *Iliad*, II 484 ff., and its imitation in the *Aeneid*, VII 641 ff.; also *Paradise Lost*, VII 1 ff. Now, Horace's careful adherence to the highest poetic models emphasizes the intentional burlesque of the description that follows, by making the language out of all proportion to the subject-matter.

Sat. I 5. 77-80:

Incipit ex illo montis Apulia notos
ostentare mihi, quos torret Atabulus et quos

¹ The New York *Herald* of Dec. 27, 1896, contained an account of a mosaic tablet, recently discovered in Tunis. The tablet represents Vergil as reading the *Aeneid*, while behind him stand two Muses. Part of the description seems worth quoting: "With head erect, eyes intent, expression as of one inspired and with his right hand placed upon his breast, the index finger being raised, the poet listens to Clio and Melpomene, who stand behind him and alternately dictate the melodious lines of the poem."

his experiences with numerous personages who sought his aid to further their social or literary ambitions. I am inclined to believe also that, if we regard the fifth, sixth and ninth Satires of this book as parts of one whole, our interpretations of these poems will be materially assisted. The sixth Satire tells how naturally and honestly the friendship between Maecenas and Horace arose, the fifth gives a glimpse of the real nature of that friendship, and the ninth tells us what that friendship is not. This view will account satisfactorily for the absence of all political allusions (save that in vss. 28 and 29) from the fifth Satire. Horace would hint that such matters form no part of the friendship, which is one between men allied, the one to the other, by similarity of tastes in matters wholly removed from the sphere of politics and statecraft.

BARNARD COLLEGE.

CHARLES KNAPP.

NOTE.

ON LUCIAN'S NIGRINUS.

The difficulty of distinguishing between the formal and the spontaneous in Lucian's work leaves commentators grotesquely at variance in regard to the intention of certain of his writings, and notably of the *Nigrinus*. From Wieland to Croiset there is a series of critics who accept it as a serious document, either a 'confession' or a tract for the times. On the other hand, Ant. Schwarz will have it pure satire, a parody of the sudden conversions aimed at by certain philosophers. P. M. Boldermann, in a really valuable contribution to Lucianic doctrine,¹ by misapplication of a fruitful theory, classes the dialogue among those in which Lucian imitates comedy in the manner of Menippus: *Nigrinus* is a comic character, but his talk is pure Cynic doctrine. E. Schwarz, reviewing Boldermann's essay in the *Philologische Wochenschrift* for March 21, 1896, refutes this notion easily enough, but sets up in place of it one of his own which will hardly be more satisfactory to Lucianic scholars. "Die Schilderung des Klientenelends im *Nigrin*," he says, "ist nichts als eine kurze Wiederholung der ausführlichen Darstellung in den *Klienten*, sie gipfelt hier wie dort in einem scharfen Angriffe auf die Philosophen, welche sich freiwillig, nur durch den Glanz des Reichthums und der Vornehmheit geblendet, zu solcher *Misère* hergeben, nur mit dem Unterschiede, dass die *Klienten* nur eine scharfe Invective gegen solche, die hellenische Philosophie diskreditierenden Philosophen sind, der *Nigrin* das positive Gegenstück liefert in dem Bilde des Platonikers, der zwar das stille und feine Athen mit dem lärmenden, groszstädtisch rohen Rom vertauscht hat, aber gerade hier ein leuchtender Exempel für echthellenische Weisheit ist. . . . er ist ebenso zu der *Klientenschrift* das Gegenstück wie die Entlaufenen Sklaven zum *Peregrinus*, wie der Fischer zu der *Βίων πρᾶσις*, wie der *Ikaromenipp* . . . zum *Δὲς κατηγορούμενος*."

¹ Diss., Leyden, 1893.

Now, it is undeniable that the discourse of Nigrinus gives a shorter description of the matters set forth at length in *De Mercede Conductis*, but if it was intended as a *pendant* and in some degree a corrective thereof, it is unfortunate that while *De Mercede Conductis* was written in a realistic spirit, with the author's eye on the object, the *Nigrinus* was composed on a palpably sophistic plan with argumentation that will not bear scrutiny. The comparison of Athens and Rome is manifestly *ad captandum*. Of the generations of critics that have taken it as a serious contribution to *Sittengeschichte*, not one seems to have noticed that, with the exception of their undue interest in horse-racing, the Romans are not charged with a single vice or folly which is not also laid at the door of the Athenians in other of the Lucianic writings. (Cp. *Nig.* 23 with *Epist. Cron.* 35 and *Gall.* 9; 30 with *Charon* 22 and *De Luctu* passim; 31 with *Navig.* 23; etc.) The dialogue is interesting as proving that it was fashionable once more to write in praise of Athens; but if it be compared with *Navigium* and *Gallus*, we must admit that, as far as Lucian's evidence goes, we have nothing to prove that society in Athens differed more widely from society in Rome than the province always differs from the capital.

The mystery of the *Nigrinus*, as of other Lucianic works, has remained unsolved because critics find it hard to believe in Lucian as a sophist. Few casual readers take the trouble to study the contemporaries whom he outshone. Even Lucianic scholars, after formally crediting the sophistic with their author's early training and first success, are wont to state that he broke with the system midway in his career, and to treat of him thereafter as though he were as completely a law unto himself as Thucydides or Plato. We find even recent commentators like Croiset speaking of him as returning to rhetoric in his old age, as though there were any evidence to show that he ever abandoned it. The famous passage in *Bis Accusatus* cannot be pressed to mean more than that he substituted the composition and delivery of dialogues for that of *meletae*. The other part of the sophistic programme, the *prolalia*, he apparently retained; the *Prometheus in Verbis* is such a work and was designed, by internal evidence, as the introduction to a dialogue recitation. It is my belief, then, that the *Nigrinus* not only shows traces of the sophistic style, as all allow, but is actually a sophistic work. I conceive that Lucian, having occasion to address an Athenian audience, determined on

two points: that he would give them a sort of Panathenaic oration,¹ and that he would do it in the Platonic manner, of which he had made a special study. In pursuit of inspiration for the first point he read Pericles' funeral oration in Thucydides² and Plato's Menexenus. Catching from the Menexenus the tone of ironical admiration which aptly secured the lightness of touch called for by the occasion, he enforced it by dipping into the Protagoras.³ We are accustomed to dismiss as pedantic and futile the methods by which the later sophists studied the great classical writers and aimed at reproducing their effects, assigning to Lucian's 'sophistic period' none but works of hopeless frigidity. The Nigrinus should save us from such blunders. We can hardly doubt its success with the audience for whom it was written; still more gratifying to the author would have been the knowledge that posterity would, on the strength of it, write him down a moralist, a patriot, and sometime a Platonist.

EMILY JAMES SMITH.

¹ When the sophist Alexander visited Athens, *ἡ μὲν δὴ διάλεξις ἐπαινοὶ ἦσαν τοῦ ἀστέος . . .*, Παναθηναϊκοῦ γὰρ λόγου ἐπιτομὴ εἴκαστο. Philostratus, Vit. Soph., 2, 78, 13 ff., ed. Kayser. Cp. Aristides' Panathenaic Oration.

² Besides the explicit quotation in the preface, cp. Nigr. 13 with Thuc. II 37, Nigr. 14 with Thuc. II 40.

³ Cp. Nigr. 35 with Prot. 328 D.

REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

A Literary History of the English People. From the Origins to the Renaissance. By J. J. JUSSERAND. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1895.

This volume forms Part I of a work to be completed in three volumes, Part II extending "From the Renaissance to Pope," and Part III, "From Pope to the Present Day." The author is particular to call his work not "a 'History of English Literature,' but rather a 'Literary History of the English People.'" It is thus distinguished from Taine's work, a brilliant essay on English literature, though often mistaken in its critical judgments, rather than a history of English literature.

M. Jusserand has devoted much labor and study to the composition of his work. He has gone to original sources, and not the least valuable portion of the volume is that containing the numerous bibliographical notes which he has appended to almost every page. These are what we miss in ten Brink, with whose valuable history of English literature this volume invites comparison. It is true that ten Brink intended to add a very full bibliography, but his most unfortunate death prevented it; it is better to give the bibliography in the course of the work, for the reader desires to know the authorities as he progresses in his reading.

The impression produced upon the mind of the impartial reader after a careful perusal of the volume, is that it is well done. If he should not, in all cases, have adopted the same perspective, and if he considers that some writers deserved a less cursory treatment, that is a matter of private judgment. The volume is divided into three books treating respectively the Origins, the French Invasion, and England to the English. These are subdivided into chapters, whose titles deserve mention, both as giving a summary of the work, and as illustrating the author's statement, "To be easily understood one must be clear," and throughout the volume one is reminded of the French adage, "*Ce qui n'est pas clair, n'est pas français.*"

The first book contains four chapters: Britannia, the Germanic invasion, the national poetry of the Anglo-Saxons, and Christian literature and prose literature of the Anglo-Saxons. The second book has also four chapters: Battle, literature in the French language under the Norman and the Angevin kings, Latin, and literature in the English language. The third book includes seven chapters: The new nation, Chaucer, the group of poets, William Langland and his visions, prose in the fourteenth century, the theatre, and the end of the Middle Ages. The several chapters are subdivided into sections with separate headings, so that at no moment is one at a loss to know what the author is talking about, for each subject, however briefly or fully treated, is kept separate and distinct from every other subject. This analytical

subdivision should not be disregarded, but it is specially serviceable in a history of literature.

In any work by a French writer we naturally look for an exaltation of the Kelts, their brilliancy, their power of imagination, their fertility of invention. Granting all that may be said on this subject by Keltophilists, we have always thought that the Keltic literature of Britain, and the Kelts themselves, before the Norman Conquest, had as little to do with English literature proper as the Greeks and Greek literature of the Byzantine empire. Whatever views we may hold as to the greater or less extermination of the Kelts by the Germanic invaders, and the greater or less incorporation of them into the body of the English,—and we are ready to grant, as the author holds, that this incorporation was greater than was formerly thought,—the literature does not seem to us to have had one particle of influence on the Old English, or Anglo-Saxon literature, and we see no advantage in beginning with it a literary history of the *English* people. English literature begins with “the national poetry of the Anglo-Saxons,” and here we see its true genius and spirit, allied to that of other Germanic and Scandinavian tribes. The author is very right in saying that the Anglo-Saxons “did not allow the traditions of the vanquished Celts to blend with theirs, and in spite of their conversion to Christianity, they preserved, almost without change, the main characteristics of the race from which they were descended” (p. 36). We must come down to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries before we find Keltic traditions beginning to infiltrate English literature, and then through the Normans as intermediaries. Whatever Keltic blood may survive in the present English people, it did not affect the Old English people, and whatever Kelts survived the Germanic invasion became hewers of wood and drawers of water, and the oil and water of that day did not mix.

The sketch of Old English poetry is all too brief, and the account of the versification is quoted from Sweet’s “Sketch” in Hazlitt’s Warton, but that was before the days of Sievers, so the student must revise the account given of it, and not take as literal truth the statement, “The rules of this prosody, not very difficult in themselves, are made still easier by a number of licenses and exceptions” (p. 37). The dispute as to the works of Cynewulf is mentioned, but the works themselves receive scant treatment, the doubtful *Andreas* being the only one of which a brief outline is given. The conjecture of Earle that he “lived in the eleventh century” is quoted as on a par with that of ten Brink that “he was born between 720 and 730” (p. 39); but Earle’s mere conjecture is utterly untenable. While the *Brunanburh*, or *Athelstan*, is found in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle under the year 937, the *Maldon* or *Byrhtnoth* (991) is not found therein, and this should not have been so stated (p. 47, note 1). As was to be expected, an outline of the *Beowulf* is given, but Beowulf did not “return to his own country” after the fight with Grendel and before that with Grendel’s mother (p. 52): he simply slept elsewhere, and so was not on hand when the latter came to Heorot and devoured Aeschere. The author in his Preface laments “misprints,” and it must be acknowledged that there is quite a number of them, which even the best of eyes cannot avoid, but *Chlochilaicus* occurs three times in note at foot of p. 50. M. Jusserand thinks that Beowulf is “very different from Roland, the hero of France, he too of Germanic origin,

but living in a different *milieu*" (p. 54); but surely some allowance should be made for chronology.

The introduction of Latin letters and their effect upon Old English writing, as seen in the works of Baeda and in the poems of Caedmon and Cynewulf, is noted; also, the contributions of Alfred to a dissemination of a knowledge of literature among his people in the first revival of learning, and the later works of Ælfric and of Wulfstan, receive mention; but fault is found with this Old English literature in that it is "almost stationary; it does not perceptibly move and develop; a graft is wanted" (p. 92). This graft was to come from the Norman invasion.

Notwithstanding the comparatively brief sketch of Old English literature,—for, in a work of this compass, we cannot expect the treatment given by ten Brink, Stopford Brooke, or Morley,—the author appreciates highly what has been handed down to us from the Anglo-Saxon period, and well says: "The English country can thus pride itself upon a literature which for antiquity is unparalleled in Europe" (p. 79). This has not always been realized even by English writers, and although a knowledge of this literature is easily accessible, it does not seem to have penetrated beyond scholars.

The Norman Conquest and its effects follow. William the Conqueror is highly exalted. "The qualities of which William gave the example were rare in England, but common in France; they were those of his race and country, those of his lieutenants; they naturally reappear in many of his successors" (p. 106). The Normans are duly praised, perhaps over-duly. "Their matchless strength and their indomitable will further one particular cause: the infusion of French and Latin ideas in the Anglo-Saxon people, and the connection of England with the civilization of the South." The fact that "the chiefs of the nation are French," and "their wives are mostly French too" (p. 108), is put prominently before us, so that one would infer that all the good in England came from France. Now, while the impartial historian will readily acknowledge the good accruing to England from the Norman invasion, he should never forget the heroic qualities lying at the basis of the English people, qualities seen in other Germanic peoples, which asserted themselves two hundred and fifty years later in that composite Saxon and Norman, that is, *English* people, almost as distinct from the French of that day as were the Saxon and Norman at the time of the Conquest; the development had been different, and the Saxon had predominated.

The diffusion of the French language and the rise of Anglo-French literature are quite fully treated. The French language and French ideas were undoubtedly prevalent in England for three hundred years. The author rightly says: "It matters little whether these ideas went across the Channel carried over by poets or by manuscripts. What is important is to see and ascertain that works of a new style, with new aims in them, and belonging to a new school of art, enjoyed in England a wide popularity after the Conquest, with the result that deep and lasting transformations affected the aesthetic ideal and even the way of thinking of the inhabitants" (p. 120).

The different kinds of this literature are enumerated and discussed. Histories, romances, religious works, *fabliaux*, prose and poetry, all are found and in great numbers. Geoffrey Gaimar, Wace, Benoit de Sainte-More, the

Chanson de Roland, "the national song of the Normans as well as of all Frenchmen" (p. 125), the authors of the Alexander, Charlemagne, and Arthur cycles of romances,—all show the activity of the Anglo-Norman intellect, and the avidity of Anglo-Norman society for literature of all kinds. As a specimen of these romances one may take the Arthurian cycle. "One thing, however, was lacking for a time to the complete success of the Arthurian epic: the stamp of authenticity, the Latin starting-point . . . Geoffrey of Monmouth makes up for this deficiency" (p. 132). Here comes in the Keltic influence on subsequent English literature. These legends had developed in Wales, Brittany, and Cornwall. "The Briton harpists had, by the beauty of their tales, and the sweetness of their music, early acquired a great reputation," and the great service of Geoffrey of Monmouth was that he collected these tales in Latin form, and passed them on to Wace and other Norman-French writers, whence they were taken by Layamon first, and after the lapse of more than two hundred and fifty years by Sir Thomas Malory, and so have been perpetuated as the only well-developed cycle of romance in English literature. What difference does it make if William of Newbury says that Geoffrey made "Arthur's little finger bigger than Alexander's back," that he "lies about almost everything"? Welcome the lies, if we take them at their true value! They were "turned into Latin verse, into French alexandrines, into Welsh prose"; "the finest poems the Middle Ages devoted to them were written on English ground" (p. 134). But while the chief one, this romantic cycle was not the only one, and romance was not the only literary form that these Anglo-French poets and prose-writers cultivated. "They have also shorter narratives in prose and verse, the subject of which is generally love, drawn from French, Latin, Greek, and even Hindu legends" (pp. 141-2). A very modern spirit pervades these love-poems. Human nature was not so very different in the thirteenth century from what it is in the nineteenth, but it has progressed since the eighth. "To sum up in a word which will show the difference between the first and second period: on the lips of the conquerors of Hastings odes have become *chansons*."

In addition to the love-literature, the literature of wit and humor was developed. "The French who were now living in England in large numbers introduced there the taste for merry tales of trickery and funny adventures, stories of curious mishaps of all kinds" (p. 155). "All this literature went over the Channel with the conquerors." Thus new ideas were introduced among the English people, which, prevalent for a time in a distinct grade of society, gradually permeated the mass and aided the development of *English* thought.

The Latin literature of the Anglo-Norman period is next treated, the period of the lengthy Chronicles of English history written during the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, from Henry of Huntingdon to Ralph Higdon. These have been made accessible of late years in the Rolls series, and constitute a unique possession, furnishing very full materials for the history of the times. M. Jusserand gives an interesting account of the Latin education of the time, the establishment of monasteries, and of schools and libraries under their walls. Paris was the literary capital, and its University in the twelfth century was a great resort. After its model the universities of Oxford and

Cambridge were formed, "but their celebrity was chiefly local, and they never reached the international reputation of the one at Paris" (p. 173).

English writers were great Latin scholars. "They handle the language with such facility in the twelfth century, one might believe it to be their mother-tongue; the chief monuments of English thought at this time are Latin writings. Latin tales, chronicles, satires, sermons, scientific and medical works, treatises on style, prose romances, and epics in verse, all kinds of composition are produced by Englishmen in considerable numbers" (p. 176).

The poem of Joseph of Exeter on the Trojan war, long attributed to Cornelius Nepos, is an example of the facility with which Englishmen wrote Latin verse. Mr. Wright has made the works of these Anglo-Latin poets accessible in the Rolls series, and has given an account of them in his *Biographia Britannica Literaria*, Vol. II, the Anglo-Norman period. A most interesting satire is the *Speculum Stultorum* of Nigel Wireker, in which the stupid monk is taken off in the person of Burnellus the ass, who visits many universities, finally that of Paris, where he matriculates among the English nation, and after seven years study has learnt nothing but "ya":

"Cum nihil ex toto quodcunque docente magistro
Aut socio potuit discere praeter ya."

Finally his master, who has been searching for him far and wide, carries him back to his usual duties.

Geoffrey de Vinsauf writes his *Nova Poetria*, in which he lays down new rules for the art of poetry. Latin prose writings are more abundant than poetry: witness the *Policraticus, sive de Nugis Curialium* of John of Salisbury, whose alternative title is taken by Walter Map for one of his witty works. Much has been fathered upon Map, which he most probably never wrote, particularly the so-called Apocalypse and Confession of Golias.

The last chapter of the second book treats the literature in the English language, and here we have a succinct account of the revival of the vernacular literature after a long repose. It had never been extinct, but for a hundred and fifty years after the Norman Conquest there had scarcely been more than enough to preserve the continuity. "The twelfth century, so fertile in Latin and French works, only counts, as far as English works are concerned, devotional books in prose and verse" (p. 205). We may add the later entries in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, but these, with the modernisations of the Gospel version, the series of Homilies, the so-called Moral Ode, and a few other poems, constitute all that we have in English before the year 1200. The native English mind, as distinguished from the Norman mind, was repressed, felt no impulse to produce, and time was needed to amalgamate the two. The thirteenth century saw the beginning of this amalgamation, and before its close we find the first English king on the throne in the person of Edward I, and the beginnings of an English literature consequent upon the fusion of the two races. This is the century of Layamon's *Brut*, the *Ormulum*, the *Ancren Riwe*, the *Genesis and Exodus*, the *Owl and Nightingale*, the most original poem of the century, the romances of *Havelok the Dane*, and *King Horn*, and the continuation of chronicle history in English in the work of Robert of Gloucester. The *Psalter* is paraphrased in English verse, and metrical lives

of saints in both Northern and Southern English abound. While not much originality is manifested, English authors can write in their own language as well as in Latin and French, and the demand for such works shows the increasing prevalence of the language, but we must wait until the fourteenth century before the preponderance is on that side. "Most of the religious treatises in English that have come down to us . . . belong to the first half of the fourteenth century. In the thirteenth . . . many Englishmen considered French to be, together with Latin, the literary language of the country; they endeavored to handle it, but not always with great success. . . . These attempts become rare as we approach the fourteenth century, and English translations and imitations, on the contrary, multiply" (pp. 213-4). This represents the true state of affairs. In the first half of the fourteenth century we have Robert of Brunne's *Handlyng Synne* and his *Chronicle*, both translations of Anglo-French works, the English version of Robert Grosseteste's *Castel of Love*, the voluminous *Cursor Mundi*, the great repertory of legends, Dan Michel's *Remorse of Conscience*, and Richard Rolle of Hampole's *Prick of Conscience* and other works, issuing from Kent and Yorkshire respectively, and both about the same year, 1340, and many others. Thus at the time of Chaucer's birth there was an English people, and an English literature in embryo, and the time was ripe for a great English poet. "In the course of the fourteenth century, under Edward III and Richard II, a double fusion, which had been slowly preparing during the preceding reigns, is completed and sealed forever; the races established on English ground are fused into one, and the languages they spoke become one also. The French are no longer superposed on the natives, henceforth there are only English in the English island" (p. 236). It had taken a long time, about three hundred years, but it had been finally accomplished. M. Jusserand sets this well before us, and not the least interesting fact stated in this connection, on the authority of Bracton, is that, in the thirteenth century, if a murder had been committed, an inquest was necessary to determine whether the murdered man was an Englishman or of French birth; in the former case no fine was imposed. The statute of 1340 abolishes the "presentement d'Englescherie," showing that by this time no distinction was made as to the genealogy of the slain, Frenchman and Englishman being on a par.

The chapter on "the new nation" is one of the most interesting in the book and brings before us the life of the fourteenth century. The disappearance of French and the rise of English is traced; the race as well as the language is transformed. A real English Parliament is constituted, and "from the end of the fourteenth century an Englishman could already say as he does to-day: 'My business is not the business of the State, but the business of the State is my business.' The whole of the English constitution, from the vote on the taxes to the *habeas corpus*, is comprised in this formula." This is a compendium of the principles of liberty, and is very different from the French king's dictum: "*L'état, c'est moi.*" A nation in which political liberty had been thus developed, in which trade, commerce, architecture, art, social life, had progressed, must needs have a progressive literature. The sense of beauty that had been manifested in other directions must manifest itself in literature, and the touch of a great poet was wanting for this purpose. The hero is the pro-

duct of his time, but the hero too carries forward his time to a greater perfection. The first half of the fourteenth century was preparatory to the efflorescence of literature in the second half.

The leader in this movement was, of course, Geoffrey Chaucer, the poet of the new nation and the representative of the new age; "he paints it from nature and is a part of it" (p. 267). We have a full chapter on Chaucer and his works treated chronologically, based on the publications of the Chaucer Society. His early reception of French influence is noted, his acquaintance with the works of Deguileville, Machault, Des Champs, and Granson, but we do not find him regarded, with Sandras, as a mere imitator of the French *trouvères*. The critical question as to his authorship of the existing version of the *Romaunt of the Rose* is barely touched upon. "The first fragment alone might, on account of its style and versification, be the work of Chaucer, but this is only a surmise, and we have no direct proof of it" (p. 278, note 2). That M. Jusserand is very doubtful about it is shown by his statement in the text that "this translation by Chaucer is lost." The spurious works are duly enumerated (p. 279, note 1). Very brief outlines of the *Boke of the Duchesse* and of the *House of Fame* are given, and a much fuller one of *Troilus and Criseyde*, in which poem "he surpasses now even the Italians whom he had taken for his models, and writes the first great poem of renewed English literature." The *Canterbury Tales* are duly described and commented on with sympathetic appreciation. "There appear in perfect light his masterly gifts of observation, of comprehension, and of sympathy; we well see with what art he can make his characters stand forth, and how skilfully they are chosen to represent all contemporaneous England" (p. 334). With respect to Chaucer's skill as a poet and its effect upon the undeveloped language, M. Jusserand remarks: "The brilliancy with which Chaucer used this new tongue, the instant fame of his works, the clear proof afforded by his writings that English could fit the highest and the lowest themes, assured to that idiom its definitive place among the great literary languages" (p. 338). "Chaucer's efforts were not exercised in vain; they assisted the work of concentration. After him the dialects lost their importance; the one he used, the East Midland dialect, has since become the language of the nation" (p. 309). It is impossible to over-estimate the position of Chaucer in a history of English literature. His influence is seen throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries down to the new impulse given by the study of Italian and classical literature in the reign of Elizabeth. The poets immediately succeeding Chaucer are simply his imitators, and serve to perpetuate his influence for a hundred and fifty years. In "the group of poets" authors are included who preceded, as well as those who were contemporary with, and those who succeeded, Chaucer, as witness the author of *Sir Gawayne and the Green Knight* and *The Pearl*. Lawrence Minot's poems on the French and Scottish wars of Edward III are touched upon, and the later romance of *The Bruce* by John Barbour, circa 1375. Gower comes in for some consideration, but "he is aristocratic and conservative by nature, so that he belongs to old England as much as to the new nation, and is the last in date of recognizable representatives of Angevin Britain" (p. 364).

A much greater poet than Gower, William Langland, has a chapter devoted to him and his visions. Professor Skeat has made us well acquainted with him,

and M. Jusserand has devoted one of his works to a study of *Piers Plowman*, some extracts from which are included in this chapter. They may be distinguished by the more rhetorical style, and serve to acquaint the reader still further with the contents and value of Langland's great work, for he stands next to Chaucer, and gives us a view of another side of life in the fourteenth century. Chaucer takes things easy and simply makes merry over abuses: Langland is the genuine reformer, who scores abuses in Church and State with the spirit of Elijah or John the Baptist, and is the defender of the rights of the people. M. Jusserand places the revision of the third text "in 1398 or shortly after," correcting Professor Skeat, who places it in 1393 (p. 375, note 2). A slip of "Shrewsbury" for "Shropshire" on p. 375 may be noted in passing. Langland's work is indispensable for a knowledge of the times, and serves as a complement to the works of Chaucer. "Chaucer and Langland, the two great poets of the period, represent excellently the English genius, and the two races that have formed the nation" (p. 402), the former representing "the latinized Celts"; the latter, "the race of the Anglo-Saxons."

A chapter on the prose of the period follows, and here we have Sir John Mandeville relegated to the region of myth, a conclusion that is a step beyond the results reached by the investigations of Col. Yule and Mr. Nicholson in their *Encyclopedia Britannica* article, and is founded on the work of Warner (1889), and later discoveries of Mr. Nicholson. Maetzner long since showed that the English version could not have been written by the author of the French one, and its language plainly shows that it is much nearer 1400 than 1350. The French version is now assigned to Jean de Bourgogne, or "Joannes ad Barbam," a physician, who died in 1372 at Liège, "where his tomb was still to be seen at the time of the French Revolution" (p. 407). This is the tomb that was formerly considered to be that of Sir John Mandeville. We give up Sir John with regret, but we keep his *Travels* as "one of the best and oldest specimens of simple and flowing English prose," even if we do not know who wrote the English version, which "was made after 1377, and twice revised in the beginning of the fifteenth century." This investigation leaves Wyclif as the true "father of English prose," and his life and works, in both Latin and English, which are very numerous, are next considered. His unfortunate death postponed the Reformation in England for a hundred and fifty years, but perhaps the time was not yet ripe for it.

An interesting chapter on the stage, with accounts of the ancient *Mysteries* and a brief notice of the *Moralities*, succeeds, and the volume closes with too brief an account of fifteenth and early sixteenth century literature. It produces the impression of having been written in a hurry. While Lydgate and Hoccleve, and even James I of Scotland, are re-echoes of Chaucer, and Hawes and Henryson but continue the literary tradition, Douglas and Dunbar, especially the latter, deserved fuller consideration, and to these Sir David Lyndsay might have been added, but perhaps he is only postponed. Bishop Pecock too was a man of mark, even if he was not the stuff of which martyrs are made. Sir Thomas Malory is barely named, and we miss any treatment of the important ballad literature of this century. We shall, however, await with interest the succeeding volumes, for M. Jusserand has given us a very readable book.

JAMES M. GARNETT.

Alfred Hillebrandt. *Ritual-Literatur. Vedische Opfer und Zauber.* Being volume III, part 2 of *Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde* (Encyclopedia of Indo-Aryan Research), edited by GEORG BÜHLER. Strassburg, Karl J. Trübner, 1897.

The philological status of no less than six important sections of the Indo-European community of peoples has been summarized, or is being summarized, by groups of competent scholars. Greek and Latin philology took the lead, and Iwan Müller's *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* stimulated the production of no less than four other 'Grundrisse,' all of which were undertaken by the enterprising firm of Trübner in Strassburg: one of Germanic philology, edited by Hermann Paul; another of Romance philology, edited by Gustav Gröber; next that of Iranian philology, edited by Wilhelm Geiger and Ernst Kuhn; and finally one of Hindu philology, in so far as it concerns the 'Aryan' peoples of India, edited by the eminent Vienna Indologist, Professor Georg Bühler, with the aid of about thirty scholars, German, Austrian, English, Dutch, American, Indian (both native and Anglo-Indian). Thus far there have appeared, in addition to the work at the head of this notice, the parts containing Speyer's Vedic and Sanskrit Syntax, Bühler's Indian Palaeography, Jolly's *Laws and Customs* (*Recht und Sitte*), Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, Garbe's *Sāṃkhya and Yoga Philosophy*, and Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism*. These treatises exhibit fairly the scope of the work which proposes to deal with the languages, literatures, history, religion, laws and customs, science and art of the Aryan Hindus. Of the more important Indo-European philologies, Indian philology is the most recent, and stands in need of concinnate treatment. Indeed, rather more than half of the subjects outlined in the prospectus have never before precipitated themselves from out of the amorphous state of article and dissertation into a connected form of treatment. The freshness of the subjects had invited in the past rather the edition and elucidation of the difficult texts, the statement of strong, salient, interesting points, and the striking of the paths that were to be the familiar exercise-ground of the enquirer. Of this there is still a vast deal to do. We need but mention the gaps in the list of even the first editions of important texts; but there is plenty of good timber for the rearing of a provisional house. The present work is timely and being executed by strong and deft hands. The Sanskritist by profession, as he glances over the compact pages of these encyclopedic treatises, realizes that his knowledge has been enlarged and the basis of his researches broadened; were there nothing but the sifted bibliographies in orderly array, which are one of the regular requirements of each contribution, these treatises would not have been written in vain.

But if we mistake not, this series is destined to exercise an unusual amount of influence in broadening and solidifying historical and institutional sciences in general. India, on account of the singular nature of her literary tradition, is destined to remain a very permanent source of knowledge, as indeed she has in the past proved herself to be the originator of important branches of historical and institutional science. The compara-

five absence of disturbance from the outside has ensured her continuous development with little foreign admixture; her own unrivalled systematic presentations in formal treatises of her religions, laws and customs have preserved a relatively perfect and unbroken record of that development. India is largely responsible for the new so-called Science of Religions which is at this moment profoundly and wholesomely modifying men's minds in their views of religion and philosophy. Students of comparative and historical jurisprudence have also been long accustomed to turn in the same direction for materials and for organic correlation of the tissue and bones of law. Professor Jolly's work, 'Recht und Sitte,' catalogued above, offers an invaluable digest of Hindu law, and points the way in the intricate maze of native literature, and now Professor Hillebrandt's contribution distinctly, for the first time, assembles and summarizes the exceedingly systematic and painfully painstaking Vedic treatises on home-life and house-customs, on the ritualistic practices of the Brahmins, and on witchcraft, incantation, exorcism and superstitions in general.

No student of India will say that a more ideally competent scholar than Professor Hillebrandt could have been called to this particular task. He is to begin with an all round Vedic scholar of the first rank. But his special qualification is found in his prolonged, patient studies of the so-called *Śrauta*-literature, the literature of the great Vedic sacrifices, having himself edited one of the most important texts of that class, the *Āṅkhyana-Śrautasūtra*, and having elaborated a number of connected treatises on special phases of this literature—witness, e. g., his essays on the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifice, on the Solstitial Festivals (*Sonnwendfeste*) and others. His sketch, as he modestly calls it, of the contents of the *Śrautasūtras* (pp 97-166), though based to a considerable extent on Professor Weber's pioneer labor in the same field (*Zur Kenntniss des Vedischen Opferrituals*, *Indische Studien*, X and XIII), is the *piece de resistance* of the entire work. To this Vedic scholars will turn most frequently for information on the literature of the subject, for guidance through the intricate performances of the numerous priests, for explanation of the well-nigh countless technical terms, and for correlation, where possible, of these rigid technical performances with the living world; in other words, for an account of their development out of popular (ethnological) needs and beliefs.

One wish connected with this very part of the work is not easily suppressed. The general plan of the series follows the native division of the Vedic literature into revealed texts (*śruti*) and traditional texts (*smṛiti*). This division is both mythical and unpractical, and it is to be regretted that it has been introduced at all. Mantra and Brāhmaṇa (*śruti*), as far as their subject-matter is concerned, are not nearly so closely allied as Brāhmaṇa and *Śrautasūtra* (*smṛiti*). The separation of the last two is in reality impossible. Professor Geldner has in charge the *śruti* of the three Vedas, and, if we mistake not the temper and the trend of his previous investigations, he will deal with the Brāhmaṇas of the three Vedas from the point of view of literary history rather than from the point of view of ritualistic

detail. The character of the Brāhmaṇas as a mixture of sacrificial prescript with legendary illustration—*hallacha* and *haggada*, as they are called in the Talmudic systematic view—is likely to engage his attention and to preempt the space allotted to him so much that he will lack the opportunity to present a complete sketch of the various sacrifices as treated in the Brāhmaṇas with any detail whatsoever. Indeed, were he, after all, to do this, he would be doing over again what Professor Hillebrandt has done so excellently upon the basis of the closely allied Çrāutasūtras. It is not unlikely that this encyclopedia will pass into subsequent editions: would it be too much, then, to ask Professor Hillebrandt to take courage and break down the artificial barrier, and to treat each çrāuta-sacrifice both in its Brāhmaṇa and Sūtra form? At least he might add to his citations, without great trouble to himself and without the need of great additional space, the places in the voluminous Brāhmaṇas in which each sacrifice is treated, even though he restricted himself, in the main, to his original expositions in the first edition.

The entire work is divided into four parts. The first deals with the beginnings, the literary sources, and the significance of the ritual practices; the second with the practices of home-life (Gṛhyasūtras); the third with the Vedic sacrifice (Çrāutasūtras); and the fourth with Vedic witchcraft. All four are products of scholarship so profound and judgment so nice as to leave one well satisfied that this compact treatise presents a picture whose general outline will never be altered materially. A little more breadth might have been desirable for the last chapter. The literature of Hindu superstition is so extensive, it is so largely dominated by transparent symbolism and by concomitant explanatory circumstances as to ensure for it that same basic importance in general ethnology and folklore which confessedly belongs to Hindu religion, law and house-customs. The subject of omens and portents alone¹ would justify an independent treatise, as would also the subject of Vedic physiology, anatomy and medicine. But even in these matters a gratifying beginning has been made.

A few details may be added to this notice. P. 36, l. 4: the *çāunakayañña* is after all not original with the Vāitāna-sūtra, since it is found also KB. iv. 6; ÇÇ. 3. 10. 7; AÇ. 9. 7. 1. But its correlation with the *abhicārakāma* remains interesting as illustrating the probably apocryphal name of the redactor of the vulgate version of the AV.—On the same page near the end the author Upavarṣa must be identical with the one mentioned JAOS. XI 376; Kāuṣika, Introduction, p. xvii.—On the same page, note 1, the Yajñaprāyaścittasūtra is doubtless identical with the six prāyaścittādhyāyas of the Vāit.; see Garbe, Introduction to his edition of that text, p. v; Weber, Verzeichniss der Sanskrit-Handschriften, vol. II, p. 83.—P. 41 (cf. also p. 71): for the division of the sacrifice into *pākayajña*, etc., see Gop. Br. 1. 5. 7, and 23.—P. 64, middle: for an attempt to explain the so-called Indrāṇi-rite as a practice to prevent the death of a husband and consequent widowhood, see the present writer, ZDMG. XLVIII 553, note 2.—P. 76,

¹ Add to the literature on the subject (p. 184) Hatfield's treatment of the Āuṣanasādbhutāni (JAOS. XV, pp. 307 ff.), and the adbhuta-texts at the end of Atharva-Parīṣṭas.

bottom : Çveta of course is = Pāidva, the white horse of Pedu that kills serpents from the time of the RV. on.—P. 80, l. 10: the practice of slaughtering a cow in honor of a guest (obviously obsolescent in the Gr̥hyasūtras) is embalmed in the Vedic proper name Atithigva; see AJP. XVII, pp. 424 ff.—On the same page, middle: To the practices connected with the building of a house add the so-called *çyenayāga* or *çyenejyā*, unearthed by the present writer, JAOS. XVI, pp. 12 ff.—P. 90, middle: for a somewhat more precise explanation of the word *çrāddha* see AJP. XVII 411.—P. 169, middle: see SBE. XLII, pp. 20 ff.

MAURICE BLOOMFIELD.

Sophokles Elektra. Erklärt von GEORG KAIBEL. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1896.

The new Teubner *Sammlung wissenschaftlicher Commentare zu griechischen u. römischen Schriftstellern* challenges attention by its title and still more by its programme. No concession is to be made to practical needs. The commentaries are to address themselves to mature scholars, and consequently invite the most rigorous scrutiny. To teach teachers is a perilous task, and the publishers have made a wise selection in the editor of the first commentary, and the editor a wise selection in the choice of his text. Apart from his long and close association with Wilamowitz, KAIBEL's independent work would lead us to expect a penetrating treatment of his author, and the Elektra of Sophokles is just the play to bring out the value of the principles that KAIBEL advocates. By a rare kindness of fortune we are able to compare the dramatic methods of the three great coryphaei of Attic tragedy in handling the same theme, and interpretation necessarily plays a conspicuous part in the Elektra. True, textual criticism will never cease from troubling, but exegesis must come to the front when so many problems of tragic psychology are involved as one finds in this play of Sophokles. "Exhaust interpretation before you attack the text" is a wise rule of a great teacher, but, unfortunately, the interpreter too often becomes exhausted before the interpretation and conjectural criticism is summoned to the relief. To be sure, what is sometimes called conjecture is not, properly speaking, conjecture. It is a manner of proof-reading for which modern slaves of the vernacular press take no credit to themselves, as every man that has served in the humble capacity of reader makes daily 'emendations' that would be the fortune of some scholars, if the operations were performed on the body of the classic texts. It is purely a matter of familiarity with the range of thought and expression, and is less a wonder, the more one is at home in a given language. Indeed, it is very questionable whether Hellenists of the old time plumed themselves so much on their corrections as do men of our day, and the praises that have been showered on some of Reiske's work in that line would doubtless have astonished that large-limbed scholar himself. But a homily on the abuses of conjectural criticism would be sadly out of place in a review of KAIBEL's Elektra, for in the very first lines of his prelimi-

nary observations he gives us to understand that he does not favor a ready resort to conjecture. 'Emendation,' he says, 'is a rare flower, which grows, if anywhere, on the rock of interpretation, and the longer one pursues this flower, the better does he know how hard it is to find or to pluck.' The application of this remark to the text of Sophokles is near at hand, and KAIBEL's protest against 'the flood of conjectures by which the text of Sophokles has been marred' will be more readily echoed to-day than it would have been twenty or thirty years ago. Especially to be taken to heart are KAIBEL's words about the patching of texts by parallel passages, a kind of skin-grafting to which critics are prone; and he is very emphatic, as emphatic as was the late Mr. Matthew Arnold, on the rights of poetic individuality. 'Every great poet,' he says, 'himself creates his language and his art. Developed with him, they grow with him, and die with him as his *δαίμων*. He has not inherited them and cannot transmit them.' And yet these words must be taken with some reserves. In Greek the type of each form of art, of each sphere of language, is more potent than is commonly supposed, more potent against other forms of arts, other spheres of language, than any amount of individual sympathy. The lyric poet is nearer to the lyric poet, no matter how diverse his temperament, than he is to the tragic poet of kindred genius. Self-ravelling is the best material for darning the poet's text, just as a poet is always his own best interpreter, but in default of that one may well resort to rival looms.

After KAIBEL's frank statement of his attitude towards conjectural criticism, the student of this edition of Sophokles' Elektra will not expect to encounter a host of irritating and inconclusive conjectures, and at least one old fellow-student of Vahlen's has read with a certain satisfaction the tribute that KAIBEL has paid to the sound methods of that eminent scholar, by whose example conservative souls have been strengthened in their adherence to the precept of the great master already cited.

I have given at some length this confession of faith because KAIBEL's Elektra is the initial volume of a series that seems destined to have a decided influence on the editorial work of classical scholars. At first, as I have intimated, the veteran student may not be willing to grant that so much remains to be done for the interpretation of Sophokles, may resent the assumption of superior insight into the meaning of a poet who has claimed the study of so many gifted scholars; but there is, after all, no arrogance in KAIBEL's claims, as there is no arrogance in any form of devotion. The secret that is revealed to kindred genius at a glance may be won by lesser spirits through steadfast and loving contemplation. That a new Elektra has emerged from this study of KAIBEL's would be saying too much, but passage after passage, scene after scene, has received welcome light and fresh color.

It is to be regretted that KAIBEL has not followed Wilamowitz in accompanying his edition with a translation. A translation is often the best commentary, and this KAIBEL recognizes. If Christ had given us a Latin rendering of Pindar, we should not be in doubt as to his judgment on moot-points without number. But KAIBEL evidently subscribes to Wilam-

owitz's doctrine that a poet must be translated into poetry, and for this he professes not to have the necessary gift, and Jebb's illustrious example has not induced him to attempt a prose version.

The editor's judgment as to the MS basis of the text may be given in a few words. A theoretical Λ and a theoretical Π are the ultimate sources of L and P. L^1 presents a very faulty text, corrected by L^2 after a member of the P family. Whoso admits the indispensableness of the corrections of L^2 admits the value of Π and the consequent value of P. No new collation has been found necessary, and KAIBEL does not attach any countervailing importance to the facsimile.

The Introduction is largely taken up with an analysis of the drama and a suggestive comparison of the Elektra of Sophokles and the Elektra of Euripides, in which the idealism of the elder poet is not extolled at the expense of the naturalism of the younger. 'Euripides,' says KAIBEL in substance, 'has shown wonderful power of invention in creating a heroine of which no representative of the modern school, of the "experimental romance," need be ashamed.' He had no 'documents'; he was hampered by a mass of traditions, which had to be respected and yet so reinterpreted and so readapted as to explain out of the environment the character of the heroine, which he conceived and created in his own way. The thought of evolving Elektra as a necessary product of her *milieu* was not his. It was due to Sophokles. But Euripides felt that Sophokles had not made the most of it, that the fruitful idea had not been made to yield all its dramatic possibilities, and the Euripidean Elektra was the result—not separated far in time from that of Sophokles.

This, it will be observed, is a very different tone from that of the traditional criticism of the Euripidean Elektra. The 'dramatic possibilities' of the life of an old maid in Greek antiquity cannot be measured by modern standards. Nay, unless the process of transformation is arrested, fifty years hence Americans will need a learned apparatus in order to understand the old maid of the nineteenth century, and perhaps even Frenchmen will be at a loss to comprehend the *vieille fille* of Balzac.

As has been intimated, the commentary shows on almost every page the value of fresh, independent study, but the character of the work precludes the production of specimens. More open to comment are the grammatical notes. Indeed, the admissibility of grammatical notes in an edition of so high a reach as this will be questioned by some. Assuredly, trivial matters ought not to be treated, but what is trivial, what not, is always doubtful. However, the points that are taken up are usually despatched in a few words with Wilamowitzian resoluteness. And yet the conclusion reached is not always self-evident. For instance, some note on $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rhoοιμεν$ (v. 58) seems to be necessary. Yet the explanation given, which is credited to Vahlen, is not satisfactory. To say that the optative makes the action designed depend on circumstances is too vague. The irregular sequence might be explained by the intrusion of the wish, but a more simple explanation is at hand. $\kappa\epsilon\kappa\rho\nu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nuον$ involves an action prior to that of the leading verb, so it is at once a perfect and a pluperfect, and these intercalated

clauses are responsible for many such shifts. λαβεῖν τε καὶ τητᾶσθαι (v. 274) is not happily interpreted by λαβεῖν τε καὶ μὴ λαβεῖν. Like all verbs of privation, τητᾶσθαι is much more than μὴ λαβεῖν (see on Pind. Pyth. 6, 22), and there is bitter emphasis in the article λαβεῖν θ' ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ τητᾶσθαι, the same bitter emphasis that KAIBEL himself recognizes in the article elsewhere, v. 166: τὸν ἀνήνυτον | οἶτον ἔχουσα κακῶν. On v. 318: τοῦ κασιγνήτου τί φής, ἡξοντος ἢ μέλλοντος, K. explains the genitive as a partitive. 'Nicht das ganze Wesen oder Handeln des Bruders kommt in Betracht, sondern nur ein Theil.' τοῦ κασιγνήτου is equivalent to τὸ τοῦ κ., and if any one chooses to call that a partitive, he is welcome. But a parallel with πιεῖν τοῦ οἴνου does not commend itself, and τὸ τῶνδ' εἶνον πάρα (v. 1203) is possessive rather than partitive, as is shown by parallels with the possessive pronoun. On v. 590: ἐκβαλοῦσ' ἔχεις, KAIBEL decides the moot-point as to the transitivity or intransitivity of ἔχω with a positiveness hardly justified by recent surveys of the history of this construction. 'Ueberall kann und muss ἔχω intransitiv "sich verhalten" sein.' The quarrel is one between historical growth, which favors the transitive view, and logical consistency, which favors the intransitive view, and is not to be settled by a ukase. These are a few of the various grammatical points in which agreement with KAIBEL is not inevitable; nor am I inclined to subscribe to the sweeping sentence (p. 90) that the ethical character of Greek metres cannot be determined by universal rules, that it depends on poetical handling, and especially on the environment. This is what Wilamowitz maintains for Glyconic verses, and the flutter of the Glyconic metres may, indeed, serve to express a variety of emotions, but there are certain logaoedic measures—notably those in which syncopé abounds—which have a more uniform tone, and KAIBEL is somewhat inconsistent with himself when he remarks on v. 171 = 192 that the bitter blame at the close is well marked by the strongly syncopated iambic verses. There is no reason to me discernible why similar checks to movement should not produce the same results in logaoedic measures.

B. L. GILDERSLEEVE.

REPORTS.

ROMANIA, Vol. XXIV (1895). First half.

Janvier.

Victor Friedel. Deux fragments du Fierabras. Etude critique sur la tradition de ce roman. 55 pages, with facsimile of one of the fragments. Two scraps, consisting of a single leaf from each of two separate MSS, are made the basis of an elaborate investigation, valuable as a showing of method rather than of results.

C. Boser. Le remaniement provençal de la *Somme le Roi* et ses dérivés. 30 pages. The *Somme le Roi* (i. e. 'Summa' Regis), otherwise entitled in the French texts *Miroir du Monde* and *Livre des vices et des vertus*, exists in Provençal in three different forms, the relations of which to each other and to the French are here elucidated, with copious comparisons.

J. Bédier. Fragment d'un ancien mystère. "On ne saurait se représenter ce mystère si modeste que composé, monté, joué dans quelque petite et pauvre ville. Cela même est significatif et prouve que le genre était très répandu, très aimé. Que les manuscrits de ces mystères, si nombreux qu'on les suppose, se soient tous perdus, c'est encore ce que notre fragment nous fait comprendre: c'étaient des poèmes d'occasion, rimés sans nulle prétention littéraire: la fête passée, nul ne s'en souciait plus."

R.-J. Cuervo. Los casos enclíticos y proclíticos del pronombre de tercera persona en castellano. 19 pages (*à suivre*). An admirable historical study.—*Illam, illum, illas, illos* gave *la, lo, las, los*; *illi, illis* became *li, lis*, and later *le, les*. Accordingly, *lo* (masc. and neut.), *la, los, las* are, etymologically, accusatives and *le, les* datives; but the case-forms began early to be confused, *le* being first substituted for *lo*, then *les* for *los*, and finally *la, las* and *lo, los* for *le, les*. From a long statistical list chronologically arranged, giving the usage of numerous authors in regard to this point, it appears that *el leísmo* (the substitution of *le* for *lo* in the accusative) culminates in the 16th and 17th centuries, among the writers of Madrid and the surrounding provinces. The usage found in a given work does not always correspond to that of the native region of its author. If we were to judge from Saavedra of the usage of Murcia in the 17th century, or from Valera [lately Spanish Minister at Washington] of that of Cordova in the 19th, we should be completely deceived; modern writings of a local character reveal to us that the peasants of the author of *Pepita Jiménez* are to-day as devoted to *lo* as were, in earlier centuries, Fernán Pérez de Oliva and Juan de Mena.

Mélanges. J. Cornu. *Combre* et dérivés. Refers the group of words to which belong Fr. *encombrer, décombrer* and their congeners, usually connected

heretofore with Lat. *cumulare*, Fr. *combler* (but cf. A. J. P. XVII 500), to Lat. *cumera*, *cumerus*, 'grand panier d'osier pour conserver le blé,' "mot qui a fort bien pu avoir aussi le sens de nasse ou de tel autre engin semblable servant à prendre du poisson. A *combre* où s'encombrent les poissons peuvent être aisément ramenés les différents sens qu'ont pris ses dérivés."—A. Thomas. Fr. *cormoran* [= Eng. *cormorant*]. 4 pages. "Je considère *cormarant* (*cormoran* est une altération inexpliquée de *cormaran*, qui est pour *cormarant*) comme représentant un plus ancien *corp marenc*, et je n'hésite pas à admettre en ancien français l'existence d'un adjectif *marenc*, tiré du latin *mare* à l'aide du suffixe germanique *-ing*."—A. Thomas. Fr. *girouette*. "*Gyrovagum*, passant par *gyrovao*, *gyrovo* a dû aboutir à **girou*, d'où les diminutifs *girouet*, *girouette*."—A. Thomas. Fr. *hampe*; prov. mod. *gamo*, *gamoun*. Littré gives to the word *hampe* five different meanings, the first three of which are closely related to each other (shaft of halberd, etc.). "Aux sens 1-3, *hampe* est une altération récente de *hanste*, qui s'emploie encore, sous la forme *hante* ou *ante*, dans les deux premières acceptions. Je considère les sens 4-5 ['breast of stag,' in *venery*, etc.] comme appartenant à un mot différent. Le dictionnaire français-allemand de Mozin traduit 'la hampe du cerf' par 'die *Wamme* oder Brust des Hirsches.' Or *Wamme* présente en allemand la forme parallèle *wampe* . . . M. Godefroy a recueilli deux anciens exemples de *wampe*, *vampe* au sens de 'empeigne de soulier': c'est une extension toute naturelle du sens de 'ventre, peau de ventre.'" M. Thomas is apparently unaware that this O.Fr. word *vampe* survives with its ancient meaning in the Eng. *vamp*, and that he has here brought incidentally to light, for the first time, the true etymology of a word which the English lexicographers refer, awkwardly enough, to the Fr. *avant-pied* (which, however, itself means 'vamp'). *Avampié* as a gloss to *antipodium* occurs in a MS of the second half of the 13th century (cf. Rom. 24, 171).—J. J. Jusserand. Les contes à rire et la vie des recluses au XII^e siècle d'après Aelred, abbé de Rievaulx. 6 pages. "'Vix aliquam inclusarum hujus temporis solam invenies, ante cujus fenestram non anus garrula vel nugigerula mulier sedeat, quae eam fabulis occupet, rumoribus aut detractationibus pascat, illius vel illius monaci vel clerici vel alterius cujuslibet ordinis viri formam, vultum moresque describat. Illecebrosa quoque interserat, puellarum lasciviam, viduarum, quibus licet quidquid libet, libertatem, conjugum in viris fallendis explendisque voluptatibus astutiam depingat.' Et il s'agit bien de contes à rire, de vrais fabliaux à l'état embryonnaire, car Aelred ajoute: Os interea in risus cachinnosque dissolvitur, et venenum cum suavitate bibitum per viscera membraque diffunditur."—P. Meyer. Guillem d'Autpol et Daspol. Identification.—G. Paris. La *Dance Macabré* de Jean le Fèvre. "Ce qui est certain, c'est que le poème de Jean Le Fèvre portait le nom de *Dance Macabré*. J'ai déjà indiqué que c'est cette forme, et non *macabre*, qui est la seule authentique . . . Mais qu'est-ce que ce Macabré, dont le nom était accolé à celui de *dance*, pour signifier la danse de la mort, dès le XIV^e siècle? On ne peut là dessus que faire des conjectures. Le nom de *Macabré* est une prononciation populaire de *Macabé* = *Macchabaeum* . . . Je serais plus porté à voir dans Macabré le peintre qui avait, le premier peut-être, représenté sous la forme d'une danse menée par la mort l'appel fatal qu'elle adresse à tous les humains."

Comptes rendus. Vincenzo Crescini. *Manualetto provenzale* (P. Meyer). "Cet utile manuel nous apporte une nouvelle preuve du développement que les études provençales prennent en Italie . . . Tel qu'il est, le *Manualetto* est un ouvrage fort recommandable."—Joseph Bédier. *Les Fabliaux*, 2^e édition (Ch.-M. des Granges). 8 pages. A penetrating review, devoted chiefly to a scrutiny of Bédier's somewhat startling attempt at a refutation of the Orientalist or 'Indian' theory of the dissemination of folk-tales. "Toute une partie de la discussion contenue dans les chapitres suivants est donc excellente. Abondance de documents, sûreté d'interprétation, rien n'y manque; une seule chose y est de trop: la perpétuelle démangeaison de *vexer* les orientalistes, qui amène M. B. à mesurer ses conclusions beaucoup moins d'après leur valeur réelle qu'en proportion du dépit qu'elles peuvent causer aux autres . . . Sur la forme même du mot *fabliau* adopté par M. B., on pourrait faire quelques réserves. M. B. s'autorise d'une raison d'*usage*: on a dit, on dit, on écrit partout *fabliau*. Soit. Mais cet ouvrage est le plus approfondi et le plus complet qui ait été consacré au genre; il va faire désormais autorité: son titre se fût imposé, avec la forme correcte *fableau*, s'il avait plu à l'auteur de heurter de front un préjugé." Even the philologists (it is Gaston Paris that stands sponsor for the new form *fableau*)—who know so much better than any one else that human speech, even at its highest and best estate, is fairly honeycombed with so-called errors and with real inconsistencies—are only too much like the every-day language-tinkers and authors of *Dites—ne dites pas* and *Don't*, in their proneness to forget, in dealing with questions of linguistic correctness, that, in face of the gentle yet imperious authority of established usage, the 'etymological argument' ought to have about as little weight in orthology (the word is needed) as in logic.—D. Merlini. *Saggio di ricerca sulla satira contro il villano* (G. Paris). "La partie la meilleure de son livre est consacrée à cette littérature (de l'antagonisme, à peu près restreint à l'Italie, entre les citadins et les campagnards); il a montré notamment avec succès, à ce qu'il me semble, le rapport où elle est avec le développement de la *Commedia dell' arte* et la création du type du *Zanni* (= *Gianni* = *Giovanni*), divisé plus tard en Arlequin et Brighella: Zanni est primitivement le *facchino* venu des montagnes bergamesques qui faisait à Venise, aux XV^e et XVI^e siècles, tous les gros ouvrages du port et s'attirait les railleries des gens de la ville (quelque chose comme l'Auvergnat à Paris [and the Gallego at Madrid])."

Chronique. Thor Sundby, professor of the French language and literature at the University of Copenhagen, died Nov. 19, 1894, at the age of 64 years. His chief works were a study of the life and writings of Brunetto Latino (1869; translated into Italian, 1884), a study of Pascal (1877), and a *Dictionnaire danois-français et français-danois*, 2 vols., 1883–84). He is succeeded in his chair by Kr. Nyrop, the eminent Romance scholar, who was adjunct professor in the same university.—W. Borsdorf has been appointed professor of Romance philology at the recently founded Welsh 'University College' of Aberystwyth.—For the marriage (October, 1893) of Vittorio Cian, the young Italian literary historian, his friends inaugurated a newly devised sort of *per nozze*. Twenty-five of them combined in the publication of a magnificent quarto volume of more than 450 pages, in which their contributions, relating chiefly to Italian literature, were printed in the chronological order of the

subjects treated.—G. Weigand, author of *Nouvelles recherches sur le roumain de l'Istrie* and of *Die Aromunen*, has organized at Leipzig, with the support of the Rumanian Government, an *Institut für romanische Sprache*.—On the occasion of the fourth centenary of the death of Matteo Maria Boiardo (December 19, 1894), the commune and province of Reggio d'Emilia published, under the editorship of N. Campanini, and with the collaboration of a number of the leading Italian littérateurs, a handsome volume devoted to the life and work of the Count of Scandiano (Bologna, pp. 479).—The Société de l'histoire de France has published the first volume of a new edition of the *Journal de Jean de Roye*, commonly known as 'la chronique scandaleuse' of King Louis XI.

Livres annoncés sommairement. 16 titles.

Avril.

P. Meyer. Anciennes gloses françaises. Two sets of glosses of Latin terms, numbering respectively 117 and 55 items, indexed and instructively annotated.

H. Morf. Notes pour servir à l'histoire de la légende de Troye en Italie (suite et fin). IV. La version vénitienne. 23 pages. "C'est un texte très intéressant au point de vue linguistique et très curieux au point de vue de l'histoire littéraire, et qui, à ce double titre, mériterait bien que quelque éditeur intelligent lui donnât ses soins."

P. Meyer et N. Valois. Poème en quatrains sur le Grand Schisme (1381). "Ayant eu la curiosité de le lire, je le jugeai assez intéressant pour mériter d'être publié. Je le copiai, et M. Noël Valois, mieux préparé que personne, par ses travaux sur le Grand Schisme, à apprécier un poème qui reflète les sentiments de l'Université de Paris sur ce grand événement, voulut bien, à ma demande, rédiger la preface qu'on va lire." The poem consists of 73 four-line strophes, in monorime.

Ou nom de Yhesucrist qui fut vray Dieu et homme
Je weil ycy dicter et compter une somme
Ou sera recité le fait et la voie comme
Est tirés et sachez le saint siege de Romme.

Berthelemieu du Bar si se dist estre pape,
Et Robert de Geneve lui veult oster la chappe.
Chascun comme saint pere lez biens de l'autel happe,
Et pour lez soustenir l'un fiert et l'autre frappe.

R.-J. Cuervo. Los casos enclíticos y proclíticos (*fin*). 45 pages. "Resumiendo esta disertación ya demasiado larga, diré que en gran parte de los dominios del castellano se ha conservado y se conserva con precisión el uso etimológico de los casos de *el*; que habiendo nacido la confusión entre el acusativo *lo* y el dativo *le* por causas morfológicas, se ha extendido por causas sintáticas, y al fin por extensión abusiva hasta predominar notablemente el *le* en el lenguaje común de Castilla . . . A esto [la distinción de oficios] han encaminado sus esfuerzos Salvá y posteriormente la Academia proponiendo ó preceptuando que *le* se aplique á personas y *lo* á cosas: al tiempo toca declarar

si por ahí va en Castilla la corriente del uso." In an appendix the author establishes once for all the correct doctrine of the pronoun, reflexive and personal, in impersonal phrases. "Las frases *se les castiga, se les admira*, nacidas de la analogía con *se les dice ó se les ruega esto ó lo otro, se les aplica el castigo, . . .* conservando el dativo, aparecen sin sujeto. Para hacerlas entrar en la sintaxis normal, es preciso descubrir el sujeto, y aquí entra la divergencia, variando las opiniones según la manera de estimar el complemento. Los que, habituados al uso etimológico, distinguen sin vacilación alguna los casos, sientan en *le les* un dativo, y naturalmente buscan el sujeto del verbo pasivo: de ahí las explicaciones de Salvá y de Bello. Los que están hechos á decir y oír *le les* en lugar de *lo, los*, toman aquellos primeros como acusativos, y no pueden menos de buscar el sujeto en el *se*, y de darle en consecuencia el calificativo de pronombre indeterminado, como se hace con nuestro *uno*, con el *on* de los franceses y el *man* de los alemanes (Acad. Gram., p. 249, ed. de 1880)."

Mélanges. A. Thomas. Etymologies françaises: *Aochier*. This word is used to translate the Lat. *suffocare* in the parable of the Sower, and is probably an agricultural term corresponding to a type **adoccare*, composed of *ad* and the well-known word *occare* 'to harrow' a field and 'to dress with earth' the foot of a tree. From this to 'stifle, choke' "il y a moins que rien." —*Artiller, artilleur, artillerie* [= Eng. *artillery*]. The only question is as to how *artem* has produced *artiller*. O.Fr. *artillier* is simply an alteration, by folk-etymology (under the influence of the word *art*), of the verb *atilkier*, the precise etymology of which is not yet established.—*Goupillon* [holy water sprinkler]. Ménage was the first to connect *goupillon* with *goupil* [*vulpeculum*] 'renard.' The etymology is rather to be sought in a stem *vipp* or *wipp*, not furnished by the Latin; cf. Dutch *wip* 'rocking motion,' Eng. *whip, wisp, wipe*.—*Hausse-col*. Not, as Littré would have it, from *hausser* and *col*, but an alteration, by folk-etymology, of *hauscot, halscot* 'neck-coat' (cf. *haubert, halsberc*).—*Penture* [part of hinge]. Derived from *pendre* (cf. Eng. *hinge* and *hang*).—*Rature* = **raditura*, from *radere*, through a participle **raditus*.—G. Paris. Fr. *dôme*. It is here for the first time pointed out and conclusively proven that the two meanings 'dome' and 'cathedral' are of entirely distinct origin and history. In the former sense the word is the Lat. *doma*, borrowed from the Greek *δῶμα*, which had acquired the general meaning of 'roof'; in the latter it is the simple reproduction of the Ital. *duomo*, German *Dom*, answering to Latin *domum*.

Comptes rendus. L. Hervieux. Les fabulistes latins depuis le siècle d'Auguste jusqu'à la fin du moyen âge. 2^e édition, entièrement refondue (L. Sudre). 8 pages. "Si M. H. n'a pas toujours la rigueur scientifique qui est à désirer en des ouvrages de ce genre, il a la patience d'un bénédictin et un flair incomparable de chercheur. Quelque imparfait que soit encore le monument qu'il a élevé à Phèdre et à ses successeurs, il imposera toujours l'admiration et la reconnaissance."—E. Etienne. Essai de grammaire de l'ancien français (IX^e–XIV^e siècles) (G. Paris). "Marque un très grand progrès."—G. Schlaeger. Studien über das Tagelied (dissertation de docteur) (A. Jeanroy). "Cette étude est certainement la plus complète et la plus richement documentée qui ait été écrite sur le sujet; mais le résultat est loin

de répondre à l'effort."—Thomas A. Jenkins. *L'Espurgatoire seint Patriz of Marie de France*. Published with an introduction and a study of the language of the author. Johns Hopkins University dissertation (G. Paris). "Avec l'impulsion féconde qui a été, dans ces derniers temps, donnée aux études romanes en Amérique, surtout grâce à M. A. Marshall Elliott, il faut nous attendre à voir arriver prochainement des Etats-Unis des flottes de 'dissertations' dans le genre de celles que nous envoie si abondamment,—un peu moins abondamment depuis quelque temps,—l'Allemagne. Nous ne pourrions que nous en féliciter, si beaucoup ont, comme celle-ci, un réel mérite et sont le fruit d'un travail intelligent, consciencieux et bien dirigé."—H. Oskar Sommer. *The Recuyell of the Historyes of Troie* (G. Paris). A reproduction of the first work printed in English, though not in England, Caxton having printed his translation of Raoul Lefèvre's *Recueil des histoires de Troye* at Bruges or at Cologne about 1474, while it was not until 1477 that he set up at Westminster the first English printing press. Dr. Sommer has provided the work with a valuable introduction, glossary and index.—F. Araujo. *Estudios de Fonética castellana* (J. Saroïhandy). 5 pages. "J'éprouve quelque embarras à conclure. M. Araujo est l'un des premiers, en Espagne, à s'être tenu au courant de la philologie moderne; il y a déployé une grande activité, et il m'est pénible de constater que, dans le travail dont j'ai passé une partie en revue, ses efforts n'ont pas été suivis d'un succès complet."—L. Sainénu. *Basmele române [the Rumanian folk-tales] in comparatiune cu legendele antice clasice*, pp. xiv, 1114 (G. Paris). "Le titre de cet ouvrage, la dimension du volume et le nom de l'auteur en indiquent suffisamment l'importance."

Périodiques.

Chronique. M. Kawczyński, author of a remarkable work on the origin and history of rhythms (cf. A. J. P. XI 358–71), has been appointed professor of Romance philology at the University of Cracow.—On the 17th of February, 1894, was appropriately celebrated, in the Aula of the University of Vienna, the sixtieth birthday anniversary of the distinguished professor of Romance philology, Adolph Mussafia.—Twenty-one former students of Professor Adolph Tobler have signalized his twenty-five years' incumbency of the chair of Romance philology at Berlin, by presenting him with a memorial volume of 510 pages, devoted exclusively to Romance studies.

H. A. TODD.

HERMES, XXXI (1896).

J. Kromayer, *Die Militärcolonien Octavians und Caesars in Gallia Narbonensis*. Plancus' *legio veterana* (Cic. ad Fam. XII 2) was the Legio X dismissed by Caesar and enrolled again by Lepidus. Caesar in the autumn of 45 had settled the tenth legion in Narbo and the sixth in Arelate, and these cities were called *Julia Paterna* to distinguish them from the colonies founded by Octavian (Dio IL 34, 4), Baeterrae in 36, Arausio between 35 and 33, and Forum Julii in 30. This meets the objections raised by Mommsen (III⁶ 553, N. 1), and shows that here as elsewhere Octavian completed the work begun by his father.

L. Ziegler, *Zur Textkritik des Scholiasta Bobiensis*, gives a collation and restoration of the Milan palimpsest for *Pro Flacco*, *Cum senatui gratias egit*, *Pro Plancio*, *Pro Milone*, *Pro Sestio*.

J. Kromayer, *Zur Geschichte des II. Triumvirats*. IV. Der Partherzug des Antonius. His route was from Zeugma to Melitene, NNE to Satala, E through Caranitis to Artaxata, through the Araxes valley to Atropatene. This is safer than Mesopotamia (where the Parthians would surely attack him), is practicable, is the right distance (8000 stadia), and had already been traversed by Pompey and by Caesar. (2) The plan of attack from Atropatene was recommended by Artavasdes and had been used by Caesar. Armenia covered the approach and the retreat. (3) Antony was not late in starting his expedition, for he must have been two months before Phraaspa, and four on the road, so that he would leave Zeugma in April, Syria in March. The approach to Zeugma was intended to draw attention from the Armenian route. He lacked neither energy nor strategic skill, but he misjudged the enemy's strength and was not supported by Artavasdes.

J. Toeppfer, *Die Liste der Athenischen Könige*. The Medontidae are the only historic kings, Codrus and Medon are mere fictions. Since the archon's office was as old as Akastus, it was thought that the kings were superseded at that time, whereas the archons merely limited the royal power. Aeschylus (777-754) was the last hereditary king, Alkmaeon was a usurper, and with Charops begin the ten-year kings, who were elected from the Medontidae family. After Hippomenes the office was thrown open to all the Eupatridae, but we do not know whether the next three rulers were called archons or kings. The archon's power was a gradual growth. Astakos. Memnon's account (FHG. III 536) is alone correct, and is confirmed by the tribute lists, though Chalkedon was the more immediate mother-city. The coins with Apollo, a lobster and an anchor point to a monetary union with Apollonia and Ankore. The city was destroyed about 290 B. C.

U. Koehler, *Attische Inschriften des fünften Jahrhunderts*. (1) Decrees in favor of Potamodorus and Eurytion, exiles from Boeotian Orchomenos (cf. Thuc. IV 76). The second decree was passed in the spring of 423. (2) Fragment of a tribute list from 439/8 B. C. Chalkis and Eretria must have recently ceded lands to Athens, for they only pay three talents each. (3) A little fragment which fits in between g. and m. (l. 20-28) in CIA. I 37, and (6) between CIA. I 190 and 191. (4) and (5) are small fragments. (7) CIA. 3, p. 15, was inscribed under a statue of Kallimachus on the Acropolis, dedicated by his son (cf. CIA. II 1512). (8) The inscription in Rangabis, Ant. Hell. 1299, is older than the Peloponnesian War and had some mathematical or astronomical use.

W. Soltau, *P. Scipio Nasica als Quelle des Plutarchs*. Nasica's letter (Plut. Aem. Paul. 15) was written to Masinissa, and was also used by Polybius (ap. Liv. 44. 35, 14), who was the friend of both parties. Plutarch knew the letter only from Juba's history, which contained extracts from Livy supplemented by antiquarian notes.

C. G. Brandis, *Studien zur Römischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*. Since pro-consuls governed Bithynia under Antoninus Pius (165 A. D.), but not under

Marcus Aurelius, we may conclude that during the latter's reign this province became imperial territory, and Lycia-Pamphylia was ceded to the senate. (2) Pontus had a separate legislative assembly established by Pompey and reorganized by Augustus. Its early existence is attested by the presence of a special Pontic magistrate throughout the Mithridatic territory, while only in the time of Pompey were the cities E and W of the Halys so well united that they could form such an assembly.

E. Assmann, *Nautica*. (1) A mediaeval parallel in H. Yule's *Marco Polo* (Introd., lxix) confirms the statement of Livy (30. 24) that conquered ships were towed stern-foremost. (2) Ships with several beaks are attested by Athen. (V 204), by coins and vases, so that *δεκέμβολος* must mean 'ten-beaked.' (3) In Hdt. II 96 *πλινθηδόν* refers to the use of small boards edge to edge. The hurdle before the bow warned the sailor of danger, the stone at the stern aided him in quickly checking his course.

R. Reitzenstein, *Properz-Studien*, sets forth, with detailed interpretation of the context, the poet's use of parenthesis and digression in II 1. 47-56 (not a separate poem), 10. 7-8, 34. 47-50, 3. 29-31, 35-8, 7. 15-18, 30. 31-32, I 16. 9-12, 15. 29-33, 14. 5-6, 8. 15 (keep *Et*). The parenthesis is not formal, but a free and conversational use of brief explanatory clauses which are outside the logical sequence of thought, a usage found more often in Propertius than in any other poet. Recognition of this principle will often prevent transposition or the assumption of a lacuna, yet we find a gap after v. 34 in II 6. This poem is intended to rival Hor. Od. III 6. In II 34. 31 he defends *memorem*, *nam* in 33, and, rejecting Maass' ascription of 34-40 to Callimachus and Philetas, refers the whole passage to Antimachus' Thebais. II 15. 25 goes back through some unknown Alexandrian to Pl. Sym. 192 D.

M. Wellmann, *Aegyptisches*. Plutarch's version of the Osiris myth goes back to Manetho, who, consistent with the desire of the Ptolemies to unite the Greek and Egyptian religions, identified the Orphic worship of Dionysus and Demeter with the cult of Osiris and Isis, divinities similar in many details of life-history, attribute and ritual, which are here enumerated. A study of the symbolic interpretation of Egyptian totemism found in Ael., Plut., Porph. and Macrob. shows their dependence on a common source. By a fondness for marvels, by a use of Stoic doctrines and of Homer, and by a wide range of reading, this is proven to be Apion; through him the myth reached Plutarch. The combination of Pythagorean theories of number with Egyptian legends is taken from Eudoxus.

J. E. Kirchner, *Beiträge zur Attischen Prosopographie*. An examination of epigraphic testimony regarding the personal history of a dozen Athenians. We learn the family-tree of Kleon, of Dikaiogenes (Isae. V) and of Kallippus, pupil of Plato. Ankyle was the deme of Kallias and Hipponicus.

G. Kaibel, *Zu den Epigrammen des Kallimachos*. V interpreted. XIII. With *Πελλαίου* sc. *βοός*, meaning the ox on a coin of Pella. XLII alludes to Archinus' Stoic studies. Propertius and Ovid imitate this *παίγνιον*. XLVIII interpreted by comparison with Anthol. Pal. VI 308.

W. Dittenberger, *Antiphons Tetralogien und das Attische Criminalrecht*. The law cited by Antiphon, III (B) β 9, et al., which forbids and punishes

justifiable homicide, is a mere fiction of the author, and the tetralogies cannot be used as an independent source of Athenian law.

L. Ziegler, *Zur Textkritik des Scholiasta Bobiensis*, concludes his detailed study of this subject.

F. Münzer, *Die Zeitrechnung des Annalisten Piso*. A study of Dionys. I 74, Plin. VIII 16, and frag. 26, 27 of Piso shows that the annalist adopted the era of Cato, which placed the founding of the city 751 B. C.

J. Ziehen, *Epencitaten bei Statius*. Silv. I 2. 213, III 1. 71 ff., 3. 179, V 2. 113 ff. show that the poet borrows his similes and allusions because of their literary excellence, although not especially adapted to his context.

Miscellen.—F. Bechtel in the Stratos inscription (BCH. XVII 445) reads (l. 9, 10) *βούλαρχος ἥς* (i. e. *ἡν*) *Σπίνθαρος* (?). The datives *τῷ*, *Καλλίππῳ* instead of locatives may be due to Athenian influence.—W. Dittenberger reads *Λητόδωρος* in Diodor. XVIII 7, 5.

M. Pohlenz, *Ueber Plutarchs Schrift περὶ ἀοργησίας*. The source of this treatise is Hieronymus of Rhodes, who as a Peripatetic opposes Plato (ch. 9 *τὰ νεῦρα τῆς ψυχῆς*, cf. Rep. III 411 B) rather than Aristotle. In ch. 4 and in the introductions to ch. 6–10 Plutarch presents his own views and uses his own phraseology, hence some obscurity. The same source appears in *περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς* and in the *Vita Coriolani*.

H. Diels, *Alkmans Partheneion*. This consisted of ten strophes, written in four columns of c. 34 lines each, but these were not sung by single maidens. Diodorus (IV 33, 6), like Alcman, mentions but ten Hippokoontidae; v. 29–35 refer to the Giants and conclude the first half of the ode. The simile in 43 ff. is justified by the contrast between the coarse Spartan humor and the lofty tone of the poem. Moreover, *ἀγέλη* was the Laconian word for chorus. Agesichora is the pupil and *ἐρωμένη* of Agido, as Kleis of Sappho. She leads one of the hemichoruses consisting of ten maidens, while Agido guides the other, which numbers eleven with the coryphaea. There is also an antichorus, called Pleiades (l. 59) by the poet, which was trained and led by Aenesimbrotia. The ode was dedicated to Artemis (Orthia in 60, Aotis in 87) and to Helen. In many places new readings are proposed, e. g. in 39, *ὀρῶρ' ὥτ' (= ὥστε)*.

E. Maass, *Untersuchungen zu Properz*, interprets the design on a Berlin vase (Furt. 2642) as Dionysus Musagetes with Muses who bear the lyre and thyrsus. I. This function of Bacchus as god of poetry (cf. Hor. Od. I 1, 29, etc.) appears in many allusions of Propertius, as in IV 3. 28, where the *tympana* are called *orgia Musarum*, and in III 30. 25–39 (cf. Orph. Hymn 76). In IV 3. 25 ff. the two fountains belong to Ennius and to Philetas, while in III 10 the source of Permessus is Aganippe, one of the springs struck out by the hoof of Pegasus (a Hippocrene, v. Ov. Fast. V 7), and here again sacred to Philetas and to the Muses, nymphs of the mountain spring. Indeed, inscriptions show that the Muses were honored at Aganippe. In Verg. Ecl. VI 64 *ad flumina* must follow *duxerit*, for Permessus and Aonia are one locality, while Linos gives the pipe to Gallus as an imitator of Euphorion. There were two traditions regarding the springs of Helicon; the older, followed by

Hesiod and Vergil, considers Aganippe alone as the fountain of the Muses, the later distinguishes Aganippe as sacred to the elegy and Hippocrene as the source of the epos. This version appears in Philetas and Ennius. II. Brief interpretation of III 32. 33 ff., IV 1. 27 ff., 5. 39 ff.

P. Wendland, Philo und Clemens Alexandrinus. The *de fort.*, *de car.*, *de paen.* and *de nobil.* belong to Philo's treatment of the Mosaic law. A detailed comparison of Clement's citations from Philo with Philo's text supplies lacunae in the latter and shows the true order of the writings as given above. The constant agreement of Clement with S makes this MS the most important authority for Philo's text.

E. Thomas, Das Janiculum bei Ovid, defends in Fast. I 245 the reading *ara mea est colli, quem volgus*. Janus may well have had an altar on the Janiculum, for his son Fons was thus honored (Cic. de leg. 2. 22. 56 and Dion. Hal. 2. 76. 6).

Miscellen.—E. Lattes shows that the inscriptions of Novilara are Etruscan in alphabet and vocabulary. Only B and U are new, and they are, at least, not Greek.—Th. Gomperz reads in Emped. 21 (Stein) μήτε τιν' ὄψει πίστιν, 131 τὰ νῦν ἐσορῶμεν ἅπαντα, 183 ζωρά τε <ᾱ> πρὶν κέκρητο.—B. Keil. The Ὀλατικὸς πόλεμος of the inscription published in Arch.-Epigr. Mitth. aus Oest. XI 66 ff. shows that Ὀλας in CIA. I 274, 7 is the name of a slave taken from a Thracian tribe living near Apollonia on the Pontus.—P. Stengel cites other passages to support his definition of πέλανος (Herm. XXIX 281 ff.), and also shows that in divination from the entrails of animals the seers observed the bursting of the gall and the intensity of the flame, not the movements of the victims.

B. Niese, Zur Geschichte des Pyrrhischen Krieges. Trogus, preserved in Justin, is the only reliable authority, since other writers distort the facts in their desire to praise Rome. This falsification was begun not by contemporary Romans, but by later Greek historians, and was continued by the Augustan writers. It appears from Justin, with whom Diodorus and Cicero agree, that the only visit made by Cineas was after the battle of Asculum, when the Romans had more power in Italy. The speech of Ap. Claudius was an early invention, for it was really the embassy of Mago that brought the Romans to a decision. The battle of Beneventum was no overwhelming defeat, nor did Pyrrhus entirely give up the war. Tarentum was not taken by storm, for it remained independent till Hannibal's time, nor was it betrayed by Milon, for he had returned to Pyrrhus.

B. Keil, Zur Delphischen Labyadeninschrift, reads ἐν νέωτα in 12, in D 31 ff. interprets ὥραν as 'day' and συμπρήσκειν as 'burn' (sacrifice), in D 13 takes λεκχοῖ as dative and παρῇ from παρήμι, in D 26 writes ἀρχων and supplies αὐτῶν with ποιόντων, in C 33 explains στροφαῖς as 'turning-places,' and in C 38 writes ἔντε κα ἡ θήκα ἐπὶ γὰν ἀποσθεθῇ, where τθ is due to progressive dissimilation.

K. J. Neumann, Polybiana. The historian was led to place the first treaty between Rome and Carthage in the first year of the republic by the general feeling that Punic treachery went back to the earliest times, a feeling reflected in Naevius and Ennius and promoted by Cato. He does not mention the

treaty of 306, simply because it was lost and forgotten. Polybius wrote books 1-15 before 151 B. C., and, on resuming work soon after 144, he revised 1 and 2, inserted the discussion of *Punica fides* and the digression in 3. 21, 9-32, 10, and then published 1-15. So this portion of his work could not be altered (v. 16. 20). Books 4-7 of Cato's *Origines* were written between 154 and 149, whereas 1-3 were published in 168.

H. F. Kästner, *Pseudodioscoridis De herbis femininis*, publishes this treatise, prefixing a description of the MSS (two Laur., one Par.) and a discussion of the sources, Dioscorides and Ps.-Apuleius. The meaning of the title is a mystery.

C. Robert, *Die Scenerie des Aias, der Eirene, und des Prometheus*. In the *Ajax* the protagonist took the parts of Ajax and Teucer. The change of scenery was effected by projecting up from 'Charon's stairs' a platform covered with earth and stones, and up these steps came Tecmessa (891), like the ghosts in *Eum.*, *Hec.* The covering of Ajax with a mantle (915) allows the actor to slip down the stairs, while a lay figure is put in his place. Here again in the *Pax* is the cave where Eirene is buried, and into this descends Trygaeus (726). This underground passage was originally larger, and was the oldest scenic contrivance of the Greeks. The wooden skene (the hill in *Aesch. Suppl.*, the *temenos* in *Sept.*) covered the rear of the orchestra, yet left abundant space for the chorus to dance. The skene did not develop from the dressing-room. The wooden houses of Zeus and Trygaeus were on different levels, and were placed one in front, the other at the side (cf. *Ach. Nub. Ran. Thes.* 657). A large *ἐκκύλημα* in *Thes.* 277 bears the chorus, but not the actors nor the altar. Over the stairway was built the hill on which Prometheus lay, and into this it sank at the end. The actor entered the image through the passage-way, and through this the chorus came to ascend the winged chariot on which they floated in the air. They did not dance at all, hence no dance-measure in the poem. That the flying-machine is as old as Aeschylus appears from *Eum.* 403-5 and the *Ψυχοστασία* (*Poll.* IV 130), and the *θεολογείον* is equally ancient (*Plut. de aud. poet.* 17 A). The Prometheus is played mainly in the air, and no other tragedy makes such large use of machinery.

Miscellen.—P. Stengel defines *θύειν* as 'sacrifice for the sake of the gods' (to honor them) and *θύεσθαι* 'for man's sake' (to get help). The middle is common in the historians, but very rare elsewhere. *λερώσυνα* are the perquisites of the priests in general, *γέρη* only their share of the flesh. *θεομορία* is the part consecrated to the gods, though sometimes taken by the priests.—W. Dittenberger proves by the use of *ἀτρέκεια* and of *πειθαρχεῖν* c. gen. that the letter of Darius I in *BCH.* XIII 529 was composed in the Ionic dialect and later changed to Attic.—F. Skutsch shows that Firmicus was a Syracusan.—C. Türk cites the Delphic inscription in *BCH.* XIX 1 to support the meaning of *ἐνιαυτός* as 'anniversary.'

BARKER NEWHALL.

BRIEF MENTION.

Professor MICHEL BRÉAL's *Essai de Sémantique*, which bears the subtitle *Science de significations* (Hachette), seems destined to make both the name and the subject popular. 'Semantic' or 'Semantics' is better than 'Semasiology' on the one hand or 'Meaning-lore' on the other, and the wider public will welcome a book which unfolds some of the most interesting lessons that the study of language has to teach. There is something, says M. BRÉAL, in linguistics besides phonetics, 'by which the study is reduced to a secondary branch of acoustics and physiology,' something besides 'an enumeration of the losses undergone by the grammatical mechanism,' an enumeration which produces 'the illusion of a crumbling structure.' Speculations on the origin of language only add, without great profit, chapter after chapter to the history of systems. The object of 'semantic' is to extract from linguistic study food for reflexion and rules for the vernacular. Each one of us is a collaborator in the evolution of human speech, and 'semantic' appeals to practice as well as to theory. Such is the programme of the *Essai de Sémantique*, which cannot fail to attract attention in professional circles as well as in the larger world for which it seems to be primarily destined.

In the introductory chapter, which gives the scope of the work, Professor BRÉAL clears the way by protesting against the abuse of metaphors, which leads people not only to say but to think that language goes its own road and that words—form and sense—lead an existence of their own, independent of man. Words are spoken of as being born, as coming into conflict with one another, as propagating their species, and as dying out. There is no great harm in these phrases, if there were not those who take them literally, and hence this prefatory protest against a terminology which is apt to efface the real causes of things. It is not the words that live, but the men that make the words. Languages are not mothers, nor do they have daughters. Verbs do not borrow certain tenses from other verbs. They are neither borrowers nor lenders. Nouns do not take on such and such a termination in the plural. Let us get rid of these fanciful expressions. Let us 'study the intellectual causes that have presided over the transformation of our languages.' And yet a critic might say that causes do not preside and that there is danger of conjuring up some such image as *Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίους νόμοις*. In point of fact, personification is too much for us. The inheritance from our imaginative forefathers determines our thought. We woo an abstraction, and the pure creature is no sooner won than it reveals itself as a shrewish goddess. But such a book as this incites on every page to reflexion and comment, and further notice is reserved. The exigencies of the Journal compel the postponement of an

elaborate review, and this preliminary mention is intended only as an announcement of a work in which the eminent author has gathered up in an attractive form the results of long and deep study.

When in the account which he gives of the first Persian invasion (Legg. 3, 698 C) Plato says of Dareios: θάνατον αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ Δατίδῃ) προειπὼν μὴ πράξαντι ταῦτα there can be little doubt that μὴ πράξαντι is a conscious abridgment of a conditional clause, whether εἰ μὴ πράξει or εἰ μὴ πράξειε. If Plato had not been in such a hurry he might have employed the finite verb and have used εἰ μὴ πράξει (πράξοι), on account of the threat. In the more leisurely story of the Menexenos (240 A) we read: εἶπεν ἦκειν ἄγοντα Ἑρετριέας καὶ Ἀθηναίους εἰ βούλοιντο τὴν ἐαυτοῦ κεφαλὴν ἔχειν. But in the Laws Plato is rushing on with his participles, and in this very passage indulges in a curious participial anacoluthon. Now, this use of the participle with μὴ as the conscious shorthand of a conditional is post-Homeric (A. J. P. XVIII 244), and Dr. GALLAWAY's laborious dissertation *On the use of μὴ with the participle in classical Greek* exhibits in detail the evolution of the usage. Of course, it was well known that Homer does not combine μὴ with the participle freely, and Monro (H. G.², §360) cites but one passage, Od. 4, 684, where it is clearly part of a wish. However, he has overlooked Il. 13, 48, where Faesi-Franke explains μὴ with partic. as conditional, and the same explanation is given by Paech, *Ueber den Gebrauch des Ind. Futuri als modus iussivus bei Homer*, p. 14, to which Ameis-Hentze refers. The passage runs:

Αἴαντε, σφὼ μὲν τε σάωσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν
ἀλκῆς μνησαμένω μῆδ' ἐκρυεροῖο φόβοιο.

True, Dr. GALLAWAY is not satisfied with the explanation of the μῆδ' as conditional, but he does not mend matters by connecting it with κρυεροῖο, for μῆδ' assuredly belongs to μνησαμένω, and as a conditional clause μῆδ' μνησαμένω would make sense in Attic. Of course, Eustathios has no difficulty with the μῆδ'; it is the natural negative of the participle with him (A. J. P. I 55), and he calls the passage ἀνδρε(ῖ)ων ἐπαινος, and makes it declarative, and not hortatory. So does the paraphrast, whose version is especially interesting. ὦ Αἴαντες, he writes, ὑμεῖς ἂν διασώσητε τὸν λαὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἰσχύος ἀπομνησθέντες καὶ οὐ τῆς φρικτῆς φυγῆς, the negative οὐ showing the declarative conception and ἂν διασώσητε that the writer had before him the reading of Apollonios, κε διασώσετε, and as ἂν with fut. ind. would have no terror for a Greekling (see my note on Ep. ad Diogn. 4, 17), we may read here for διασώσητε, διασώσετε, and not διασώσαιτε. In his commentary (1888) Monro gives the future in Il. 13, 47 'a hortatory force,' but in his H. G.² (1891) he does not accept the 'gentle imperative' (§326) theory. Moreover, the hortatory force of the future does not explain the negative μῆδ', as Paech has pointed out (l. c.); and compare further A. J. P. XV 117, where I have shown that an imperative future with μὴ has very doubtful warrant. The trouble is that σάωσετε has not been recog-

nized by the authorities as a thematic form of the aor. imperative. Gehring still classes it as a future, and it does not keep *οἶσете* company in the lists usually given. If Dr. GALLAWAY had consulted Leaf, he would have found what seems to be the true solution of the problem: '*σώσετε* is the imperative of the sigmatic aorist, as is shewn by the following *μή*,' for *μνησαμένω* clearly represents the imperative. Compare the phrase Il. 6, 112: *μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς*. The point is a small point even for *Brief Mention*, which is a manner of pin-cushion for small points, but it is not altogether uninteresting as a specimen of the progress of doctrine.

Mr. E. F. BENECKE 'met with his death in Switzerland, on July 16th, 1895, in his twenty-sixth year,' and his friends have published for the use of scholars a fragment which he left behind, *Antimachus of Colophon and the Position of Women in Greek Poetry* (Swan Sonnenschein), in the hope that the material may be of service to those engaged in similar studies, as it undoubtedly will. And, furthermore, there will be no lack of those engaged in similar studies, for the subject has a fatal fascination, especially for young men. So there is an essay in the Harvard Studies, vol. I, by another young scholar, entitled *The Position of Women in Aristophanes*, which covers part of the ground traversed in Mr. BENECKE's posthumous book. Under the sad circumstances, criticism would be out of place, and yet one who has studied the subject enough to despair of attaining may be allowed to remark resignedly that Greek and women, apart or together, are lessons never learned to an end. *Dies diei eructat verbum* may answer for the one, *nox nocti indicat scientiam* may answer for the other. No better average woman, Greek or other, than the seawoman of the old iambist of Amorgos. Find out the attitude of the Greek to the sea, and you have the answer to the other problem.

Apart from the contents of his writings, Josephus may be made to render good service as a specimen of the kind of Greek that ought not to be written, and as we want the best texts attainable for all samples, whether good or bad, we welcome the completion of NIESE's monumental edition of Josephus in the closing volume, *Flavii Iosephi An(t)iquitatum Iudaicarum Epitoma* (Weidmann).

Professor GUDEMAN's handy little manual, *Outlines of the History of Classical Philology* (Boston, Ginn & Co.), has vindicated its usefulness by reaching a third edition, and it is to be regretted that the 'thorough revision' claimed for it has not extended to a number of eccentric Greek accents.

NECROLOGY.

GEORGE MARTIN LANE.

On the last day of June, George Martin Lane ended his useful and noble life in Cambridge. He was born in Charlestown on Christmas Eve, 1823, but his parents removed to Cambridge during his infancy, and he never knew any other home. His early education was in the common schools of the town, but in his seventeenth year a new bent was suddenly given to his life. A circular left at his father's house described the Hopkins bequest for a classical school to fit Cambridge boys for college, and on reading it, young Lane said at once, "I must go." Two years later he entered Harvard, and upon his graduation, Dr. Beck, who then went to Europe for a year, selected him as his substitute, saying that he had never had a pupil who could write Latin so well. As tutor he did excellent work, and then went to Göttingen, where he received his degree of Ph. D., in 1851, presenting a thesis which is still an authority upon the history and antiquities of Smyrna. He was at once appointed Professor of Latin in Harvard College, and continued the active work of his chair until 1894, when he was made professor emeritus with the degree of LL. D.; but until his strength failed, in 1896, he still gave instruction to advanced classes in the graduate department.

Dr. Lane was one of the greatest teachers of his time. All who knew him felt in his society the presence of an intelligence at once broad and acute, profound and lively, richly furnished with acquired knowledge which had been assimilated and organized by original thought. But his pupils found in him more than this: a mind with the peculiar power of stimulating other minds to do their best, a perpetual source of impulse and zeal in the search for truth. The least dogmatic of men, the most modest in asserting even cherished convictions, he was always found to have deep and strong foundations for his slightest suggestions of belief or doubt. A controversy in which he engaged always took the form of unprejudiced inquiry. No tradition, no doctrine, no belief, in scholarship or in life, had any value for him save as it could endure the most rigid examination of proofs. His catholic welcome of every new idea, even if it challenged his life-long habits of thought, might suggest to strangers a feeble grasp of principles; but not to his friends, who knew that none was more tenacious of his reasoned beliefs, though none was more free from prejudice, or more abhorrent of the influences of feeling upon mental processes. Hardly surpassed in minute accuracy of learning within his special province, he was yet more remarkable for the instinctive and indomitable habit of linking the whole with every detail; of finding analogies between the dust and the stars of thought; of illuminating and ennobling what seemed trifling, by side-lights from high places. This peculiar perception of likeness and of contrast, ever playing upon the stores of a wonderful

memory drawn from a vast range of reading and observation, enlivened his class-room and his conversation, and made his wit famous far beyond the college circle. Indeed, if any passion ever threatened his equanimity and disturbed his judgment, it was the love of fun, and the only cruelty with which he could ever reproach himself was when his perfect courtesy, so kindly sensitive for all around him, was for a moment qualified by his vivid sense of the ludicrous in some expression of dullness or ignorance. Yet even then his sympathy was keen, and he suffered more than the victim of his epigram. Throughout a life which, though not exempt from burdens and deep sorrow, was yet one of the happiest, his most unfailing pleasure was to indulge and foster the sense of the ludicrous, and had he not been the first Latinist, he might have been the first humorist of America. No other shade could give him so fraternal a welcome to the spirit land as Desiderius Erasmus.

The works he has left, the fruits of his life, are to be found almost wholly in the minds he helped to form. He made important contributions to Latin lexicography, but only as gifts to a friend, and to the cause of sound scholarship, and with no personal stamp upon them. The one book to which he gave many years of labor, the Latin grammar which he left unpublished, will mark an epoch in the study of the laws of the language, by its clearness, completeness and accuracy, while excelling its predecessors above all in felicity of expression. But Professor Lane's published and posthumous writings together were but a meagre product for such a mind. On the other hand, no one ever studied under him but found in after-life the pathway of truth smoothed and the best use of his own faculties made easier by that companionship and guidance. A large proportion of the graduates of Harvard for the last half-century, gratefully recognize his contributions to whatever of culture and of power they have acquired. And in them, and most of all in those among them who have carried on his methods and spirit as a teacher for the benefit of yet another generation, is his true monument.

It has seemed needful here to speak only of his professional career and of his work for mankind at large. But any tribute to these, were it even far less inadequate, would seem to the large but rapidly diminishing number of those in whose life he was for many years a valued part, to be less than the shadow of the man. It is as the brightest of companions, the most generous of hosts, the wittiest and cheeriest of talkers, the most sympathizing of counsellors, the most affectionate of friends, that they remember him and will ever cherish his memory. His teachings and writings have well merited his fame, but we have known something far greater than they are—himself.

CHARLTON T. LEWIS.

FREDERIC DE FOREST ALLEN.

Frederic De Forest Allen, whose sudden death on August 4, 1897, was the heaviest affliction which classical philology in our country has suffered for nearly a quarter of a century,—since the death of James Hadley in

1872, at about the same age,—was born in Oberlin, Ohio, on May 25, 1844, of true New England stock. His father, George N. Allen, set out for Ohio as a young man in 1832, under the influence of his pastor, Lyman Beecher, who went to live in Cincinnati in that year. Being taken ill on the journey, and kindly cared for at Hudson, Ohio, where the Western Reserve College had been recently established, he remained there and spent five years in study in the preparatory school and college, but at the close of his junior year went to the new college at Oberlin, where he graduated in 1838. Three years later he married Miss Rudd of Stratford, Conn., who had just received the degree of bachelor of arts at Oberlin,—being with two classmates doubtless the first women of the world to receive this degree in course,—and was appointed instructor in the college, where he taught music and (for many years) natural science, until 1871. Mrs. Allen had great strength of mind and of character, with marked scholarly tastes, and maintained a deep and close interest in her son's philological studies. Frederic Allen graduated from college in 1863, a few weeks after he was nineteen years of age. In his undergraduate days his philological tastes were not awakened; he was still immature, and had not come to his own; but he read widely in the best French literature and gave indications of unusual tastes and powers. Soon after graduation he seems to have turned with eagerness to classical studies, and was appointed professor of Greek and Latin in the University of East Tennessee before he was twenty-two years old. He soon felt the need of better training for his work, and in 1868 took a leave of absence in order to study in Leipzig with Georg Curtius, who was then the leader in the application of the results of the study of comparative philology to the older science of classical philology. In Leipzig Allen remained two years, taking an active part in the work of Curtius's *Grammatische Gesellschaft*, and winning the hearty respect of the scholars of the university. His dissertation for the degree of doctor of philosophy, *de Dialecto Locrensi*, was highly commended by Curtius, in public and in private. Returning to Knoxville, he resumed his former place, but in 1873 he was called to Harvard as tutor in Greek. There he had his first opportunity of giving instruction to advanced students, since Professor Goodwin, who spent that year abroad, left part of his work in his care. The philological companionship which he found there, and the treasures of the Harvard library, were a peculiar delight to him after his comparative isolation in Tennessee; but his sojourn in Cambridge at this time was only for a single year, for he was called to the chair of ancient languages in the newly-founded University of Cincinnati, and felt obliged for pecuniary reasons to decline overtures to remain at Harvard. His new work in Cincinnati interested him greatly. He was pleasantly associated with other well-trained young scholars, and all worked together in harmony. There he made his excellent edition of Euripides's *Medea* for the use of college classes, and prepared his *Remnants of Early Latin*, which not only has been used in this country and England, but also has been the basis of university lectures in Germany, and wrote his important tract on Homeric Verse, which was published in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*. In 1879 he received with pleasure a call to the chair

at Yale College which had stood vacant since the death of Professor Hadley in 1872, but he was hardly yet habilitated at Yale when he was invited in the spring of 1880 to do more congenial work at Harvard. According to the custom of the time and the constitution of the department, he had at Yale fifteen hours of instruction each week with sophomores and very limited opportunities for giving instruction to advanced students. At Harvard he was to have fewer hours in the classroom, and most of these were to be with graduate students. Yale has the honor of being the first institution in this country to offer systematic instruction to graduate students in philology, and in the early seventies, with Whitney, Hadley, Thacher, and Packard, stimulating lectures were given and good work was done, as a partial list of the students would testify,—I. T. Beckwith, M. W. Easton, C. R. Lanman, Jules Luquiens, I. J. Manatt, B. Perrin, W. R. Harper, H. P. Wright, J. P. Peters, R. B. Richardson. But the death of Hadley and the ill-health of Thacher and Packard had broken up the well-laid plans and the possibilities of such work at Yale for the present, while President Eliot was then giving special prominence to graduate work in philology at Harvard. Allen was attracted also by the call to be professor of Classical Philology; he had recently published his *Remnants of Early Latin*, and always enjoyed maintaining his Latin and his Greek studies side by side. Some of his more important courses of lectures at Harvard were: Religion and Worship of the Greeks; Roman Religion and Worship; Greek Grammar with study of dialectic inscriptions; Latin Grammar: sounds and inflexions; Elements of Oscan and Umbrian; History of Greek Literature; Roman Comedy; Homer's *Iliad*, with an elaborate introduction. For some of these courses the MS is so carefully prepared and complete that we may hope that no wrong would be done to the author's memory by publication. In addition to his published works to which reference has already been made, the following deserve mention: a revision of Hadley's Greek Grammar, 1884; a translation and edition of Wecklein's *Prometheus of Aeschylus*, 1891; Greek Versification in Inscriptions (100 pp.) in the fourth volume of the *Papers of the School at Athens*, 1888. He contributed Etymological and Grammatical Notes to the first volume of this Journal, and in later volumes published some Greek and Latin inscriptions and an article on 'Prometheus and the Caucasus' (Journal, vol. XIII). He read at least five papers before the American Philological Association. His papers in the Harvard Studies on 'Gaius or Gaius?', 'Manus Consertio,' and 'Os columnatum' are characteristic. He wrote a few excellent articles for encyclopaedias, and reviews and notes for the *Nation* and the *Classical Review*. He was never in haste to publish what he had written, or to put into writing his observations and discoveries, and doubtless the later years of his life, if he had lived to "three score years and ten," would have seemed more productive. Perhaps the most important work which he left incomplete is an edition of the *Scholia to Plato*. He gave the better part of his last 'Sabbatical year,' 1891-92, to the careful collation of the Clarkianus and Parisinus MSS, and found to his surprise that this work had never been done properly before. The inspection and possibly the collation of the Venetian MSS

remained, to be undertaken before the publication of the results of his labor, and for this he was already planning as the chief occupation of his next Sabbatical year, 1898-99. Another important work in which he was greatly interested, and for which he had made extensive researches, was on the history of religions.

The academic year 1885-86 Professor Allen spent in Greece as the Director of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, but the year proved one of disappointment and deepest sorrow: his oldest and only then-living child died in Athens, and his health was so wretched that he was obliged to abandon his plans for archaeological explorations.

Professor Allen was never robust. He suffered sadly from sciatica and asthma in Ohio, from asthma in Greece, from hay-fever for at least the latter half of his life, and particularly from disabling sick headaches,—but he performed much intellectual labor. When in this country in the summer he sought refuge in the White Mountains from the distress of hay-fever. For many years he spent weeks each summer in climbing and tramping in northern New Hampshire, visiting repeatedly the summits of the Presidential range, and being specially fond of the summit of Mt. Moosilauke, where he often sojourned for a week or two among the clouds, with one or two friends and some philological books.

The chief recreation of Professor Allen, from his boyhood, was found in music. His knowledge of the art of music was thoroughly scientific, and probably no other American scholar understood ancient Greek music so well as he. He found relief from his severer studies not simply in hearing but also in composing music. In addition to setting occasional verses to music, he composed the music for a pantomime and an operetta of his friend Professor Greenough; and in his desk after his death was found a MS of which no one knew anything except that he had said it was for this same friend,—an operetta, with words and music complete.

Professor Allen was married on Dec. 26, 1878, to Miss Emmeline Loughton of Portsmouth. Their eldest child, a daughter, died in Athens, as has been stated. A son and a daughter, with their mother, survive him.

The scholarship of Professor Allen was admirable. His command of philological methods was unusual, and his presentation of arguments in behalf of any thesis was most attractive,—never seeming merely plausible, but commanding acceptance as necessary truth. Never was mind more open than his to the receipt of light from any quarter,—like Socrates, ever glad to be refuted, and abandoning old views without a shadow of regret when these were shown to be false. His kindly patience, his accuracy, his absolute sanity, and his clearness of exposition made him a remarkable teacher as well as a great scholar. His criticisms were absolutely frank, but assumed so fully that he whom he criticised was seeking the truth like himself, that they left no sting. Those who knew him well admired in him the man even more than the scholar. He was ever simple, straightforward, kindly, affectionate. His friends depended more than they knew on him and his judgment. With him a great and pure light has gone out of their lives.

THOMAS DAY SEYMOUR.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Thanks are due to Messrs. Lemcke & Buechner, 812 Broadway, New York City, for material furnished.

AMERICAN.

Caesar (C. J.) *The Second Book of Caesar's Gallic War*; ed. for the use of schools by W. C. Collar. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. 9 + 96 pp. Map, 16mo, cl., 40 cts.

Cicero (Marcus Tullius). *Pro Plancio*; ed. with introd. and notes by H. W. Auden. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 84 + 150 pp. 16mo, cl., net 80 cts.

Hempl (G.) *German Orthography and Phonology*. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. c. 27 + 303 pp. 12mo, cl., \$2.10.

Homer. *Eight Books of Homer's Odyssey*; with introd., commentary and vocabulary, by B. Perrin and T. D. Seymour. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. c. 68 + 107 pp. 12mo, \$1.50.

Hutson (C. W.) *The Story of Language*. Chicago, *A. C. McClurg & Co.*, 1897. c. 2 + 392 pp. 12mo, cl., \$1.50.

Pearson (H. C.) *Greek Prose Composition*. New York, *American Book Co.*, 1897. c. 187 pp. 12mo, cl., 90 cts.

Snider (D. J.) *Homer's Odyssey: a commentary*. St. Louis, Mo., *The Sigma Publishing Co.*, 1897. c. '95. 534 pp. 8vo, cl., \$2.

Sophocles. *Tragoediae*; ed. by Rob. Y. Tyrrell. (Parnassus Library of Greek and Latin Classics.) New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 25 + 272 pp. 16mo, bds., net \$1.60.

Xenophon. *Works*; tr. into English by H. G. Dakyns. In 4 v. V. 3, pt. 1. *The Memorabilia, and Apology, The Economist, The Symposium, and Hiero*. Pt. 2. *Three essays: on the duties of a cavalry general, on horsemanship, and on hunting*. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 70 + 130 pp. 12mo, cl., net \$1.25.

ENGLISH.

Cicero Correspondence. Revised text, notes, etc., by Rb. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser. Vol. V. London, 1897. 8vo, 500 pp. 14s. Vol. I-IV, £2 11s.

Elliott (W. A.) *Dictionary of the Tebele and Shuna Languages*. London, 1897. 8vo. 10s.

Hill (G. F.) *Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars*. London, 1897. 8vo, 434 pp. 10s. 6d.

Jaschke (H. A.) *Tibetan-English Dictionary. English-Tibetan Dictionary*. London, 1897. 8vo, 694 pp. £1 10s.

Lang (A.) *Modern Mythology*. London, 1897. 8vo, 238 pp. 9s.

de Larajasse (F.) *Somali-English, English-Somali Dictionary*. London, 1897. 8vo. 12s.

— and de Sampont (F. C.) *Practical Grammar of the Somali Language*. London, 1897. 8vo. 12s.

Larsen. *Dano-Norwegian English Dictionary*. London, 1897. 8vo, 687 pp. 12s. 6d.

Robinson (C. H.) *Hausa Grammar, Exercises, Readings, Vocabulary*. London, 1897. 8vo. 5s.

Wright (J.) *The English Dialect Dictionary*. Part 3. London, 1897. 4to. S. Nr. 1081. 15s.

FRENCH.

de Julleville (P. L.) *Histoire de la langue et de la littérature française*. Vol. III, fasc. 4-11. Paris, 1897. 8vo. Vol. III cplt., 16 fr.

Masqueray (E.) *Observations grammaticales sur la grammaire Touareg* ('Publications de l'Ecole des lettres d'Alger,' tome XVIII, fasc. 3). Paris, 1897. 8vo, 193 pp. 5 fr.

Vandaele (H.) *L'optatif grec. Essai de syntaxe historique*. Paris, 1897. 8vo. 8 fr.

GERMAN.

'Arib, Tabari continuatus, quem edidit, indicibus et glossario instruxit M. J. de Goeje. gr. 8. xxvii, 213 S. Leiden, *Buchhandlg. u. Druckerei vorm. E. J. Brill*. m. 6.

'Αριστοφάνους Εἰρήνη. Cum scholiorum antiquorum excerptis passim emendatis recognovit et adnotavit Henr. van Herwerden. 2 partes. gr. 8. Leiden, *A. W. Sijthoff*. m. 12.50.

Benezé (Emil). *Sagen- u. litterarhistorische Untersuchungen*. Nr. 1 u. 2. gr. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*.—1. Traummotiv, das, in der mittelhochdeutschen Dichtung bis 1250 u. in alten deutschen Volksliedern. 82 S. m. 2.40.—2. Orendel, Wilhelm v. Orense u. Robert der Teufel. Eine Studie zur deutschen u. französ. Sagengeschichte. v, 112 S. m. 2.80.

Bibliothek indogermanischer Grammatiken. Bearb. v. B. Delbrück, K. Foy, G. N. Hatzidakis, etc. 6. Bd. 1. Thl. 2. Abth. gr. 8. L., *Breitkopf & Härtel*.—6. Hübschmann (H.) *Armenische Grammatik*. 1. Thl.: Armenische Etymologie. 2. Abth.: Die syr. u. griech. Lehnwörter im Altarmenischen u. die echtarmen. Wörter. xxiii u. S. 281-575. m. 8.

— *phonetischer Wörterbücher*. Hrsg. v. H. Michaelis. 1. Bd. gr. 8. Hannover, *C. Meyer*.—1. Michaelis (H.) u. Passy (P.) *Dictionnaire phonétique de la langue française*. Avec préface de Gaston Paris. xvi, 319 S. m. 4; geb., m. 4.80.

Blanckenburg (Curt.) *Studien üb. die Sprache Abrahams a S. Clara*. gr. 8. iv, 87 S. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*. m. 2.40.

Braune (Wilh.) *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*. 4. Aufl. gr. 8. viii, 249 S. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*. m. 4.50.

Bursy (Bernh.) *De Aristotelis Πολιτείας Ἀθηναίων partis alterius fonte et auctoritate*. gr. 8. viii, 148 S. Jurjewi. L., *K. F. Koehler's Sort.* m. 2.50.

Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae. Editio emendatior et copiosior, consilio B. G. Niebuhrii C. F. instituta, auctoritate academiae litterarum regiae borussicae continuata. Vol. I (Schluss). Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XVIII. Ex recensione Maur. Pinderi. Tom. III. Libri XIII–XVIII. Ed. Thdr. Büttner-Wobst. gr. 8. xxi, 933 S. Bonn, *E. Weber*. m. 24.

Dienel (Rich.) Untersuchungen üb. den Taciteischen Rednerdialog. Progr. gr. 8. 20 S. St. Pölten, *Selbstverlag*. m. —40.

Dissertationes philologicae Halenses. Vol. XIII. Pars 3. gr. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*.—3. Haym (Conr.) De puerorum in re scaenica Graecorum partibus. iii u. S. 217–295. m. 2.

Dittmar (Armin). Studien zur lateinischen Moduslehre. gr. 8. xi, 346 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 8.

Enneccerus (M.) Die ältesten deutschen Sprach-Denkmäler. In Lichtdrucken hrsg. Fol. 44 Taf. auf 18 Bl. m. 3 S. Text. Frankfurt a. M., *F. Enneccerus*. In Mappe, m. 27.

Eudociae Augustae, Procli Lycii, Claudiani carminum graecorum reliquiae. Recensuit Arth. Ludwich. 8. vi, 241 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 4.

Grammatiken, ältere deutsche, in Neudrucken, hrsg. v. John Meier. IV. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*.—IV. Ölinger (Alb.) Deutsche Grammatik, hrsg. v. Willy Scheel. ix, lxii, 129 S. m. 2 Fcsms. m. 5.

Grundriss der germanischen Philologie, hrsg. v. Herm. Paul. 2. Aufl. 3. Bd. 1. Lfg. gr. 8. S. 1–256. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 4.

— der indo-arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde. Hrsg. v. Geo. Bühler. 1. Bd. 3. Hft. B. gr. 8. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.*—I 3, B. Zachariae (Thdr.) Die indischen Wörterbücher (Kōśa). 42 S. m. 2.50.

— der iranischen Philologie. Hrsg. v. Wilh. Geiger u. Ernst Kuhn. 2. Bd. 3. Lfg. gr. 8. S. 321–480. Ebd. m. 8.

Jacob (A.) Die Glossen des Cod. S. Pauli D. 82. Diss. gr. 8. vi, 52 S. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*. m. 1.20.

Jahrbücher, neue, f. das klassische Altertum, Geschichte u. deutsche Litteratur u. f. Pädagogik, hrsg. v. Johs. Ilberg u. Rich. Richter. 1. Jahrg. 1898. 1. u. 2. Bd. 10 Hfte. Lex.-8. 1. Bd. 1. Hft. 80 u. 64 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 28.

Jahresbericht des Instituts f. rumänische Sprache (rumänisches Seminar) zu Leipzig. Hrsg. v. Gust. Weigand. gr. 8. ix, 336 S. L., *J. A. Barth*. m. 6.

Jahresberichte f. neuere deutsche Litteraturgeschichte, hrsg. v. Jul. Elias u. Max Osborn. 6. Bd. (J. 1895). 1. Abtlg. Lex.-8. 141 S. L., *G. J. Göschen*. m. 6.

Iungius (C. L.) De vocabulis antiquae comoediae atticae quae apud solos comicos aut omnino inveniuntur aut peculiari notione praedita occurrunt. gr. 8. xxiv, 358 u. 6 S. Traiecti ad Rhenum. Amsterdam, *J. Müller*. m. 10.

Kluge (Frdr.) Angelsächsisches Lesebuch, zusammengestellt u. m. Glossar versehen. 2. Aufl. gr. 8. iv, 214 S. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*. m. 5.

Künstlinger (Dav.) Die Theorie der Zahlwörter in den semitischen Sprachen. gr. 8. 32 S. B., *S. Calvary & Co.* m. 1.

Laurin u. Der kleine Rosengarten. Hrsg. v. Geo. Holz. gr. 8. v, xlvi, 213 S. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*. m. 7.

Lehrbücher des Seminars f. orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin. Hrsg. v. dem Director des Seminars. XVI. Bd. gr. 8. B., *W. Spemann*. Geb. in Leinw.—XVI. Viehe (G.) Grammatik des Otjiherero, nebst Wörterbuch. xii, 140 S. m. 12.

Lemcke (Ernst). Textkritische Untersuchungen zu den Liedern Heinrichs v. Morungen. gr. 8. 110 S. Jena, *O. Rassmann*. m. 1.60.

Mitteilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft. 1897. 2 u. 3. gr. 8. B., *W. Peiser Verl. in Komm.*—2. Rost (Paul). Untersuchungen zur altorientalischen Geschichte. iii, 141 u. 8 autogr. S. m. 8.—3. Sammelheft. Glaser (Ed.) Das Alter der minäischen Inschriften u. der Ursprung des Namens der Ebräer.—Hommel (Fritz). Das graphische Π im Minäischen u. das Alter der minäischen Inschriften.—Müller (W. M.) Geographische Einzelheiten.—Müller (W. M.) u. Winckler (Hugo). Papâhu Hierapolis.—Winckler (Hugo). שְׁתַּר בִּזְכִּי.—Winckler (Hugo). Tel-Amarna 125.—Winckler (Hugo). Die Istar v. Ninive in Aegypten.—Niebuhr (C.) Die erste Dynastie v. Babel. 48 S. m. 2.

— 1897. 4–6 (Schluss). gr. 8. B., *W. Peiser Verl. in Komm.*—4. Peiser (F. E.) Studien zur orientalischen Altertumskunde. 32 S. m. 1.—5. Winckler (Hugo). Die sabäischen Inschriften der Zeit Alhan Nahfan's. 32 S. m. 1.50.—6. Glaser (Ed.) Zwei Inschriften üb. den Dammbruch v. Mârib. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Arabiens im 5. u. 6. Jahrh. n. Chr. iii, 128 S. m. 6.

Münzer (F.) Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius. gr. 8. xi, 432 S. B., *Weidmann*. m. 12.

Neoglottia. Kritische Rundschau auf dem Gebiete der neueren Sprachen u. Litteraturen. Hrsg. v. Adf. Kressner. 1. Jahrg. Oktbr. 1897–Septbr. 1898. 24 Nrn. hoch 4. Nr. 1 u. 2, 16 S. L., *Renger*. Halbjährlich m. 5.

Saga-Bibliothek, altnordische. Hrsg. v. Gust. Cederschiöld, Hugo Gering u. Eug. Mogk. 6. Hft. gr. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*.—6. Eyrbyggja saga. Hrsg. v. Hugo Gering. xxxi, 264 S. m. 8.

Sammlung kurzer Grammatiken germanischer Dialekte. Hrsg. v. Wilh. Braune. VIII. gr. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*.—VIII. Noreen (Adf.) Altnordische Grammatik. II. Altschwedische Grammatik m. Einschluss des Altgutnischen. 1. Lfg. (Einleitung, Sonanten). 173 S. m. 3.60.

Schmid (Wilh.) Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern von Dionysius v. Halikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus. Registerbd. gr. 8. iii, 234 S. St., *W. Kohlhammer*. m. 6.

Stucken (Ed.) Astralmythen der Hebräer, Babylonier u. Aegypter. 2. Tl. Lot. gr. 8. S. 81–125. L., *E. Pfeiffer*. m. 5.

Studien zur englischen Philologie, hrsg. v. Lor. Morsbach. I. u. II. Hft. gr. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*.—I. Spies (Heinr.) Studien zur Geschichte des englischen Pronomens im XV. u. XVI. Jahrh. (Flexionslehre u. Syntax.) xix, 311 S. m. 8.—II. Herzfeld (Geo.) William Taylor v. Norwich. viii, 71 S. m. 2.

Tibullus (Albius). Untersuchung u. Text v. H. Belling. 2 Tle. 8. B., *R. Gaertner*. m. 9.

Toepffer (Johs.) Beiträge zur griechischen Altertumswissenschaft. gr. 8. xvi, 384 S. m. 1 Abbildg. u. Bildnis. B., *Weidmann*. m. 10.

Usener (H.) Der Stoff des griechischen Epos. [Aus 'Sitzungsber. d. k. Akad. d. Wiss.'] gr. 8. 63 S. Wien, *C. Gerold's Sohn in Komm.* m. 1.50.

Vandaele (Hilarius). Qua mente Phaeder fabellas scripserit. Thesis. gr. 8. iv, 105 S. Paris, *E. Bouillon*. m. 3.20.

Winckler (Hugo). Altorientalische Forschungen. 1. Bd. VI. gr. 8. v u. S. 469-573. L., *E. Pfeiffer*. m. 6; geb., m. 6.50.

Witkowski (Stanisl.) Prodrömus grammaticae papyrorum graecarum aetatis Lagidarum. gr. 8. 65 S. Krakau, *Buchn. der poln. Verlags-Gesellschaft in Komm.* m. 3.

ITALIAN.

Cicero (M. Tullius). Actionis in C. Verrem secundae liber quartus [de signis]. Commentato da Vittorio Brugnola. Torino. 8vo, pagine 151. L. 1.80.

Fregni (Giuseppe). Studi storici, filologici e letterari. Modena. 8vo, fig., pagine 164. L. 5.

Pizzi (Italo). Grammatica elementare dell' antico iranico (zendo e persiano antico), con antologia e relativo vocabolario. Torino. 8vo, p. 92. L. 2.50.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Actus Epistolaeque Apostolorum Palaeoslovenice. Ed. Aemilianus Kalužniacki. Sumptibus Caes. Litt. Academiae. Wien, *Carl Gerold's Sohn*, 1896.

Αἰσχύλου δράματα σωζόμενα καὶ ἀπολωλότων ἀποσπάσματα μετὰ ἐξηγητικῶν καὶ κριτικῶν σημειώσεων τῇ συνεργασίᾳ Εὐγενίου Ζωμαρίδου ἐκδιδόμενα ὑπὸ Ν. Wecklein. Τόμος Β' περιέχων Προμηθεά, Ἰκέτιδας καὶ ἀποσπασμάτια. Τόμον τρίτον τεύχος περιέχον ἀποσπασμάτια. Leipzig, *Harrassowitz*. 12 m.

Anecdota Oxoniensia. Aryan Series. Part VIII. The Mantrapāṭha, or the Prayer-book of the Āpastambins. Ed. by W. Winternitz. I. Oxford, *At the Clarendon Press*, 1897.

Anglo-Saxon Poetry, Library of. Vol. IV. Contents: Maldon and Brunnanburh. Ed. by C. L. Crow. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897.

Caecilii (L.) liber ad Donatum confessorem de mortibus persecutorum vulgo Lactantio tributus. Ed. Samuel Brandt. Wien u. Prag, *F. Tempsky*. Leipzig, *G. Freytag*, 1897. 60 pf.

Ciceros Rede für den Sex. Roscius aus Ameria. Für den Schulgebr. herausg. v. H. Nohl. 2te verb. Aufl. Leipzig, *G. Freytag*, 1897. 50 pf.

Ciceros Rede für P. Sestius. Für den Schulgebr. herausg. v. H. Nohl. Leipzig, *G. Freytag*, 1897. 70 pf.

Collitz (Hermann). Der Name der Goten bei Griechen u. Römern. Sonderabdr. aus *Journal for Germanic Philology*, vol. I, No. 2.

Conway (R. S.) The Italic Dialects. Ed. with a grammar and a glossary. Vol. I. Containing the Records of Oscan, Umbrian and the Minor Dialects. Vol. II. Containing an Outline of the Grammar, Appendix and Indices. Cambridge, *At the University Press*. New York, *Macmillan & Co.*, 1897. \$7.50.

Emerson (Alfred). Catalogue of the H. W. Sage Collection of Casts from Antique Sculpture. Cornell University. Ithaca, N. Y.

Ethnology, Bureau of. Fifteenth Annual Report (1893-94), by J. W. Powell. Washington, D. C., *Government Printing Office*, 1897.

Filologiska föreningen i Lund. Språkliga uppsatser. Lund, 1897, *S. G. Möller*, Bookseller to the University.

Gallaway (W. F.) On the Use of μή with the Participle in Classical Greek. (J. H. U. Diss.) Baltimore, *John Murphy & Co.*, 1897.

Gardner (E. A.) A Handbook of Greek Sculpture. London and New York, *Macmillan & Co.*, 1897. \$2.50.

Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde, herausg. v. Georg Bühler. 1. Bd. 3. Heft. B. Inhalt: Die indischen Wörterbücher (Kōśa), v. Theodor Zachariae. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner*, 1897. Subsk.-pr., 2 m.; Einzelpr., 2.50.

Gudeman (Alfred). Outlines of the History of Classical Philology. 3d ed. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897.

Hermes, herausg. v. G. Kaibel u. Carl Robert. XXXII. Band. 2. u. 3. Heft. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897.

Journal (The) of Germanic Philology. Vol. I, No. 2. 1897.

Journal of Philology (The). Ed. by W. A. Wright, Ingram Bywater and Henry Jackson. Vol. XXV, No. 50. London and New York, *Macmillan & Co.*, 1897. 4s. 6d.

Knauth (H.) Uebungsstücke zum Uebersetzen in das Lateinische. Deutscher Text u. Lateinische Uebersetzung. 2te Aufl. Leipzig, *G. Freytag*.

Leo (Fr.) Die plautinischen Cantica u. die hellenistische Lyrik. Abhandlungen der Königl. Gesellsch. der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philolog.-histor. Klasse. Neue Folge. Bd. I, No. 7. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897. 7 m. 50 pf.

Michaelis (H.) et Passy (P.) Dictionnaire phonétique de la langue française. Hannover, *Carl Meyer*, 1897. 4 m.

Mnemosyne. Bibliotheca Philologica Batava. Nova series. Vol. XXV. Partes I, II, III. L.-B., *E. J. Brill*. Lipsiae, *O. Harrassowitz*, 1897.

Modern Language Association of America, Publications of the. Ed. by James W. Bright, Sec'y. Vol. XII, No. 3. N. S., vol. V, No. 3. Contents: Literature and Personality (Calvin Thomas); Learned and Learn'd (Geo. Hempl); A Study of the Metrical Structure of *The Pearl* (C. S. Northup); Gaston Paris (H. A. Todd); Pastoral Influence in the English Drama (H. Smith). Baltimore, *John Murphy & Co.*, 1897.

Moore (Clifford H.) Julius Firmicus Maternus, der Heide u. der Christ. (Münchener Diss.) (1897.)

Münzer (F.) Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius. Berlin, *Weidmannsche Buchhandlung*, 1897. 12 m.

New York, University of the State of. Examination Bulletin. No. 13, June, 1897. College-Entrance English. Albany, *University of the State of N. Y.*, 1897.

Πρακτικά τῆς ἐν Ἀθῆναις ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἐταιρίας τοῦ ἔτους 1896. Ἀθῆναις, 1897.

Reditus Augusti, carmen praemio aureo ornatum in certamine poetico Hoeufftiano. Accedunt quattuor poemata laudata. Amsterdam, *Muller*, 1897.

Sollima (Francesco). Le Fonti di Strabone nella geografia della Sicilia. Messina, 1897.

Sophokles' Oidipus auf Kolonos. Für d. Schulgebr. herausg. v. Fr. Schuber. 2te verb. Aufl. 1897. 60 pf.

Syms (L. C.) Third Year in French. N. Y., Cinc., Chic., 1897. \$1.20.

Tropea (Giacomo). Il mito di Crono in Sicilia e la ragione del nome Zancle. Messina, 1897.

Weidner (Andreas). Schüler-Kommentar zu Tacitus' historischen Schriften in Auswahl. Leipzig, *G. Freytag*, 1897. 1 m. 70 pf.

Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Ed. by C. W. Gleason. New York, Cinc., Chic., *American Book Co.*, 1897. \$1.25.

Zeitschrift für französische Sprache u. Litteratur, unter besonderer Mitwirkung ihrer Begründer, Körting u. Koschwitz, herausg. v. Behrens. Bd. XIX, Heft 5 u. 7. Der Abhandlungen 3. u. 4. Heft. Berlin, *W. Gronau*, 18. Sept. 1897.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. XVIII, 4.

WHOLE No. 72.

I.—THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN INDEPENDENT SENTENCES IN PLAUTUS.

III.—OPTATIVE AND POTENTIAL.

The immediate result of the working of the forces discussed in the previous paper has been the formation of usages and idioms in which the meaning of the subjunctive form is restricted more or less closely, as the usage is narrow or broad, to a particular function. Therefore the explanation of any particular case of the subjunctive on historical principles must begin with the determination of the extent to which one or more of these forces has acted upon it. The explanation of *caperes fustem* is that the mode is limited by the past tense to the expression of obligation; *non meream* by person and by verb-meaning to negative determination in regard to a supposed case; *eamus* by person and number to an exhortation, and *eamus tu, leno, in ius* by the emphasis upon the 2d pers. becomes a command. *egon . . . patiar* is determined by the form of sentence and by the meaning of *patior*. The added words and the meaning of the verb limit *sit per me quidem* to an expression of indifference. In *saluos sis* the verb-meaning and the person are enough to restrict the phrase to use in greetings, as the same influences restrict *salve*. Three forces—the verb-meaning, the passive voice and the 3d pers. (impers.)—limit *fiat* to an expression of assent. The extension of the modal force by suggestion is illustrated in *quo modo ego uiuam sine te?* with its apparent *can* force, in *quor* with the accompanying *should* sense, and in *qui ego istuc credam?*, where a special form of

interrogation unites with a particular verb-meaning to give the mode a *can* sense in a stereotyped phrase.

Between the usages thus fixed it is at times possible to trace, or at least to suspect, a real historical connection. The various forms of *quid faciam?* which in the movement toward precision expand along one line into *quid ego nunc faciam?* and along another line into *quid uis faciam?* illustrate such a connection. The differentiation of will from wish by *uolo* and *uelim* with a paratactic subjunctive and the subsequent use of *uelim* with infinitives and even with an object or absolutely, the optative sense becoming less marked in the later uses, is another illustration. Some other indications of relationship have been noted above, but for the most part it is not possible to prove an actual connection between different usages. Schemes of relationship, intended to exhibit the many varieties of subjunctive usage in a kind of modal genealogical tree, are speculations. But two groups of usage, the potential¹ and the optative, are so evident and so generally accepted that they must be recognized in any discussion of the subjunctive.

The subjunctives which do not express any of the varying shades of will and desire have been noted in the lists above. Excluding the questions and the few paratactic cases, there are about 140 such cases.

About 40 of them have a protasis in the context, though not in the same sentence. They are found in all forms, mainly in 3d sing. (about 12 cases) and in 3d plur. (about 20, of which 10 are in Merc. 407 ff.). They are true potentials, or at least are hypothetical, but most, if not all, are so influenced by the protasis that they cannot be made the basis of any reasoning about the subjunctive in independent sentences. They are material for study of the conditional sentence.

With these must go a smaller group of cases where a subjunctive clause (with *dum*, *ubi*, *quamuis*, *qui*) accompanies the leading clause. Thus, *qui culpet . . . , stultus sit*. It is impossible to exclude the influence of these clauses, which usually precede the main verb and may affect it as a protasis would.

In discussions of potential use examples are largely drawn from the interrogative sentence, especially from *quis* questions with the verb in 1st sing. of the present. These cases have been suffi-

¹I have used the term potential, not because it is correct, but because it is convenient and in common use.

ciently commented upon above. They are not very frequent, possibly 30 or 40 cases out of more than 200; they are not hypothetical, except when a definite protasis is expressed; and they are connected most closely and distinctly with the subjunctive of will. The meaning of the mode is, however, turned from direct will to obligation,¹ first by the interrogative form in general and also by the special influences which have been noted above. In *quid ego nunc faciam?* it is the self-address; in other cases it is the special form of *quis*, as *quid* 'why,' *quor*, *qui*. In the phrase *qui ego istuc credam?* the verb-meaning helps to give the *can* sense, but if it had been *quor ego istuc credam?* the apparent sense would have been *should*. A sense which varies with the varying form of sentence, instead of remaining fixed with the fixed mode, is not a meaning of the mode, but of the whole sentence, including the mode. It is not of great importance to decide whether these uses should be called by the name potential; that depends upon the definition given to the term; but it is important that we should look upon them rather as a group of usages which have grown out of the subjunctive of will or desire in sentences of peculiar form, than as the result of a supposed potential force, inherited from the I.E. stage.

A fourth group consists of some 16 or 18 cases, all but one in pres. 1st sing., in which there is an element of will, though they are negatived by *non*, and which relate, for the most part, to a hypothetical act or situation. Of *haud (non) dicam dolo* and *deum (maiorum) uirtute dicam* it has been said above that they are almost futures, used as *eloquar* is frequently used, to introduce a statement of determination in regard to a future act (cf. *ibo*). But an unmodified expression of determination is, strictly, incompatible with *haud dolo* and still more plainly with *deum uirtute*; the addition of the idea 'without concealment' or 'thanks to the gods,' 'by the goodness of the gods,' brings in the suggested thought 'I *am* able to say,' 'I *may* say.' That is, *deum uirtute dicam*, expanded to its full meaning, is 'by the kindness of the gods I may say and will now say, that . . .,' and so *dicam* gets in these phrases a slight potential coloring and lies, as I have said, between the future and the subjunctive.

The other cases of this group express a determination, usually negative, in regard to the speaker's action in a supposed case. There is in *non . . . meream*, *non duim*, an element of will, not

¹ Cf. Elmer, Prohibitive, p. 36 (= A. J. P. XV 3, p. 313).

strong, but sufficient to distinguish them from cases which express an opinion or even a conviction, like *nimis nili tibicen siem*. But a determination is separated from a conviction by so small an interval that Trin. 758, *ab amico . . . mutuom argentum rogem*, or Truc. 495, *sine uirtute argutum ciuem mihi habeam pro praefica*, might be either. But the potential force of all these cases is shown by the fact that they deal with a supposed situation.

A fifth group is made up of the sigmatic aorists, 1st sing., 18 cases. The MSS give only *ausim* and *faxim*, but *negassim* and *empsim* are not improbable conjectures. In use they are of two kinds, *ausim*, *negassim*, *empsim* with a negative expressing determination, like *non meream*, and *faxim* in hypothetical sentences, usually with a protasis. Functionally, therefore, they belong either in the fourth group or in the first, but they are put together here because the form, which was already becoming obsolete with most verbs, doubtless aided in producing a sharpness of definition, a limitation of use, which they would not have shown if the form had been in free use. Archaic forms survive in idioms. The same fact would limit their influence upon later constructions.

The cases of the indefinite second person have been given above, about 20 in number. This usage is by no means easy to define, and some of the cases might doubtless be understood to refer to a definite person. The doctrine of Madvig, that the subjunctive is always used with the indefinite 2d pers., is now known to be too sweeping,¹ since cases exist with the indic., e. g. Asin. 242. But a general tendency to associate the indef. 2d sing. with the subjunctive evidently exists. In Plautus the verbs are *uideas* (5), *censeas* (3), *audias* (2), *scias* (2), *nescias* (2), *conspicias*, *cupias*, *desideres*, *uelis*, *inuenias*, *perdas*, *noceas*; but the last two are used after *quom feras* and *exoritur optio*, a situation in which a verb with definite subject would be subjunctive. The rest are all verbs of mental action.

This rather specialized idiom, then, is marked by three characteristics—the meaning of the verb, the potential tone of the mode, and the indefinite subject—and the explanation of it must be sought along these lines. In the first place, only one of these verbs occurs in 2d sing. in a direct expression of will, and in that passage (M. G. 282 *tute scias soli tibi*) it is distinctly less jussive

¹ Kühner, II, p. 480; Hoffmann, *Das Modusgesetz*, 28 ff.; Blase, *Wölfflin's Archiv*, IX 1, p. 19 f.

than a verb of action like *abeas*, *accipias*. The meaning of the verbs almost excludes them from the jussive uses and confines *uideas*, *nescias*, if the forms are employed at all, to potential functions. Only the impv. form could give a direct will-force to these verbs, and even in this form *uide* is rather 'see!' than 'perceive,' *audi* is 'listen!' and *scito* has a peculiar sense. In the second place, a potential or conditioned use in the definite 2d sing. passes easily into the indefinite, because what is true of the definite 'you' is true generally, especially when the verb is of mental action. The statement 'If this should be so, you would think thus and so,' is easily extended from the definite 'you' to the general 'you,' when it means 'Under certain conditions you would necessarily think in a certain way.' In such reasoning it is really a matter of indifference whether the 2d person is definite or general, and only the context would tell whether *una opera postules* is definite (as it happens to be in all three cases) or indefinite.¹ But the use of these verbs of mental action with a general subject still further separated them from the direct will-force, since the will cannot well be generalized, as it is when it is directed upon an indefinite 'you,' and still retain its simple force. It becomes rather an expression of propriety, as in cases in 3d plur. where the subject is a class of persons. It is to the combination of these two forces, weakening the meaning of the mode, with the influence of a preceding thought setting a hypothetical tone (see below), that the highly specialized idiom of the indef. 2d pers. is due. Or, in other words, the indef. 2d pers. is a variety of the hypothetical use, made idiomatic by the meaning of the verb and by the indefinite direction of the will. The withdrawal of these verbs from ordinary uses leaves four usages in 2d sing. which supplement each other with little over-lapping: verbs of physical activity in the various expressions of desire, the same verbs in potential uses with preceding clause (very rarely without such introduction), verbs of mental action in the impv., and the same verbs in the indef. 2d pers., potential. The last use is evidently the most specialized and presumably the latest of them all.

Beside the groups of usage already mentioned, there are about 25 cases: *esse* is used 9 times (*siem*, *sit*, *sient*, *esses*, *esset*, *fuisses*), *possiet* once, *dicat* once, *dicant* twice, *autument* twice, *postules* (or

¹ There is a like tendency to pass from the particular to the general in phrases of the *ne tu frustra sis*, *ne erres* class.

iubeas) with *una opera* 5 times, *habeam* 'I should consider,' *uideatur*, *ecficiatur*, once each, *neque mereat* (which is like *non meream*) and *seruaretur* (but this may express obligation). These are chiefly verbs of saying and *esse*, and they are mainly in the 3d person. As to *sit*, it is used in direct expressions of will only in wishes (never in commands) and in expressions of propriety like *bonus sit bonis*, *malus sit malis*, describing an ideal. With its passive meaning it is little likely to be used in any jussive sense, though it is freely used in questions. But the chief influence in all these cases is not the verb-meaning, but other words in the sentence which influence the mode. Every word or phrase which is added to the nucleus of the sentence both brings into clearer light the germ of the thought and modifies that thought by its own associations and color. I have tried above to show how this is true of added verbs and of some adverbs and particles, which strengthen or weaken or color the idea of will. In a like manner a sentence may begin with a phrase which is incompatible with the direct forms of will and therefore excludes them, but which heightens and fosters a potential force. Thus *sine uirtute ciuem* introduces the thought in such a way that the verb, *habeam pro praefica*, already by person and verb-meaning inclined toward the potential, can mean nothing but 'I should consider.' In Ba. 312 the father is told that his money is in public guard at Ephesus; he begins his reply, *occidistis me: nimio hic priuatim*, and into this setting the verb *seruaretur* must fit with a potential force. So *una opera* introduces a comparison between an ideal and the proposed act; it is in itself hypothetical, and when it is followed by *postules* (with the Plautine meaning, 'to expect') the potential tone is doubled. Cf. Cas. 309 ff. *una edepol opera in furnum calidum condito atque ibi torreto me pro pane rubido, ere, qua istuc opera a me impetres quod postulas*, where *una opera* is strong enough to give a potential force even to the impv., *condito, torreto*. So *non par uidetur* expresses an opinion and prepares for the further expression of opinion in *neque sit consentaneum*. It is the modifying effect of a comparative which gives to *malim* a potential force that *uelim* does not have, and *potius* gives potential meaning to the future indic.¹ and even to an impv., Rud. 1048 *uos confugite in aram potius quam*

¹Neumann, de fut. in prisc. Lat. . . . ui et usu, Breslau, 1868, p. 28. This dissertation contains some very acute observations upon the over-lapping of temporal and modal meanings.

ego. Cf. also the use of the subj. after *potius quam*. So in Rud. 780 f. *utrum tu . . . cum malo lubentius quiescis an sic sine malo . . . ?* the comparative *lubentius* in the interrogative sentence makes *quiescis* almost potential. It is perhaps not fanciful to feel a modal difference between *faciam sedulo* and *faciam lubens*, though the English phrases which we instinctively recall may easily mislead us. These illustrations, taken almost at random, may serve to show how great the influence of the preceding thought upon the modal sense may be. A force which can suggest potential meaning in an impv. or a fut. or pres. indic. might easily be sufficient to confine the subj. to potential functions. This influence of the preceding thought is, in fact, recognized by the phrases 'suppressed condition,' 'disguised condition,' which are sometimes employed; but these phrases imply that the conditioning expressions modify the modal meaning only because they are substitutes for a protasis. This is to explain the simpler structure by the more complex, *fac ualeas* by *fac ut ualeas*, *an* in simple questions by *an* in double questions. Such simplification of language may no doubt take place, but it can be accepted only on sufficient evidence. The general trend of thought and language is the other way, and when a simple structure and a complex one are surely connected, the probability is that the simpler form is the earlier. A phrase like *una opera* is rather a protasis in embryo than a suppressed protasis. As it becomes more distinct in thought it takes on more distinct form, as a clause or a formal protasis, and gives a more fixed and definite potential sense to the main verb.

The potential in Plautus is not a single and unified usage; it is a group of usages, similar but by no means identical in meaning, and, in this early stage at least, scarcely enough alike to influence each other through analogy. They have followed distinct lines of analogical connection, have been influenced in their changes of meaning by distinct sets of forces, and have assumed meanings which, on any careful analysis, are also distinct. *quid ego nunc faciam?* starts from a subjunctive in which speaker and willer are different persons, is turned from its original meaning by being addressed by the speaker to himself, and results in a meaning like the English 'What am I to do?' *non meream* starts from a subjunctive in which speaker and willer are one, is influenced by person and number and by verb-meaning, and results in an expression of negative determination. So *faxim, uideas, qui ego istuc credam? una opera postules, sit*, has each its separate

semasiological history and its distinct result. Of all these forces that which is exerted by a preceding thought, giving a hypothetical or ideal tone to the sentence, is the strongest and produces the widest departure from the ordinary meanings of the subjunctive.

It is extremely difficult to say at what point the similarities between different usages begin to be recognized or felt, so that the usages exert an influence upon each other through analogy. It is clear enough that all these developments are part of one general process, an extension of subjunctive meaning, but it is difficult to think that in the time of Plautus the subjunctive in *quid faciam?* can have influenced *uideas* or that *una opera postules* can have suggested the use of *nimis nili tibicen siem*. And if they were not united into a single group, they can have exerted no common influence upon later usage, e. g. upon the subordinate clause. The only kind of potential use which can have affected the subordinate clause is that in which the mode is ideal or hypothetical, a rare usage, not more than one-twentieth of the true independent subjunctives. This is connected by clear lines with the conditional sentence, but the connection with the relative clause, which is often assumed, is less certain.

It is generally held that the potential use of the subjunctive, which is regarded as a single use, is descended from an I.E. future or contingent future. This would involve the belief that the potential is an early development. On the contrary, most of these usages appear to be comparatively late. This is certainly true of the deliberative question, of the expressions of negative determination and of the indefinite 2d person. The archaic form of *faxim* might seem to indicate an early use, but the complete separation of *faxim*, *faxis*, *faxit* into three widely different functions would imply a long period of slow change from the original single function or closely related functions. As to the purely hypothetical use, it is probably earlier than the others, since the conditional sentence in the time of Plautus had already advanced so far, but it is the result of the influence of thought upon thought and cannot have come into use until language and thought were somewhat complex. If E. Hermann¹ is right in thinking that there was no hypotaxis in language in the pro-ethnic period, then the I.E. potential, if any such usage existed, must have been merely rudimentary. This would of course involve the hypoth-

¹ K. Z. 33 (1895), pp. 481 ff. Gab es im Indogermanischen Nebensätze?

esis that the developments in other languages, e. g. in Greek, were distinct from the Italic.

I have thus far avoided using the negative as a test of the potential, not because it is not, in the main, a correct test, but because it should not be used without some consideration of its meaning. The composition of *ne* with all kinds of words, and especially with indicative verbs, *nescio*, *nequeo*, *nolo*, can be explained only on the hypothesis that *ne* was once the general Italic negative and that *non* is a later strengthened or compounded form of *ne*. Whatever may have been its original composition or form, something in the meaning of *non* made it a stronger word than *ne* for statement, and it therefore displaced *ne* from its use with the indic., leaving to it only the function of negating expressions of will. And by a well-known law of language, *ne* then lost the power of serving as the negative of a statement. Meanwhile, with the general movement of language toward complexity and precision, the functions of the subjunctive were extended and new functions were added. Some of these approached the indicative so closely that there is a common ground where either mode may be used. Thus *oportet esse* is used as a parallel to *sit* and *aequom fuit dispertisse* to *darent*; the subjunctive is the expression of an obligation, the indicative is a statement of it. As *ne* had so narrowed its function that it could be used only in prohibitions, it was unfitted for use in these statements of obligation, or in hypothetical or ideal statements. The use of *non* therefore indicates only that to the Roman these uses were more akin to the statement than to the prohibition. But a division of all sentences into expressions of will or statements of fact is an extremely rough classification; between these extremes lie many shades of meaning, and it should not be thought that in the choice of *non* or *ne* language has been always precise. There are cases where *non* is used with a subjunctive of will or wish (Cist. 555 *utinam audire non queas*, though *queo* is regularly compounded with *ne*) occurring all through Latin literature (Schmalz², §31), which, though they usually negative a single word, are yet evidence that the fields of *non* and *ne* are separated not by a sharp line, but by a strip of neutral ground. Still less is the use of *non* evidence as to the origin of a particular modal meaning. For *non* is applied to the result of the process; it shows that the shift of meaning has produced a function which more nearly resembles the indic. than the subjunctive, but it tells little of the process and nothing of the starting-point. There

can be no doubt that in *abi. || abeam?* the subjunctive is one of will, but such a subjunctive is negated by *non* (Capt. 139 *ne fle. || egone illum non fleam?*). It is likely enough that the use of *-ne* in such questions, with a negative force still somewhat felt in the time of Plautus, may have prevented the use of the negative *ne* in the same sentence. The use of *ni* as the negative after *quid, quippe*, offers a curious illustration of the persistence of *ne* with a subjunctive which is as nearly potential as that of any *quis* question. All subjunctives after *quid* 'why' have this sense, yet they are negated by *ni* (which is here only another form of *ne*, and not conditional) because the use of *ni* is preserved by the association, almost composition, with *quid, quippe*. These cases show that *ne* was once the negative of such questions, just as *ne-scio* shows that it was the negative of the indicative.

While, therefore, the use of *non* is evidence, in a general way, of a potential sense and indicates a likeness to the indic., it is neither a perfect test, since some potentials have *ni* and some expressions of will have *non*, nor is it of any value for determining the history of a construction. It is a test which cannot be trusted implicitly nor used mechanically, as it is not infrequently used in syntactical work. Least of all can the use of *non*, a purely Italic particle and of comparatively late origin, indicate anything as to the supposed connection between the potential and an I.E. future.

The accepted theory of the Latin subjunctive, that it is the result of the amalgamation of subjunctive and optative, rests upon two lines of argument. With the argument from the comparative stand-point I have nothing to do, except to say that the existence of the two modes in Sanskrit and Greek may be perfectly well explained as a separate and later development. But the argument from the Latin, which, next to these two languages, has employed the subjunctive (and optative) most widely, falls within the scope of this paper, and I shall try to show that it has less weight than is usually ascribed to it.

The optative forms in Plautus are these :

<i>uelim</i> and compounds (74 in 1st sing.),	78
<i>sim</i> and compounds (in all persons),	97
<i>duim</i> and compounds (18 in 3d pers.),	21
Sigmatic aorists,	79
Perfect tense,	70
	<hr/>
	345

Counting all cases of *uelim* and compounds as wishes, there are about 125 wishes in this number, roughly one in three. Not including *uelim* there are about 50 wishes, one in seven. If the forms of the 1st conj.,¹ *ament*, *infelicet*, etc., were included, the proportions would not be greatly changed. Of the 1250 subjunctive forms about 125 are wishes, one in ten. This preponderance of optative forms with optative functions is, however, misleading. With a very few exceptions, the 50 wishes fall into three classes: *saluos sis* in greetings, *bene* (*male*, *fortunatum*) *sit*, and curses or blessings with *di* or the name of a god and the verbs *perduit*, *perduint*, *faxint* and *duint*. The range of usage is very narrow. If all significant distinctions were made, there would not be more than six or eight phrases. Mere number of cases may mean nothing; the 17 cases of *saluos sis* indicate only the frequent recurrence of a certain dramatic situation, and are no more significant of the extent of modal use than is the fact that of the 94 cases in 1st plur., 42 are of *eamus* and compounds. The wishes with subjunctive forms show something of the same tendency to run in ruts (*di perdant* 30 times, *di ament* 14 times), but the variety of phrase is, on the whole, greater than with the optative forms. These considerations are, I think, sufficient to remove the impression which the statistics at first make and to justify the statement that there is no real preponderance of optative forms in wishes, but only a frequent repetition of a few specialized phrases.

From the functional side the wish is an expression of simple desire, unmixed or but slightly mixed with intention or determination or expectation. But such a definition is general and does not take into account the minor varieties, in which the optative force is heightened or lowered according to the nature of the wished-for act and the personality of the actor. These elements combine in many and somewhat complex ways, but two or three main groups may be noted:—*a*) A simple expression of desire in regard to the action of another person, such as is expressed by the English 'I wish that he would come.' *b*) Desire mixed with hope in regard to the circumstances or health or prosperity of another person. *c*) Desire taking the form of an indirect appeal to the gods to act. Further subdivisions might be made, if the nature of the act were to be more fully analyzed. E. g., the

¹ Cf. Stolz in Müller's Handbuch, II, §115, 2d ed., p. 378; Brugmann, Grundr. II 2, §946, p. 1309.

optative force is milder if the desire is that a certain person shall come, stronger and more easily recognizable as a wish if the desire is that he shall perish or suffer harm. But these minor variations of thought, though they affect the language, are rarely distinct enough to produce special forms of wish, and may therefore be neglected.

There are a few cases in which there is nothing in the form to distinguish the wish from ordinary expressions of will. Thus Cas. 611 *ducas easque in maxumam malam crucem*, M. G. 936 *bene ambula, bene rem geras*, Cas. 822 *uir te uestiat, tu uirum despolies*, Trin. 351 *quod habes ne habeas*; these and a few other cases like them lack the element of determination which distinguishes the will from the wish, but the optative sense is not strong, and they illustrate the faintness of the line which divides the two fields. But for the most part the wish is marked by a distinct form. The milder expressions of desire in regard to the action of another person have *utinam* or *uelim*, which are also employed (the latter more often than the former) in curses, usually comic and elaborate curses. Wishes for the health or prosperity (or the reverse) of another person are expressed by the impersonal forms, *bene (male) sit*, marked by the verb and adverb. The phrases of greeting, *saluos sis, ualeas*, were originally of this sort, but became formulaic and lost something of their meaning. Asseverations, *ita me di ament*, are still more distinctly differentiated by *ita*, and when the gods are mentioned, as in these forms and in *di te perduint (perdant)*, the fullest optative meaning is brought out.

Now, in all these phrases the forces which give the optative sense are perfectly clear. Except in some of the cases with *uelim* and *utinam*, the action contemplated is one which it is out of the power of a human actor to perform and out of the power of the speaker to influence. The element of determination can have nothing to do with the action or state of *ualere, saluos esse, bene esse*. In other words, these verbs, if they are employed at all in expressions of desire, must be optative; the verb-meaning excludes any other sense. So also the actor is, in all the most distinct expressions of wish, either left out of view entirely, as in the impersonals, or is superhuman and so beyond the reach of human determination. These two forces, the verb-meaning and the actor (person and number) absolutely fix the meaning of *di te perdant*, so that it very rarely takes *utinam*. But in the more

elaborate or less formulaic optations, where the force of the verb-meaning is less clear, and especially in the 2d and 3d sing., where a definite person is the subject and, in a sense, the actor, some specific sign of the wish is needed, and here *utinam* and *uelim* are employed.

The optative function, therefore—that is, the capacity to express a wish—is not so distinct as to require us to explain it by referring it to an I.E. optative function. Any mode which expresses desire would of necessity express optation also, if the desire was that the gods should bring a certain man to ruin. To explain *di te perdant* and *ualeas* by saying that they got the optative function from *di te perduint* and *saluos sis*, and that these acquired it at some remote time in some unexplained way, is to turn away from simple forces, working under our eyes, to a vague hypothesis which, after all, explains nothing. The forces which can give an optative sense to *salue* or *di te amabunt* will explain all optative subjunctives.¹

The state of things which we find existing in Plautus as to optative forms and functions is best explained not by the hypothesis that the Italic had an optative mode, a system of special terminations applicable to any verb-stem and having as their most distinct function the expression of a wish, but by the hypothesis that the two modal formations were along the Italic line of descent never clearly differentiated. It is unlikely that both forms were in general use with the same verb-stem, and there is no evidence to show that they had that universality and system which would justify the use of the term mode.² Out of this undifferentiated or but partially differentiated modal material, the growing consciousness of the wish, as distinct from will, working through the person and number and the verb-meaning, produced the optative forms of sentence. In general, these were not sufficiently specific without the addition of specializing words, *utinam*, *uelim*, but certain forms, still further separated from the ordinary uses of the subjunctive by being employed as greetings,

¹ Compare also the future with the subjunctive in Pers. 16 o Sagaristio, di ament te. | o Toxile, dabunt di quae exoptes; Capt. 877 ff. ita me amabit sancta Saturitas, Hegio, itaque suo me semper condecoret cognomine, ut ego uidi.

² Cf. Streitberg in Paul and Braune's Beitr. 15, p. 116: "damals [in idg. urzeit] existierten überhaupt keine 'tempora,' d. h. keine formalen kategorien, deren ursprüngliche function es war, zur bezeichnung der relativen zeitstufen zu dienen."

asseverations, curses or blessings, became idiomatic and needed no distinguishing particle.

The potential and the optative uses are not parallel, though they are in some respects similar. Both are in part due to the influence of person and number (the subject) and of verb-meaning, but these influences are stronger in the optative than in the potential; in the latter they produce conditions favorable to the potential, rather than true potential uses. These appear only when other forces are brought into operation. The optative is a specialized use, the result of convergence and of increasing isolation, whether it be in phrases like *saluos sis, di te perdant*, or in uses which require a special optative particle, *utinam*. The close resemblance to ordinary expressions of desire is most apparent in the wishes of a general character and content, such as take *utinam*, but it is also plain in the more specialized and formulaic wishes, and there is no form of optation in which this connection cannot be clearly seen; the element of determination is lessened or dropped out, but the element of desire is intensified. In the potential uses the tendency toward isolation, which appears in *non meream, quid ego nunc faciam?* or *deum uirtute dicam*, is one which increases the element of determination and the meanings allied to the future and which lessens the element of desire. But desire in some form is the most common meaning of the subjunctive, the meaning which a subjunctive form at once suggests, and when it is weakened the form is left to a considerable extent meaningless, emptied of its normal meaning. This is one of the processes by which a word or a syntactical group is prepared to assume new meanings, new functions. The form *meream*, existing through the analogy of other verbs of the 2d conjugation, and in part excluded by its meaning from the expression of desire, is speech-material ready to take on any new function, not too far removed from the old. The suggestion of new meaning comes from the context, the preceding thought. For the subjunctive is never potential—differing in this altogether from the optative uses—when it is alone. A form like *ualeas, saluos sis, pereat* (the last not in Plautus) can convey a wish without context, except as the attendant circumstances always supply a context, or a brief phrase like *di te perdant* with almost no context; but this is rarely, if ever, true of the potential. *faciam* alone, without the help of the interrogative, is not potential; *meream* alone might have somewhat more of potential

suggestion, because the suggestion comes largely from the verb-meaning, but *sit, dicat, postules, duceret* do not convey potential meaning except in a certain context. It is only when these forms, unfitted or only partially fitted for the expression of desire, are used with phrases which set a hypothetical tone—the interrogatives, *deum uirtute, una opera*, a subjunctive clause, a formal protasis—that they take on new meaning from their surroundings, and become most widely separated from the usual subjunctive functions. To a slight degree an optative phrase, *ualeas, saluos sis*, may also acquire new meaning from its use in greetings, but for the most part it is correct to say that the optative function is only an intensification and isolation of a meaning inherent in the subjunctive, while the potential force is an acquired function, not inherent in the mode, but rather, in its extreme development, showing but slight trace of its connection with the mode of determination and desire.

¹The potential and the optative uses are only the most striking illustrations of the process which went on over the whole range of modal expression, and which in the end produced the many varieties of subjunctive usage to be found in any author or at any period. Looked at from the functional side, this process, if its steps could be traced, would be one of constant progress from vague thinking toward precise thinking, from indiscriminating and vague desire with reference to all kinds of action under all varieties of circumstance toward differentiated will, entreaty, exhortation, command, permission, direction, advice, and so on. In other words, we must suppose that, though man in the primitive stage entreated, exhorted, commanded, and though these emotions were really different, the difference was not strong enough to find expression in language. But it is not to be supposed that this movement toward differentiation, though constant, was regular. The need of expression varied, and was felt in some directions (e. g. perhaps in curses or in direct commands in 2d sing.) before it was felt in others. The means of expression, also, would lie near at hand for such a use as 1st plur.,

¹ The paragraphs which follow I present as a hypothesis merely; to others they may seem no more than speculation. And the same thing may be said of some of the preceding remarks upon the potential and the optative, though I venture to think that they rest more firmly upon direct inference from the facts. I have also examined somewhat carefully all the corresponding uses in a dozen or more of other writers, Cato, Terence, Varro, Lucretius, Catullus, Vergil, Horace, Caesar, Pliny, and some others, but not Cicero.

but for other uses (deliberative questions, *una opera postules*) would have to be shaped by long use. Looked at from the formal side, the process was equally irregular. The forces of analogy and assimilation, by which the modal forms were slowly worked into a systematic mode, afforded at first and for a long time an irregular and unsystematized speech-material. Some verbs had both subjunctive and optative forms, some had only one, some had neither, and we can hardly doubt that still other modal formations existed which have not been preserved.¹ Nor is it to be supposed that all verbs began to be used in subjunctive forms at the same instant. I have said above that some verbs were peculiarly fitted by their meaning for use in expressions of will, and that other verbs were excluded by their meaning or by tense or voice or person and number from the expression of the simpler forms of will. That, of course, does not mean that such forms as *dicam*, *meream*, *caperes*, *ecficiatur* existed but were not used, but only that they may be said to have had a potential existence from the time when similar forms came into use; an actual existence, as a part of the language, they did not have until the modified and specialized kinds of will, which are all that they are capable of expressing, came to be felt. *mereo* had no pres. subj. 1st sing. until the idea expressed in *non meream* (or some similar idea) called for expression; the form *dicam* was very rare until the idea of futurity or something like it was felt. *uelim* is a striking illustration of this. Unless we suppose that it meant 'I should wish'—a hypothesis which really rests upon classical and later usage and is absolutely contradicted by the usage of Plautus and, indeed, by much of the later, especially the colloquial, usage—*uelim* had no proper meaning, and *uelle* had therefore no modal form in the 1st sing. until the need arose of distinguishing, e. g. *ueniat* the will from *ueniat* the wish. Then *uolo ueniat* expressed the one and *ueniat uelim* the other, the form *uelim* coming into existence through the analogy of similar forms under the influence of the optative force of *ueniat*. Such independent meaning as *uelim* has, it acquired from this association with an optation and carried over into the uses with infin. and ptc. and adjective; in fact, the other persons, *uelis*, *uelit*, are rare in any really independent use.

¹Quintil. I 7, 23 quid? non Cato Censorius 'dicam' et 'faciam' 'dicem' et 'faciem' scripsit eundemque in ceteris, quae similiter cadunt, modum tenuit?

Thus upon the formal side, as well as upon the functional, the spread of the mode was irregular, and the formation of the specialized usages, which, taken together, are the basis for our generalizations as to the subjunctive, was for both reasons, the formal and the functional, irregular and unsystematic. There was no formation of broad types, like the potential, but only of restricted usages, and the analogies which determined the direction of the process, the lines of cause and effect, the retarding influences, must all be sought in the specialized usages. It is true that such usages may sometimes be grouped together on the basis of a functional resemblance, but the separate members of such a group have no organic connection until they begin to influence each other; that is, until the resemblance in function becomes clearer and stronger than the similarity in verb-form, in sentence-form or in verb-meaning. Such a stage was most certainly not reached by the various members of the potential group—the type which is most frequently treated as having an actual existence—in the I.E. period; if it was beginning at all in the time of Plautus, its range was still very narrow. The use of the term *Grundbegriff* to describe the sphere of application of a group of syntactical forms¹ is unfortunate, if it encourages the belief that the members of such a group exerted a common influence in addition to the influence of each individual usage. Common influence can be exerted only when the usages have become bound together by mutual analogies.

The formation of specialized usages in which the tense or the verb-meaning or some other force influenced the meaning of the mode either intensified the subjunctive sense or weakened it; where will and desire were weakened, the subjunctive form took on, in part, new meaning. The result was an extension of the field of the mode, on the one side toward the most explicit expression of will, the *impv.*, on the other side toward the mode of statement, the indicative. In the one direction the subjunctive was extended to uses (e. g. some kinds of prohibition) in which it is impossible to detect any difference between its force and that of the *impv.*; on the other side it was extended until it reached ideas of expectation, determination, propriety, necessity, obligation, which could be more precisely expressed by the future, by modal verbs (*oportet, debet, uelle, posse*), by phrases like *aequom*

¹ It is used in somewhat this way by Delbrück in Brugmann's *Grundr.* III 1, p. 81, and by Brugmann, *Indog. Forsch.* V, p. 93, n. 2.

est, by the periphrastic forms or by verbal nouns. For the precise determination of the meaning of the mode—that is, of the range of its application—a study of the neutral territory in which these phrases are employed as parallels to subjunctive forms is to be desired.¹ Within the historical period the competition between the mode and the other expressions of modality went on until the modal forms were to a considerable extent driven out by the analytic forms, and passed over into the subordinate clause or survived in the Romance languages with changed functions. In Plautus the competition is just beginning.

An actual historical connection between different usages can be established by clear evidence in only a few instances. Thus the expansion of *quid faciam?* in one direction into *quid vis faciam?* and in the other into *quid ego nunc faciam?* is clear, and I have attempted to show above how the use of the indef. 2d sing. with verbs of mental action is an off-shoot of the ordinary hypothetical use. In such cases the connection shows which usage is the older. With somewhat less of probability, it is possible to conjecture that the simple and direct expressions of desire preceded the more complex. The hortatory 1st plur. must have begun, very much as it appears in Plautus, as soon as the analogies of other subjunctive forms led to the use of the 1st plur. ending. It is still in Plautus used only with verbs of physical action and with a simple meaning, except where the addition of *tu* or a vocative suggests a jussive force; it shows no signs of the rhetorical uses, *uideamus*, *transeamus*, which are found in Cicero. It can hardly be doubted that such a use is earlier than a phrase like *qui ego istuc credam?* or than the entirely distinct uses of the three persons, *faxim*, *faxis*, *faxit*, which can have come about only by a long process of shift of meaning. A still slighter degree of probability attaches to attempts to prove relationship and comparative age by reasoning based upon English auxiliary verbs, *would*, *should*, *can*, *will*, *shall*; such reasoning suggests speculation and may thus become fruitful, but it does not of itself establish facts. The difficulty of proving relationship between the different uses of the subjunctive is not due, however, to insufficient *data* for the early periods or to inaccurate observation. It

¹ Some suggestions bearing upon this kind of definition of the mode may be found in J. Lattmann, *Die deutschen Modalitätsverba*, Progr., Clausthal, 1879; Johanson, *debere, posse* sim., Upsala, 1868; Neumann, *De futuri . . . usu*, Breslau, 1888.

is rather evidence that but few such relationships existed, except as all uses of like forms are related, and that the specialized usages grew up separately through the complex working of a number of different forces.

It is not less difficult to determine with any considerable degree of probability which usages of the Latin mode go back to the I.E. stage. That modal forms then existed is clear enough, and it is plain that the forms were used to express some kind of desire or will; just how precise this statement may be made is far less clear, and the value of it to the student of a single language is often over-estimated. For to one who is endeavoring to understand the phenomena of a single language, Greek or German or Latin, the course of that language from the beginning of speech must be regarded as continuous; as to the student of the Romance languages, French or Portuguese presents an unbroken line of development from Plautus to the present time. The certainty, if it could be reached, that a particular special usage dated from the I.E. stage would make it possible to reason with somewhat greater exactness from the forms which that usage took in other languages, but the gain would not be great. The phrase "of I.E. origin," which one not infrequently meets in syntactical work, is not in fact an explanation, but a very vague date. But it is not the *when* that is of primary importance in syntax: it is the *how* and, if possible, the *why*. It is the process of change, the laws, the forces, the causes, that historical syntax must follow out; the date is only a means to the accomplishment of this task.

I have not cared to make in this paper what is called a "critical examination" of the theories of the mode current in America and to some extent in England. The differences between them and the view which I have been trying to present will, I hope, be evident, and there is no work in which philologists engage more useless, in my opinion, than negative criticism. If a theory is wrong, it can be disproved only by supplying a better theory. This paper is an attempt to suggest a new and, possibly, more fruitful method of studying the subjunctive.

E. P. MORRIS.

II.—THE USE OF *ENIM* IN PLAUTUS AND TERENCE.

In the winter of 1885–86, Goetz, who was busy with his new edition of the *Bacchides*, suggested to me, then a student at Jena, the investigation of the use of *enim* in the earlier language. The following pages present the results of that study, delayed and postponed for various causes these eleven years. While the conclusions may not be all that were hoped at the time the investigation was begun, from over twenty readings and comparisons of the entire text of Plautus and Terence, it is felt that the classification is more thorough and systematic than has been previously attempted. While my views on minor points have sometimes changed, my opinions and convictions on the most important usages have been strengthened by successive comparisons of the text. Of the numerous conjectures that would introduce *enim* into the text, only the more plausible have been noticed. It has not been deemed advisable to cumber the page with improbable emendations. Only disputed or typical passages have been quoted in full.

Nearly thirty years ago, Ramsay, in his edition of the *Mostellaria*,¹ stated: "we maintain that in the earlier writers *enimvero* always signifies 'for in truth' as *enim* always signifies 'for,' and that both are uniformly employed to introduce an explanation." Eleven years later Langen,² who devoted considerable space to the discussion and gave the most complete classification hitherto attempted, asserted with equal positiveness (p. 262): "Ich glaube behaupten zu dürfen *enim* ist bei Plautus *ausschliesslich* Betheuerungspartikel, es wird von ihm überhaupt nicht zur Begründung eines vorhergehenden Gedankens gebraucht." This latter view became at once the prevalent one among Plautine students, although a number of prominent editors and critics have taken more or less exception to its sweeping conclusions. There is, it would seem, a position between these two extremes, which we are warranted in taking.

¹ London, 1869, p. 206.

² Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung des Plautus. Leipzig, 1880, pp. 261–71.

I.—*The Position of Enim.*

The position of *enim* may best be considered under two heads : (1) the position of *enim* in the sentence ; (2) the position of *enim* in relation to other words.

(i) *The position of enim in the sentence.*—In Plautus *enim* stands as the first word in the sentence in the following passages : Aul. 500,¹ Capt. 592, Cas. 890, Cist. 777, Mil. 429, 1018, Most. 1144, Pers. 236, 319, 612, Trin. 1134. In Epid. 701 I should read *enim istaec captios*, as I see no good reason for discarding the manuscript reading for Brix's conjecture, *em istaec captios*, adopted by Götz. In Men. 846 I read *enim haereo*² with Brix. This, suggested by Ussing in his note to Aul. 492, is much to be preferred to *enim periculum est*, which he adopts in his later edition. Schöll transfers the words from Menaechmus to Matrona, and so is compelled to change *haereo* to *censeo*. In Trin. 806 *enim* is to be preferred to the manuscript *at enim*.

The two most probable conjectures that would give *enim* first place in the sentence are Lachmann's *enim verbis probus* for *in verbis probus* in Amph. 838, and Ribbeck's ingenious emendation of Mil. 1319, which will be discussed more fully below.

Enim vero stands at the beginning of the sentence in the following passages : Amph. 723, 771, Asin. 688, Capt. 628, Cas. 475, 728, Cist. 519, Curc. 175, 608, Men. 860, 1075, Merc. 739, Pers. 349, Poen. 296, 435 (where its parenthetical position really gives it first place), Rud. 1003, Stich. 398, 616, Trin. 958, 989 ; probably in Capt. 22 and Poen. 280.³

Enim is first⁴ in four passages in Terence : Ad. 168, H. T. 72, Hec. 238, Phorm. 983, and *enim vero* in eight : And. 91, 206, H. T. 320, 1045, Hec. 673, Phorm. 465, 937, 1036.

Enim is found in the second place (when not joined with other particles) 21 times in Plautus and 7 in Terence. In only one

¹ The citations for Plautus (both plays and fragments) are made according to the edition of Götz, Löwe and Schöll ; for Terence, that of Dziatzko.

² Compare Capt. 532, Merc. 739.

³ Langen's statement (p. 263) : "Weit häufiger (am Anfang des Satzes) ist aber die Verstärkung durch *vero*, mindestens dreissigmal," is incorrect.

⁴ This position of *enim* in the earlier language is not noted by the majority of grammars in general use. Roby, II, p. 22 ; Harkness, §569, III ; Allen and Greenough, §§156, R, 345, b, and Bennett, §345, are all guilty of the same omission. Gildersleeve-Lodge, §498, n. 1, recognizes the usage. A number of equally dogmatic and incorrect additional statements could easily be secured.

passage does it occupy third place, Cas. 525 *em*, *nunc enim* etc., where its position can be accounted for by its close connection with *nunc*.

(ii) *The position of enim with reference to certain words.*—An examination of the passages shows that *enim*, both alone and in compounds, is often found associated with certain words. The following collocations are worthy of note:

(1) *Enim with pronouns.*—*a.* With personal pronouns: *enim*¹ *ego*, Cas. 280, Merc. 251, Mil. 809, Most. 888, 926, Poen. 604; *mihi*, Aul. 500, Amph. 733, Cas. 366; *me*, Trin. 1134; *tu*, Capt. 568; *enim vero ego*, Capt. 534, Pseud. 979, Trin. 958; *certo enim ego*, Aul. 811; *mihi*, Stich. 88; *at enim mihi*, Stich. 738; *nos*, Stich. 129; *tu*, Epid. 94; *quia enim me*, Merc. 248, Truc. 266; *te*, Amph. 606, Pers. 592; *certe enim tu*, Asin. 614; *nempe enim tu*, Trin. 60; *verum enim tu*, Mil. 293; *non enim tu*, Rud. 989.

b. With demonstrative pronouns: *enim id*, Men. 163, Ad. 730; *enimvero id*, And. 848; *verum enim vero id*, Ad. 255; *at enim id*, Bacch. 793, 1080; *quia enim id*, Most. 1098; *enim illa*, Phorm. 113; *illoc*, Men. 249; *etenim ille*, Amph. 266; *enim vero ille*, Amph. 771; *illud*, Men. 860; *at enim ille*, Cist. 739, Men. 790; *illi*, Pers. 569; *quia enim ille*, Curc. 667; *ne enim illi*, Most. 1095; *non enim illum*, Rud. 922; *neque enim illi*, Trin. 585; *enim ipsi*, Cas. 323; *etenim ipsus*, And. 442; *enim istaec*, Epid. 701, Most. 1144; *at enim istaec*, Eun. 381; *istoc*, H. T. 699; *enim hic*, Bacch. 457; *at enim hoc*, Poen. 1197; *non enim haec*, Most. 827.

c. With relative or interrogative pronouns: *certo enim quod*, Poen. 1182; *at enim quod*, Pers. 832; *quia enim qui*, Hec. 311; *verum enim vero qui*, Poen. 874; *quid enim*, Amph. 694.

(2) *Enim with adverbs.*—It is also joined with many adverbs, especially those of time. Thus, *nunc enim*, Asin. 598, Cas. 525, Epid. 162, 648 (*non enim nunc*), Capt. 534 (*nunc enim vero*), And. 823 (*immo enim nunc*); *enim iam*, Cas. 890; *verum enim quando*, Ad. 201.

Four examples are found of the combination *ita enim vero*, Amph. 410, Asin. 339, Cist. 519 (*enim vero ita*), Most. 920.

(3) *Enim with negative and final particles.*—It is joined with negative and final particles: *enim non*, Cist. 777, Pers. 236, Ad.

¹ These lists are arranged for the sake of brevity with *enim* first, even if it be postpositive.

168, Capt. 628 (*enim vero non*), Merc. 395, Mil. 1139, Pseud. 325 (*quia enim non*); *haud enim*, Capt. 592; *enim ne*, Mil. 429, Cist. 235, Most. 922 (at *enim ne*).

(4) *Enim with the first person of verbs*.—In numerous cases it is joined with the first person of verbs. Examples are: *aio enim vero*, Amph. 344, Pers. 185; *ego enim dicam*, Cas. 372.

II.—*The Force of Simple Enim.*

(i) *Enim with corroborative force*.—In both Plautus and Terence *enim* has in the majority of cases an affirmative or corroborative force, corresponding to our 'indeed, certainly, to be sure,' and the German 'fürwahr, wahrhaftig.'

1. With this corroborative force *enim* occupies the first place in the sentence in Aul. 500, Capt. 592, Cas. 890, Cist. 777, Epid. 701, Men. 846, Mil. 1018, Most. 1144, Pers. 236, 319, 612, Trin. 806, 1134, H. T. 72, Hec. 238, Phorm. 983. I do not find any passage, resting on manuscript authority, where *enim* in the first place has any other force. Lachmann's conjecture, Amph. 838 *enim* (MSS *In*, Uss. *Id tu*) *verbis probas*, has the same meaning, with a tinge of irony.

2. It is similarly employed in the second place in the sentence with no unusual emphasis: Amph. 333, Asin. 598, Bacch. 457, Cas. 525, Epid. 648, Men. 251, Merc. 251, Phorm. 113.

3. In answers it is frequently employed with the same signification: Cas. 279–80 *Ch.* Te uxor dicebat tua Me vocare. *Lys.* Ego enim vocari iussi, 323, 366,¹ 372, Men. 162, Mil. 429 (*enim* first), 810, Most. 888, Pers. 670, Poen. 387, Ad. 168 (*enim* first), 730.

Nil is sometimes joined with *enim* in the reply: Bacch. 701–2 *Pist.* Nunc quid nos vis facere? *Chrys.* Nil enim (*Nihil* Uss., *enim nihil* R., Lang.) nisi ut ametis impero; Most. 551, Ad. 656, 921, Hec. 850.

An isolated example that may be quoted here is H. T. 317 *Cl.* Quid illa facias? *Sy.* At enim. *Cl.* Quid enim?

4. The corroborative force sometimes takes an ironical turn like *vero* or the German *freilich*: Capt. 568 Tu enim repertu's, Philocratem qui superes veriverbio; Amph. 836–8 *Alc.* Quae non

¹ Schöll's arrangement and punctuation of the line removed the objections to the rare and doubtful use of *enim* in questions. One other case will be considered below.

deliquit, decet Audacem esse, confidenter pro se et proterve loqui. *Amph.* Satis audacter. *Alc.* Ut pudicam decet. *Amph.* Enim verbis probas.

5. In *Amph.* 694 is found the only example of a usage so familiar in Ciceronian Latin, *quid enim* in *Quid enim censes? te ut deludam contra lusorem meum?* Langen (p. 267) denies its genuineness, and declares: "Plautus hat gewiss *quidnam censes* geschrieben." While there is no other example in the writers of the period based on as good MS authority (*Quid enim*, *Curc.* 273, being a conjecture; *quis enim*, *Enn.* 114 (M.), depending on the reading of the scholiast, and *quis enim*, *ex inc. inc. fab. 1* (R. I), having so uncertain a date), there seems no reason for making the change. There are other readings of equal authority and rarity in Plautus.

(ii) *Enim with causal force.*—*Most.* 925–6 reads: *Tr.* Quid? tibi unquam quicquam, postquam tuos sum, verborum dedi? *Th.* Ego enim recte cavi. Lorenz, in his note to the passage, recognizing its causal force, and the implied ellipsis, translates: "*Ego enim*, 'nein, denn ich'—eine bei *nam* und *enim* wie bei γάρ häufige und bekannte Ellipse."

In *Poen.* 604, Milphio exclaims: En, edepol mortales malos! whereat Agorastocles proudly replies: Ego enim docui. The passage is similar to the preceding, and the simplest and most natural way to interpret it is by supplying the evident ellipsis: 'Certainly they are, for I taught them.' To explain *enim* as equivalent to *profecto* is to decidedly weaken the force of the reply.

I have always been sorely tempted to regard a similar ellipsis as existing in *Cas.* 279–80 *Lys.* Te uxor aiebat tua Me vocare. *Ch.* Ego enim vocari iussi, though the causal force does not seem as strong as in the two preceding passages.

Pseud. 133 seqq. Ballio comes out heaping abuse on the heads of his slaves: Exite, agite exite, ignavi, male habiti et male conciliati Quorum numquam quicquam quoiquam venit in mentem ut recte faciant Quibus nisi ad hoc exemplum experior, non potest usura usurpari, Neque homines magis asinos umquam vidi, ita plagis costae callent, Quos quom ferias, tibi plus noceas, eo enim ingenio hi sunt etc. Lorenz, properly regarding *enim* as causal, explains the passage: "*noceas*, theils weil sie dann an Diebstahl, Raub und Flucht denken; denn *eo ingenio sunt* etc."

There is no necessity of thus straining the meaning of *noceas*. Ussing gives, to my mind, the true explanation by regarding the clause beginning *neque homines* as parenthetical and referring *enim* to the lines preceding.

Terence furnishes one example, And. 808-9 *nam pol si id scissem, numquam huc tetulissem pedem; semper enim dictast esse atque habitast soror*.

Of the half dozen or more examples of *enim* that have found their way into the text of Plautus by conjecture, I shall mention only one, Ribbeck's emendation of Mil. 1319 *Enim pietas sic hortat*. Two objections have been urged against the conjecture, the use of *enim* as causal and the active form *hortat*. The first has been already disposed of. The second is stronger, though examples of the active forms of *hortor* are cited by Ribbeck in his critical notes and the lexicons. It must be admitted from Langen's statistics (p. 63) as to the forms of *hortor* in Plautus based on manuscript authority that the active form is improbable, though possible. Still the strongest argument against the reading is the position of *enim*. It has been shown that in all passages, in both Plautus and Terence, where *enim* holds the first place, its force is corroborative. Indeed, we are justified in regarding this as a rule. *Enim* in Ribbeck's text is nothing if not causal, and in its position lies the gravest objection to its adoption.

It is in place to state Langen's argument as to the non-existence of causal *enim* in Plautus. Briefly put, it is as follows: In a large majority of passages in Plautus *enim* has the corroborative force and no other meaning is possible. In the remaining examples a causal force is possible, though a corroborative force can be given. Therefore there is no passage in which the corroborative force is impossible. Let us test this argument with reference to Terence. It is agreed that the investigation must start with simple *enim* and proceed to its compounds. In Terence there are 10 instances of simple *enim* with corroborative force to one with causal. Applying Langen's reasoning, as the overwhelming majority of passages are corroborative, all may well be, and the one causal instance vanishes. But it does not. Langen admits that it is causal and cannot be otherwise. If one example in 11 can be causal in Terence, is the proportion so great as to make it impossible for 3 out of 37 or 4 out of 38 in Plautus, as shown above? It may be answered that the causal meaning is the only permissible one in the Terentian passage, but only one of two and

perhaps not the better in the four Plautine examples. It is no greater feat of mental gymnastics to read a corroborative force into the passage from the *Andria* than into the passages cited from Plautus. The causal force of *enim* in a number of passages in Plautus yet to be discussed is as plain to me as the majority admittedly so in Terence. Each reading only emphasizes this view. Tests made with others, who could not be accused of bias toward either view, favor the causal interpretation as the only reasonable one, and as the clearest and most emphatic. I can see no special difference in usage between Plautus and Terence in this regard. Any preconceived idea, carried out to its logical result, will be as sweeping in its conclusions as Langen's on this subject. That the conclusions are always correct, and the process a laudable one, is deserving of serious question.

III.—*Enim with Affirmative Particles.*

(i) *Enim vero*.—From *enim* we pass to the strengthened form *enim vero*, which simply increases the force of the affirmation. The view of some early grammarians, that it may have an adversative force like *sed*, is not sustained by the examples. Dräger¹ shows that its occurrence with this meaning is only in later prose.

1. It is found in simple assertions: *Amph.* 266, 723, 771, *Capt.* 22, *Cas.* 475, *Cist.* 519, *Men.* 860, *Stich.* 398, *Trin.* 958, *And.* 91, 206.

2. It is often used to denote a state or condition, and then is frequently accompanied by a temporal particle: *Capt.* 534 *Nunc enim vero occidi*; *Curc.* 175, 608, *Merc.* 739, *Hec.* 673.

3. It is used in statements expressing indignation or irony: *H. T.* 1045, *Phor.* 465.

4. It is found in answers. These are of two kinds: (1) where the answer is suggested by the statements of the preceding speaker: *Capt.* 628 *Heg.* *Fuistin liber?* *Tyn.* *Fui.* *Ar.* *Enim vero non fuit, nugas agit*; *Most.* 920, *Pers.* 349, *Poen.* 280, 296, 435, *Rud.* 1003, *Stich.* 616, *Trin.* 989, *And.* 848, *H. T.* 320, *Phorm.* 937, 985; (2) where the answer is a direct reply to the preceding question: *Amph.* 344 *Merc.* *Ain vero?* *So.* *Aio enim vero*; 410, 759, *Asin.* 339, 688, *Cas.* 728, *Men.* 1075, *Pers.* 185, *Pseud.* 979, *Trin.* 987, *Phorm.* 1036.

¹ *Historische Syntax*, II, p. 131.

(ii) *Certe enim* and *certo enim*.—Langen¹ in an exhaustive study and citation of the Plautine and Terentian passages in which the words occur, reaches the conclusion that in Plautus *certe* expresses 'subjective certainty' and *certo* 'objective certainty.' In Terence we find *certe* in its later classical usage taking the place of *certo* in expressions of 'objective certainty.' The same results apply in the use of the words when strengthened by *enim*. The examples are not numerous—six in Plautus and one in Terence.

1. *Certe enim* is found Amph. 331, 658, Asin. 614, And. 503. Aul. 811 the manuscripts read: *Certo enim ego vocem hic loquentis modo mi audire visus sum*. This should be changed to Langen's reading *certe*, in conformity to his rule.

2. *Certo enim* occurs in two passages: Poen. 1182 *Certo enim, quod ad nos attinuit, Pulchrae praepollentesque, soror, fuimus*; Stich. 88 *Certo enim mihi paternae vocis sonitus auris accidit*. Terence has no example of the combination.

(iii) *Nempe enim*.—Trin. 61 Ritschl and Schöll read: *Nempe enim tu, credo, me imprudentem obrepseris*. The manuscript reading *namque enim* is adopted and defended by Brix, Hand,² Langen³ and others. It must be admitted that Ritschl's conjecture is unusual, it being the first instance of the usage outside of the writers of the Silver Age. On the other hand, *namque enim* occurs nowhere else. Hand would explain it as a colloquialism, comparing it with *neque haud*. This explanation is far from acceptable. Ritschl's conjecture⁴ has two reasons to commend it: (1) it is probable from the frequent interchange of *nempe*, *namque*, *neque* in the manuscripts, and (2) more important still, it is in perfect harmony with Megaronides' remark.⁵

IV.—*Enim* with Adversative Particles.

(i) *At enim*.—*Enim* is frequently joined with the adversative particle *at*, having in most cases the affirmative or corroborative force already noticed. It may then be translated 'but indeed, but surely.'

1. Examples of such usage are: Bacch. 993, 1080 (*et MSS, sed Acidalius*), Cist. 235, 739, Epid. 94, Men. 790, Merc. 159, Most.

¹ Beiträge, pp. 22–31.

² Vol. IV, p. 12.

³ Beiträge, p. 261.

⁴ Prolegomena, p. lxxv (reprinted in his Opuscula, vol. V, p. 332).

⁵ For other conjectures and discussions of this much-disputed passage, see Schöll, App. Crit., p. 127.

808, Pers. 569, 832, Poen. 914, 1197 (twice), Pseud. 436, Stich. 129, 738, Trin. 919, Eun. 381, 751, H. T. 317, 699, 713.

2. In Most. 922 At enim ne captioni mihi sit, si dederim tibi is an example of the common ellipsis of *metuo*.¹ In Ad. 830 seq. we have At enim metuas, ne ab re sint tamen Omissiores paulo.

3. It is used in the reply expressing indignation or some other emotion: Phorm. 487 *Ph.* Audi quod dicam. *Do.* At enim taedet iam audire eadem milia.

4. It is found twice in questions in connection with *scin*: Pseud. 538, 641.

5. One example is found of a comical play on the particle: Epid. 95 At enim,—bat enim. With this can be compared Pseud. 236 *Cal.* At. *Ps.* Bat; and Pers. 213 *Paeg.* Heia. *Soph.* Beia.

(ii) *Verum enim*.—Langen² shows that *verum* has only adversative force. Any interpretation (like that of Ussing in his note to Asin. 790, who translates it by *sane*) which would regard it as synonymous with *vero* is incorrect.

1. Six examples of *verum enim* are found in Plautus and Terence: Cist. 80, Mil. 293, Poen. 874, Ad. 201, Eun. 742, Phorm. 555. In five of these *verum* has plainly the force of *sed*. The sixth presents unusual difficulties. It is Poen. 873-4, where Goetz reads: *Syn.* I in malam rem. *Mil.* I tu atque herus. *Syn.* Verum enim qui homo eum norit, cito homo pervorti. Geppert changed the second verse so as to read: Verum enim, si modo eum noris etc., where *verum enim* can only have the force of *enim vero*, and the answer is not in harmony with what precedes.

Two ways out of the difficulty suggest themselves. *Enim vero* can be read, in harmony with the numerous passages where its Plautine force has been shown, or we can suppose that some passage or lines containing Synecratus' reply has been lost, and that the statement of the text is its continuation.

2. A strengthened form of *verum enim* is *verum enim vero*. An example of this is found in each author: Capt. 599, Ad. 255.

(iii) *Sed enim*.³—No example of *sed enim* is found in the manuscripts of Plautus or Terence. Three conjectures have introduced

¹ Lorenz in his note on the passage cites other examples of the same ellipsis.

² Beiträge, pp. 113-21.

³ See Brix's note on Mil. 983.

it into the text. So Acidalius in Bacch. 1080 in place of *etenim* (at enim Pareus), Ritschl in Bacch. 1083, while Goetz prefers to follow the manuscripts, and again in Mil. 983, with Fleckeisen and Lorenz. Ribbeck, Brix and Goetz, however, read *sed ne et istam* instead of *sed enim ne istam*, which removed the faulty hiatus *sed ne istam*. The first example based on manuscript authority is in Cato, Or. pro Rhod. (Jordan, 23, 9).

(iv) *Immo enim*.—*Immo enim* is used whenever an opinion opposed to what has just been expressed is to be emphatically stated: Pseud. 31 *Call.* Lege vel tabellas redde. *Ps.* Immo enim pellegam; Stich. 699, And. 823, Phorm. 337. *Enim* has in these examples its corroborative force.

The stronger form *immo enim vero* occurs with substantially the same force: Capt. 608, Eun. 329, Phorm. 528.

V.—*Enim with Causal and Final Particles.*

(i) *Quia enim*.—*Enim* is often joined with *quia*, strengthening or intensifying its causal force. It is thus found in answers to questions introduced by

1. *Qui*, Amph. 266, 1034, Pers. 228, Truc. 733.
2. *Qui istuc*, Phorm. 331.
3. *Qui dum*, Epid. 299, Rud. 1116.
4. *Qui vero*, Merc. 395 (Ritschl).
5. *Quid*, Capt. 884, Cas. 385, Curc. 449, Mil. 1139, Poen. 1344, Truc. 266 *Quia enim me truculentum nominas*.
6. *Quid ita*, Pers. 592.
7. *Quid iam*, Bacch. 50, Mil. 834, Pseud. 325.¹
8. *Quo argumento*, Mil. 1001.
9. *Qua istuc ratione*, Pseud. 804.
10. *Quamobrem*, Curc. 443, 667, H. T. 800.
11. *Cur*, Merc. 648, Most. 1097.
12. *Qua propter*, H. T. 188, Hec. 311.

(ii) *Ut enim, ne enim*.—In a similar way *enim* with its affirmative force is joined with the final particles *ut* and *ne*. Thus with

1. *Ut*, Cas. 268, Epid. 277, Poen. 855.
2. *Ne*, Most. 1095.

¹ Lorenz, by comparing this passage with 318 (*quia pol*) and 345 (*quia edepol*), shows the connection between *enim*, *pol* and *edepol*.

VI.—*Enim with Negative Particles.*

(i) *Non enim*.—There are two distinct usages of *non enim*, as has been found to be the case with simple *enim*.

1. It has already been shown that in a large majority of the passages in Plautus and Terence in which it occurs, the force of *enim* is merely corroborative. A comparison of the passages containing *non enim* in the light of these results will give the same conclusions. Accustomed as most scholars of Plautus have been to Ciceronian usage, they have often been led astray by the discovery that *enim* with causal force, in negative sense, is not in place in several passages. To remove this difficulty the archaic negative *noenum* or *noenu* is substituted, as by Ritschl in Trin. 705 and Bücheler in Asin. 808. It is questionable if this is either necessary or based on good reasons. The examples of *noenum* (*u*) based on manuscript authority are so rare that conjectures increasing their number must be regarded as venturesome.¹ With the corroborative force of *enim*, so generally admitted, no change is necessary.

This corroborative force is shown by the following examples: Aul. 594, Cist. 562, Epid. 162, Most. 1133, Pseud. 1266, Rud. 989, Stich. 600, Truc. 309.

Three passages similar in construction are: Mil. 283 *Non enim faciam quin scias*; Stich. 302 *Non enim possum quin revortar*; Trin. 705 *Non enim possum quin exclamem*.

Non enim is used once in Terence to express a strong, confident denial: Phorm. 694 *An. Quid fiet? Ge. Non enim ducet*.

2. In the following passages the causal force of *enim* is far more in place than the corroborative; indeed, in several it is the only possible one.

Capt. 860 *Heg. Non sentio. Ergas. Non enim es in senticeto, eo non sentis*. Brix, striving to reproduce the pun and at the same time preserve the corroborative force of *enim*, translates: "Ja, du bist auch kein Märker." A correct translation must bring out the causal force of *enim*: 'You don't feel, because you are not in the briars.'

Most. 827–8, Tranio says of the door-posts: *Atque etiam nunc satis boni sunt, si sunt inducti pice. Non enim haec pultifagus*

¹ The only cases I have discovered are Aul. 67 and Lucr. 3, 199; 4, 712. The three passages in Ennius, A. 287, 479 (M) and F. 201 (R) are all due to conjecture. See L. Müller, Lucilius, 30, 23 (p. 267); Ritschl, Opus, vol. II, p. 242.

opufex opera fecit barbarus. Sonnenschein, in his note on the passage, says: "This is one of the few passages in Plaut., in which *enim* seems to approach very nearly to the meaning of 'for,' but it may be translated 'look you.'"

I cannot see how any translation but the causal can be defended here. Tranio plainly assigns his reason for the good condition of the posts. He does not stop and turn to Theopropides with the exclamation 'Look you, no pottage-eating artisan from foreign parts made them.'

So Poen. 285-6 Nam pro erilei et nostro quaestu satis bene ornatae sumus. Non enim pote quaestus fieri, nisi sumptus sequitur scio, and Truc. 907-8 Numquam uno hoc die eficiatur opus quin opus semper siet. Non enim possunt militares pueri ut alii (Bugge, *avis*, Schöll) educier.

Rud. 921-2 Gripus in his monologue says: Vigilare decet hominem qui volt sua temperi conficere officia, adding as his reason, not as a parallel statement, non enim illum exspectare oportet dum erus se ad suum suscitet.

Bücheler read *noenum* Asin. 808, where the text has Haec sunt non nugae: non enim mortualia. Ussing would explain it thus: "Haec seria sunt, non nugae; neque enim mortuis haec cantantur, sed vivis." This explanation is designed to meet Langen's objection as to its causal force, since anything can be *nugae*, without being necessarily *mortualia*. Ussing's interpretation has much to commend it, though I doubt the genuineness of the verse.

Eun. 453 *Th.* Bene dixti ac mi istuc non in mentem venerat. *Gn.* Ridiculum! non enim cogitaras. We may translate: 'Absurd! why, you had not thought of it.' It is not difficult to see something of the causal force in the passage.

(ii) *Neque enim*.—The same peculiarities of usage are exhibited in *neque enim*.

1. Its corroborative force, in a negative sense, is shown in Cas. 888 Reppulit mihi manum; neque enim dare sibi savium me sinit.

2. Its causal force is evident in Pers. 63 seq. Neque quadruplari me volo; neque enim decet Sine meo periculo ire aliena ereptum bona, Neque illi qui faciunt, mihi placent; Trin. 584 *Les.* Nam certumst sine dote haud dare. *Stas.* Quin tu i modo. *Les.* Neque enim illi damno umquam esse patiar.

This force is still more marked in two passages from Terence: Ad. 647 Habitant hic quaedam mulieres pauperculae; Ut opinor

eas non nosse se et certo scio; Neque enim diu huc migrarunt; Hec. 833-5 Haec tot propter me gaudia illi contigisse laetor: Etsi hoc meretrices aliae nolunt; neque enim est in rem nostram Ut quisquam amator in nuptiis laetetur.¹

(iii) *Numquam enim*.—*Numquam* occurs with *enim* in corroborative force in Pers. 489, Stich. 96, 751.

VII.—*Etenim*.

Etenim (a word as peculiar and mysterious in its formation as *namque*) is foreign to Plautus, the only passage in which it is retained in the text being in the late prologue to the *Amphitruo*, where (v. 26) we read: *Etenim ille, quoniam huc iussu venio, Juppiter, Non minus quam nostrum quivis formidat malum*. The two passages Cist. 777 and Bacch. 1080, in which the manuscript reading has been changed in our texts, have already been discussed. The causal force, shown in the *Amphitruo* passage, occurs in three passages from Terence: And. 442 *Deinde desinet. Etenim ipse secum eam rem reputavit via*; Eun. 1074 *Ut lubenter vivis (etenim bene lubenter victitas)*; H. T. 546-7 *Facile equidem facere possum si iubes. Etenim quo pacto id fieri soleat calleo*. I see no reason to read with Langen, in the *Eunuchus* passage, *et enim* ("und wahrlich"). The causal force is not as strong, it is true, as in the other two examples.²

Omitting all conjectures that would introduce causal *enim* into the text and all examples of *etenim*, there are, at a rough estimate, 14 examples of *enim* corroborative to 1 of *enim* causal in Plautus, while in Terence the proportion is 13 to 1. The causal force in the examples from Plautus is clear, in most cases as much so as those of Terence. The percentage of causal examples, though not large, is respectable enough not to be rejected through mere devotion to a theory. The proportion, too, it will be noted, is nearly as large as in Terence. With the exception of *etenim*, which leads a peculiar existence in most of the poets before the Silver Age, the use of *enim* and its compounds in the two poets

¹ Dräger's statement (Syntax, vol. II, p. 68): "*Nec enim* statt *non enim* findet sich zuerst Ter. Hec. V 3, 36," is shown by the above examples from Plautus to be incorrect.

² Dräger's statement (Syntax, vol. II, p. 171) that *etenim* occurs twice in Plautus and four times in Terence must be corrected.

seems to harmonize. Under such conditions, it is impossible to give any dogmatic assertion regarding the origin and growth of the causal usage. Had more of the earlier language, outside of the two dramatists, been preserved, such a statement might be risked. With the scant remains at our disposal, and these largely conjectural, no satisfactory results can be gained. It is for this reason that other writers of the period, though examined, have not been drawn into the discussion.¹

UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO,
Aug. 6, 1897.

WILLARD K. CLEMENT.

¹ Remoteness from large libraries and philological centres makes it impossible for me to familiarize myself with more than the names of many of the German dissertations or programs bearing more or less directly on the theme. Experiences while a student abroad convinced me that it is often impossible to secure certain much-quoted pamphlets or articles. Omissions or failures to make proper reference or give due credit are not always the result of carelessness or ignorance.

.

III.—ON THE CHARACTER OF INFERRED PARENT LANGUAGES.

1.—The idea of inferentially constructing a parent language on the basis of actually existing cognate languages or dialects seems to have originated with Schleicher. In his *Linguistische Untersuchungen*, vol. II (*Die Sprachen Europa's in systematischer Uebersicht*), published in 1850 at Bonn, he speaks of 'primary languages' (*Primärsprachen*, e. g. pp. 29–30) such as the Latin and the Sanskrit, contrasting them with 'secondary languages' such as the Romance languages and the modern Hindu vernaculars. In some cases, he adds, such primary languages are not extant, but must be constructed from their descendants (secondary languages). These primary languages, in turn, he regards as daughters of one mother, the parent language (*Ursprache*). Two years later, in his *Formenlehre der Kirchenslavischen Sprache* (1852), he expresses himself similarly. A Parent Slavonic is posited there as the common source from which the different Slavonic idioms must be derived and which may be inferred by a comparison of these idioms (p. 27). And by way of illustration he constructs (p. 28) the Parent Slavonic active present participle on the basis of the Church Slavonic, Serbo-Illyrian, Russian, Polish, and Bohemian forms.

What is done here for the Slavonic dialects he considers possible for the Indo-European languages: 'From a comparison of the oldest extant languages of the different Indo-European families, with due regard to the laws of historical grammar, we may form a comparatively clear conception of the Indo-European parent language from which the mothers of the different families [= Schleicher's primary languages] developed in a manner analogous to that in which the Romance languages were evolved from the Latin' (p. 4, l. c.). *All* the derived languages, he maintains, must form the basis on which the Indo-European parent language is to be constructed, since *all* of them have originally flowed alike from this common source. But the varying degree of faithfulness with which the different languages have preserved old sounds and forms makes, according to Schleicher, those languages of

especial importance which have remained nearest to the original home of the Indo-European parent people.

It was nine years later, viz. in 1861, when this plan of reconstruction was actually carried out. As the subtitle of the compendium '*Kurzer Abriss einer Lautlehre der Indogermanischen Ursprache, des Altindischen, Alteranischen, Altgriechischen, Altitalischen, Altkeltischen, Altslawischen, Litauischen und Altdeutschen*' shows, 'the attempt has here been made to place the inferred Indo-European parent language alongside of its really existing descendants' (², p. 8, note). Summing up the results of comparative grammar of the preceding half-century, the compendium closes the first period. It opens the second period in that it endeavors to trace the facts of the various Indo-European idioms back into prehistoric times, in order to reconstruct from the data of the individual languages the parent language from which all of them are descended.¹ For a great deal of the work of the last forty years has been done along these very lines, and in the eyes of many the ultimate reconstruction of the Indo-European parent language has been the ideal of all special comparative investigation, the more so as it seemed the key to open to us the mysteries of a prehistoric civilization. 'I had originally intended,' says Fick in the preface to the fourth edition of his *Comparative Dictionary* (1890), 'a work on a much larger scale. I had in view to add to the lexicon of the Indo-European parent language also its grammar, and, furthermore, a sketch of the civilization of the parent people. But the time for doing this has not yet come. There is need of more works like J. Schmidt's *Pluralbildungen*, before we may dare approach the reconstruction of the grammar of the parent language . . .'

To be sure, the parent language as now reconstructed looks very different from that inferred by Schleicher.

2.—We have ceased to look with Schleicher for absolute simplicity in the parent language. To him the morphological elements of a word were then still intact, for successive vowels and consonants had not yet begun to react on each other. The diversity and manifoldness in sounds and inflection of the various Indo-European idioms as they appear in historical times are to Schleicher the results of decay and degeneration. This theory was gradually abandoned for two reasons.

¹ Cf. Bechtel, *Hauptprobleme*, *Einleit.*, p. 1.

First, because such an *a priori* postulate of simplicity could only reasonably be made for the very first period of language-production. But this period is absolutely beyond our reach and separated by a vast gulf from the periods amenable to reconstruction.

Second, because this principle conflicts with Schleicher's second methodological principle, that the parent form must be of such a character that all really existing forms of the Indo-European languages may be derived from it by regular laws. The more consistently this principle has been applied, the more has simplicity given way to complexity, and in consequence of it the parent language as now reconstructed is, in some respects, richer than any of its descendants.

3.—An inquiry into the nature and character of the parent language, thus reconstructed, will naturally fall into two parts.

First, we must examine the various limitations to which this method of reconstruction is necessarily subject.

Second, we must determine how these limitations affect the object reconstructed according to this comparative method; whether, namely, they imply quantitative imperfections only, or whether their influence is so vital as to touch upon the very essence and quality of the reconstructed object.

4.—Philology, like all historical sciences, requires an object clearly defined in time and in space. It is here that we find our comparative method most seriously defective.

The chief characteristic of all modern grammatical investigations is that they are historical, i. e. that they do not treat a language as if it were fixed and immovable, but as a growth whose changing phases should be outlined in a connected series of successive periods. The very attempt to reconstruct a parent language is due to this historical treatment, for its aim is simply to extend the continuity of development beyond historical times.

5.—But the question, To which period of the prehistoric Indo-European does a given reconstructed form belong? is, unfortunately, unanswerable. 'When we speak of Indo-European forms,' says Brugmann (Compendium, Engl. tr., I, p. 13, §12), 'we *generally* mean those forms which were in use toward the close of the primitive period.¹ But we *also often* mean such forms as

¹ The vagueness of this limit is pointed out below, §10.

belonged to an earlier period of this stage and which had already undergone a change toward its termination. Forms put down by us as primitive Indo-European . . . are therefore *not* to be indiscriminately regarded as *belonging to the same period.*' The result of this uncertainty becomes glaringly apparent if we imagine an English grammar or dictionary constructed according to a method by which Anglo-Saxon, Chaucerian, and nineteenth-century forms could not be separated but would all stand on the same plane.

6.—It is only another aspect of the same fundamental difficulty that we are unable to fix accurately the time and extent of operation of inferred phonetic laws. Ignorant of the exact time during which they were operative and of the relative chronology of different laws, it is inevitable that we must be constantly committing the gravest anachronisms in our reconstruction of Indo-European forms, combining in the same form laws which operated at entirely different periods. As early as 1869 Johannes Schmidt called attention to this danger. In the preface (p. ix) to the second edition of Schleicher's *Die deutsche Sprache* (revised by him after Schleicher's death) he says: 'The forms of the German parent speech I have left as Schleicher wrote them . . . It was of no importance to reconstruct here the words in all their parts just as they actually existed at some one definite prehistoric point of time, but simply to restore the old endings for the better understanding of their later forms. Whether, for instance, the gen. plur. *dagām* ever existed in this form, or whether, at the time when the gen. plur. terminated in *-ām*, the shifting of mutes had not yet taken place and the form was, consequently, *daghām*, while after the shifting of mutes the real form was *dagā*, is immaterial for the purposes of this book. In this respect all forms of the German parent speech are merely hypothetical.'

If we were to adopt this method in the reconstruction of an English word we should run the risk of joining to a Chaucerian stem an Anglo-Saxon prefix and a nineteenth-century suffix, begetting a monster not unlike the Chimaera, *πρόσθε λέων, ὀπίθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα*.

7.—In a very suggestive article on 'Relative Sprachchronologie' (*Indogermanische Forschungen*, IV (1894)), Otto Bremer, after alluding (p. 8) to the chronological difficulties just treated, which

lead us to assign two words, of which one is perhaps much older than the other, to the same preliterate period, or cause a similar error by uniting in the same word phonetic changes belonging to entirely different periods, offers a most excellent illustration of a third obstacle in the way of reconstruction of parental forms, viz. that the antiquity of a sound-change cannot be measured by the frequency of its occurrence in the individual languages.¹ This theory stands and falls with the linear theory of the disintegration of the Indo-European primitive stock, which pictures it in the form of a genealogical tree. It becomes *theoretically* untenable as soon as the latter hypothesis is discarded. And Bremer has shown it *practically* wrong in the concrete example of a change confined to the Anglo-Frisian for which, on direct evidence, greater antiquity may be claimed than for certain changes which are common to all Germanic dialects.

8.—And finally we must base our reconstructions on individual forms which have behind them a most unequal stretch of independent development. A Vedic form is separated from an Albanian form by at least 3000 years. And the problem, as was early enough recognized and admitted, is in reality not the reconstruction of the parent on the basis of descendants of the first degree, but on the basis of an aggregate of descendants of very different degrees, descendants which have undergone an independent development of very unequal duration, during which unknown external forces have had an opportunity of variously affecting them.

9.—We have seen above how intimately linked questions of chronology are with the geographical notions held with reference to the spread of the Indo-Europeans over the territory which they hold in historical times.

To Schleicher the Indo-European parent people was a nation limited in numbers, inhabiting a comparatively small area somewhere in Asia, whence issued forth, from time to time, migratory expeditions which settled down in new homes more or less removed from the old parent stock, and, breaking intercourse with it, started on a line of independent development. Though remnants of this theory yet linger on, as is shown by expressions like 'the parting of the peoples' or 'the end of the primitive

¹ Cf. Paul, *Principien*², p. 41 (§46 of the Engl. tr.).

period' and the like, it is safe to say that it is at present generally discarded and has been superseded by the theory of gradual expansion, which may be regarded as a transfer of the leading idea of Schuchardt-Schmidt's linguistic wave-theory to the ethnological problem of the spread of the Indo-Europeans. Now, if migration, as conceived by Schleicher, played at best but a very small part in locating the Indo-Europeans in their present quarters, and we substitute for it a gradual expansion progressing in (roughly speaking) concentric circles, belt after belt being added as time passed and numbers increased, the whole aspect is considerably changed. Instead of assuming a series of sudden interruptions of intercourse between members of the outer belts and the central stock, we shall rather have to admit a constant communication of members of inner and outer belts, varying, of course, in the degree of intensity, which would depend on a variety of causes which need not be treated here. The effect of this continual interdependence, which thus takes the place of Schleicher's independence, is a slow dissemination over an ever-increasing area of whatever developments in language or institutions or art or manufacture may arise in any one locality.

10.—But as soon as we substitute this theory of gradual expansion for that of disintegration, we can no longer contrast the parent stock with the individual members, as Schleicher does. Instead of a parent stock which is broken up into a number of smaller units which, stopping their intercourse with the main body, start on a new and independent course of development, we must posit a nucleus which develops proportionately to the outer belts, which continually reacts on them, as they react on it, which, in a word, is ever changing.

Leaving out of consideration, for the moment, all possible contact with foreign tribes (though the influence from that source was certainly very great), the territory occupied by the Indo-Europeans, even in the course of a wholly normal expansion, must have represented thousands of years before our oldest historical records begin, an aspect so diversified that it would be impossible to regard it as one national unit, much less to assign to it one dialect. But this is the very period for which alone a reconstruction can be attempted. The time for which uniformity might theoretically be postulated lies in so distant a past that it is altogether beyond our reach.

Brugmann very clearly states that he is not 'operating with the idea of one primitive nation and a primitive, homogeneous parent speech,' a fault which E. Meyer had urged against comparative philologists (*Geschichte des Alterthums* (1884), I, pp. 7-8, note) when he says (*Compend.*, Engl. tr., I, p. 2, §3) that 'it is impossible to suppose that a language [like the Indo-European] should have gone through a long course of development and be spoken by a people of any considerable number without a certain amount of dialectic variations, and hence we cannot look upon the speech of the Indo-Europeans, even while they still occupied a comparatively small territory and maintained a fairly close degree of intercourse with one another, as bearing, in any strict sense, a uniform character. Local differences had, no doubt, already arisen . . . We may take it for granted that the differentiation of dialects about the year 2000 B. C. had gone so far that a number of communities existed side by side which could no longer or only with difficulty understand each other.' And Bremer almost verbally coincides with E. Meyer's remark (*l. c.*): 'Nowhere does a homogeneous parent speech exist, but everywhere we have dialects influencing one another,' when he says (*Indog. Forsch.* IV (1894), p. 10): 'Within every parent language there existed at all times dialectic variations. I do not believe that we shall ever succeed in reconstructing the posited Indo-European parent language in its main features. We shall have to content ourselves with the reconstruction of the dialectically differentiated components.'

11.—After thus summing up the various limitations which are inherent in the method followed in the work of reconstructing the parent language, we are in a position to approach the second question propounded above: Is the result of these limitations merely a greater or smaller number of *quantitative* imperfections in the reconstructed object, or are they of such a character as to affect it *qualitatively*?

12.—It is plain that the term Indo-European parent language is parallel to terms like Greek language, German language and the like.

These latter terms we use, however, in two entirely different senses. For, as sometimes used, the term German language refers to the *literary language* of Germany, and the term Greek

language is not infrequently used to designate the literary Attic dialect. If thus employed, the term *language* simply denotes a certain dialect which, for one reason or another, and often with admixtures from other dialects, has gained a supremacy over its competitors and is accepted as the general means of (chiefly literary) communication. The elevation of a dialect to a literary language, however, is always a very late development. It presupposes a literature and a strong national feeling tending toward centralization. But the farther back we go the weaker becomes this feeling. So little realized, in fact, is the homogeneous character of large aggregates that during the earlier periods very frequently a name for these larger aggregates is wanting. With Meyer (*Gesch. des Alterth.* I, p. 7, §7, note), we must regard the creation of a literary language—like the creation of a nation—as the goal of historical evolution. It is apparent that the term Indo-European parent language cannot be used in this sense.

13.—There remains, then, the second sense in which terms like English language, German language, etc., are used, viz. when we employ these abstractions as classificatory devices, in order to arrange a large mass of more or less similar units. Is the nature of these generic abstractions such as to make reconstruction possible? This question can only be answered on the basis of a minute examination of the method by which they are formed. The result of our reconstruction is forms, and forms are perceptual objects. If a language-form is a perceptual object it permits, theoretically, of reconstruction; if not, reconstruction of a language-form is an impossibility. In the following paragraphs we shall therefore attempt an analysis of the generic terms 'dialect' and 'language' with a view of ultimately determining whether dialect-forms and language-forms are perceptual objects or not.

14.—Like all historical objects, the language of a people presents static and dynamic problems. In the *first* case it is necessary to regard the object as stationary, and our task is to examine the qualities exhibited by the object at a given point of time. Extending such an examination over a number of successive stages, the result of the examination of each stage marks a point through which the object in its development passed. In the *second* case the object is considered as being in continual

motion, and our task now is to determine the forces which govern this motion.¹

For the full understanding of a given object it is essential that it should be investigated by *both* methods. Such knowledge is made up of the results of both descriptive-historical and explanatory-analytical treatment.

15.—But popular concepts are not the result of such a purely scientific investigation. A large part of the elements of which popular concepts consist is, no doubt, of a static or dynamic character. But a naïve observation couples with them elements which cannot be assigned to either class, elements which are in no way inherent in the object itself, but connected with it by *external* ties, viz. temporal or local contiguity. I propose to call these elements 'associative elements.' So elements of the percept 'lamp' may associatively enter into the concept 'light,' or those of 'a court of law' into that of 'justice.'² For practical purposes this associative admixture causes little or no inconvenience because the total picture is of sufficient clearness. When, however, these same terms are used for scientific purposes the heterogeneous character of their composition gives rise to much ambiguity and, consequently, of controversy. In this case it becomes a matter of importance to distinguish between the various elements which make up the concept, especially with a view to remove the dangerous associative elements.

16.—How, then, does the concept of a dialect³ originate, and of what character are the elements composing it?

The concept originally is not the result of scientific investigation, but of naïve observation. The naïve person expects every one to talk like himself. Hence the fact that his neighbor talks like

¹ Quite similarly we may, in mathematics, regard a curve *either* as a system of discrete points *or* as the track of a point moving under the influence of certain forces. And no bridge leads from the system of discrete points to the continuum.

² It is especially where the other elements are weak, indistinct, and insufficient to produce a clear concept, that the latter is supported, as it were, by a frame-work of associative elements.

³ The most important points affecting the scientific study of dialects were brought out in the controversy regarding the boundaries of Romance dialects, which is admirably summarized by A. Horning in *Zt. f. roman. Philol.* (1893), XVIII 160 *c ff.* Cf. also Paul's second chapter, where *im wesentlichen einheitlich* (pp. 35, 37) equals my 'subjectively uniform.'

himself fails to arouse his attention or interest. This fact, indeed, is not noted by him until he is confronted by a group of individuals differing from him in their speech. The *contrast* for the first time makes him realize the *identity* of speech of himself and the members of his group. This speech-identity of his group he conceives of as the dialect of his group.

Dynamic elements, therefore, originally never enter into the make-up of this concept. They are without value for the immediate purpose for which the concept was created; for the forces to which identity and diversity of speech are due have no direct bearing on the contrast between 'like speech' and 'unlike speech.'

Static elements, on the other hand, are largely present. In calling the speech-identity of a group its dialect we have combined in this concept a large number of judgments passed on the quality of the speech of a certain number of individuals, singling out their speech from that of the rest and claiming likeness for it. The term dialect thus expresses a certain relation of the speech of some individuals to that of other individuals. It must vary as this relation varies, and a dialect, D , may be regarded as a function of this relation, $R : D = F(R)$.

But the concept of a dialect is not wholly made up of static elements. Speech is indissolubly linked to the speaking individual. And, consequently, wholly heterogeneous elements associatively enter into our concept which, for want of a better term, might be called 'ethnological.'

After the contrast of speech of two groups A and B had been noted and found expression in the formation of the concepts ' A -dialect' and ' B -dialect,' it became evident that these *dialectal* groups corresponded to certain *political* groups. And the more normal and primitive the conditions, the closer must have been the similarity between these groups, the stronger, therefore, also the associative tie by which they were held together. The inevitable result was a *fusion* in which elements of one concept passed over into the other. Thus the concept of a dialect, which arose from the necessity of marking the *relation* of a certain kind of speech to another kind of speech, by this admixture of ethnological elements departs somewhat from its original connotation and comes to be used not only with reference to a certain *relation* existing between two kinds of speech, but also denoting a given speech as characteristic of a given political group; and thus part of its purely abstract character is lost.

17.—After we have thus determined the character of the elements of which the popular concept of a dialect is composed, we turn to examine somewhat minutely the exact manner of procedure in the formation of this concept.

The knowledge which we obtain concerning speech is either subjective or objective.

The knowledge which is based upon the direct acoustic sense-impressions conveyed to our brain by the speech-sounds I term *subjective*.

Objective knowledge of speech, on the other hand, is based on a direct examination of the stimuli producing our sensations.

Neither one of these two methods can rightly claim a superiority over the other. Both alike are experimental. They differ only in that the objects of investigation differ. In the former case we examine *sensations*, in the latter case *stimuli*. Their results, therefore, can never be said to conflict. For, if the results obtained by one method are not like those obtained by means of the other, the diversity merely shows that sensation and stimulus are two different things.

18.—In the naïve observation which formed the concept of a dialect the objective method played no part. It was formed wholly *subjectively*, i. e. it is based on *sensations* only, not on a knowledge of the *stimuli* which gave rise to these sensations.

Such subjective knowledge is characterized by these qualities :

I. Our sensations are imperfect. For—

(a) They are of moderate sensitiveness. Certain stimuli are not perceived at all. There is an upper and lower limit for audible tones; variations of a stimulus within certain bounds are not discovered; etc.

(b) They are subject to deception, as in the case of visual illusions.

II. They lack uniformity. For their degree of accuracy depends—

(a) On practice, as in judging distances, weights, etc., and

(b) On attention. This is of especial importance where, as in speaking, a complex object (the spoken word) can be observed for a short time only. As it is possible to attend to only *one* thing at a time, a short observation-time will necessarily prevent *all* qualities of the object from being *equally* attended to.

From this it appears that in subjectively forming the concept of a dialect we may *à priori* assume—

(a) That certain stimuli, though present, were disregarded because they were not perceived.

(b) That the ratio of two or more sensations permits no direct inference as to the ratio of the corresponding stimuli.

(c) That the results must vary in direct proportion to both practice and attention of the observer.

19.—By this method the naïve observer classifies the speech of the individuals surrounding him, and, as we saw above, by a *μετάβασις* into the ethnological *γένος*, these individuals themselves. The speech which is like his he groups into one class; the speech which is different from his into a second class. As in all classification, he thus simplifies the comprehension of a large number of individual objects. Like all generic names, the name of a dialect does not stand for any perceptual object, but expresses a peculiar *relation* of a series of perceptual objects. It stands, not for a sense-percept, but for the particular manner in which we have viewed and grouped a number of sense-percepts.

20.—Two ways are open for such classification:

I. We may begin by tracing a certain system of boundary lines within which we include kindred objects. But very frequently such boundary *lines* cannot be drawn, and in their stead we have boundary *zones*. J. Simon and others experimentally showed this to be the case in dialect-boundaries, and many similar instances might be added.

II. But instead of starting from the periphery, we may also select a *center* around which a number of kindred objects are grouped in concentric circles, the radius of these circles being inversely proportional to the degree of similarity with the center.

If we choose for such a center one of the many concrete objects which are to be classified, I propose to call this a *concrete center*. If, on the other hand, we construct the center on the basis of the concrete objects, none of them being absolutely identical with it, I will call this an *ideal center*.

21.—Let us first examine the manner in which such an *ideal center* may be constructed. We must distinguish here between two possibilities:

I. If we classify single qualities expressible in numbers (e. g. weight, distance, etc.), the *ideal center* is equal to the *mean* of these quality-numbers.¹

Around the *mean* thus obtained the *variations* may be grouped.

And such a classification is of especial interest because certain mathematical theories may be directly brought to bear on it. For Quetelet showed in 1846 (*Lettres sur la théorie des probab. appliq. aux sciences mor. et pol.* Lett. XVIII 119) that the different variations grouped around such a mean may be regarded as so many *fallible measurements* of this same mean, and that therefore the Law of the Frequency of Error may be applied to them.² We shall return to this point below (§26).

II. But if we classify not *single qualities*, but *whole objects*, we construct our ideal center in a somewhat different way.

We begin by comparing all objects ($o_1 o_2 \dots o_n$) as to their qualities. It will then appear—

(a) That certain qualities are present in the same degree or manner in all objects (constant qualities).

(b) Certain qualities are present in all objects, but *not* in the same degree or manner (variable qualities).

(c) Certain qualities are present in some objects and absent in others (variable qualities).

Our ideal center, *O*, must then be constructed in such a manner that it will contain *all* qualities enumerated above under (a) and those qualities enumerated under (b) and (c) *in the most characteristic manner or degree*, by which is meant that manner or degree which will permit the variations as they appear in the

¹ Whether this mean should be the arithmetical mean,

$$M = \frac{a_1 + a_2 \dots + a_n}{n},$$

or the geometric mean,

$$M = \sqrt[n]{a_1 a_2 \dots a_n},$$

must depend on the nature of the case. If, e. g., we have a series of weights, the weight-center will be the arithmetical mean. If, on the other hand, we deal with such sensations as come under Weber-Fechner's law (viz. sensation = log. stimulus), the geometric mean must be substituted (cf. Galton, *Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond.* (1879), XXIX 365).

² Cf. on this also Stieda, *Archiv f. Anthropol.* XIV 167; Galton, *Proc. Roy. Soc.* (1879), XXIX 365; McAlister, *ibid.*, p. 367; Galton, *ibid.* (1889), XLV 135, and the applications by Galton (above), Davenport and Bullard, *Proc. Am. Ac. Arts and Sci.* (1897), XXXII, No. 4, and Brewster, *ibid.*, No. 15.

concrete objects to be most easily deduced from it. This deduction in all historical sciences is *genetic*. The qualities falling under (b) and (c) will therefore be given to *O* in such degree and manner as will make it possible to regard them as the sources from which the individual variations *may* have developed. I say advisedly '*may* have developed,' because by such a method of comparison we can never obtain results for which more than a possibility can be claimed. Certainty could only be gained by experimentally watching the actual progress of development. Strictly speaking, we do not *reconstruct* 'parent'-forms, but we *construct* them. Only when we have been able to observe an object during its period of evolution are we able to reconstruct by retracing the course of development. For in this case the course of development is given. In the construction of 'parent'-forms by the comparative method, however, the course of development from the unknown 'parent'-form, *y*, to the present form, *a*, is not experimentally determined; it is not given, but inferred. We deal here with two unknown quantities. And this makes it very problematic that the result of such a construction will be exactly identical with the real prehistoric 'parent'-form. It will be more or less similar to it; but real identity would be a mere matter of chance, obtained rather despite of our method than by means of it. And cogent proof of such identity must always be lacking.¹

A comparison of any one concrete object *o_x* with the ideal center *O* will then show that *o_x* varies from *O* *either* in lacking a quality which *O* has, *or* in possessing a quality which *O* lacks, *or* in possessing a quality in a degree or manner differing from that of *O*.

22.—The ideal center constructed in the preceding paragraph has, of course, no perceptual existence. But suppose that after the construction of such an ideal center it should be found that one of the concrete objects to be classified shows no variation from it, that, e. g., *o_y* = *O*.

In this case it is plain that we might discard *O* altogether and substitute *o_y* in its place. This concrete object *o_y* would then appear in a double rôle, viz. *first* as one of the many concrete objects forming the series *o₁o₂ . . . o_n*, and *second* as ideal center or type of this series.

¹ Cf. Wundt, *Logik*, II 47.

And in *this* case the ideal center really does possess perceptual existence, and we distinguished it from the *ideal type* of §21 by calling it *concrete type*.

23.—Whenever, therefore, we have to deal with generic terms or types we must examine in each case whether we have to do with an ideal or a concrete type. This examination will be our next task, and by it I hope to show that a dialect-form differs from a language-form in that the former is a concrete type, while the latter is an ideal one.


24.—For this purpose it is necessary to investigate those individual objects which, in the manner discussed in §21, II, are fused into the generic concept of a dialect. These elements are, of course, the speech-forms of the various members of the dialectal unit, which may be designated as $U_1 U_2 \dots U_n$. But 'speech-form of a member of a dialectal unit' is itself a generic concept. It is based on the sum of *momentary* utterances ($u_1 u_2 \dots u_n$) of each member, and our attention must therefore be first directed toward these *momentary utterances*.

25.—The basis for any given momentary utterance (u) of an individual is a certain psycho-physical condition or diathesis Δ .¹ In this respect language does not differ from any other movement. As the expressive movement of a gesture affects our sight, so the expressive movement which gives rise to the spoken word affects our hearing. As a repeated gesture is not the same as the first original gesture, so the repeated utterance is not the same as the first original utterance. Neither the gesture nor utterance has a latent existence during the interval; but the original gesture or utterance on the one hand, and the repeated gesture or utterance on the other hand, are linked together, not directly, but *indirectly* by the psycho-physical diathesis of which they are respectively the results. This diathesis remains; its results absolutely vanish. Consequently the repeated momentary utterances do not exist independently of each other, but as effects of their respective psycho-physical diathesis; so that as long as this diathesis remains the same, the utterances will remain so also.

¹ Paul, I believe, was the first to introduce these psychological and physiological considerations into linguistic literature.


But while we may thus speak of repeated utterances as results of a given diathesis, it is conversely true that this diathesis itself is in turn the product of all the speech movements which have gone before. For the strength of the diathesis depends on practice. The constancy of a diathesis is proportionate to the number of repetitions of the movement, and the probability that a given movement *will be* performed in a given way is the stronger the oftener such movement *has been* so performed.

The first utterance, u_1 , creates a weak diathesis, Δ , on account of which a second utterance, u_2 , will be similar to u_1 ; but, like every subsequent utterance, u_n will react on Δ and strengthen it. In the adult, therefore, the diathesis, under normal conditions, must be constant and the utterances belonging to it alike.



(Because Δ is of increasing stability, $u_1 = u_2 = \dots u_n$.)

26.—It must be borne in mind that in these observations likeness and unlikeness are determined by purely *subjective* methods. It is not denied that variations may exist and could be discovered by an *objective* examination. All that is claimed is, that if such variations exist they are not perceived as such, *partly* because our senses are not keen enough, *partly* because our attention is not directed to them, *partly* because we compare sensations which do not follow each other in quick succession, but the memory of one sensation is separated from the next similar sensation by a longer or shorter interval, and *partly* for the following reason: Suppose that we have n variations ($v_1 v_2 \dots v_n$) grouped around the type or mean V . Suppose, further, that of these n variations a few lying close to v_1 and v_n (i. e. close to either extreme) are sensibly perceptible; but that those variations lying between v_1



and v_n are not perceptibly different from the type V . The Law of the Frequency of Error teaches, then, that of all n variations the greatest number is bunched closely around V . That is, by far the greater percentage of these n variations must fall between

v_1 and v_x , and is therefore sensibly perceived as *equal* to V . Consequently the effect of n variations on the diathesis is not alike. For a large number of these n variations, being perceived as V , strengthens the diathesis, and the number of variations whose difference from V is perceived is in many cases far too weak to act as a disturbing element.

27.—We have seen in §25 that repeated momentary utterances of the same individual are subjectively perceived as alike. If we now form the type U of the whole series of these momentary utterances ($u_1 \dots u_n$), we may, under these conditions, take any u as such a type, and we thus obtain a concrete type:

$$U = u_1 = u_2 = \dots u_n.$$

We may, in other words, take a given momentary utterance of an individual, say u_x , as representative of his average utterance U , because there is an overwhelming probability that the diathesis which gave rise to u_x , and itself was the product of the whole series u_1 to u_n , will produce an u_1 and u_x which will be, subjectively, like u_x .

28.—Having thus determined of what character the average utterance of an individual is, we must now compare the average utterances $U_1 U_2 \dots U_n$ of the various members of a dialectal unit, on which, as we saw above, our concept of a dialect is founded.

Now, at the time when the concept of a dialect was first formed they must have been subjectively alike, for this very likeness was the cause for combining them into a class. And if all U 's were alike, their bases, viz. the respective diatheses ($\Delta_1 \Delta_2 \dots \Delta_n$) of the various members of the dialectal group, must have been very similar.


Again, in the case of normal accessions to the dialectal group, viz. by birth, the diathesis of each child was formed by the sum-total of its utterances. And these utterances being, consciously and unconsciously, fashioned after the utterances of its surroundings, would naturally produce in each child a diathesis similar to the diatheses around it.

But suppose that, for reasons which need not be discussed here, new members of a dialectal group should perceptibly differ from the rest. In this case we may plainly see how the admixture

of the heterogeneous ethnological elements (cf. end of §16) will tend to vitiate the very connotation which the concept originally possessed. For we have seen that it was devised to denote a *likeness*, to unite in one class the speech of individuals talking *alike*. To group together a number of individuals in a dialectal group when their speech *differs* is plainly a contradiction in terms. And such grouping does, in fact, not rest on the basis on which the original concept of the dialect was formed, but on an entirely different, heterogeneous basis, viz. *sameness of origin or nationality*. The introduction of this double standard is the source of vagueness and ambiguity, to which reference was made in §16. And for scientific purposes it is certainly essential to remove from the concept of a dialect these heterogeneous, ethnological elements and confine it most strictly to its original sense. Suppose, then, that new members added to the *political group* which, up to that time, had continued to be identical with the *dialectal group*, do perceptibly differ in speech from the rest. It will simply mean that this identity of political group and dialectal group has ceased, and that we now have *two* (or more) *dialectal groups* within the *same political group*.

From these observations it will be apparent that from the very definition of a dialectal group we must assume all U 's of its members to be subjectively alike, from which a corresponding similarity of the respective diatheses ($\Delta_1 \dots \Delta_n$) may be inferred.

The diagram below may serve to represent the relations to the dialect D of the diatheses $\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_n$ of the various members of a dialectal unit; of the average speech of each member, U_1, U_2, U_n ; and of the momentary utterances of three such members, viz. u_1, u_2, u_n and u'_1, u'_2, u'_n and u''_1, u''_2, u''_n :



Now, if

$$\Delta_1 = \Delta_2 = \Delta_n,$$

then

$$u_1 = u_2 = u_n = u'_1 = u'_2 = u'_n = u''_1 = u''_2 = u''_n;$$

also

$$U_1 = U_2 = U_n;$$

also

$$U_1 = U_2 = U_n = D.$$

And because $U_1 = u_1$, therefore D also $= u_1$.

Or, in other words, any momentary utterance (u) of any member of a dialectal unit may be taken as a type of the *dialectal* utterance. And because any u is a concrete, perceptual entity, all *dialectal utterances are concrete, perceptual entities*.

29.—We may therefore now define thus:—A dialect is the sum of all dialectal utterances. A dialectal utterance is the type of the average (typical) utterances of the members of a dialectal unit. This average utterance is subjectively equal to any one momentary utterance. The type referred to is therefore concrete, and any one momentary utterance of a member of a dialectal group may be taken as representing a dialectal utterance. A dialectal unit is constituted by the speech of all those persons in whose utterances variations are not sensibly perceived or attended to. A dialectal unit, especially at first, may coincide with an ethnological unit, but such coincidences grow rarer as development continues.

30.—There finally remains to be examined the term 'perceptible variation' which has been used throughout, and which we have found to be the one criterion according to which a dialectal group must be determined. The more exactly we can, therefore, draw the line between those variations which *are* subjectively perceived and those which are *not* so perceived, the more sharply shall we be able to distinguish what lies *within* a dialectal group from that which lies *without*.


There appears to be but one method of ascertaining whether two utterances are subjectively felt to agree or to differ, and that is to take the testimony of the persons whose sensations form the subject of our inquiry. There is indeed no other way of determining a dialectal group than to take the testimony of the men who are to compose it. For the very reason that the concept of a dialect is formed wholly on a *subjective* basis, all *objective* tests are barred out.

The question whether the inhabitants of two villages, *A* and *B*, belong to the same dialectal group can only be answered on the testimony of the villagers as to whether they believe they

speak alike. They are the court of last resort, from which there is no appeal. And occasionally a nickname or a jest will be *prima facie* evidence of the fact that the villagers of *A* clearly feel the difference of their speech from that of *B*.

But he who is unwilling to operate with so uncertain and variable a quantity as a dialect thus appears to be, will be forced to discard this subjective attempt at classification and substitute for it some new *objective* arrangement.

31.—In §26 we grouped *n objective* variations around a center *V* and assumed that the variations lying between v_y and v_x were *not* sensibly perceptible, while those which lie between v_1 and v_y and between v_x and v_n were sensibly perceptible:



And we have seen in the preceding paragraph how the two points, v_x and v_y , can be experimentally fixed. Whatever lies between them is intra-dialectal; what lies outside is extra-dialectal. These extra-dialectal variations (between v_1 and v_y and between v_x and v_n) *are alike* in that they are always sensibly perceived; they *differ* in the degree in which they affect the ease and clearness with which a given word may be *understood*. For, as conveyance of ideas is the chief aim of language, everything which stands in the way of an utterance being understood is of the greatest moment. But it is plain that the nearer the center a perceptible variation lies, the more easily will the utterance containing it be understood; the farther away from the center it lies, the more will it interfere with the understanding of the utterance, until it absolutely prevents the utterance from being understood.

32.—If we now continue our classification of speech along the same lines which led to the formation of the concept of a dialect, we may proceed to unite two or more dialects into a dialect-family; two or more dialect-families into a language; and two or more languages into a language-family. But whereas a dialect-form, as we have seen (§28, end), is a concrete type and hence a perceptual entity, the speech-forms of the types enumerated here are ideal types and have no perceptual existence. No one concrete utterance belonging to any of these three classes may, as in the case of a dialect, be taken as concrete type, because in

each such concrete utterance one or more variable elements *perceptibly vary*. The typical utterance is here *similar* to all concrete utterances, but *like* none. Remove the *perceptible variation*,¹ and these classes revert into the dialect whose distinguishing mark is the *imperceptible variation* of its variables. The whole may be illustrated by the following diagram, in which the classes are represented as (logical) functions of a series of constant (Latin letters) and variable (Greek letters) elements. The variable elements whose variations are not subjectively perceived are enclosed in brackets.

SPEECH-FORM OF	CONSTANT ELEMENTS.	VARIABLE ELEMENTS.			
		Variations perceived.		Variations not perceived.	
6. A Language-family,	$U = F(q \ r \ s \ t)$	$\alpha \ \beta \ \gamma$		$[\delta] \ [\epsilon]$	
5. A particular Language,	$L = F(q \ r \ s \ t)$	$\alpha \ \beta \ \gamma$		$[\delta] \ [\epsilon]$	
4. A Dialect-family,	$D' = F(q \ r \ s \ t)$	$\alpha \ \beta \ \gamma$		$[\delta] \ [\epsilon]$	
3. A Dialect,	$D = F(q \ r \ s \ t)$	$\alpha \ \beta \ \gamma$		$[\delta] \ [\epsilon]$	
2. Average Utterance of a member of a dialectal unit,	$U = F(q \ r \ s \ t)$	$\alpha \ \beta \ \gamma$		$[\delta] \ [\epsilon]$	
1. Momentary Utterance of a member of a dia- lectal unit,	$u = F(q \ r \ s \ t)$	$\alpha \ \beta \ \gamma$		$[\delta] \ [\epsilon]$	

33.—If I have succeeded in showing that an insurmountable bar thus separates language-forms from dialectal forms, that the latter are perceptual objects while the former are imaginary, it follows that from the very nature of the case the perceptual reconstruction of language-forms is impossible. When a given form is said to be German we thereby mean that it is a member of a large mass which, for convenience sake, we have accustomed ourselves to group together on account of certain resemblances exhibited by all members. But while we may thus classify a given form as German or Greek, just as we might classify a given animal as a bird or a fish, it is as impossible to construct, inferentially, a German form or a Greek form as it is to construct a fish or a bird. Or, to be more exact, the result of these constructions in either case will be an ideal type for which only an illogical hypostasis could claim a past reality.

¹ Perceptibility is the *gewisse maass* of Paul (p. 36) which variations must reach in order to result in *dialectspaltung*.

34.—It would be very rash to deny the value of constructive parent forms because perceptual reality cannot be claimed for them. Their distinct value lies, however, as indicated above, in the fact that they are the means by which we classify and arrange a given number of existing forms. The posited Indo-European *ĝen-* signifies that Latin *gen-*, Avestan *zan-*, Sanskrit *jan-*, etc., belong together. To claim more means losing one's self in a maze of speculative possibilities. So it is, of course, perfectly proper to say that the I.E. possessed the vowels *a, e, o*, if it is borne in mind that, in doing so, we simply maintain that there is sufficient evidence to show that all prehistoric I.E. dialects (which form the bases of the historical I.E. languages) possessed these vowels at stages of their development antedating the historical epochs. This evidence, however, is *not* sufficient to warrant a claim that these three vowels belonged to the *whole* prehistoric period of I.E. speech, or to settle the question as to their *original* independence. It is impossible to prove or to disprove on such evidence any of the points involved in the controversy outlined by Bechtel, *Hauptprobleme*, p. 63 f.

The sum total of inferred forms does not give us a true picture of any language ever spoken; nay, even the single forms cannot lay claim to being representatives, true in every detail, of words ever in actual use. Yet it is only by reducing the results of our investigations to such *formulae* that they become convenient enough to be easily handled and permit a clear arrangement of the facts of a language. It is a significant fact and a sign of clear logic that Schleicher's great successor, Brugmann, in the *Grundriss*, does not follow his predecessor in placing on the title-page an 'Indo-European parent language' alongside of the historical languages.

The danger increases if, after infusing life into a parent language constructed by our own hands after the defective method examined above, we proceed to erect upon it as a basis a lofty superstructure of mythological or sociological inferences. Investigations of this character, which are beset by enormous difficulties even when carried on under the most favorable conditions, must necessarily see their ends defeated, if based upon material so unfit because designed for entirely different purposes. The method of Usener in his *Götternamen* (1896), and Wernicke (*Pauly's Real-Encyclop.*, 2d ed., vol. II, 'Apollo') is a most

healthy reaction, which will result in placing positive results in the place of unprovable and often improbable hypotheses.

There are certain limitations which are inherent in, and common to, all historical sciences. Their objects must be clearly defined in space and in time. They all start where tradition, in one form or another, begins. It is true that inferences may be permitted as to what lies beyond this boundary line which divides the historic from the prehistoric. But these inferences must be confined to the period immediately preceding the beginnings of tradition. The farther they depart from it, the more shadowy, general, and unreal they become, because the data of time and space are wanting, and without them historical investigation becomes impossible.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

HANNS OERTEL.

IV.—CONCLUDING NOTES ON THE ORIGIN OF THE GERUND AND GERUNDIVE.

In the A. J. P., vol. XV, part 2, July, 1894, pp. 194–216, there was published my first essay on ‘The Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive,’ and in a subsequent number (A. J. P. XVI, July, 1895, p. 217, n. 1) were given some ‘Addenda et Corrigenda’ thereto.

The first essay was supplemented, in A. J. P. XVI, July, 1895, pp. 217–222, by ‘Further Notes on the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive.’

The present paper consists of what may fitly be called ‘Concluding Notes on the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive,’ together with a ‘Precise Statement of My View.’

Before turning attention to the further consideration¹ of the main propositions which I sought to establish in the two papers already published,² I should like to give, concerning the said papers themselves, the following

Addenda et Corrigenda:—

A. J. P. XV 198, l. 13: For “This suffix *-do* may, *so far as Latin alone is concerned*, represent,” etc., read: “This suffix *-do* might, *so far as Latin alone is concerned* (that is to say, *if there were no Osc.-Umbr. forms of the Gerundive to be taken into account*), represent,” etc.³

¹ See *infra*, pp. 444 sqq.

² Namely, A. J. P. XV 194–216, XVI 217–222.

³ There are two other remarks on this page, viz. 198, which may require slight amendment:

ll. 15–16: For “*√dhē-* ‘place,’ or rather ‘make,’ since the Idg. *√dhē-* has lost its meaning ‘place’ in Italic, and retained only that of ‘to make,’” read: “*√dhē-* ‘to make’ or ‘to place.’”—The meaning ‘to place’ is preserved apparently in (a) *con-dō* (see Brugmann, *Grundr.* I, §370, p. 282), *ab-dō* (Brugmann, *op. cit.* I, §507, Rem.), *crēdō* (see Brugmann, *op. cit.* I, §507, Rem., and II, §160, 1, p. 479; and also A. J. P. XV 207), and in (b) *prae-ficio* (whence *prae-fectus*) and *in-ficiō* (the original meaning of which appears to have been ‘to place, put, or dip something in something else’).

ll. 31–33: For “He shews that in the middle of a word in some cases we find Idg. *dh* represented in Latin by *d*,” read: “He shews that medial Idg. *dh*, unless followed by *r*, *l*, or preceded by *r*, *u* (*u*) and perhaps *m*, is represented in Latin by *d*.”

XV 199, l. 33: After the word "*dhiyam-dhā-*" omit the words "quoted above."—On a Greek parallel to this word see further *infra*, p. 441, s. v. "XV 205, ll. 21–26."

XV 201, l. 6 and note 2, l. 1: It is here observed that "the suffixes *-dho-* and *-do-* are not frequent in forming Greek nouns like Lat. *rubidus*, etc." I ventured, however, to hazard one Greek example of *-do-*, namely, *κόρυ-δο-ς* 'crested lark' (with which, in order to shew that there was no objection to the view that its *δδ-* might come from a verb, I compared Gk. *κερασ-φόρος* *κερο-φόρος* and Lat. *corni-fer corni-ger*).

Beside the suffix *-do-* thus seen in *κόρυ-δο-ς*, we may possibly see the suffix *-dho-* in the parallel bird-name *κόρυ-θο-ς* (if rightly thus analysed) 'crested trochilus.'

In a recent article in Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, XXII, pp. 128–130, Dr. W. Prellwitz furnishes us with a very interesting example shewing *-dho-* (given *infra*, p. 441).

From the concluding remarks of the article in question (quoted *infra*, p. 446) we are led to hope that a forthcoming treatise by the same scholar will give us further examples of Greek nouns formed with the suffixes *-do-* and *-dho-*.

XV 201, note 2, l. 22: After "This explanation of *-dhi*" add: "namely, that it is derived from the Idg. $\sqrt{dhē-}$."

XV 201, at the end of note 2, add: "P. S.—It may be equally possible to regard this *-dhi* as a *case-form* belonging to the same group as Gk. *-θε -θεν -θα -θαι -θην*, etc. [cf. the groups *nō nē neų neī nāī noi*, etc. (Per Persson in *Idg. Forsch.*, vol. II, pp. 199 sqq.), *-κι κε κεν καὶ κᾶ, δέ δή δαί -da(m) -dō dē*], these and such like primitive particles being generally considered to shew forms with varying vowel representing various case-forms.

But, whether the *i* of *-dhi* be explained in this way or as in the actual text of the note (i. e. A. J. P. XV, p. 201, note 2), my derivation of *-dhi* as from the Idg. $\sqrt{dhē-}$ (a derivation in which it is gratifying to note that Prof. E. W. Fay concurs¹) is nowise affected."

XV 204, l. 5: For "*ahūmer'ñc*" read "*ahūmer'c*¹ or *ahūmer'ñc*¹." See Brugmann, *Grundr.* II, §§27 and 163 (as amended by A. J. P. XV 204, n. 1).

204, l. 6: For "*ahu-mer'c*¹" read "*ahu-mer'c*."

¹ A. J. P. XVI, 1895, p. 2.

XV 205, l. 1: Read “*κερασ-φόρος* beside *κερατοφόρος* and *κερο-φόρος*.”

XV 205, ll. 21–26: The explanation here given of Lat. *vindex* and *iūdex*, as *compounds wherein the prior member is an accusative case governed by the second member*—(a class of compounds which, in A. J. P. XV 203 sqq. and XVI 217 sqq., I have illustrated from Sanskrit, Avestic, Greek, Italic and Lithuanian)—is supported also by W. M. Lindsay, *The Lat. Lang.*, 1894, chh. III, §16, VIII, §95, p. 544, and by P. Giles, *Short Manual of Comparative Philology*, 1895, §284, p. 215.

So also W. Prellwitz (in Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, XXII, pp. 128, 129), who there adds from Greek the following very interesting example of such composition:

**θια-θο-* or **θια-θ(η)*—the base of **θια-θῆος* whence *θίασος* “‘eine versammlung, die einer gottheit zu ehren opfer, chöre, aufzüge u. dgl. veranstaltet’” (Prellwitz, l. c.)—is to be equated with Skr. *dhiyam-dh(ā)* “‘das anschauen worauf richtend’ (*dhā*- ‘setzen’), daher von menschen ‘andächtig,’ von göttern ‘achtsam’” (a word which I had already given in A. J. P. XV, pp. 200, 203, as an instance of a compound the prior member of which is an accusative case governed by the second member), **θια*¹ being an accus. sing. (identical with Skr. *dhiyam*) governed by the second member of the compound.

[Several more examples of such compounds, which apparently have escaped the notice of Prellwitz, are to be found (as above mentioned) in A. J. P. XVI, pp. 217 sqq.]

Further Latin instances:—

iōcundus [with *ō* due to the *u* of *iūcundus* (from which it is etymologically to be separated¹)] *iōcundus* [the latter only in late Latin]—the *ioc-* whereof is generally identified with the *iōc-* of *iōcus iōcare*²—is probably to be regarded as a compound of this class, representing originally **iōcum-do-s* ‘giving merriment, giving pleasure.’

rōtundus should also be added here, if the explanation of it offered by Dr. Prellwitz (cf. *infra*, p. 443, and see *infra*, p. 446) be correct.

¹ Seen also (according to Prellwitz, l. c.) in *θια-γόνες*, whose literal meaning is held by Prellwitz to be ‘huld-zeuger.’

² See R. S. Conway in the *Class. Rev.*, vol. V, 1891, p. 300 *b*, ad fin.

³ So, for instance, Conway, l. c.

XV 206: On *Lariscolus* and *legiscrepa* see further A. J. P. XVI, p. 220.

XV¹ 208, 209: The derivation here offered of *venundo* and *pessumdo* finds an advocate also in W. M. Lindsay, *Class. Rev.*, vol. VII (1893), p. 106, n. 1,² and *The Lat. Lang.* (1894), ch. VIII, §95, p. 544.

XV 212, l. 22: It was here observed that Osc. *eehiianasúm* was "of uncertain meaning." But I now think so no longer. In an article on 'The Italic Verb *eehiia-ehia-*,' published in the *Class. Rev.*, vol. X, May, 1896, I venture to think that I have offered the correct explanation of this Oscan word.

XV 212 ad fin.: "*timi-du-s : timen-du-s*," etc.—Pairs of such compounds shewing in the one case a bare stem as prior member, in the other a full case-form, are not rare in the Idg. languages. Cf., e. g., the following:

VED.-SKR.:

*dhanadā*³ : *dhanam-jayá*⁴

AVESTIC:

*ahumer*⁵ : *ahūmer*⁵ c-, standing for **ahūm-mer*⁶ c-

vīrajan- (: Skr. *vīrahán-*)⁵ : *vīreñjan-*, standing for **vīrem-jan*⁵

GREEK:⁷

<i>πυροφόρος</i> ⁵	:	<i>πυρ-φόρος</i> ⁵
<i>χέρνιψ</i> ⁵	}	: { <i>ποδα-νιπτήρ</i> ⁵ <i>ποδά-νιπτρον</i> ⁵
<i>χερόνιπτρον</i> ⁵		
<i>μυοφόνος</i> ⁵	:	<i>μυσ-φόνος</i> ⁵
<i>βιβλιογράφος</i> ⁵	:	<i>βιβλια-γράφος</i> ⁵
<i>βιβλιοφόρος</i> ⁵	:	<i>βιβλια-φόρος</i> ⁵

¹ XV 208: Concerning the explanation given of *palam-facio* in XV 208, I would add the following note: "Even granting that *palam* was originally a fem. accus. sing., it is, however, quite possible that at the time of its composition with *facio* the purely adverbial meaning of the word had become established, and the true explanation of the word (as acc. fem. sing. of a substantive) forgotten. Of course, if this be so, *palam-facio* is not here a case in point."

² Referred to again, *infra*, p. 445.

³ A. J. P. XV 199.

⁴ A. J. P. XV 203.

⁵ A. J. P. XV 204.

⁶ A. J. P. XV 204, and herein, *supra*, p. 440.

⁷ In addition to the examples here cited, see, further, the letter of Dr. Prellwitz cited *infra*, p. 446.

παντόπτης ¹	:	παν-όπτης ¹
φαεσφόρος ¹	}	: φωσ-φόρος ¹
φωτοφόρος ¹		
κεροφόρος ²	}	: κερασ-φόρος ²
κερατοφόρος ²		
ξιφοφόρος ⁴	:	ξιφη-φόρος ⁴
τερατοσκόπος ⁴	:	τερασκόπος, standing for *τερασ-σκοπος ⁴
θυοδόκος ⁵	:	θυοσ-κόος ⁴
		θυη-κόος ⁴
		θυη-δόχος ⁵
		θυη-πόλος ⁵
		θυη-φάγος ⁵

LATIN :

<i>iuridicus</i> ⁶	:	<i>iudex</i> , standing for * <i>ius-dex</i> ⁶
<i>muricidus</i> ⁷	:	<i>muscipula</i> ⁷
<i>Larifuga</i> ⁷	:	<i>Laris</i> (= <i>Lares</i>)- <i>colus</i> ⁷
<i>legirupa</i> ⁷	:	<i>legis</i> (= <i>leges</i>)- <i>crepa</i> ⁷
(Skr. <i>bhāga-dhēya</i> - ⁸):	:	<i>merenda</i> ⁸
<i>lepidus</i>	:	<i>iocundus</i> . ⁹

XV 213, l. 1: "If from *√ dhē-*." A reference to XV 202, ll. 14-16, will explain the point of this "if."

XV 215, ll. 6, 7: A still simpler explanation of *rotundus* is now offered by Dr. Prellwitz (cf. *supra*, p. 441, and see *infra*, p. 446).

XVI 218, l. 14: Add: With respect to the second of the two suggested explanations of Lesb. *δικασκόπος*, compare the following remark of Brugmann, *Grundr.*, vol. II, §161, p. 487: "No doubt *δικ-η* has replaced an older **διξ* = Skr. *dīś*." And, for **δικ-α* : *δικ-η*, compare *κρόκ-α* : *κρόκ-η* and *ἀλκ-ί* : *ἀλκ-ή*.

XVI 218, l. 30: On the vocalism of Lat. *cāvēō* see now the essay on 'The Establishment and Extension of the Law of Thurneysen and Havet,' A. J. P. XVI, Dec. 1895, p. 448.

XVI 222, n. 1, ll. 13-15: For "Umbr. *pane*" read "Umbr. *pane*."

¹ A. J. P. XV 204.

² A. J. P. XV 205.

³ Herein, p. .

⁴ A. J. P. XVI 218.

⁵ A. J. P. XVI 219.

⁶ A. J. P. XV 205.

⁷ A. J. P. XV 206.

⁸ A. J. P. XVI 219.

⁹ Given herein, *supra*, p. 441.

We may now turn our attention to the further consideration of the main propositions which it was the object of my two first papers to establish:—

(1) *That the Italic Gerundive developed itself on Italic soil, i. e. in other words, was purely an Italic development.*¹

Of this view I need say no more here than that it has the advantage of being supported by “the influence of a great name”²—the name of Brugmann.³ I believe the view to be correct as stated.⁴

(2) *That the Gerundive arose before the Gerund, the latter being a development from the former.*⁵

In support of this proposition—advocated not only by myself in the two papers on the ‘Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive,’ A. J. P. XV 194–216, XVI 217–222, but also by such distinguished philologists as Dr. Joseph Weisweiler in his ‘Das Lateinische Participium Futuri Passivi in seiner Bedeutung und Syntaktischen Verwendung’ (Paderborn, 1890), Professor Karl Brugmann in his Grundriss, vol. IV, 1892, §1103, Rem., p. 1424, and Mr. W. M. Lindsay, The Latin Language, 1894, ch. VIII, §94, p. 543—Mr. F. W. Thomas, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, sends me the following communication:

“You may be interested to note as confirmatory of your and Weisweiler’s” and (he might have added also) Brugmann’s and Lindsay’s “opinion as to the priority of the adjective in Latin, that, beside the Greek, the Sanscrit shews an Impersonal Gerundive, viz. in *-yam* and *-īyam*, derived from the adjective. (This will be found discussed by Böhtlingk in a short article ‘Ueber d. impersonalen Gebrauch d. Participia necess. im Sanskrit’ in the Zeitschrift d. Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, vol. 42, 1888, pp. 366–9.)”

¹ See A. J. P. XV 195, 202, 212, and XVI 222, n. 1.

² See Prof. E. W. Fay in the Proc. of the Amer. Philolog. Assoc., vol. 26, 1895, p. lxxv.

³ Brugmann, Grundr., vol. IV, §1103, 3, Rem.

⁴ “Suppose for a moment that my first proposition is incorrect, and that the Italic Gerundive took its rise (not, as I have held and believe, in *Prim. Italic*, but) in *Idg.* itself. My main propositions concerning the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive would, notwithstanding, remain practically unaffected.” See Postscript (1), *infra*, p. 450.

⁵ See A. J. P. XV 195, 202, 215, 216 ad fin.

(3) *That the Gerundive itself was a compound, wherein the prior member, consisting of the Prim. Ital. accusative infinitive in -m,¹ was governed as object by the second member, the verbal suffix do-.²*

It was pointed out in A. J. P. XVI, p. 217, that this view is supported by Mr. W. M. Lindsay in his work on *The Latin Language*, 1894, ch. VIII, §§94-5, and also in his 'Addenda et Corrigenda' thereto (p. 660). I find, too, that Mr. Lindsay, in the *Classical Review*, vol. VII, 1893, p. 106, note 1, instancing *laudandus* as an example of the Gerundive, wrote "I would make -*dus* a Verbal Adjective 'giving praise.' Cf. *ruborem-do*, *venum-do*." With Mr. Lindsay's permission, I now venture to supplement this with the following extract from a letter which, in Oct. 1894, he wrote to me (then personally quite unknown to him): "I have just seen your excellent article on the 'Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive' in the *Amer. Journ. of Philology*. I have long believed that the Gerundive was a Compound of a Verbal Noun, in Accusative and not in Stem-form, with the root DŌ, and am delighted to read your thorough-going justification of the theory."

My view is supported also by Dr. Prellwitz (Joint-Editor of *Bezenberger's Beiträge*) in a letter to me (dated 1 Feb. 1896), which runs as follows:

"Ihre Ansicht über das Gerundium ist mir sehr interessant gewesen. Aehnliche Gedanken haben mich lange beschäftigt und sind dann durch andere Thätigkeit zurückgedrängt. Demnächst hoffe ich aber Ihnen einige Sachen übersenden zu können, die Ihrer Ansicht über das Gerundium, die ich völlig billige, ziemlich verwandt sind."

This letter Dr. Prellwitz has, more recently (28 Sept. 1896), supplemented by a second, in which, (after courteously granting me permission to publish the foregoing) he gives me a first instalment of the promised 'Sachen.' He writes as follows:

"Die Ihrer Gerundiverklärung ziemlich verwandten Aufsätze habe ich noch nicht zum Druck geben können.

"Ein Vorläufer aber davon ist die Erklärung *θίασος* : ai. *dhiyam-dhā* (B. B. 22, 128 ff.)."—See above, p. 441.

¹ See A. J. P. XV 196, 198, 202.

² See A. J. P. XV 198, 202, 203 sqq., 212, 213; XVI 218 sqq., and herein, pp. 441, 442, 446, 447.

“Wenn $\theta\iota\alpha$ Accusativ + $\theta\iota\omicron\varsigma$ von $\sqrt{dh\bar{e}}$ - ist, so ist es auch erlaubt die andern Wörter auf $a-\theta\omicron\varsigma$ so zu trennen; ferner die Wörter auf $\iota\nu-\theta\omicron\varsigma$, $\iota\nu\nu-\theta\omicron\varsigma$, u. s. w., als *Composita aus Accusativen auf* $\iota\nu$, $\iota\nu\nu$, + $d\bar{h}\omicron\varsigma$ von $\sqrt{dh\bar{e}}$ - zu betrachten. Die Nebenformen auf $\iota-\theta\omicron\varsigma$ $\nu\theta$ - ohne ν sind dagegen mit dem reinen Stamm auf $-\iota$ $-\nu$ zusammengesetzt.”

[“Endlich ist es klar,” he writes at the conclusion of his above-mentioned article in Bezz. Beitr. 22, “dass sich aus obiger Deutung von $\theta\iota\alpha\sigma\omicron\varsigma$ u. s. w. wichtige Folgerungen für die Wörter auf $-\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ und $-\alpha\delta$ -, ja auch für die auf $-\nu\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ergeben.”]

“So ist *rotundus*,” he continues in his letter, “sehr viel einfacher zu erklären als Brugmann und auch Sie meinen. Es ist **rothom-dos* (resp. *-dhos*) ‘Umdrehung gebend (oder machend)’—**róthos* ‘Umdrehung’ (mit *th* wegen ai. *ratha-s* und gr. *ἐπιρροθος*), neben **rothā* (lat. *rota*) ‘Rad’ ist ganz regelrecht angesetzt.

So,” he concludes his letter, “erkläre ich noch eine grosse Anzahl von Wörtern.”¹

Numerous examples of this kind of composition (which is seen in the Italic Gerundive)—composition, that is, *wherein the prior member of the compound is an accusative case governed as object by the second member*—will have been found collected in A. J. P. XV 203 sqq., XVI 218 sqq., and herein, supra, pp. 442 and 443, and the present page.

And now we come to the remaining proposition which I sought to establish, namely:—

(4) *That, unless it be assumed that the Umbr.-Osc. Gerundive was borrowed from Latin, its formation (assuming the latter to be identical with that of the Latin Gerundive) should compel us to regard the said suffix $d\bar{o}$ - as the representative (not of Idg. $dh\bar{o}$ - from Idg. $\sqrt{dh\bar{e}}$ -, but) of Idg. $d\bar{o}$ - from Idg. $\sqrt{d\bar{o}}$ -.*²

In A. J. P. XVI, July, 1895, p. 222 (text), at the conclusion of the second of the two papers on ‘The Origin of the Gerund and

¹ P. S.—See further, now, a “Sonderabdruck aus ‘Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie’ (Berlin), 1897,” wherein Dr. Prellwitz, again adverting to the subject, writes (on p. 11): “Ich hoffe bald Zeit zu finden, um ausführlich zu zeigen, dass $-\nu\theta\omicron\varsigma$ oder vielmehr $\alpha\nu\theta\omicron\varsigma$, $\iota\nu\theta\omicron\varsigma$, $\iota\nu\nu\theta\omicron\varsigma$, $\alpha\theta\omicron\varsigma$ auf Accusative Sing. auf $-\acute{\alpha}\nu$, $\iota\nu$, $\iota\nu\nu$, $\alpha + \theta\omicron\varsigma$ d. i. $dh\bar{e} + \omicron\varsigma$ ‘machend’ zurückgehen.”

² See A. J. P. XV 198, 202 (text and note 3); XVI 217, note 1 (ad fin.), 222 (text and note 1), and herein, supra, p. 439.

Gerundive'¹—in which I had endeavoured to prove that the Gerundive [which (in common with Weisweiler, Brugmann, and Lindsay²) I held to be the earlier formation of the two³] was a Prim. Italic compound wherein the prior member consisted of the Prim. Ital. accus. infin. in *-m*, governed as object by the second member, namely, the suffix *do-*, and that (as said above) “unless it be assumed⁴ that the Umbr.-Osc. Gerundive was borrowed from Latin, its formation (assuming the latter to be identical with that of the Latin Gerundive) should compel us to regard the said suffix *dō-* as the representative (not of Idg. *dō-* from Idg. *√ dhē-*, but) of Idg. *dō-* from Idg. *√ dō-*”—*occasion was taken to touch on Prof. E. W. Fay's theory of 'The Latin Gerundive -^ondo-.'*

The latter had appeared in the same number of the A. J. P. as my own first paper on ‘The Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive,’ namely, A. J. P. XV, July, 1894, pp. 217–222.

I pointed out (XVI 222, text) that, inasmuch as Prof. Fay's theory, explaining the *d* of ‘The Latin Gerundive -^ondo-’ as the representative of an Idg. *dh* from the Idg. *√ dhē-* (thus Lat. *ferend-* from Idg. **bherndh-*)—an explanation to which, so far as the *Latin* forms alone were concerned, no objection need be raised—took no account whatever of the Umbr.-Osc. forms of the Gerundive, and inasmuch as (according to my view⁵) the latter could not possibly represent Idg. *dh*, it followed that Prof. Fay's theory (with respect to which we need here concern ourselves only with *his views on the phonetic development of Idg. dh in Italic*) must therefore “inevitably fall to the ground.”

With this comment on Prof. Fay's theory I (originally) concluded my ‘Further Notes on the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive’; and it was not till after I had remitted them to Prof. Gildersleeve for the A. J. P. that I received my copy of A. J. P. XVI, part 1, April, 1895 (containing Prof. Fay's attempt to escape from the difficulty confronting him).

Having observed that my remarks concerning the representation of Idg. *dh* in Italic would, unless they could be proved to be incorrect, tell distinctly against his own explanation of ‘The Latin Gerundive -^ondo-’ (as given in A. J. P. XV 217–222), Prof. Fay in A. J. P. XVI, April, 1895, p. 1, n. 1, brought forward certain

¹ A. J. P. XV 194–216, XVI 217–222.

² See herein, *supra*, p. 444.

³ See A. J. P. XV 195, 202, 215, 216 *ad fin.*, and herein, *supra*, p. 444.

⁴ An assumption “which does not seem very probable,” A. J. P. XVI 222.

⁵ See A. J. P. XV 198, 202 (text and note 3); XVI 217, note 1 *ad fin.*, 222.

forms whereby he hoped to shew that Idg. “-ndh- gave Osc.-Umbr. -np- > -nd- > -nn- || -n-,” i. e. in other words, that the -nn- || -n- of the Osc.-Umbr. Gerundives could represent Idg. -ndh- as well as Idg. -nd-.

This led to my adding at the end of the ‘Further Notes on the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive’ (A. J. P. XVI, July, 1895, pp. 217–222) a Postscript (namely, the note on p. 222) wherein I endeavoured to prove that “the examples adduced by Prof. Fay do not seem at all convincing” and that we must “therefore feel compelled to regard Prof. Fay’s suggestion, that Idg. -ndh- gave Osc.-Umbr. -np- > -nd- > -nn- || -n-, as unproven.”

In A. J. P. XVI, Dec. 1895, pp. 491–5, Prof. Fay has returned once more to the charge. He is, however, unable to adduce in support of his suggestion—that Osc.-Umbr. -nn- || -n- can represent Idg. -ndh- as well as Idg. -nd-—any further examples than those which he had previously given (A. J. P. XVI 1, n. 1), the unconvincing nature of which I had exposed (A. J. P. XVI 222, n. 1).¹

To my own view concerning the representation of Idg. *dh* in Italic—expressed in A. J. P. XV 198, 202 (text and note 3); XVI 217, note 1 (ad fin.), 222 (text and note 1), and identical with that of Brugmann, Grundr. I, §370—I still feel bound to adhere,² whether the particular Oscan word *Anafriss* (to which Prof. Fay devotes three pages³) be⁴ or be not⁵ ultimately considered as an example of Idg. *dh*.

In conclusion let me quote in support of my view the opinion of Prof. C. D. Buck, as expressed in his paper on ‘The Oscan-Umbrian Verb-System,’ published in The University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, vol. I, 1895. Speaking of the origin of the Latin Gerundive, he there says (on p. 184) as follows:

“*The Oscan-Umbrian forms*” of the Gerundive “*furnish, in my opinion, conclusive evidence for original (n)d rather than (n)dh.*”

¹ “The comparison of *in-de* with *ἐν-θεν*”—in the validity of which Prof. Fay says that he does “not believe” (A. J. P. XVI 491)—was, it may be observed in passing, no suggestion of mine. See A. J. P. XVI 222, note 1.

² For the present, at all events; pending the discovery of further and much stronger evidence than any which Prof. Fay has yet been able to adduce in support of his suggestion.

³ A. J. P. XVI 492–5.

⁴ The view held by one set of scholars.

⁵ The view held by Prof. Fay, A. J. P. XVI 492–5.

In bringing to a close these 'Concluding Notes,' it would perhaps be well for me to take the opportunity of summarising, in precise terms, my view concerning 'the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive' (as expressed in A. J. P. XV 194-216, XVI 217-222, and in the foregoing pages herein).

Precise Statement of My View
(with references).

I regard the Italic (i. e. Latin-Oscan-Umbrian) Gerundive as having "developed itself on Italic soil" (XV 195), or, in other words, as being "purely an Italic development" (XVI 222, n. 1).¹

Of the Gerundive and Gerund—which latter indeed "does not appear in the Umbr.-Samn. monuments" (XV 194)—I consider that "the Gerundive was the earlier formation of the two" (XV 216²), and that "the Gerund was developed from the Gerundive" (XV 195³).

The Gerundive itself, held (as aforesaid) to have arisen on Italic soil, I explain as "a compound, wherein the prior member, consisting of the Prim. Ital. Accusative Infinitive in -m⁴," is "governed as object by the second member, the verbal suffix dō-⁵" (supra, p. 445⁶).

And, lastly, I consider that "unless it be assumed—an assumption 'which does not seem very probable' (XVI 222)—that the Umbr.-Osc. Gerundive was borrowed from Latin⁷, its formation (assuming the latter to be identical with that of the Latin Gerundive) should compel us to regard the said suffix dō- as the representative (not of Idg. dhō- from Idg. √ dhē-, but) of Idg. dō- from Idg. √ dō-"⁸ (supra, p. 446⁸).⁹

¹ A. J. P. XV 195, 202, 212; XVI 222, note 1, and herein, p. 444.

² A. J. P. XV 195, 202, 215, 216, and herein, p. 444.

³ A. J. P. XV 195, 215, and herein, p. 444.

⁴ See A. J. P. XV 196, 198, 202, and herein, p. 445.

⁵ A. J. P. XV 198, 202, 203, 212, 213, and herein, p. 445.

⁶ For examples of such composition see A. J. P. XV 203 sqq., XVI 218 sqq., and herein, pp. 442, 443, 446.

⁷ A. J. P. XV 198, 202 (text and note 3); XVI 217, note 1 (ad fin.), 222, and herein, pp. 439, 447.

⁸ A. J. P. XV 198, 202 (text and note 3); XVI 217, note 1 (ad fin.), 222 (text and note 1); and herein, pp. 439, 447 sqq.

⁹ P. S.—Indeed, assuming the correctness of my first proposition (namely, that the Italic Gerundive took its rise, not in Idg., but in Prim. Italic), it would appear that *the suffix even of the Latin Gerundive can hardly be held to*

POSTSCRIPT.

(1) Suppose for a moment that my first proposition is incorrect, and that the Italic Gerundive took its rise (not, as I have held and believe, in Prim. Italic¹, but) in Idg. itself:

My main propositions concerning the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive would, notwithstanding, remain practically unaffected. (a) The Gerundive would still have arisen before the Gerund, the latter being a development from the former². (b) The Gerundive would still have been a compound, wherein the prior member was an accusative infinitive in *-m* governed as object by the second member the verbal suffix *-do*³. And (c) this latter—"unless it be assumed" (etc., as above⁴)—must still be regarded as the representative (not of Idg. *dhō-* from Idg. *√dhē-*, but) of Idg. *dō-* from Idg. *√dō-*⁵. In fact, the only difference arising would be that the said "accus. infin. in *-m*" would have to be regarded (not as a *Prim. Ital.*, but) as an *Idg.* infinitive in *-m* (concerning which latter, reference may be made to Brugmann, *Grundr.* IV, §900, p. 1268, §1088, p. 1414, §1094, p. 1419, §1103, 3, Rem., p. 1425).

[If **lomdho-s* is rightly to be regarded as the Idg. groundform of Lat. *lumbu-s* (see Brugmann, *Grundr.* I, §370; Stolz, *Lat. Gr.*², §55, p. 295; Osthoff, *Zur Gesch. d. Perf.*, 533 sq.), it would appear to be matter of doubt whether Idg. *-mdh-* could even in Latin have normally given rise to *-nd*⁶. If, there-

represent Idg. *dhō-* save on the assumption that the Gerundival suffix was taken direct from the old-established Latin adjectives already containing the verbal suffix *-dō-s* representative medially of Idg. *-dhō-s* (from Idg. *√dhē-*). [Concerning these adjectives see below, Postscript 2, n. 7.]

But in Umbrian and Oscan themselves, as already observed, there could have been no such adjectives shewing *-dō-s* from Idg. *-dhō-s*; all such must in Umbrian and Oscan have shewn not *-dō-*, but *fō-*; hence, if we were to insist on seeing Idg. *-dhō-* in the *-dō-* of the Latin Gerundive, we should (as said above) be compelled to accede to the improbable view that the Umbr.-Osc. Gerundive was borrowed from Latin.

All our difficulties vanish the moment we decide that the suffix of the Italic Gerundive is the representative (not of Idg. *dhō-* from Idg. *√dhē-*, but) of Idg. *dō-* from Idg. *√dō-*.

¹ See herein, p. 449, and the passages there referred to.

² See herein, p. 449, and the passages there referred to.

³ See herein, p. 449, and the passages there referred to.

⁴ See herein, p. 449.

⁵ See herein, p. 449, and the passages there referred to.

⁶ How far Lat. *condō* could be regarded a case in point is uncertain. It has been thought by some that the *-dō* of Lat. *condō* comes direct from Idg. *√dhē-* (i. e. *cond-* from **kom-dh-*). It appears, however, that it may legitimately be considered doubtful (1) at what exact date Lat. *condō* came into being, (2) whether it may not in fact have arisen in Latin itself, simply on the analogy of certain other Latin verbs which have been held to preserve Idg. *√dhē-*, such as *addō* and *abdō*. Should this latter suggestion be correct, the *-nd-* of Lat. *condō* would afford no argument to counterbalance that afforded on the other side by Lat. *lumbu-s* from Idg. **lomdho-s*.

fore, the three scholars just named are right in their said derivation, they furnish us with an additional argument—this time from *Latin*—in favour of the contention that, *even assuming the Italic Gerundive to have taken its rise in Idg. itself*, it must nevertheless be regarded as representing, not Idg. *-m + dhō-* (from Idg. *√dhē-*), but Idg. *-m + dō-* (from Idg. *√dō-*).]

(2) *Assuming again for the moment that the Gerundive may have taken its rise (not, as I myself believe and have said, in Prim. Italic¹, but) in Idg. itself*—in which case, as said above, the accus. infin. in *-m*, whereof the prior member of the gerundival compound consisted, would have to be regarded (not as a *Prim. Ital.*, but) as an *Idg. infinitive*²—

And thereupon assuming further (α) the change in Idg. of *-mdh-* to *-ndh-* (an assumption which in itself would appear to be somewhat doubtful³), (β) that an Idg. *-mdh-* could *normally* have given rise even in Latin to *-nd-* (again a somewhat doubtful assumption⁴), and, lastly, also (γ) that it had been proved (and—with all respect to so brilliant a scholar as Prof. Fay be it said—it certainly has not been proved as yet⁵) that Idg. “*-ndh-* gave Osc.-Umbr. *-np->-nd->-nn- | -n-*,” in other words that the *-nn- | -n-* of the Osc.-Umbr. Gerundives can be the representatives of an Idg. *-ndh-* as well as of Idg. *-nd-*⁶;

Assuming all the foregoing hypotheses, I should not perhaps be so anxious to quarrel as to which exactly of the two suffixes Idg. *dō-* (from Idg. *√dō-*) and Idg. *dhō-* (from Idg. *√dhē-*) is represented in the much-discussed suffix of the Italic Gerundive—both, *on the given premises*, being equally admissible. Indeed, *on the given premises*, I should feel almost inclined to suggest that the suffix of the Italic Gerundive might very probably represent *both* Idg. *dō-* and Idg. *dhō-*.

I say “*both* Idg. *dō-* and Idg. *dhō-*,” and I say it not unadvisedly. There would be no inherent improbability in such a view. Indeed, it could aptly be paralleled by the following pairs of Sanskrit compounds:—*garbha-da-s : garbha-dhd-s*, *a-doma-dd-s : a-doma-dhd-s*, *jani-dd-s : jani-dhd-s*, *sahasra-dd-s : sahasra-dhā* (all of which I cited in A. J. P. XV 199).⁷

¹ See herein, p. 449, and the passages there referred to.

² See above, Postscript (1).

³ See Postscript (1) concerning Idg. **lomdho-s* as the groundform of Lat. *lumbu-s*.

⁴ Doubtful, that is to say, in view of the derivation of Lat. *lumbu-s* from Idg. **lomdho-s*. See above, Postscript (1).

⁵ See A. J. P. XVI 222 (text and note 1), and herein, supra, pp. 447 sqq.

⁶ The view of Prof. Fay in A. J. P. XVI, p. 1.

⁷ In A. J. P. XV 202 I said that on account of a certain Umbrian word there quoted “it is more probable that we should trace *√dō-* than *√dhē-* in the Latin adjectives in *-du-s* (given above).” But I doubt whether the conclusion was sufficiently warranted by the premise. One Umbrian word can hardly, in such a case, be allowed to ‘legislate’ for all the Latin adjectives in *-du-s*. I now think that while many of the latter (along with the particular Umbrian word) doubtless represent Idg. *dō-* (from Idg. *√dō-*), others may nevertheless represent Idg. *dhō-* (from Idg. *√dhē-*), and some (in all probability) *both* Idg. *dō-* and Idg. *dhō-*.

So far as the original meaning and the syntax of the Gerundive are concerned: a glance at §5 of my first paper (A. J. P. XV 213-215) will at once shew that the acceptability of my explanation concerning these points would be in nowise affected (unless, indeed, in the direction of still greater acceptability) by the advent of Idg. $\sqrt{d}h\bar{e}$ - upon the stage.

"The root $d\bar{h}\bar{e}$ - in agglutinative groups" is, too, of such frequent occurrence (see Prof. Fay's interesting paper in A. J. P. XVI, pp. 1 sqq.) that one would gladly welcome its appearance (if possible) in one's old friend, the Italic Gerundive.

But (as already indicated) the hypotheses, on which alone such appearance could be held to come even "within the sphere of practical politics," remain as yet "unproven." They remain, in a word,—"hypotheses."

LIONEL HORTON-SMITH.

53 Queen's Gardens, Lancaster Gate, London, W., England,

22 Sept., 1897.

V.—NEGATIVE FUTURES IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

It has long been the common doctrine of New Testament grammarians and commentators that the double negative οὐ μή, which is used with the aorist subjunctive, and more rarely with the future indicative, in denials referring to the future, is an *emphatic* negative. It is the purpose of this paper to show that the facts of New Testament and Septuagint usage prove that οὐ μή was not regarded by Hellenistic writers as an emphatic negative, but that, on the contrary, the aorist subjunctive with οὐ μή was the more common way of expressing a negative future. In modern Greek all futures are expressed by the subjunctive, the word *θά*, abbreviated for *θελει ἵνα*, being placed before it, to show that the future is intended. In Hellenistic times the change to the use of the subjunctive for the future had so far advanced that in the majority of cases where the prediction was *negative* the subjunctive was used, the peculiar double negative, whatever its origin, having come to indicate the *tense-force* intended, not the quality of the negation.

It is not our purpose to discuss now the origin of the remarkable combination οὐ μή, or the question how far it is really emphatic in classic usage. Our contention is only that, however it originated and however it may have been previously used, it was not emphatic to Hellenistic writers.

There are two ways in which a negative future may be expressed: a negative word may be affirmed, as, "No man shall set on thee to harm thee," or the verb may be denied, as, "He shall not lose his reward." Of course, we have in mind in this paper only this latter kind of negative futures. These may be subdivided again into Prohibitions and Predictions. The prohibitions are expressed in the New Testament by οὐ with the future indicative; for example, "Thou shalt not kill" (Mat. v. 21).

Negative predictions in the New Testament are expressed either by οὐ with the future indicative or by οὐ μή with the aorist subjunctive, or rarely with the future indicative. A pretty careful examination shows that οὐ with the future indicative occurs about

eighty times, while οὐ μὴ occurs about ninety times, in eighty of which cases Westcott and Hort give with it the aorist subjunctive. Westcott and Hort give in ten instances the future indicative with οὐ μὴ, but on account of the variations of the manuscripts, and the indecisiveness of the spelling even if there were no variations, only one of these is certain, Mat. xvi. 22, "This shall never be unto thee." It seems most likely that when the future indicative was used with οὐ μὴ, as often in the Septuagint, it was from a confusion of the two original idioms, and that no different meaning was intended. Our question is simply whether in the ninety-odd cases with οὐ μὴ the negation is emphatic, and in the eighty cases with οὐ unemphatic. The fact that the common doctrine requires the recognition of special emphasis in the majority of the instances raises a doubt at the outset.

Let us see now how οὐ μὴ has been treated in our English versions. Out of ninety-three cases in which οὐ μὴ stood in the Textus Receptus, the Authorized Version rendered as emphatic only the following seventeen :

- Mat. v. 18. one jot or one tittle shall *in no wise*
 20. ye shall *in no case* enter into.
 26. Thou shalt *by no means* come out.
 x. 42. he shall *in no wise* lose his reward.
 xxiv. 21. no, *nor ever* shall be.
 Mk. xiv. 31. I will *not* deny thee *in any wise*.
 Luke x. 19. *nothing* shall *by any means* hurt you.
 xviii. 17. shall *in no wise* enter therein.
 John vi. 37. I will *in no wise* cast out.
 Acts xiii. 41. which ye shall *in no wise* believe.
 Rev. xviii. 14. thou shalt find them *no more at all*
 21. and shall be found *no more at all*.
 22. shall be heard *no more at all* in thee (bis)
 23. shall shine *no more at all* in thee
 23. shall be heard *no more at all* in thee
 xxi. 25. shall *not* be shut *at all* by day.
 27. there shall *in no wise* enter into it.

It is evident that the selection of these seventeen cases for emphasis, and the omission of emphasis in the other seventy-six cases, was a matter of pure accident, since no one would contend for a moment that these denials are in themselves more vehement than many of the others.

The authors of the Revised Version added emphasis to the translation of οὐ μὴ in twenty-two additional cases :

- Mat. xiii. 14. shall *in no wise* understand.
 shall *in no wise* perceive.
 xvi. 22. this shall *never* be unto thee
 28. which shall *in no wise* taste of death.
 xviii. 3. shall *in no wise* enter into the kingdom.
 Mk. ix. 1. shall *in no wise* taste of death.
 41. shall *in no wise* lose his reward.
 x. 15. shall *in no wise* enter therein.
 xiii. 19. and *never* shall be
 xvi. 18. it shall *in no wise* hurt them.
 Luke ix. 27. which shall *in no wise* taste of death.
 xii. 59. Thou shalt *by no means* come out thence.
 John iv. 48. ye will *in no wise* believe.
 Acts xxviii. 26. shall *in no wise* understand
 shall *in no wise* perceive
 I Thes. iv. 15. shall *in no wise* precede them that are fallen
 v. 3. they shall *in no wise* escape.
 Heb. xiii. 5. I will *in no wise* fail thee
 neither will I *in any wise* forsake thee.
 Rev. iii. 5. I will *in no wise* blot his name.
 xviii. 7. shall *in no wise* see mourning.
 22. shall be found any more *at all* in thee.

In two instances the Revisers have weakened what was emphatic in the Authorized Version :

- Mk. xiv. 31. But he spake exceeding vehemently, If I must die with thee, I will *not* deny thee. (A. V.: I will *not* deny thee *in any wise*.)
 John vi. 35. he that cometh to me shall *not* hunger (A. V.: shall *never* hunger).

These changes were not made on account of any change of reading in the Greek text. The first may have come from the feeling that the briefer rendering would be more forceful. In Rev. ix. 6 a change of reading has introduced *οὐ μὴ* into the text, and the Revisers have rendered it emphatically, "shall *in no wise* find it."

We have therefore in the Revised Version thirty-eight cases in which *οὐ μὴ* is rendered emphatically and about fifty-three in which it is not. We say 'about,' because there are differences of readings and we may have overlooked a few cases. About forty-two per cent. of the cases are now rendered as emphatic, and fifty-eight per cent. are not so rendered. But the division seems again to have been made by accident, as will appear from the following list of the cases which still stand unemphasized in the Revised Version :

- Mat. x. 23. Ye shall not have gone through.
 xv. 6. he shall not honor his father.

Mat. xxiii. 39. Ye shall not see me henceforth.

xxiv. 2. There shall not be left here one stone.

34. This generation shall not pass away.

35. my words shall not pass away.

xxvi. 29. I will not drink henceforth.

Mark xiii. 2. there shall not be left here one stone upon another which shall not be thrown down.

30. This generation shall not pass away.

xiv. 25. I will no more drink.

31. I will not deny thee.

Luke i. 15. shall drink no wine.

vi. 37. ye shall not be judged

ye shall not be condemned.

viii. 17. that shall not be known.

xiii. 35. Ye shall not see me.

xviii. 7. And shall not God avenge.

30. who shall not receive manifold more.

xxi. 18. And not a hair of your head shall perish.

32. This generation shall not pass.

33. my words shall not pass away.

xxii. 16. I will not eat it

18. I will not drink from henceforth.

67. ye will not believe.

68. ye will not answer.

John iv. 14. shall never thirst.

vi. 35. he that cometh to me shall not hunger, and he that believeth on me shall never thirst.

viii. 12. shall not walk in the darkness.

51. shall never see death

52. he shall never taste of death.

x. 5. And a stranger will they not follow.

28. and they shall never perish.

xi. 26. whosoever liveth and believeth on me shall never die.

56. That he will not come to the feast?

xiii. 8. Thou shalt never wash my feet.

38. The cock shall not crow

xx. 25. I will not believe.

Rom. iv. 8. to whom the Lord will not reckon sin.

1 Cor. viii. 13. I will eat no flesh for evermore.

Gal. iv. 30. shall not inherit with the son of the freewoman.

v. 16. ye shall not fulfil the lust.

Heb. viii. 11. And they shall not teach.

12. their sins will I remember no more.

x. 17. their iniquities will I remember no more.

1 Pet. ii. 6. shall not be put to shame.

2 Pet. i. 10. ye shall never stumble.

Rev. ii. 11. shall not be hurt of the second death.

iii. 3. thou shalt not know what hour.

- Rev. iii. 12. he shall go out thence no more.
 vii. 16. neither shall the sun strike upon them.
 xv. 4. Who shall not fear, O Lord.

There is nothing to indicate that the line of division between the cases in which οὐ μὴ is translated emphatically in the Revised Version and those in which it is not translated emphatically is other than an accidental one. What but inadvertence can have been the reason that Peter's vehement protestation, "I will not deny thee" (Mat. xiv. 31), and Thomas's obstinate refusal, "I will not believe" (John xx. 25), and similar passages were left unemphatic by men who rendered "I will in no wise fail thee" (Heb. xiii. 5) and "ye will in no wise believe" (John iv. 48)? Sometimes the Revisers seem to have seen the οὐ μὴ, and then to have emphasized the negation, and sometimes they seem to have overlooked it. It is curious that the quotation from the Septuagint in Mat. xiii. 14 and Acts xxviii. 26 has been made emphatic, so that we now read "shall *in no wise* understand" and "shall *in no wise* perceive," instead of "shall not understand" and "shall not perceive," while the very same idiom in quotations from the Septuagint is left "shall not inherit" in Gal. iv. 30, "they shall not teach" in Heb. viii. 11, and "shall not be put to shame" in 1 Pet. ii. 6.

It is next in order to inquire whether those negative predictions which are expressed by the future indicative with οὐ are less emphatic in their meaning than those which are expressed by the aorist subjunctive with οὐ μὴ. Twenty of these taken at random will serve as specimens:—

- Mat. x. 29. not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father.
 xii. 19. He shall not strive nor cry aloud :
 20. A bruised reed shall he not break, And smoking flax shall he not quench
 31. but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven
 32. it shall not be forgiven him.
 39. there shall no sign be given to it.
 xvi. 18. the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it.
 Mark iii. 25. that house will not be able to stand.
 xiii. 24. the moon shall not give her light.
 31. my words shall not pass away.
 Luke x. 42. which shall not be taken from her
 xvi. 31. neither will they be persuaded if one rise from the dead.
 xix. 44. shall not leave in thee one stone upon another.
 John vii. 34. Ye shall seek me, and shall not find me.
 xix. 36. A bone of him shall not be broken.

Rom. iii. 20. by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.

ix. 33. shall not be put to shame.

Heb. i. 12. And thy years shall not fail.

Rev. xxii. 3. And there shall be no curse any more.

5. And there shall be night no more.

Are these passages, in their spirit and purpose, less emphatic than those with οὐ μή? Let this list be read over to some intelligent person familiar only with the English version, and then let the list of passages in which οὐ μή has not been emphatically translated be read to him, and let it be seen whether such a person can guess which list of passages has the stronger negatives in the Greek. Our point is that if one should approach the New Testament with the notion that simple οὐ is an emphatic negative, he would find in usage as much to support that gratuitous theory as he can find to support the doctrine that οὐ μή is emphatic.

Even the most hasty reading of the Septuagint is sufficient to convince any one that the authors of that version regarded οὐ μή with the subjunctive or future indicative as the natural translation of any Hebrew negative future without regard to its character for emphasis. The Hebrew imperfect with אֵל, which is not an emphatic negative, is freely so rendered. Often in the same connection and even in the same verse where two or more Hebrew imperfects stand, each with אֵל, the Septuagint changes from οὐ with the future to οὐ μή with the subjunctive, obviously in unconsciousness, or merely for variety. For example, we read in Isaiah ii. 4, "nation shall not lift up (οὐ λήψεται) sword against nation, neither shall they learn (οὐ μή μάθωσιν) war any more." Isaiah v. 27 is an instructive example, "They shall not hunger (οὐ with fut. ind.) nor grow weary (οὐ with fut. ind.) nor slumber (οὐ with fut. ind.) nor sleep (οὐ with fut. ind.), neither shall they loose (οὐ μή with fut. ind.) the girdle of their loins, nor shall the latchets of their shoes be broken (οὐ μή with aor. subj.)." The negative in the Hebrew is simple אֵל every time. In the two cases just given οὐ μή comes last and might therefore be thought to be climacteric; but it is liable to come first, as in Isa. vii. 7, "It shall not stand (οὐ μή with aor. subj.), neither shall it come to pass (οὐ with fut. ind.)." In commenting upon Paul's quotation in Rom. iv. 8 from Psalm xxxii. 2, "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not reckon sin," Dr. Shedd says: "The double negative is noticeable: the fact that there is *certainly* no imputation of sin

must first be established, before there can be felicitation." But there is no double negative in the original Hebrew, and it does not seem likely that the Septuagint meant to put into that verse more negation than the Psalmist had put into it, or that St. Paul meant to attribute to David more negation than he actually used.

To sum up the argument: We do not regard *οὐ μή* as an emphatic negative in the New Testament—

1. Because it is freely used in the Septuagint to render unemphatic *אין* in the original Hebrew.

2. Because in the Septuagint *οὐ μή* with the aorist subjunctive, or future indicative, is mingled in the same sentences with *οὐ* and the future indicative without discernible distinction.

3. Because the *majority* of negative predictions in the New Testament have *οὐ μή*, which is inexplicable if it is emphatic.

4. Because the negative predictions in which *οὐ μή* occurs would not, on other grounds, be regarded as more emphatic than those which have simple *οὐ*.

5. Because *οὐ μή* is not used in the New Testament in future prohibitions (except, possibly, in one or two doubtful cases), although in these an emphatic negative would be peculiarly appropriate.

6. Because *οὐ μή* is used in relative clauses, and questions which amount to positive assertions, connections in which an emphatic negative is wholly out of place; for example, "there shall not be left here one stone upon another, which shall not (*οὐ μή*) be thrown down" (Mark xiii. 2); and "shall I not (*οὐ μή*) drink it?" (John viii. 11).

7. Because the makers of our English versions, although holding to the doctrine that *οὐ μή* is an emphatic negative, have not seen fit to apply that doctrine in the majority of the instances, and we fail to discover any principle by which they were guided.

The foregoing considerations are sufficient, in our judgment, to decide the matter inductively for the New Testament. If, however, any one remains unconvinced, we should like to ask him one question: Would you approve of inserting the phrase 'in no wise,' or an equivalent phrase, fifty-three more times in the Revised Version? and if not, why not?

W. G. BALLANTINE.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

Professor Ballantine is right in saying that οὐ μὴ is commonly set down as an emphatic or strong negative. True, Blass varies the phraseology somewhat and says that οὐ μὴ is "die bestimmteste Form der verneinenden Aussage über Zukünftiges." But no great chasm divides 'emphatic' from 'decided.' The tone of personal interest which I have claimed for μὴ οὐ in certain combinations (A. J. P. VII 170) is recognized for οὐ μὴ by Ewald (320 a), cited in my Justin Martyr, Apol. I 38, 9. Ewald says: "Nur selten ist ^ὁ bei blossen Aussagesätzen, drückt dann aber doch stets eine innigere Theilnahme wie οὐ μὴ." 'Innigere Theilnahme' is perhaps better than 'emphatic' or 'strong,' but of the passages cited by Ewald, in only one (Ps. 34, 6) is ^ὁ rendered in the LXX by οὐ μὴ. Professor Ballantine's demonstration that the 'emphasis,' 'strength,' 'interest,' whatever we may call it, is not very palpable in the N. T. is in accordance with the blunting of a great number of pointed idioms in the transfer from classic Greek. Nothing is more natural than exaggeration and emphasis in the use of an adopted language (see J. M., Apol. I 16, 6). Of this there are many instances in Hellenistic Greek, not merely in the vocabulary, but also in grammatical construction. Instead of saying with οὐ, the Hellenist swears with μὴ (cf. A. J. P. I 50). Instead of using the quieter present imperative, he is prone to employ out of all proportion the more pungent aorist imperative. Comp. Justin Martyr, Apol. I 16, 6, with Professor Miller's statistics, A. J. P. XIII 425. Josephus has a tendency to overdo the participle (A. J. P. IX 154). The articular infinitive, which belongs to argument, is made to figure conspicuously in narrative (A. J. P. VIII 337). There is no just sense of sphere, of proportion. So here, οὐ μὴ, however explained, belongs to the dramatic domain of classical Greek (A. J. P. III 202). It has very little scope outside of dialogue, and, in my judgment, can only be accounted for by a certain amount of passion. But it would be hard to see any special passion in many of the examples that Professor Ballantine cites, and we must suppose that the stress has been lost by over-familiarity. Swearing has no place in narrative, as Lucian has remarked emphatically (Quomodo historia, 11, II 19 R.), but the ordinary Hellenist is not troubled by that and uses his ^ὁ Δία freely. Nothing seems to be more likely than that οὐ μὴ has found its way into the LXX and the N. T.

from the range of everyday speech. The Hellenist picked up οὐ μή as the Scythian archer picked it up in Ar. Thesm. 1108: οὐκὶ μή λαλήσει σύ. It is not to be emended into the text of Pindar, O. 3, 45, and if it occurs in the oracular Parmenides (A. J. P. III 203), it is only one more evidence of the essentially unpoetic character of his philosophic epic. Nor does it seem to me that Professor Jannaris, in his recently published Historical Greek Grammar (§ 1828), has cleared the matter up at all by his advocacy of the theory that οὐ μή is a corruption of οὐ μήν, the very combination, by the way, which has been used by scholars to correct unruly οὐ μή's, as in Ar. Ranae, 508.¹ οὐ μήν, of which οὐ μή is supposed to be a corruption, Professor Jannaris calls a negative form of ἡ μήν. "Hence," he adds, "in the N. T. οὐ μή(ν) or rather οὐμήν and ἀμήν or rather ἡμήν hold the balance, 95 and 77 times respectively." I have not been careful to count after Professor Jannaris, but I submit that it ought to have given him pause to find that, according to his own reckoning, the N. T. holds more οὐ μή's than are to be found in the whole range of classic Greek. Professor Jannaris's οὐ μή(ν) theory carries with it, of course, the survival of the futural subjunctive in classical Greek, and it is a striking illustration of the fact that in historical syntax we cannot afford to neglect aesthetic syntax or the history of the department. Professor Jannaris cites among his arguments the non-occurrence of οὐ μή in inscriptions. But who would look for οὐ μή in inscriptions? Our Greek syntax would be much simplified if we restricted it to what may be found in Meisterhans. Not less striking is the illustration of the danger that besets the Greek of to-day in dealing with recondite problems of Greek syntax. The vernacular is apt to prevail over the historical sense, and many things besides the futural subjunctive give no shock to the consciousness (A. J. P. I 242). As θὰ φύγῃς must deaden the sensibilities to the shock of οὐ μήν φύγῃς, so the impossible aphaeresis postulated by οὐ μήν in certain passages might be welcome to a man whose mother-tongue is full of similar prod-elisions.² But the whole theory refutes itself and breaks down at the first serious application.³

¹ Tyrrell on Eur. Bacch. 852.

² So. Tr. 978: οὐ μὴ 'ξεγερῇς, Ar. Pax 1302: οὐ μὴ 'πιλάθῃ, both cited by a reviewer in *The Nation*, Jan. 20, 1898.

³ E. g. Xen. An. 4, 8, 13: οὐδεὶς μηκέτι μείνῃ.

NOTE.

ON LATIN *nihil* 'NAUGHT, NOT.'

The etymology of Latin *nihil* seems to me to be still in need of explanation. Brugmann keeps a dead silence as to its origin, in the Grundriss. Victor Henry hazards nothing as to its formation, in his Grammaire comparée. All that Stolz says (Iw. Müller's Hdbch.², p. 315) is "*nihil* neben *nihilum*." Wharton (Etym. Lat., s. v.) makes this entry: "*nī* not, see *nī*, + adj.-ending -ŪLO-. Ovid has *nihil* through a popular connection with *hīlum*." The entries in Lewis and Short's lexicon, s. v. *hīlum*, do not vindicate the actuality of any such word. When Ennius divides *ne-que . . . hīlum*, the skeptically minded will bethink themselves of his method of tmesis in 'saxo *cere-* comminuit *-brum*.' I am of the opinion that *hīlum* is the veriest of ghost-words, although F. H. Fowler, in what is probably the last treatment of the word ('The Negatives of the Indo-European Languages,' Univ. of Chicago dissertation), allows himself to write **ne-hīlum*.

To make a new explanation of the word, I start with **nihīlum*, with a by-form *nihīl*, which originated before vowels, and was shortened in its (pen-)ultimate quantity by the operation of the iambic law: from *nihīl* the adverb *nihīlo* got its quantity. Still, the quantity of *nihīlo* may be due to shortening in composition, a phenomenon we cannot yet precisely limit, but may not forthright deny.

I propose to divide **nihīlum* into *ne + hi + elum*: *-hi-* is the particle affixed to Aryan **ne* (or a compound of **ne-*) in Sk. *nahi* and Lith. *neigì*, affixed in Greek to a new negative particle in οὐ-χι.

We have next to explain **-elum*. We may define *nihil* very exactly by Eng. *naught* 'no any whit,' and its by-form *not* 'non.' It is to be noted also that Lat. *non*, the ordinary negative, is a compound of *ne + unum*; and compound negatives meet us in French *ne—point*, Ital. *non—punto* 'not at all.' We may seek, therefore, in **-elum* for the meaning 'whit, bit.'

For this we can find plenty of cognates: to begin with, *elementum* 'atom.' I am aware of the explanation of *elementum* from the names of the letters *el* + *em* + *en*, but, ingenious as it is, it has never seemed to me plausible. I lean, for my own part, to the comparison of *elementum* with Sk. *añú* 'fine, thin'—as noun 'atom'—*añimán* 'the finest particles of an object.'

Here, too, we may refer *álakam* (R.V.) 'to no purpose,' Lat. 'parum.'

Greek is also not without cognates, for we may well put here *ὀλίγος* 'short,' which G. Meyer explains as *ὀ-λίγος* (with prothetic *ὀ-*), comparing Lith. *ligà* 'illness' and noting the Hesychian gloss *λιζόν· ἑλαττον*; while Prellwitz in his dictionary suggests, with a query, a connection with Homeric *λίγδην* (adv.) 'grazing.' As to its formation, *ὀλίγος* is a *quasi* rhyme-word with *δολιχός* 'long.'

Another Greek cognate is *ἐλαχίς* 'small.' Here again the *ἐ-* has met its explanation as a prothetic vowel, because of Sk. *laghú*, Lat. *levis*. But we have to do here, I suggest, either with the problem of dissyllabic gradation, or with a case of contamination of two stems meaning 'small.'

It is easier to declare for the latter alternative, and we have a parallel case to our hands in Gk. *ἐρυθρός* 'red,' in which we should see not only a cognate of Sk. *rudhirá*, but also a cognate of Sk. *aru-ṇá*, both meaning 'red.' Why not?

This evidence seems to me enough to warrant us in positing an Aryan base *el-* 'small, a bit, whit.' A trace of this *el-* I would see in Latin *nihil* 'naught, not.'

LEXINGTON, VA., Oct. 18, 1897.

EDWIN W. FAY.

REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

A History of English Poetry. By W. J. COURTHOPE, C. B., M. A., D. Litt.,
Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford. Vols. I and II. Mac-
millan & Co., New York and London, 1895, 1897. \$2.50 each.

These volumes form the opening instalments of Professor Courthope's work, intended to be the first *complete* history of English poetry that we have had since Warton, or rather that we have ever had, and we trust that the fates may be more propitious to him than to ten Brink and Morley, cut off before they had more than half completed their great designs.

That a complete history of English poetry is wanted will not be questioned, for in the multiplicity of monographs and partial works, of single volumes treating certain periods, and of text-books of English literature, we have no work that gives a thorough and scholarly treatment of all our literature, or even of the poetical literature alone. It is to be regretted that the plan of the work did not include a history of the prose literature also, as in the works of ten Brink and Morley, for literature is individual as well as national, and the separation of a man's work in poetry from his work in prose looks like depriving him of a part of his individuality, dividing his mind in two, as it were, and giving but a partial view of the man himself—but it is not worth while to quarrel with what we have.

The first volume covers the period included in "The Middle Ages: influence of the Roman empire; the encyclopaedic education of the Church, and the feudal system"; the second, that marked by "the Renaissance and the Reformation: influence of the Court and the Universities." It will thus be seen that the first volume corresponds generally with Part I of Jusserand's "Literary History of the English People," published in the same year in English, although the French edition appeared the year before (1894). Prof. Courthope's preface gives his point of view. He quotes Pope's scheme, which remained but a scheme, and Gray's design, which he abandoned on learning of Warton's work, but, with his well-known procrastination, it is doubtful whether he would ever have executed it, even if Warton had not been engaged on a similar work. Courthope regrets that Warton set about his work—which was never completed—"in the spirit of an antiquary" rather than in that of a literary critic, and thinks that he was better fitted for the latter than for the former, hence the deficiencies of Warton's history. He then explains the principles of his own work. Taking warning from the experience of Warton, he concludes that the design of the historian of English poetry must possess unity; Gray's design fulfilled this condition, but his classification did not correspond with the facts; Courthope aims "to treat poetry as an expression of the imagination, not simply of the individual poet, but of the English people." He thinks too that a historical treatment of poetry "must exhibit the principle

of its growth and movement," and finds fault, justly, with Taine because he looks with disdain upon the minor poets of the fourteenth century and finds little of interest in them, which causes blunders with regard to them. But "The Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists regarded themselves as the lineal descendants of the poets of the fourteenth century," and so "we must examine the foundations on which they built." While rightly regarding Taine's criticism of our earlier poets as too depreciatory, Courthope takes exception to Pater's and Symonds's views of the Renaissance "as a sudden and isolated movement of the human mind, which cannot be explained by the ordinary methods of historic investigation." He thinks rather that "the business of historical criticism is to trace the stream of thought that connects age with age, and the almost imperceptible gradations which mark the advance of language and metrical harmony." This causes him too to deal "not only with the progress of poetical invention, but with the more technical question of the development of metrical harmony." For taking up this subject he apologizes in advance both to the philologist and to the general reader. No apology is necessary to the former if he gives the correct results as ascertained by philologists.

After this sketch of his object and principles in the preface, Prof. Courthope announces his intention of tracing "the history of the art of English poetry from the time of Chaucer to the time of Scott." He thus disclaims any intention of giving a history of poetry anterior to Chaucer, and justifies himself for abandoning the method of ten Brink and Jusserand, on the ground that "between the poetry produced in England before the Norman Conquest and the poetry of Chaucer there is absolutely no connection." But half of the volume is taken up with a consideration of poetry in England antecedent to Chaucer, and chapters III and IV treat specially "the poetry of the Anglo-Saxons," and "Anglo-Norman poetry"; so he himself feels that this period cannot be altogether neglected, and however distinct the alliteration of Langland is from that of Layamon and from the earlier normal scheme of the Anglo-Saxons, it is scarcely probable that Langland would have originated the metrical scheme of his great poem if he had not had earlier models, and the history of "the development of metrical harmony" alone would have necessitated an investigation of the form and style, and hence the contents, of these earlier models, so that the historical connection cannot be overlooked.

Renouncing then any "attempt to derive the originals of Chaucer from the cradles of the Anglo-Saxon race," the author seeks "to trace his imagination through its immediate literary sources," to "connect it with the poetry of races of partial Latin descent," judging that in this way cause and effect may be linked together. These peoples, while differing in language and race, "are united by a common system of faith, education, and military institution," and their writers deal with similar problems of thought, which take their rise in a more ancient system of civilization, "but not joined to the life of Europe in the Middle Ages by any apparently continuous stream of literature." It is the course of this stream that Prof. Courthope proposes to trace in order "to arrive at the primal fountains of mediaeval poetry." Next will come "the progressive stages in the formation of the mediaeval stream of thought, which feeds the literatures of England, France and Italy," and its connection with "the great

system of Graeco-Roman culture, which seems—but only seems—to disappear from the world after the death of Boethius.” Then the course of the national language must be explored “in order to observe the changes produced by Saxon and Norman influences on the art of metrical expression before it received the developments of Chaucer.” Finally, the meaning of the word “Renaissance” must be examined, and “the early effects of the movement on the literature of Europe.” We can then appreciate the evolution of poetical thought and language that characterized the art of succeeding poets.

This comprehensive method is analogous to that of Prof. Freeman in the field of history, for it seeks to connect the modern with the ancient, to evolve the former out of the latter, to show that the modern is the legitimate descendant of the ancient, and is not separated by any hard-and-fast line. Like Freeman’s unity of history—which he enforced on all occasions—it emphasizes the principle of the unity of literature. This work needed to be done, for, so far as we know, it had not yet been done for English literature, historians of literature apparently thinking it necessary only to begin with Chaucer as an isolated phenomenon, as if he too were not the child of his age, and often to overlook the antecedent literature.

After this preliminary sketch of his plan, showing the philosophic method which he intends to pursue, Prof. Courthope examines “the character and sources of mediaeval poetry,” his object being, for a right understanding of the character of English poetry, “to appreciate the nature of the vast change in the life of imagination effected during the decline of the Roman Empire and the gradual formation of the mediaeval system of Europe.” The subject is treated at some length under the four heads: “(1) The decline of the civic spirit under the Roman Empire, and the corresponding decay of classical taste; (2) the transformation of the system of imperial education by the Latin Church; (3) the rise of a new mythology among the nations embraced within the system of Latin Christianity; and (4) the influence of feudal institutions, of the scholastic logic, and of Oriental culture” (p. 14).

Our limits will not permit a detailed examination of each of these points. Suffice it to say that, after a brief discussion of the first two, Prof. Courthope concludes “that, in this continuous stream of education . . . we find the controlling force which has, in one form or another, guided the imagination and judgment of every generation of poets from the days of Augustus down to our own era.” The third point is treated at greater length, and the replacing of the pagan mythology by the Christian, and its effects on poetry, are discussed, especially when accompanied by the growth of heroic legends, as those of Troy and Alexander from the ancient world, of Charlemagne and King Arthur from the modern. This cause, it seems to us, had the greatest influence on the progress of mediaeval poetry, as a similar cause affected ancient poetry. The fourth point is next treated, and the common bond of minstrelsy is found to connect the Teutonic *Scop* (Prof. Courthope prefers the older form *Scôp*) and the Romance *Trouvère* and *Troubadour*; the *Gleeman* becomes the *Jongleur*. “Teutonic, as well as Celtic, poetry is, in its origin, an embodiment of the imagination of the Tribe, not of the State” (p. 60), but the character of this minstrelsy changed, especially under the influences that emanated from Charlemagne, “the last great figure of Teutonic epic song,” and “the decline in the

spirit of minstrelsy led to a great variety of style in metrical composition." The result was shorter compositions and a great variety of tales; society became more settled, and "the Frankish intellect, coming under the influence of an old civilization, began to aim at new artistic ideals." The scholastic logic too affected literature, as in the case of Dante and Chaucer; so, while "the motive power of Christian European poetry springs from the oral minstrelsy of the Teutonic [i. e. Germanic] and Scandinavian tribes," this was "profoundly modified by contact with Latin civilization," and the resulting effects.

Inquiry is next directed to "the origin of the metrical forms and literary models adopted by the early poets of France and Italy, who gave the first examples of composition to the fathers of English verse" (p. 69). The author shows how the prosody of Latin verse was modified by the prevalence of the principle of accent over that of quantity, referring to Prudentius, who treated *mathesis* as having the second syllable short, and Diomedes, who treated *armatus* as an amphibrach. So in popular verses the laws of quantity were soon completely disregarded, and this was done deliberately in the hymns of the early Christian fathers, the Hymn of St. Ambrose, cited by Bede (*De Metrica Ratione*), being given as an illustration. Other illustrations of this point follow, and "The sum of what has been said as to the history of modern European metres is, that many of the Greek metres were imported into the Latin language by the literary Roman poets; that some of them were afterwards modified, by the disregard of quantity, to suit the requirements of the popular ear; and that, still later, by some obvious retrenchments, they were accommodated to the changed character of the Romance languages which grew up out of the rustic Latin." But as this was not sufficient to explain "the rise of the new system of rhyming architecture," the author traces it to the Arabs, from whom the poets derived their models of harmony. The Italian poets took them from the Arabs of Sicily and the French from those of Spain, and from the Arabs came not only the Italian and Provençal metres, "but even the poetical conventions observed by Petrarch and the troubadours."

This is but a brief summary of Prof. Courthope's interesting chapter on the mediaeval poetry of Europe, but it has been thought advisable to give it, as the subject is usually omitted in histories of English literature, and as it illustrates his attempt "to bridge over in various directions the gulf that seems to separate the civilization of the ancient world from the thought and imagination of the community of Europe in the Middle Ages, at the time when the rising nations were beginning to make use of the vulgar tongues for the purposes of poetical composition" (p. 78).

He now travels back to England and traces the fusion of the elements of the English language from Anglo-Saxon times to Chaucer. The chapter on Anglo-Saxon poetry need not detain us long. This has been much better done elsewhere. Prof. Courthope is evidently not so much of a philologist as of a literary critic, and forgets the old saw, *ne sutor supra crepidam*. A summary of the *Beowulf* is given, based on Arnold and Earle, and a notice of the *Byrhtnoth* and of the *Metrical Paraphrase*, "once ascribed to Caedmon." We should be glad to have the grounds of the "certainly" in the enumeration of the works of Cynewulf's composition. There is a reference to Kemble's *Codex Vercel-*

lensis for Cynewulf's date, which date has been long since abandoned by scholars, a short extract from Weymouth's translation of the *Elene*, a reference to Stopford Brooke's *History* to combat his view that Cynewulf was equal to Caedmon, and a short account of the *Crist*, with reference to Gollancz's edition. A few lines from *Beowulf*, in which there are several misprints, are given "as a good sample of the style," and a few pages follow (in which there are several errors) intended to show how Anglo-Saxon changed to English. The point of view may be given from the following quotation of one "change": "5. The gradual substitution of the termination *ing* for that of *and* in the present participle. This change at first sight seems anomalous, considering that the Norman-French *ant* resembled the Saxon ending. The latter, however, in the southern part of the country, was replaced by the variation *ind*, and it may be conjectured that the final labial [*sic*] of this ending, under the influence of the Normans, with whom the *t* of the present participle was mute, gave way to the guttural *g*" (pp. 109, 110). It would have been better to omit this whole antiquated linguistic discussion. In its attempt to turn Anglo-Saxon into English with a wave of the hand, it reminds us of Jefferson's *Essay towards facilitating instruction in the Anglo-Saxon language*, but that was one hundred years ago. It is not well to make an excursus into language in a purely literary work.

The chapters on "Anglo-Norman Poetry" and on "The Early Renaissance" are better done, and here we traverse the ground of Jusserand's Book II. The genius of the Normans is contrasted with that of the Saxons; their poetical activity includes three stages, that of Wace and Benoit de Ste. More in the twelfth century, the romantic poetry (and prose) of the *chansons de geste* and the King Arthur cycle, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the lays and fables of Marie de France, who is placed by Courthope in the reign of Henry III, although Jusserand says she "lived in the time of Henry II." Orm and Layamon are touched upon, but the *Owl and Nightingale* receives the fullest attention. The author places it in the reign of Edward I, rather later than it is usually assigned, and thinks that it shows "the influence of French models" and "a careful study of the style of Marie." The *Cursor Mundi* shows the writer "to be a genuine descendant of Caedmon, though breathing the atmosphere of the Middle Ages." If so, this helps the connection between Caedmon and Chaucer. A notice of the works of Robert of Brunne and Robert of Gloucester closes the chapter. The *King Horn* and *Havelok the Dane* are barely mentioned, but they still further aid the historical connection and might have been described.

The early Renaissance is treated as affecting Italy, France, and England. "Up to the middle of the thirteenth century European poetry may be said to possess a universal character," and that, "because it reflects the image of a society which still preserves many of the essential features of the universal Roman Empire." "The Renaissance" is called a phrase at once misleading and obscure, and exception is taken to the usual definitions, "for on the one hand the pioneers of the movement were the schoolmen, . . . and on the other, the stream of classical culture . . . had never entirely ceased to flow." It was "a tendency inherent in the condition of things, and it was promoted from different quarters by the independent action of all the greatest minds of the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries." This seems like saying it was so because it was so, and fails to give any adequate cause. Until this great movement affected each country in turn there was no national literature, and the production of such was one of its greatest effects. The effects in Italy, as seen in the works of Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, and in France, as represented by the *Roman de la Rose*, of which a full analysis is given, are traced, and then we pass to England, where "the idea of national life and of the just relations between Church and State," had been conceived more clearly than in any other country of Europe. This development of political liberty had its foundation in the institutions of the Saxon race, but "had the Saxon race remained in complete isolation, a certain slowness of temperament, which is apt to disguise its more heroic qualities, might have sunk it in torpor and decay." The Danes "infused new blood and energy into the northern part of the island," and "the Normans from the south communicated a fresh shock to the national life by the introduction of feudal institutions, and of a ruling race possessed of all the qualities in which the exhausted Saxon dynasty was deficient" (p. 186). As these results did occur, we cannot speculate on what might have happened if the Danes and Normans had not invaded England, but from the dogged energy and persistency of the Saxon race, which have ever characterized the English people, and from the conspicuous lack of such qualities in the French people, the nearest of kin to the Normans, we may reasonably suppose that the basic qualities of the English would have re-asserted themselves in the course of time even if there had been no such cataclysm as the Norman invasion, which more or less repressed the native race for many years, and even if the result had shown somewhat less elasticity of temperament and brilliancy of imagination. English = three-fourths Saxon + one-fourth Norman. This spirit of political liberty is seen in the political songs of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (see Wright's *Political Songs* in the *Rolls Series*), several of which, in English, French and Latin, and some of the macaronic kind (French and Latin), are commented on. Abuses of all sorts, and especially the universal corruption of justice in both the ecclesiastical and the king's courts, are ridiculed and denounced. "Non est lex sana quod regi sit mea lana," illustrates the tenor of one of this class. So also,

" Sum cum justitiario
 Qui te modo vario
 Possum adjuvare,
 Si vis impetrare
 Per suum subsidium.
 Da michi dimidium
 Et te volo juvare " (p. 193).

The song after the battle of Lewes—which has also been separately edited—states the respective positions of the king and the barons. The patriotic poetry of Laurence Minot (1333–1352) illustrates another side of the national spirit. The effect of the Renaissance in England was then to awaken this spirit of political liberty, to "reveal a consciousness of united purpose and corporate pride in the nation, for which no contemporary parallel can be found in any other country of Europe." "The time had not yet come for

England when the masterpieces of ancient literature could exercise a refining influence on the efforts of her native genius" (p. 198). This, however, was to come a little later.

Prof. Courthope calls Langland the Naevius and Chaucer the Ennius of English poetry, and the two following chapters are devoted respectively to a study of each of these great poets. This order is preferable to that of M. Jusserand, who treats Chaucer and Gower before Langland, whereas the first form of Langland's work was written before Chaucer had even translated the *Romaunt of the Rose*. Langland's *Vision of Piers Plowman* is rightly called "a classic work in English literature"; his "vigorous satire, vivid powers of description, strong sense of justice, so faithfully reflect the conscience of the English people, that his *Vision* often seems to be projecting its light upon the ethical problems of our own day." The author discusses "the two great principles on which society in the Middle Ages rested, Catholicism and Chivalry," and shows that they "reached their grand climacteric, and sank into rapid decay." Even before Wycliff the religious sense of the time embodied itself in Langland's great work. It is analysed very fully, and a parallel is drawn between Dante and Langland: "both poets present an image of the ideal or spiritual order of nature and human society, in striking contrast with the actual course of the world"; "but Dante's conception was based on the metaphysical side of Catholic Christianity, Langland's on the ethical and practical side"; this gives the keynote of the criticism.

A brief extract from the *Brunanburh*, with many misprints, and one from *Piers Plowman*, are given as illustrative of the metre, but Prof. Courthope does not analyse the structure of the Anglo-Saxon verse. The two do not admit of strict comparison. Langland merely employs, though with great skill, the old-fashioned alliteration as an ornament to his verse, for he has been to some extent affected by the Renaissance in his metrical form, and does not attempt to reproduce accurately the original rhythm, but he uses the same metrical principle. His metre is sometimes very regular, but at others very irregular, and at variance with the older scheme.

An interesting chapter on Chaucer and his works follows that on Langland. It is confessedly based on Prof. Skeat's edition, but unfortunately Courthope does not always follow Skeat in his quotations, and hence his text is sometimes bad and needs emendation. We note in passing on p. 252 the common misprint of *Village* for *Visage*. As to the burning question of the final -e, Courthope is inclined to follow Payne in *Essays on Chaucer* (Chaucer Society, IV, pp. 84-154) vs. Skeat. He thinks no positive answer can be returned to the question "whether or not it was pronounced at the end and in the *caesura* of an English verse, in words where it had a grammatical significance" (p. 256). He is willing to grant that "strong arguments are forthcoming on both sides of the question," but he leaves each reader to follow his own taste. This view would now be regarded as antiquated, and most scholars would certainly prefer to follow Morris and Skeat and pronounce the final -e, notwithstanding the "feminine rhymes." The existing translation of the *Romaunt of the Rose* is regarded as Chaucer's, and we are not even informed that there is any doubt about it. An extract from it is given as showing that Chaucer "furnished the English language with a new standard of versification which no poet

henceforth could afford to disregard"; and it is "not only remarkable as making a landmark in the refinement of our versification," but "it marks with equal significance the rise of a new spirit in English poetry, the importation of thoughts and themes from the Continent, announcing the approach of the Renaissance" (p. 258). While this work and, at a farther remove, *Troilus and Criseyde*, are treated as showing Chaucer's powers as a translator, the *Book of the Duchess*, the *Parlement of Foules*, the *House of Fame*, and the *Legend of Good Women*, show his powers as an imitator; and the *Canterbury Tales*, as an inventor. They are "the full harvest of the art of the trouvère," who "was the lineal literary descendant of the tribal gleeman" (p. 279).

The trouvère was dependent upon the *Fables of Bidpai* and the *History of the Seven Wise Masters*, of Hindoo and Persian origin, which provided him with his models. Thus originated mediaeval story-telling. "The main object of the literary trouvère was to collect appropriate subjects, and Chaucer, with his habits of encyclopaedic study and omnivorous reading, had amassed a supply of stories, not indeed so numerous as those collected by Boccaccio, but covering a wider range of tastes and interests" (p. 288). His framework was his own, and who but Chaucer could have given us such inimitable pictures of the various characters in English society? A table of the *Tales*, with their respective sources, is given, and a summary of the time spent on the journey, after Skeat. A criticism of Chaucer's excellences closes the chapter, and he is pronounced "the first *national* poet of England." Chaucer emancipated poetry from the trammels of "Metaphysics, Allegory, and Theology, and from the deductive methods of thought encouraged by encyclopaedic science," and "reanimated it by the old classical principle of the direct imitation of nature." Others developed this principle, Ariosto, Cervantes, Molière, "but to Chaucer must be assigned the honor of having led the way." Thus the movement of the fourteenth century from the mediaeval to the modern had its pioneer in Chaucer.

Our limits permit but a mention of the succeeding chapters. One follows on "The Epical School of Chaucer—Gower, Lydgate, Occleve," in which these poets are much more fully treated than by Jusserand. The Progress of Allegory in English Poetry is next considered, as illustrated in the *Pearl* and the *Vision of Piers the Plowman*, which exemplify two opposite modes of treatment, the contemplative and the active, in the *Temple of Glass*, which follows the rules of the fashionable Love-allegory, in the *Court of Love*, of much later date, and in the *King's Quair*, which stands midway between the other two, and "forms a landmark in the history of allegorical poetry." These are followed by the works of Henryson, Dunbar, and Douglas, in Scotland; Hawes, Skelton, and Barclay, in England. The last has been usually known only from his translation of Brandt's *Ship of Fools*, but his *Eclogues*, in which "the bucolic style is adopted merely as a vehicle of a moral allegory," are more fully treated by Prof. Courthope. Allegory was a most popular form of composition, and it seems that scarcely any writer could avoid using it as a vehicle for moral instruction. It is, indeed, as old as Esop, and the *Faerie Queen* and the *Pilgrim's Progress* are doubtless the most brilliant examples of it in English literature, but the taste for it has declined, and it is now considered heavy and antiquated.

The Rise of the Drama in England is next treated in the familiar forms of the Mysteries and the Moralities, but we find nothing new,—a mere synopsis of the well-known authorities.

A chapter on the Decay of English Minstrelsy succeeds, and here the deficiency in Jusserand is supplied. Percy's and Ritson's views are discussed; the author considers Percy "amply warranted in concluding that 'the minstrels seem to have been the genuine successors of the ancient bards.'" His very free "editing" of his MS. is not, however, endorsed. The changes in the art of minstrelsy are traced, "as illustrated by the progress of society from the tribal to the civil state, by the transition from oral to written poetry, and by the character of the ballad." The ballad is defined, its origin and development are treated, and some illustrations are given, particularly the *Mary Hamilton*, as showing that the ballad "was a type of poem adapted by the professors of the declining art of minstrelsy from the romances once in favor with the educated classes."

A Retrospect of some half-dozen pages, giving a summary of the History, closes the volume. With the exception of the third chapter on the poetry of the Anglo-Saxons, Prof. Courthope has given us in this volume an interesting contribution to a complete history of English poetry.

In the second volume the same design as that noted in the first volume, of tracing the course of English poetry by the stream of the national thought and imagination, and by its European relations, is continued, and it is now all the more important because "the sixteenth century is the great age of transition from mediaeval to modern times; the chief poets of the period work from the basis of culture provided for them by the Middle Ages, but they are alive to all the influences of their own age; and, like their ancestor Chaucer, they avail themselves of ideas and feelings flowing in upon them from a foreign source." A sketch is first given of the religious and political system of Europe in the early sixteenth century, "in the still Catholic European community," as shown in the Diet of Augsburg (1518). The idea of the modern state arose out of the decaying fabric of the Christian Republic, and "Spain, France, and England began to display a clearly marked individuality in all matters relating to religion, art, literature and manners." This is seen in the works of the great European writers. The *Courtier* of Castiglione and the *Discourses* and the *Prince* of Machiavelli, "particularly impressed the minds of knightly poets and scholarly dramatists in England." Mr. Courthope accounts for Machiavelli by the circumstances by which he was surrounded, and thinks that his works exerted an all-powerful influence. The *Colloquies* of Erasmus too exerted a strong influence "on the more reflective part of European society in the sixteenth century, by educating public opinion indirectly in a more rational scheme of manners and conduct"; and Luther's treatise on *Christian Liberty* exerted a similar influence in the religious sphere. The three countries of Spain, England, and France were sufficiently organized to receive the influences of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Spain resisted them; More's *Utopia* showed how "the unity of Christendom might be expanded to satisfy modern requirements," and it was destined to bear fruit hereafter; in France power was concentrated in the hands of the king, who was absolute; the writers reflected the ideas of the Court, and lacked the ideas of rational liberty and toleration seen in the

Utopia. The author traces these influences so as to give a view of "the collective forces acting on the imagination of Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century." Especially "the idea of liberty of thought and action, in the constitution both of the State and the Individual," arises, and all of these influences affect the English imagination, and "begin to break up the solid structure of traditional belief and ancient chivalry." Prof. Courthope's method is thus seen to be very different from that of Prof. Morley, more philosophic, and directed to tracing the history of ideas and how these European ideas affected English literature.

After this sketch of "intellectual conflict in Europe in the sixteenth century," the following chapters are devoted to showing its effect in England in the poems of Wyatt and Surrey, the pioneers of the English Renaissance. In the poems of Wyatt we see the first results, since Chaucer, of the study of Italian literature. He is distinguished from the preceding poets by "the individual energy of his thought and his persistent imitation of foreign models." To him is due the credit of the introduction of the sonnet into English literature; but, although he followed the Petrarchan model, from his unfortunate lack of ear he was unable to make the improvement in English versification which characterized the poems of Surrey. In his satires he imitated Alamanni in his use of the *terza rima*, and he also combined the Alexandrine with the Septenar, so that he struck out new paths in English verse, even if he did not possess the skill to handle his instrument very successfully. "Wyatt is a noble figure in English poetry. His strength, his ardor, his manliness, his complete freedom from affectation, make him a type of what is finest in the national character, and there is little exaggeration in the very fine epitaph written on him by his great contemporary, Surrey"—which epitaph closes the chapter.

Surrey was a man of more ardent disposition than Wyatt, and not so grave a character. He lacked Wyatt's "vehement individuality," "but he succeeds where Wyatt failed in naturalizing the ideas he borrows by the beauty of his style," and to it "he owes his great position in the history of English poetry." His unfortunate death, or murder rather, on a trumped-up charge by the advisers of the king, when Henry was on his death-bed, was a great loss to English letters. Like Sir Philip Sidney later, he was the flower of chivalry, and both by birth and character was a fine representative of English nobility. His "Fair Geraldine" was an idealized lady-love, and his love-poems were, like Wyatt's, modeled after Petrarch; but he possessed higher gifts than Wyatt of "terseness, sweetness, purity, and facility of style." His reform of English versification is traced under several heads, showing that he grounded himself on Chaucer, but it is unfortunate that Prof. Courthope should use such a poor text, with so many misprints, as that given on p. 87 as a specimen of the beginning of the Prologue; Prof. Skeat might have supplied him with a better one. Surrey's sonnet-stanza is that used afterwards by Shakspeare and is not the Petrarchan form. He too first used blank verse in his translation of Virgil; and "he was also the first to refine the system of poetical diction so as to adapt it to the reformed versification."

But while Wyatt and Surrey were thus refining the style and versification of English poetry after Italian models, political poetry was being developed in

Scotland in the writings of Sir David Lyndsay, and a little later in England in the huge collection of political tragedies known as the *Mirror for Magistrates*, which owes its claim to consideration as poetry to Sackville's *Induction* and his *Complaint of the Duke of Buckingham*. Lyndsay was a follower of Douglas and Dunbar in his use of dream and allegory, but he was more. He used his allegory to illustrate the political condition of the country. Lyndsay's manner is still mediaeval: it points backward, but his matter points forward, and, in its "union of Lutheran piety, political philosophy, and classical imagery," reflects the mind of the Scottish aristocracy on the eve of the Reformation. A full account is given of the composition of the *Mirror for Magistrates*, and its language and versification are pronounced to be "full of instruction for the student who seeks to trace systematically the growth of the art of English poetry" (p. 17). The transition in style from the rude and archaic of the early sixteenth century to the finished manner of the Elizabethan writers is here seen. It culminates in Sackville's *Induction*, for Sackville showed the beneficial influence of Surrey. "Of the epic poets of England, if Chaucer is the first to exhibit the genuinely classic spirit, Sackville is the first to write in the genuinely classic manner."

A chapter follows on the translations of the classics, due to the establishment of the new learning in the universities, and the love of learning shown by Elizabeth herself. "Wolsey promoted the study of Greek by the foundation of Christ Church [Oxford]. Colet and Grocyn lectured on the Greek orators and poets in the same university; and Cheke and Ascham familiarized their scholars at Cambridge with the dialogues of Plato, the philosophy most highly approved by the reformers of the Continent. Here was an influence that could not fail to be felt in literature. But Elizabeth, according to Roger Ascham, knew Latin, Greek, French and Italian, and could speak with facility all of those languages. Ascham was her preceptor in Latin and Greek for two years, so he ought to know. This learned influence communicated itself to the Court, the Universities, and the writers. A translation of the *Aeneid* had been made by Douglas in 1513, Surrey had translated Books II and IV into blank verse, the first in English, and now Thos. Phaer, 1555-1560, and Thos. Twine, 1562, translated the whole of it into the iambic septenar. Jasper Heywood, 1559-61, translated three of the tragedies attributed to Seneca into the same ballad metre; and Arthur Golding, 1565-67, turned into the same verse Ovid's *Metamorphoses*; this was the translation which Shakspeare used. All of these translations testify to a desire for a knowledge of the new learning in English form.

Now came many imitators and followers of Wyatt and Surrey in the numerous *Miscellanies* of Elizabeth's reign, which were preceded in 1557 by the most important of all, *Tottel's Miscellany*, containing the poems of Wyatt and Surrey, of Thomas, Lord Vaux, Grimald, and others. Grimald led in the pedantic and conceited style of the later school of Cowley, dubbed by Dr. Johnson "metaphysical," doubtless merely because it was unnatural. He was the first to imitate Surrey in the use of blank verse, in which he showed his good sense, writing in that verse a poem on the *Death of Cicero*. Googe followed with his *Eglogues*, *Epytaphes*, and *Sonettes*, and Turbervile, with his *Songs*, *Epitaphs*, and *Epigrams*. Googe, who translated *The Zodiac of Life*, of Marcellus

Palingenius, and Turberville, Ovid's *Heroical Epistles* and Mantuan's *Eclogues*. Churchyard, who had contributed "a tragedy called *Shore's Wife*" to the *Mirror for Magistrates*, contributed poems also to these *Miscellanies*, and lived to be called old-fashioned by the later Elizabethans. But he was far exceeded by Gascoigne, after Sackville the greatest name in English letters before Spenser. Gascoigne was a leader in many ways and deserves more credit than he has usually received. Prof. Courthope does not seem to be aware of Prof. Schelling's excellent monograph on his life and works. He wrote sonnets, lyrics, a satire, *The Steel Glass*, and other *Poesies*, and was a critic of English verse—but we shall have to return to him under the drama.

Gascoigne died in 1577, and we now reach the middle of Elizabeth's reign, the beginning of the Elizabethan efflorescence in literature. The preceding thirty or forty years had been preparation and now we have fulfillment. Three chapters follow, treating Court Dialect, as seen in Lyly, Court Romance, in Sidney, and Court Allegory, in Spenser. Euphuism is treated as a movement towards refinement in language which affected every literature in Europe. Although the *Euphues* and the *Arcadia* are written in prose, the author thinks they are "so closely associated with metrical composition and with the progress of English taste that it would be unphilosophical to regard them as beyond the limits of a history of English poetry." This illustrates the disadvantage of treating poetry and prose separately in a history of English literature; they mutually act upon each other, and both must be considered in any complete view of the national thought and imagination. Passing over what is said of Italy, Spain and France, we find the problem in England of forming a standard of literary composition more difficult because of the mixture of races and languages, but, fortunately for the development of style, "French influence so far prevailed that the order of words in a sentence follows the logical order of the thought." This is an advantage, it may be noted, that the Germans have never attained, and hence their involved and cumbrous prose style. The introduction of Latinized words was carried so far that many never took root. Witness Douglas's *dulcorate* and *facund*, Lyndsay's *prepotent* and *celsitude*, and Wilson's specimen (p. 183), which he says is no caricature, containing such words as *revoluting*, *ingenia*, *accessited*, *adjuvate*, *obtestate*, *contignate*, *invigilate*, &c., &c., so that it requires that one should know Latin in order to know English. It may be remarked in passing that the date here given for Wilson's *Art of Rhetoric*, the first treatise of the kind in English, is 1562, whereas on p. 289 it is given as 1553, and this was not the first edition. The date of this work is of importance as bearing upon the date of our first comedy, *Ralph Roister Doister*. The history of Euphuism is traced, and it is carried back, as usual, to Guevara. If Prof. Courthope knows of Landmann's study of the subject, he does not mention it. The common characteristics of this stylistic fad, as seen in Lyly's work, natural history metaphors, antithesis and alliteration—"transverse alliteration," as Landmann calls it—are duly noted, and its great influence remarked. "*Euphues* was as much esteemed by polite society as by the critics. It was accepted with the *Arcadia* as fixing the standard of eloquence at Court." *Euphues* is called "an example of rhetoric in the language of love composed to suit the taste of the Court," hence its flattery, its logic and its illustration.

"The metaphorical style in the love-poetry of the Euphuists is a natural growth of the classical Renaissance: it marks the decay of the allegorical interpretation of nature, which itself largely accounts for the abundant use of metaphor in the poetry of the Middle Ages." The influence of *Euphuus* lasted for a hundred years, and Prof. Courthope considers Lyly's discovery as of permanent value, for "he perceived the advantage of clearness, correctness and precision, in the arrangement of words." For this he should receive due credit, and his style, when purged of its unnecessary adjuncts, left a residuum of value in the history of English prose style. "Addison and Steele . . . learned from Lyly how to present genuine thoughts in an artistic form; and Burke, Johnson, and Macaulay, . . . followed his example in working up sentences and periods to the climax required for the just and forcible presentation of the argument"¹ (pp. 201-2).

Sidney was at the head of the school opposed to the Euphuists, and he criticises them in one of his sonnets. Sidney, Dyer, Harvey, and Spenser for a time, until his good sense predominated, wished to reform English versification after the Latin, and perpetrated certain barbarous hexameters. Edward Vere, Earl of Oxford, was at the head of the other party, and was a great favorer of the Euphuists; he and Sidney quarreled and it came near resulting in a duel. On Sidney's retirement from the Court in consequence of his bold protest against the Anjou marriage, he amused himself with writing the *Arcadia* for his sister Mary, "Sidney's sister, Pembroke's mother," intermingling poetry with his prose romance. This work is treated at some length and its literary defects are commented on. "The action is wanting in human interest, the characters are conventional, the structure of the story is confused and irregular." The style too is criticised: "Nothing is said plainly; commonplace is disguised by metaphor; style is mechanically elevated by a tricky arrangement of words." But, "regarded historically, as a mirror of the feelings of Sidney and the best of his contemporaries, and as a work of fiction contributing to the development of the English drama, the *Arcadia* is a most interesting monument." The element which affected contemporary taste was derived from the study of Montemayor, and consisted in "concentrating the main interest of his narrative in the complications of the love-plots." The dramatists were indebted to the *Arcadia* for sentiment and landscape, for development of action and character, and for the complications arising from the disguise of sex.

The *Astrophel and Stella* sonnets are also treated with critical insight, and Prof. Courthope differs from several other critics, Lamb, Trench, and Symonds, in his interpretation. He thinks that their "theory of a profound and all-pervading passion is contradicted by the facts of the case, by the character of Sidney, by the character of the sonnets themselves." Each of these points is developed, and I must say that I am inclined to agree with Prof. Courthope. This attempt of critics to find in ideal love-poems some personal reference, which has been "run into the ground" in the case of Shakspeare's Sonnets, seems to me far-fetched and mistaken. Penelope Devereux was a young girl

¹I may be permitted to remark just here that in my "Selections in English Prose from Elizabeth to Victoria" (1891) I purposely begin with Lyly as the pioneer in the formation of English prose style, and I fully concur with Prof. Courthope in giving credit to Lyly for his contribution to this object.

who attracted Sidney's attention when she was under fifteen, and her father was anxious for the match. Some cause, now unknown, prevented it, and after she was married to Lord Rich at the age of nineteen, she became Sydney's "Laura," and received his ideal adoration. "Artistic opposition to the Euphuists" also inspired these Sonnets, and "sonnet after sonnet sounds the note that love alone is an adequate source of inspiration, without the artificial supplement of science and learning." This is a much more reasonable theory than the personal one.

The chapter on Court Allegory is a very full criticism of Spenser. As the greatest genius since Chaucer, and the writer in whom the influences of the Elizabethan age culminated, he receives the fullest share of critical attention. "He wanted no quality required to place him in the same class with Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and perhaps I may add Chaucer, but that supreme gift of insight and invention which enables the poet to blend conflicting ideas into an organic form." Prof. Courthope does not agree either with those who regard Spenser "primarily as a poetical *philosopher*," or with Lowell, who thinks "the true use of Spenser is as a gallery of pictures," and who compares the moral to "a bit of gravel in a dish of strawberries and cream." The sense is, for Courthope, a characteristic part of his work, but the allegory is mainly interesting in so far as it serves the purposes of poetry, not then as a vehicle of moral truth. The designs of the poems are separately examined, and artistic unity is found even in *The Shepherd's Calendar*. These poems were his experiments in poetical diction. The design of the *Faery Queen* is found in the letter to Raleigh, not in the poem itself. "As he sought in *The Shepherd's Calendar* to treat the Eclogue in a new style, so in the *Faery Queen* he aimed at producing a variety of the Romantic Epic of the Italians." As is seen in Harvey's correspondence, he sought to "overgo Ariosto."

His works are examined to see "how far his conceptions were formed in harmony with the laws of his art, and how far his execution did justice to his subjects as he conceived them." In the examination of *The Shepherd's Calendar* from a metrical point of view, Mr. Courthope thinks that "the metres of several of his Eclogues are founded on what he erroneously believed to be the metre of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*," and that he read the Prologue with four accents instead of five, as follows:

" Whánne that A | príle with his | shówres | sóte
The dróught | of Márch | had pérc'd | to the róte," &c.

This is a remarkable mixture of dactylic-trochaic and iambic-anapaestic rhythm, the latter predominating in the following lines, but from Spenser's ignorance of Chaucer's language, it is barely possible that he so read the Prologue, for he does employ this "composite style" in this poem. It is pronounced, on the whole, "a truly beautiful and graceful, if somewhat artificial composition."

The *Faery Queen* is also examined at length and compared with Ariosto. "Ariosto's word-painting is unequalled for brilliancy and distinctness of color, but Spenser surpasses him in depth of imagination." Beside being a great picture-gallery, the *Faery Queen* "is also a vast experiment in English metrical composition," and Spenser's treatment of his stanza is judged to be

"a triumph of art." Spenser was the poet of chivalry and of mediaeval allegory. "He composed his poems in the spirit of a great painter, a great musician," and his *Faery Queen* is "a thing of beauty, a joy forever."

The next chapter on the growth of criticism and its effect on poetry, with notice of the poetical euphuists, traces the advance of national taste as seen in the later Elizabethan *Miscellanies* and the consequent development of poetical criticism. Gascoigne was here a pioneer, for his *Notes of Instruction concerning the Making of Verse* is the first critical treatise that we have on the verse-practice of the time. Campion, Webbe, Puttenham, and Sidney receive brief notice, and the four main groups of metrical composers are successively described, the university scholars, Harvey and Fraunce, who wished "to reform the national poetry on classical lines"; the sonnet writers, Watson, Constable, Lodge, Daniel, and others, who imitated Petrarch and the Italians until they ran out in the nonsense of Barnes; the court poets, Sidney, Dyer, Essex, Raleigh, Oxford, who have written some of the best lyrics of the age; and finally, the men of letters, "who embodied the spirit of the Renaissance in poetical romance or classical mythology," such men as Breton, Barnfield, Greene, Lodge, and Marlowe. These last have left the most permanent impress on the poetry of the time, and in Marlowe's *Hero and Leander* we have the culmination of the poetry of passion. "Though his style is colored with the conceits and mannerism of the period, yet, as compared with the diction of contemporary Euphuistic writers, it has a fiery strength and vigor not to be found in any other man."

We now reach that form of literature for which the Elizabethan age was distinguished *par excellence*, and the last two chapters of the volume are devoted to the development of the drama. Schlegel's theory that Shakspeare "owed hardly anything to his predecessors" is rightly excepted to; such a theory is "the height of critical superstition," and Prof. Courthope devotes his efforts to showing the historical evolution of the drama, "the transition from pageant to theatre, from interlude to tragedy, comedy, and history." The professed historians of the drama, Collier, Ward, and Symonds, have done much to elucidate its history, but the author thinks that "something still remains to be done," and he devotes this chapter to tracing "the slow gradations by which the dramatic art passed out of the rudimentary conditions, peculiar to it in the Middle Ages, into the hands of those who brought the form of the romantic drama to its full perfection." Without going into details, which would take more space than we have at command, we may say that the facts fully justify Mr. Courthope's position. He investigates the progress of the stage from the Miracle Play to the Morality; the influence exercised upon the stage by the Court, the Universities, and the Inns of Court; the opposition of the Puritans and the effect of the building of theatres outside of the municipal jurisdiction of London; to all which were added the improvements in dramatic art made in the course of time. Prof. Courthope analyses many of these Moralities, and shows the gradual progression from allegorical personification to individual action, from mere dialogue to development of a complicated plot. *Like Will to Like* (1568) illustrates the manners of the time, and here we have a mixture of allegorical and individual characters, and the personal Vice, Nichol Newfangle. In *The Three Ladies of London* (1584), "the genius of the old Morality

probably reached the highest level of which it was capable": it is too a dramatic satire on the manners of the day. These were, however, very late examples of the Moralities. Full credit is given to John Heywood for the steps taken in advance by him, and under the influence of the study of Plautus and Terence, is finally reached the first regular comedy, Udall's *Ralph Roister Doister* (about 1550). Progress is made in Gascoigne's translation of Ariosto's *Supposes* and in his *Glass of Government*, but Prof. Courthope omits to note that this last is based on the Latin *Acolastus*, founded on the parable of the Prodigal Son. It was no more original with Gascoigne than *The Supposes*. Gascoigne's *Jocasta* too was but a translation, from the Italian of Dolce, of the *Phoenissae*. Lyly's prose Court comedies mark the highest development in this direction. Prof. Courthope does not notice the supposed allegorical signification of the *Endymion*, which has been brought out in the Introduction to Mr. Baker's edition of that play. The dramatic movement from Interlude to Comedy is summed up, from didactic allegory to imitation of manners, thence to action of human personages in fuller plots and with greater refinement of dialogue.

So too was Tragedy evolved from Interlude, and here exception is taken to Symonds's view of two types of tragedy, one modelled after Seneca and the other after the Italian plays, the latter finally prevailing. The tragedies and tragi-comedies "all have a close affinity with the Interlude," and there was no "conflict between the type of tragedy favored by the Court and that dear to the people." As the *Mirror for Magistrates* presented tragedy in epic form, so the plays presented it in dramatic form. The influence of Seneca was plainly seen in our first regular tragedy, *Ferrex and Porrex*, or *Gorboduc* (1562), which Mr. Courthope speaks of only as Sackville's, ignoring Norton altogether, although he wrote more than half of it. Notwithstanding Schlegel's opinion, it is characterized as "a work of great merit," and so it was if we consider its time, but it was well for English tragedy that it did not develop on the lines of *Gorboduc*. Hughes imitated it in his *Misfortunes of Arthur* (1587), but this was the year of Marlowe's *Tamburlaine*, and no one thought of Seneca after that. Bale, with his *King Johan*, "probably written during the reign of Edward VI," began the evolution of Chronicle History out of the Interlude. So throughout the sixteenth century there was a gradual progress in dramatic development. The Moralities and Interludes, themselves developed from the old Miracle-Plays, gradually passed into Tragedy, Comedy, and Chronicle History, under the influence of the Renaissance.

The last chapter is occupied with a study of the infancy of the romantic drama as seen in the works of Greene, Peele, Marlowe, and Kyd. Now we find a conflict in England between the principles of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Puritanism showed itself in the attacks made upon the stage. Between 1570 and 1587 there were no less than six violent attacks in pamphlet form made upon the stage. Prof. Arber has given us a summary of these in his edition of Gosson's *School of Abuse* (1579), which was an invective against "Poets, Pipers, Players, and such-like Caterpillars of a Commonwealth." Being dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney, it produced his *Apologie for Poetrie*, as Sidney did not relish the inclusion of Poets in this general onslaught. The Puritans had ample justification for their attacks. Englishmen had become *Italianated*, and here too Gascoigne had led the way, but he repented, so that

Whetstone, his friend, could indite funeral verses on *The Well-employed Life and Godly End of G. Gascoigne, Esquire*, which elegy the curious reader will find prefixed to Prof. Arber's edition of *The Steel Glass*. Greene, however, went further than Gascoigne in this process of *Italianisation*, and if what he states in his *Repentance* and his *Groats-worth of Wit* is true, he was veritably "a hard case." Courthope sees no reason to question the authenticity of his autobiography. Greene's dramas, all of which except *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay* are thought to show Marlowe's influence, are successively noticed, and "what is best and most characteristic . . . is the poetry of his pastoral landscape, and his representation of the characters of women; in both of these respects he exercised an unmistakable influence on the genius of Shakespeare." Greene was the true predecessor of Shakspeare in comedy, as Marlowe was in tragedy. Peele is thought by Prof. Courthope to have "a finer range of imagination" than Greene, and he is given a higher rank than that usually assigned him by the historians of the drama. His two best plays, *The Arraignment of Paris*, which inspired Shakspeare in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and *David and Bethsabe*, are alone noticed, and that briefly. The bulk of the chapter is rightly reserved for Marlowe, "the great genius who may justly be called the founder of English poetic drama." In Marlowe "the rupture with the Puritanic element of the nation was absolute and complete." Marlowe wrote "freed from the restraints of Conscience and Law." He believed in "the freedom of the human will," and he wrote accordingly. The incarnation of absolute power is seen in *Tamburlaine*, of knowledge in *Faustus*. "Tamburlaine is the type of resistless force; Faustus represents the resolute pursuit of knowledge as an instrument of material power." *Faustus* is pronounced "unquestionably Marlowe's greatest play; one of the greatest plays that the world possesses." Others have given the palm to *Edward II.* They are both great in different ways, but I must concur with the estimate of the final soliloquy of Faustus, "which, as a representation of mental agony and despair, is only equalled, in the whole range of the world's poetry, by the speech of Satan to the Sun in *Paradise Lost*." The other plays are briefly noticed, and some excellent criticism follows. Marlowe's violence and exaggeration are recognized; also, the ill-construction of his plots. His "theory of dramatic action is contrary to the constitution of human nature," for "it eliminates the factor of Conscience"; and "the narrowness of his conception of man and nature is seen in his representations of female character." As has been recognized by all critics, Marlowe could not paint a female character.

The chapter closes with a notice of Kyd, but he was only a disciple of Marlowe who exaggerated Marlowe's faults; rant and bloodshed are his predominant characteristics. Shakspeare rescued the drama "by restoring to tragedy the elements of conscience, religion, and chivalry, which Marlowe had expelled from it."

This volume carries forward the history of English poetry to the time of Shakspeare, and we await with interest its successors. Prof. Courthope's work traces with philosophic judgment, critical taste, and literary skill, the course of English poetry, and is a useful addition to its history, notwithstanding some defects. To each volume a very full analytical table of contents is prefixed, but indexes are wanting.

JAMES M. GARNETT.

T. Lucretius Carus de Rerum Natura. Buch III erklart von RICHARD HEINZE. Teubner, Leipzig, 1897. Pp. vi + 206.

The edition of the third book of Lucretius which we have before us is the second volume in the new series of *Wissenschaftliche Commentare* published under the editorship of Professor Kaibel of Strassburg. It is a worthy successor to the inaugural volume of the series, the *Electra* of Sophocles, edited by Professor Kaibel himself. Like that work, it not only undertakes to present a new and more thoroughgoing interpretation of the text chosen, but it also stands for a theory of interpretation as yet but scantily represented. If I understand the purpose of the commentary aright, it assumes that there is much more in an ideal interpretation than an explanation of the difficulties of thought, language or text. It would seem to aim at something further—at illustration of the background of thought and the habit of language out of which the poet's work has proceeded. Its effort is not only to explain difficulties, but in a manner to reproduce the creative atmosphere in which the poet wrought. It would substitute for mere explanation a background of consciousness. It may be that this is to put more into the editor's work than he himself felt, but if so, it is under the influence of the agreeable feeling that in this work we have a real approximation to a true interpretation, infinitely removed from the vast bulk of editions "with notes."

In the brief but instructive preface the editor calls attention to the main directions of his effort. The task of the editor, he points out, consists in an explanation of the relation of the poet to his material, since the poet is only the interpreter of the teachings of another, and of the transformation of this material from scientific prose to verse. The content of Lucretian verse therefore requires attention first of all. In this consists, I believe, the most original and positive contribution of the editor to the interpretation of Lucretius. The vast mass of scattered and fragmentary material relating to the philosophy of Epicurus has been brought to bear upon this portion of the *de rerum natura* with an insight before which many an obscurity has disappeared, and with a sureness of touch that reveals the master in the field of Greek philosophy, to one phase of which an earlier work of the editor was devoted (*Xenocrates*, Lpz. 1891). This material is presented not only current with the text, but in the introduction to the commentary the psychology of Epicurus is presented briefly, but with great clearness, and in such a manner as to cast much light on a field in which the obscurity is not wholly the fault of a scanty tradition. In the whole matter of the relation of Lucretius to his sources, Heinze seems to have penetrated much further than his predecessors (notably, for example, in the arguments for the mortality of the soul), as was no more, to be sure, than could fairly be demanded with the results of much recent investigation in this field at hand (e. g. Usener's *Epicurea*), but still with an originality and breadth of grasp that deserve the fullest recognition.

Closely connected with this subject is the question of terminology, to which the editor also calls attention in his preface. Here it has been his effort to ascertain in every case the equivalence of the terms chosen, and

when the exactness of the Latin word employed might be questioned, the possibilities of expression at the disposal of the poet have been weighed. In this connection Munro's defence of the poet against his own complaint of the poverty of the Latin tongue and of the difficulty of giving expression to obscure ideas in a field of thought never before trodden by Roman bard, will be remembered (cf. Munro, *Int.* p. 11). Certainly in this well known passage Munro has given expression to the feelings of Lucretian scholars since Lachmann restored a legible text. For there is a confidence and sureness of movement in the language of the poet that does not leave room for much consciousness of the inadequacy of the language to the theme. But Heinze in his note on vss. 258-261, on the nature of the admixture of the elements of the soul, observes that no portion of the poem is more obscure, and furthermore that it is the only portion of the Epicurean doctrine which Lucretius greatly abridged. The causes of this he holds are therefore not only the obscurity of the subject-matter, but he believes that we must also give credence to the poet, whose complaint here is reiterated, that the language did not permit him to say what he gladly would.

In the matter of the text the editor has been quite conservative. His own conjectures are not numerous, nor do they extend to changes that have a radical effect upon the thought. In vs. 58 (*cripitur persona manare*), where the Itali read *manet res*, he suggests *mala re*, but does not introduce the reading into his text, and wisely, since from no point of view does it seem so satisfactory as the correction of the It., which in turn we may still grant is not convincing. In vs. 194 *constat* for *extat*, a rather doubtful change in the interest of conventional phraseology. In vs. 337 *praeterea* is changed to *propterea*, as it seems to me correctly in view of the argument. In vs. 394 *quam sis = suis*, attractive. In vs. 433 *feruntur* seems correctly restored for *geruntur*. That vs. 493 is hopelessly corrupt is not made convincing to me. In the matter of transposition and rearrangement (apart from single verses), which has been a favorite field for the display of editorial ingenuity, the editor is very conservative, and has shown very clearly that most difficulties of this kind are to be removed by interpretation. Thus at vss. 417 and 526, the apprehension of the true dispositio makes transposition quite superfluous. Indeed the editor's grasp of thought and arrangement reminds me not infrequently of the keen sense for psychological suggestion in explanation of transitions which Kiessling displays and was the first to apply with discernment to the interpretation of Horace. When it is remembered that Heinze has assumed the responsibility of revision for Kiessling's Horace, it is not unlikely that we have a clue to the source of the training which marks much of the characteristic quality of this work.

It is a satisfaction to find so pervading a sympathy with all the moods and themes of the poet as the editor reveals, and one is pleased with his expression of the feeling that Lucretius has in most cases elevated the prosaic parts of his theme to the rank of true poetry. It used to be, and I think still is, commonly said (e. g. by Teuffel) that Lucretius was a great poet

sadly astray in the choice of a subject. I am sure, however, that many a devotee of Lucretius will join with me in protest against this utterance. For when we consider the sort of work that was possible or that was likely to have challenged the attention of a Roman poet in the first century B. C., we cannot, I believe, conceive of any theme that we should willingly exchange for the *de rerum natura*. What were an epic of any theme, mythological or national, or the Alexandrine sources of inspiration of his contemporaries, in comparison with a subject-matter which called forth a passionate intensity of feeling and devotion that we miss in all other Roman poetry? Of refined workmanship and rhetorical vigor there is no lack elsewhere in the higher poetry of Rome, but of feeling, verging at times to an almost unhealthy fervor, there is no other grandly sustained example, and let us not therefore complain of a subject-matter which was its inspiration. I know not if there is a statelier or simpler example of intense dramatic conception than the long cumulative enumeration of the considerations which show the mortality of the soul, summed up in those triumphant verses beginning *Nil igitur ad nos mors est neque pertinet hilum*. To the sagacious and sympathetic interpreter of this culminating book of Lucretius, scholars who have leisure to peruse his work will feel a sense of personal obligation.

G. L. HENDRICKSON.

REPORTS.

ROMANIA, Vol. XXIV (1895). Second half.

Juillet.

Ferdinand Lot. *Celtica*. 17 pages. A series of interesting observations throwing light upon various obscure points in the relations of the romances of the Round Table to their Breton prototypes. Thus, *Mabonagrain* in the tale of *Erec et Enide* (the *Geraint et Enid* of the Mabinogi) is a fusion of the juxtaposed names of two magicians, *Mabon* and *Evrain*, the latter name being in turn a corruption of *Euuain* (Owen), due not to phonetic change, but to an error of reading in written transmission. Again, the "château de Lis" is a mere tautology, *Ulys* signifying 'castle' in Breton.

A. Thomas. *Les noms composés et la dérivation en français et en provençal*. 18 pages. In his treatise on the *Formation des mots composés*, Arsène Darmesteter was able to draw up a list of only 66 derivatives from French compound words, a fact which he offered in support of his statement that "la dérivation, richement développée chez nous, s'exerce cependant avec difficulté sur les composés." M. Thomas begins by eliminating from this list a certain number of derivatives from compound proper names (such as *saint-cyrien*, *terreneuvier*), "car l'on peut dire que tous les noms propres, composés ou non, sont susceptibles de fournir des dérivés" (*Le Chat-Noir*, *chatnoiresque*); and such words as *vaurienne*, while citing in addition, in this category, *fainéante*, "qui est reçu partout, et *propriarienne*, qui est encore confiné dans les bas-fonds parisiens (c'est là de la flexion et non de la dérivation)." The author then proceeds to supplement very considerably the list given by Darmesteter and to furnish one of his own for the Provençal. In conclusion he points out a species of parasynthetic not before signalized. "La pomme dite *blandureau* tire manifestement son nom de ce qu'elle est *blanche* et *dure*: on ne voit pas que l'adj. *dur* ait produit de dérivé *dureau* en dehors de ce mot composé." The words of this class are comparatively numerous.

P. Meyer. *La descente de Saint Paul en enfer: poème français composé en Angleterre*. Beginning at least as early as the fourth century, there have been numerous versions of this legend in various languages. M. Meyer here publishes, face to face, a Latin prose abridgment of the legend and an Old French rhymed version of 282 verses, founded upon it and contained in a manuscript of Toulouse.

Paget Toynbee. Dante's references to Pythagoras.—Dante's obligations to Orosius.—Some unacknowledged obligations of Dante to Albertus Magnus.—Dante's obligations to Alfraganus in the *Vita Nuova* and *Convivio*. 55 pages. This series of articles constitutes an original and valuable contribution to our knowledge of the sources and references of Dante's writings. Speaking of

Albertus Magnus, the author says: "It is singular that, though he has made such liberal use of the works of Albertus Magnus, Dante does not mention him by name more than four times, viz. *Convito*, III 5 (where he is called 'Alberto della Magna'), *Convito*, III 7 and IV 23 (in both of which he is called simply 'Alberto'), and *Paradiso*, X 98 (where he is called 'Alberto di Cologna')." Apropos of this paragraph the present writer pointed out, in a paper read before the philological section of the N. Y. Acad. of Sciences, that the modern appellation of 'the Great,' as applied to Albert, appears to have been the outgrowth of a misapprehension. The epithet Magnus was pretty certainly given originally to Albertus simply to designate him as 'the Tall,' but may also have been used as a mistaken latinization of the 'della Magna' ('of Germany') which we find used by Dante. It is noteworthy that, so far as appears, no other scholar or writer in the world's history ever acquired the appellation of 'the Great.'

Mélanges. A. Mussafia. Francese *vals, valt, valent; sals, salt; chielt, chalt*. 4 pages. Latin *vales, valet, valent* should have given regularly in O.Fr. *vels, velt, velent*, but the latter forms are nowhere found. Most scholars have regarded the universally occurring forms with *a* (*vals, valt, valent*) as due to analogy with *valons, vales*, where the *a* is regular, being pretonic. Mussafia here supports an explanation long since advanced by Cornu, that in this verb the *a* of the forms in question was preserved chiefly by the influence of the *a* regularly occurring in a majority of the stem-tonic forms, "forme rizotoniche" (*vaille*, etc.).—E. Langlois. Interpolations du jeu de Robin et Marion. Ingeniously surmises and unmaskes two important interpolations.—G. Raynaud. Le dit du Cheval à vendre, publié d'après un manuscrit du château de Chantilly. A fragment of only 51 verses, carefully edited.

Comptes rendus. Abhandlungen Herrn Prof. Dr. Adolf Tobler, zur Feier seiner fünfundzwanzigjährigen Thätigkeit als ordentlicher Professor an der Universität Berlin von dankbaren Schülern in Ehrerbietung dargebracht (G. Paris). 10 pages. The work reviewed consists of 22 articles, "tous intéressants, quelques-uns de très grande valeur," covering over 500 pages.—W. Meyer-Lübke. Zur Geschichte des Infinitivs im Rumänischen. "Dans cette savante et pénétrante étude, M. Meyer-Lübke nous donne un avant-goût de ce que sera le troisième volume de sa *Grammaire*, consacré à la syntaxe."—J. Vising. *Quomodo* in den romanischen Sprachen. "Montre que, dans diverses langues romanes, a côté de *com* ou *como* < lat. vulg. *quomo* < *quomodo* il existe ou a existé une forme *coma*, qui s'explique par *quomo ad*, et une forme *come*, qui s'explique par *quomo et* . . . Presque partout les formes se sont confondues. En français, c'est *come* (*comme*) qui a absorbé *com*."—A. Wallensköld. Zur Lösung der Lautgesetzfrage (G. P.). "Je suis depuis longtemps à peu près de l'avis de mon savant ami sur le traitement exceptionnel auquel sont sujets certains mots très usités . . . Cette négligence tient à ce qu'on sait qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de les prononcer pleinement pour que l'auditeur les comprenne, quelques-uns d'entre eux, surtout parmi les formules d'allocution,—comme prov. *en, na*, esp. *Usted*,—arrivent à n'être en réalité que de simples *allusions* vocales."—K. Breul. Le Dit de Robert le Diable. "L'édition du *Dit de Robert le Diable*, faite avec autant de soin que d'intelligence, est assurément

une des contributions qui ajoutent le plus de prix à ce beau recueil."—E. Gorra. *Delle origini della poesia lirica del medio evo* (A. Jeanroy). "La *prolusione* de M. Gorra est aussi habilement composée qu'élégamment écrite."—H. Springer. *Das altprovençalische Klagelied* (A. Jeanroy). "Conscientieuse étude."—G. A. Cesareo. *La poesia siciliana sotto gli Svevi* (A. Jeanroy). 8 pages. "Il y a dans ce livre des pages excellentes et qui resteront; mais l'ensemble est gâté par des erreurs, des à peu près, une tendance au paradoxe."—E. Wechssler. *Ueber die verschiedenen Redaktionen des Robert von Borron zugeschriebenen Graal-Lancelot-Cyclus* (G. Paris). "L'ordre et la lumière pénètrent peu à peu dans ce chaos indigeste, dans cette *selva oscura* des romans en prose de la Table Ronde . . . Le mémoire de M. Wechssler est une des plus importantes contributions qui aient été apportées à cette œuvre de reconnaissance et de déchiffrement qui ne sera pas de longtemps achevée."

Chronique.

Périodiques.

Livres annoncés sommairement. 40 titles. W. H. Schofield. *The Source and History of the Seventh Novel of the Seventh Day of the Decameron*. "Excellente petite étude."—James D. Bruner. *The Phonology of the Pistoiese Dialect*. "Ce travail porte sur l'état ancien aussi bien que sur l'état moderne du parler de Pistoja."—René de Poyen-Bellisle. *Les sens et les formes du créole dans les Antilles*. "L'auteur de ce petit livre est intelligent et suffisamment au courant de la philologie romane."—G. Lanson. *Histoire de la littérature française*. Paris, Hachette, pp. xvi, 1158. 5 francs. "Dans ce très remarquable ouvrage, qui conduit l'histoire de notre littérature de ses premières origines jusqu'aux œuvres les plus récentes, le moyen âge occupe une place justement proportionnée (216 pages). Cette place est extrêmement bien remplie."

Octobre.

F. Lot. *Etudes sur la provenance du cycle arthurien*. 32 pages. I. Le sens du mot *breton* au XII^e siècle. In the 11th and 12th centuries, for the French, the Normans and the English, the *Bretons* were the inhabitants of ancient Armorica, "la Bretagne." The insular descendants of the ancient Bretons were called *Gualois*, *Gallois* (Welsh), and their country, to the west of the Severn, is *Guales* (Wales). They called themselves *Cymri* (Latin *Cambri*). —II. De la provenance des lais dits bretons. The author analyzes critically all the evidence, and concludes that at least half of the *lais* that have come down to us derive, not from Armorica, but from southern Great Britain.

P. Meyer. *C et g suivis d'a en provençal: étude de géographie linguistique (avec carte)*. 47 pages. It has been well known that in the southern portion of the regions speaking the *langue d'oc*, Latin *c* (and similarly *g*), initial, or second consonant of a group, preserved its Latin sound virtually intact before *a*, *o*, *u* (*camp*, *castel*, *galina*), while in the more northern parts *c* and *g*, in like case, take on a complex sound commonly represented by *ch* and *j* (*champ*, *chastel*, *jalina*). The present elaborate memoir undertakes to establish the

geographical line of demarcation between the sounds *ca, ga* and the sounds *cha, ja*. "Si on instituait une recherche semblable pour la zone où, dans le nord de France, *CHA* passe à *CA*, les résultats, autant que j'en puis juger par quelques études qui je continuerai peut-être un jour, seraient moins satisfaisants à tous égards. Pourquoi? Pour diverses causes qui se réduisent en somme à une seule: parce que la limite de *ch* et de *c*, de *j* et de *gu* (*Chastel* et *Castel*, *Jouy* et *Gouy*) passe trop près de Paris . . . Les parlers locaux sont actuellement ou éteints ou trop imprégnés de français pour donner des indications nettes et précises."

Mélanges. F. Bonnardot. A qui Jacques de Longuyon a-t-il dédié le poème des "Vœux du Paon"? The great vogue of this poem during the latter part of the Middle Ages lends some interest to the discovery of the identity of the personage to whom it was dedicated, viz. Thiebaut, bishop of Liège from 1303 to 1312, son of Thiebaut II, comte de Bar.—A. Thomas. Etymologies françaises. *Chevène* [sort of fish resembling the whitebait]. From **capitlnem*, doublet of *capitōnem* (cf. archaic *turbōnem* for *turbīnem*).—*Hanse* [shaft of a pin]. Probably an alteration of *hante* (O.Fr. *hanste*), due to influence of *anse*.—*Haque*. *Harengs à la haque* are herrings prepared and salted to be used as bait. The phrase *à la haque* is doubtless for *à l'aaque*, from the verb *aeschier* 'to bait,' from Latin *esca*.—*Orpailleur* [gatherer of gold-dust]. A folk-etymological modification of *harpailleur* (influenced by *or* 'gold'), through *harpailier*, pejorative of *harper* 'to seize.'—*Rouis* [Mod. Prov. for 'bush, brier']. From **rusteum* for *rustum*.—O. Densusianu. O.Fr. *baucan* [a dappled horse]. For *baucenc*, from Lat. *balteum*, with substitution of Germanic suffix *-ing*.—G. A. Nauta. La Danse *Macabre*. "La danse de la Mort était nommé au XVe siècle dans les Pays-Bas *Makkabeus dans*."—P. Meyer. La Descente de Saint Paul en Enfer: poème français composé en Angleterre (note complémentaire).—A. Morel-Fatio. Espagnol *yogar*. Among the orders pronounced by the immortal Sancho Panza in the government of his Island appears the following: "Procurad que no os venga en voluntad de *yogar* con nadie." The etymologists have hitherto failed to distinguish between the familiar verb *yogar* 'to sport,' from *jocare*, and the archaic word *yogar*, meaning 'to lie (with).' Latin *jacuit* gave regularly the strong preterit *yogo* (pronounced *yogo*). This form came to be confused with the weak preterit *yogó* = *jocavit*, and the confusion extended to other forms of the two verbs *yacer* and *yogar*.

Comptes rendus. P. Marchot. Les gloses de Cassel. Les gloses de Vienne (G. Paris). M. Marchot considers these two glossaries as both belonging to one of the Raeto-Romance dialects. Holtzmann long ago assigned the Cassel glossary to a Romance idiom spoken in Bavaria in the 8th century, and Gaston Paris formerly adhered to this opinion, but now admits that Marchot has rendered his view very probable. The Vienna glossary seems to be correctly assigned to the dialect of Friuli.—Kritischer Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der romanischen Philologie. Unter Mitwirkung von 115 Fachgenossen herausgegeben von Karl Vollmöller und Richard Otto. I. Jahrgang (G. Paris). "C'est en fait le *Grundriss* de Gröber indéfiniment continué et mis au courant: je ne saurais mieux en faire comprendre et le mérite et l'utilité."—L. Willems. Etude sur l'Ysengrinus (L. Sudre). Even after the

masterly introduction prefixed by Voigt to his edition of the *Ysengrimus* in 1884, the present work is valuable as throwing light on a certain number of obscure points. The orthography of the title, *Ysengrinus* (with an *n*), is defended by serious arguments.

Périodiques. A report is given of vol. I (1894) of the *Revue Hispanique*: recueil consacré à l'étude des langues, des littératures et de l'histoire des pays castillans, catalans et portugais, publié par R. Foulché-Delbosc.

Chronique. M. Anatole de Montaiglon, professor at the *Ecole des Chartes* in Paris, died at Tours on September 1, 1895, in his 72d year. He was a scholar of varied attainments, a prolific writer, and the editor of numerous works in the domain of Romance philology.—There has been founded at Madrid a *Revista critica de historia y literatura españolas*, which is published monthly.

Livres annoncés sommairement. 27 titles. Guernsey: Its People and Dialect, by Edwin Seelye Lewis. Johns Hopkins University dissertation. "Il est à souhaiter que M. Lewis reprenne et complète son étude, dont l'objet est des plus intéressants, non seulement pour la dialectologie moderne, mais pour l'histoire de l'évolution du français."

H. A. TODD.

RHEINISCHES MUSEUM FÜR PHILOGIE, Vol. LII, parts 3, 4.

Pp. 305-32. Lateinische Uebersetzungen aus der Aratusliteratur. M. Manitius. A critical edition of the "Arati ea quae uidentur" (= 'Αράτου φαινόμενα) of the Dresden MS Dc 183. This is a translation from the Greek into an extremely barbarous Merovingian Latin. The MS belongs to the 9th century, the translation may have been made about the beginning of the 6th.

Pp. 333-7. Die Exostra des griechischen Theaters. A. Körte. In the fifth century B. C. ἐξώστρα and ἐκκύκλημα were different names for the same thing. At a later period ἐξώστρα meant a balcony. From the accounts of the temple of Delos for the year B. C. 274 (B. C. H. XVIII 163) it is clear that there were several exostræ. This inscription confirms the statement of Pollux, IV 127 καὶ χρη τοῦτο νοεῖσθαι καθ' ἐκάστην θύραν, οἶονεὶ καθ' ἐκάστην οἰκίαν. Reisch has exaggerated the difficulty of working such a machine (Das griechische Theater, pp. 244, 246).

Pp. 338-47. Antiker Volksglaube. W. Kroll. I. The ancient popular belief that the soul of man dwells in the air, whence it is breathed into the body, is found in some Orphic verses quoted by Vettius Valens (cod. Oxon. Selden. 22, saec. XVII): καθὼς καὶ ὁ θειότατος Ὀρφεὺς λέγει· ψυχὴ δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἀπ' αἰθέρος ἐρρίζωται· καὶ ἄλλως· ἀέρα δ' ἐλκοντες ψυχὴν θεῖαν δρεπόμεσθα. II. The κυνάνθρωπος or λυκάνθρωπος νόσος described by Marcellus of Sida was not a religious hallucination, as W. H. Roscher has recently maintained (Abh. d. sächs. Ges. XVII 3). Kroll himself assumes, without any obvious warrant, that the disease of lycanthropy presupposes a belief in werwolves. III. The command of the anonymous dialogue Hermippus to change the names of the

dead in order that they may escape from evil spirits is to be compared with the belief that the dead may be recalled to life by thrice pronouncing their names.

Pp. 348-76. Lucubrationum Posidonianarum Spec. II (cf. Comm. in hon. Wachsmuthii scr., 1897, pp. 13 sqq.). E. Martini. A study of Cleomedes, Cycl. Theor., lib. I, cc. 2-7.

Pp. 377-90. Lebte Erasistratos in Alexandria? R. Fuchs. It is probable that Erasistratus was settled in Alexandria towards the close of his life, and was closely connected with the royal court.

Pp. 391-8. Altes Latein (Fortsetzung von Band LI, S. 471; see A. J. P. XVIII 114). F. Bücheler. XXI. *Favere* is a later form of *fovere*. An inscription which apparently belongs to the latter half of the 3d century B. C. runs: FOVE L. CORNELIAI L. F. The gloss *fovet: nutrit studet* (IV, p. 239, 21 G) may be explained without assuming a confusion. XXII. Lexical notes on the tesserae described by Hülsen, Mitth. des röm. archäol. Instituts, 1896, pp. 228-37. XXIII. *Aplopodite*, C. I. L. XII 6025, is for (*h*)*aplopotide(m)*. For the word ἀπλοποτίς cf. Goetz, Corp. Gloss. III, p. 219, 23 dos aplopotin: da filiolum (i. e. *fiolum* = *phialam*). XXIV. The legal *praestat*, ἐγγυᾶται, was formed by combining *praes* and *stat*, about the time of Sulla. Cf. Mon. ant. dei Lincei, VI (1895), p. 411, 7 ff. *quei pro se praes stat*.

Pp. 399-411. Buphonien. P. Stengel rejects the view of H. von Prott, pp. 187 ff., that this represented an earlier human sacrifice.

Pp. 412-24. Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik. L. Radermacher. I. Timäus und die Ueberlieferung über den Ursprung der Rhetorik. II. Plutarchs Schrift de se ipso citra invidiam laudando.

Pp. 425-34. Zur lateinischen Wortbildungslehre. M. Pokrowskij. I. *Sere-nus* originally meant 'dry,' rather than 'bright.' It is perhaps formed from **sērē-re*, inchoat. *serescere*. *Crūdus* : **crūde-o* : *crūdē-li-s* :: μῆμος : μῆμ-ομαι : μῆμ-λό-ς. II. *Defraudit*, Petron. 69 : *fraudere* :: *olunt*, Petron. 50 : *olere*. III. Die mit *in-* negativum zusammengesetzten Verba. *Fateor* and *infiteor* are derived from **fa-to-s* (= φά-τό-ς), **infl-to-s*. With **infitos*, *infiteor*, *infitiae* cf. ἀπιστος, ἀπιστέω, ἀπιστία.

Pp. 435-45. Zu Pseudokallisthenes und Julius Valerius. I. Ad. Ausfeld.

Miscellen.—Pp. 446-7. W. Schmid. Zwei Vermuthungen zu der Schrift περὶ ὑψους (βάρους for βάθους, II 1; συναραιῶι for συνάροι, XLIV 5).—Pp. 447-9. R. Schneider. Zu dem Lexicon Messanense de iota ascripto. Textual notes.—P. 449. J. Ziehen. Zu Cicero ad fam. VIII 17, 2. Read *vos invitos vincere coegero astutia! num me Catonem?*—Pp. 449-50. A. Frederking. Zu Horat. carm. II 6. *Lasso*, v. 7, may refer to Septimius, not to Horace.—Pp. 450-54. J. Ziehen. Eine Zeitbeziehung in der ersten Mäcenaselegie.—Pp. 454-7. M. Ihm. Nemesians Ixeutica.—Pp. 458-9. A. Zimmermann. Ueber Entstehung von neuen Verwandtschaftsnamen aus alten im Latein. *Opiter* is derived from the vocative *ave pater*.—Pp. 459-61. M. Ihm. Mars Mullo, Mars Vicinnus und drei pagi der Redones.—Pp. 461-2. C. Wachsmuth. Ein

inschriftliches Beispiel von Kolometrie. A marble tablet inscribed with the Septuagint version of the 15th Psalm, recently found at Lapethus in Cyprus. It was probably used in public worship, not later than the 4th century.—Pp. 463-4. W. Schwarz. Eigennamen in griechischen Inschriften.

Pp. 465-504. Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Philo. I. P. Wendland.

Pp. 505-8. Zur lateinischen und griechischen Etymologie. M. Niedermann. I. The *-per* of the Latin adverbs *nuper*, *parumper*, *paulisper*, *semper*, *topper*, etc., is to be identified, not with *-pert* of the Oscan *petiopert* (= *quater*), but with the Greek particle *περ*. Cf. *parumper* and *pauxillisper*, e. g., with the Homeric *μίνυνθά περ*. II. *Βελλερο-φόντης* is the Lycian form of the hero's name, *Ἰππώνου* the corresponding Greek name. Cf. *Ἀλά-βανδος*, the Carian equivalent of *Ἰππόνικος*.

Pp. 509-18. Die Composition der Chorlieder Senecas. F. Leo. The essential difference between the *στάσιμα* of Euripides or Sophokles and the choruses of Seneca is that the latter have neither strophe nor antistrophe. Like the monodies of Euripides and the cantica of Plautus, they exhibit a systematic arrangement of metrical periods corresponding to divisions of the subject. Cf. especially Oed. 403-508. The majority of the lyric metres are taken from Horace; the general form of the chorus represents the actual dramatic practice of Seneca's time.

Pp. 519-56. Der korinthische Bund. J. Kaerst. The Hellenic confederacy formed by Philip of Macedon after the battle of Chaeronea, and its influence upon the subsequent political development of Hellas.

Pp. 557-68. Zu Pseudokallisthenes und Julius Valerius. II. A. Ausfeld.

Pp. 569-90. Das afrikanische Latein. W. Kroll. There may have been in the time of Apuleius and Tertullian a tendency toward a special development of the Latin spoken in Africa, but from the material which has come down to us we cannot learn more of these dialectic variations than a few uncertain details. The archaisms of the so-called African Latin are due to a general tendency of the time, a tendency which has its parallel in the Greek of the same period. The Grecisms are mainly due to translation. The tendency of the period is distinctly rhetorical, but this concerns the literary language, not the everyday Latin of popular speech. Very few of the supposed provincialisms which are usually cited as characteristic of vulgar Latin are peculiar to African writers.

Pp. 591-623. Ueber die Schriftstellerei des Klaudios Galenos. IV. J. Ilberg.

Miscellen.—Pp. 624-8. L. Radermacher. *Varia*. Notes on Plaut. Stich. 270-1; Varr. Sat. Menipp., fr. 384; Propert. IV 1, 7; Aetna Carm.; Gratt. Cyneg.—Pp. 628-32. K. Lüddecke. Ueber Beziehungen zwischen Isokrates' Lobrede auf Helena und Platons Symposion.—Pp. 632-3. A. Brinkmann. Ein neues Axiochoscitat.—P. 633. M. Ihm. Probi de nomine excerpta.—

Pp. 633-4. R. Fuchs. εἰσω vorn, ἔξω hinten (in medical Greek).—Pp. 634-5. L. Radermacher. ἀπάριστα, ὀπίσωθεν.

A third section of the Beiträge zur lateinischen Grammatik, by Th. Birt (see vol. LI, pp. 70-108, 240-72; A. J. P. XVIII 108-9, 111), is printed as an Ergänzungsheft. This forms a book of 218 pages, entitled 'Sprach man *aurum* oder *aurum*?' It is provided with a table of contents, two indexes, three Anhänge and eight pages of Nachträge und Berichtigungen. The author collects the evidence for the pronunciation *aurum*.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

WILFRED P. MUSTARD.

BRIEF MENTION.

The long-expected edition of *Bacchylides* was received at the office of the Journal from the authorities of the *British Museum* after the present number had been made up, and there is no space for a full account of this priceless addition to the Golden Treasury of Greek Lyric Poetry. The editor is the distinguished scholar F. G. KENYON, whose mastery was evinced by his *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* and his *Herondas*, and there is no one who will begrudge him the privilege of another *editio princeps*. This time Mr. KENYON's rare palaeographic ability was not put to so severe a test and he has had the advantage of help and counsel from eminent Hellenists, from JEBB, with his faultless taste and his unique faculty for Greek verse-composition, from the lamented PALMER, from BLASS, the skilled palaeographer, from SANDYS, with his wide command of the whole Greek domain. But it is Mr. KENYON's edition after all, and to him the gratitude of scholars is first due. Twenty poems, some of them entire, have been brought to light and a new chapter in the history of Greek literature has to be written. Before many days the philological world will be flooded with literature on the subject, with emendations, restorations, characteristics. The happy hours of the first possession will be succeeded by weeks muggy with extemporized learning—extemporized, for comparatively few are the scholars who have earned the right to speak authoritatively by reason of special studies in this too much neglected domain of Greek poetry; and in the dense air which is about to envelop Bacchylides, the memory of these three or four undisturbed days will come back with the sigh, *fulsere vere candidi tibi soles*. True, every one knew in advance from the old fragments what manner of poet we were to expect; no οἰόφρων πέτρα like Aischylos, no τανύπτερος αἰετός like the Theban singer, but a clear and fluent and brilliant master of his art, one who well deserves the title by which he calls himself in one of his Hieronic odes, 'a honey-tongued Keian nightingale.' Still, Bacchylides has given us much more than we could have dreamed of, combinations that no one could have anticipated, dramatic effects which theorists had denied to lyric poetry, and, like Cortes' men, scholars are looking at each other with a wild surmise. But amid all the joy over the new treasure and the endeavor to master the new points of view, the lover of Pindar may be pardoned for thinking chiefly of the important accession to the Pindaric apparatus that has come to us through the discovery of Bacchylides. Here he welcomes confirmation of previous judgments, there he yields with what grace he may to the contravention of cherished views. Fourteen of the poems are epinikian odes, and enough of these are sufficiently well preserved to show that they are built on the same lines as those of Pindar's Songs of Victory. The type is older than Pindar. It is in the handling of the type that the differences come out. Praise, myth, praise are found as in Pindar, and those who believe with Drachmann that the myths

are mere ἐμβλήματα will doubtless point to Bacchylides with triumph. But others will maintain that Pindar has put a deeper meaning into the conventional adornment, and that Bacchylides was satisfied with the mere embellishment, and has given us a Euripidean as over against an Aischylean choral. Those who have made so much of recurrent words in Pindar will find that Bacchylides lends scarcely any handle to repetition as a *τεθμός* of lyric poetry, as an indication of the various members of the Terpandrian νόμος. No such toying iteration is to be found in Bacchylides as we have, for instance, in Pindar's Sixth Olympian, and those who are not willing to concede that Pindar, like other strong natures such as Samson and Aias, delighted in the play on words, will have to set up the theory that Bacchylides deliberately abandoned the technique of repetition and paronomasia just as alliteration was abandoned in English poetry. The short line which reigned in the days before Boeckh will probably be brought to honor again by this MS of Bacchylides, but to those who are familiar with the principles of kolometry the short line is merely a matter of convenience to the eye. Those who have learned to recognize the importance of the literary sphere for syntax and of syntax for the literary sphere will be interested to find that different as Pindar and Bacchylides are in race, in gifts, in temperament, the lyric law keeps them to the same range. One has not much new syntax to learn in passing from Pindar to Bacchylides.

But while the lover of Pindar may be prone to dwell on the resemblances and differences of the two rival poets, the student of Greek literature in general will be most interested in the "lyrical idylls," as the editor calls them. One of them tells of the demand for the surrender of Helen, another of Deianeira's gift to Herakles, yet another and a most spirited poem of the contest between Minos and Theseus, in which Theseus trusts himself to his father Poseidon with all the unreserve of the divers in the Bay of Naples. Most remarkable of all is a lyrical dialogue between Aigeus, king of Athens, and Medeia, his queen, which not only increases our repertory by a fine poem, but constitutes, as Mr. KENYON says, "a striking and, in some respects, unique addition to our knowledge of Greek lyrical composition."

Some of the poems are much mutilated and tempt the restoring hand. Would that a thorough study of the odes that remain entire might precede the ready fancy of the multitudinous guessers! But the wish is vain. As I lay down my pen I catch sight of strings of unconvincing restorations and, which is worse, hear a critic's voice declaring Pindar a landlubber and Bacchylides a seasoned sailor. It is true that Pindar's fellow-Boeotian, Hesiod, was a landlubber οὔτε τι ναυτιλίας σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν (O. et D. 649), but even he had to make space for navigation, because his brother Perses might take to the sea. "The Boeotians," says Mr. Roberts the apologist, "never made use of the sea, favourably situated as they were, to the same extent as the Dutchmen,"¹ with whom he parallels them; but for all that the land that had been the abode of the Minyan vikings, that headed the catalogue of the ships in Homer, that had Aulis for a harbor, can hardly be classed as the home of the landlubber, and I may not have blundered so much after all in calling attention to the sea-air in Pindar.²

¹ The Ancient Boeotians, p. 59.

² Introd. Essay, xliii.

Mr. BUSSELL has written a book entitled *The School of Plato* (London, Methuen; New York, Macmillan), which is readable in spite of its preciousity and suggestive in spite of its oracular tone. The late Mr. Pater is his cynosure, which will hardly be an unqualified recommendation in the eyes of some people, and Mr. BUSSELL has taken that alembicated stylist's *Plato and Platonism* more seriously than a philologist would be apt to do. Paired with this admiration of Mr. Pater's powers, one finds a curious neglect of a somewhat more conspicuous thinker, and it is with no little astonishment that one reads the candid confession that the author "did not read Lotze's *Microcosm* until the greater part of the work was in the press." One might forgive Mr. Bussell for calling a hen 'the solicitous stepmother of the farmyard,' but Lotze was a philologist as well as a philosopher: he was the translator of *Antigone* into Latin verse as well as the author of the *Mikrocosmos*, and an editor of a *Journal of Philology*—especially one who knew Lotze in the flesh—cannot help taking the matter to heart. But really the work hardly enters into the range of this periodical, for, when Mr. Bussell says that he is afraid that his title will appear somewhat of a misnomer, his fear is fully justified. The aim of the work is to prepare the way for an elaborate defence of the Roman Imperial Age—that age which, as Mommsen has said, is "mehr geschmäht als gekannt"—and Sokrates and Plato together occupy only 40 pages out of a total of 346.

Mr. G. F. HILL, in his *Sources of Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian War* (Oxford, At the Clarendon Press)—a collection of documents for the period known as the πεντηκονταετία—has primarily had in view an educational object. The student of history is to be taught to study it in the light of ancient authorities, not in the reflections of modern writers. Such a lesson, it is superfluous to say, is not needed by the readers of this *Journal*. But the secondary object is not less praiseworthy, and many advanced students will be glad to be spared the necessity of referring to the originals for the verification of the references in such a book as Busolt's *Pentekontaetie*. Of course, as in the case of punctuation, any arrangement is *ipso facto* an interpretation, and an excerpt cannot take the place of an unbroken context; but every such work has its limitations. The book is divided into the following chapters: I. Origin and Organization of the Athenian Confederacy; II. The Quota Lists; III. External History of Athens, her Allies and Colonies; IV. The Athenian City; V. The Athenian Constitution; VI. Biographical; VII. Sparta and Peloponnesus; VIII. The Western Greeks. There is also a list of Athenian archons, but, except here and in the quota lists, dates are a rarity, belonging, presumably, to the reflections of modern writers.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Thanks are due to Messrs. Lemcke & Buechner, 812 Broadway, New York, for material furnished.

AMERICAN.

Apuleius (Lucius). The Story of Cupid and Psyche done out of the Latin by Walter Pater. Portland, Me., *T. B. Mosher*, 1897. 16mo, pap., 75 cts.

Cicero (M. T.) Selected Letters; ed., with introd. and notes, by F. F. Abbott. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897. 76 + 315 pp. 12mo, cl., \$1.35.

Conway (R. S.) The Italic Dialects; ed. with a grammar and glossary. V. 1, pt. 1. The Records of Oscan, Umbrian and the Minor Dialects. V. 2, pt. 2. Grammar of the Dialects; with appendix, indices and glossary. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 2 v., 18 + 456, 6 + 457-686 pp. 8vo, cl., net \$7.50.

Horace (Q. H. F.) Works; tr. by A. Hamilton Bryce. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 4 v. 16mo, cl., net, ea. 30 cts.

Lyttelton (E.) Are we to go on with Latin Verses? New York, *Longmans, Green & Co.*, 1897. 193 pp. 12mo, cl., \$1.25.

Muller (F. Max). The Sacred Books of the East; tr. by various oriental scholars. American ed. 12 v. V. 1. The Upanishads. New York, *The Christian Literature Co.*, 1897. 101 + 320 + 52 + 350 pp. 8vo, subs., cl., \$2.50.

Plato. The Philebus; ed., with introd., notes and appendices, by R. G. Bury. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 87 + 223 pp. 8vo, cl., net \$3.25.

— The Republic; ed., with critical notes and an introd. on the text, by Ja. Adam. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 21 + 329 pp. 12mo, cl., net \$1.25.

Sophocles. The Text of the Seven Plays; ed. with an introd. by R. C. Jebb. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 14 + 364 pp. 8vo, cl., net \$1.40.

Xenophon. Works; tr. into English by H. G. Dakyns. In 4 v. V. 3, pt. 1. The Memorabilia, and Apology, The Economist, The Symposium, and Hiero. Pt. 2. On the Duties of a Cavalry General, On Horsemanship, and On Hunting. New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897. 70 + 130 pp. 12mo, cl., \$1.25.

ENGLISH.

Jannaris (A. N.) Historical Greek Grammar, chiefly of the Attic Dialect, as written and spoken from Classical Antiquity to the Present Time. London, *Macmillan & Co.*, 1897. 8vo, 776 pp. £1 5s.

Jensen (H.) A Classified Collection of Tamil Proverbs. London, 1897. 8vo. 8s.

Macalister (R. A. S.) Studies in Irish Epigraphy. Part I. London, 1897. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Murray (J. A. H.) A New English Dictionary. Part II. Foisty-Frankish. London, 1897. 4to, 132 pp. 5s.

Searle (W. G.) Onomasticon Anglo-Saxonicum. A list of Anglo-Saxon proper names from the time of Bede to that of King John. London, 1897. 8vo. 20s.

FRENCH.

de Julleville (P. L.) Histoire de la langue et de la littérature française. Tome IV. 17^e siècle. Paris, 1897. 8vo. 16 fr.

Kums (A.) Les choses naturelles dans Homère. Paris, 1897. 8vo. 5 fr.

Ledrain (E.) Dictionnaire de la langue de l'ancienne Chaldée. Paris, 1897. 8vo, 600 pp. 50 fr.

Michaelis (H.) et Passy (P.) Dictionnaire phonétique de la langue française. Paris, 1897. 8vo, 320 pp. 5 fr.

Oischewsky (S.) La langue et la métrique d'Hérodas. Leiden, 1897. 8vo, 84 pp. 90 c.

GERMAN.

Abhandlungen f. die Kunde des Morgenlandes, hrsg. v. der D. M. Gesellschaft unter der Red. von E. Windisch. X. Bd. Nr. 2 u. 4. gr. 8. L., *F. A. Brockhaus' Sort.*—2. Avaśyaka-Erzählungen, die. Hrsg. v. E. Leumann. 1. Hft. 49 S. m. 1.80.—4. Marāth-Uebersetzung, die, der Suka-saptati. Marāthi u. deutsch v. Rich. Schmidt. iii, viii, 175 S. m. 7.50.

Acta martyrum et sanctorum (syriace), ed. Paulus Bedjan, Cong. Miss. Tom. VII vel Paradisus patrum. gr. 8. xii, 1019 S. Parisiis. L., *O. Harrassowitz.* m. 28.

Aus der Nibelungen Not. Fol. 8 Bl. Fksm.-Drucke. St. Gallen, *A. and J. Köppel.* m. 6.

Babrii fabulae Aesopeae, recognovit, prolegomenis et indicibus instruxit Otto Crusius. 8. cvi, 440 S. m. 3 Taf. L., *B. B. Teubner.* m. 8.40.

Beiträge, Münchener, zur romanischen u. englischen Philologie. Hrsg. v. H. Breymann u. J. Schick. XIII. gr. 8. L., *A. Deichert Nachf.*—XIII. Fest (O.) Der Miles gloriosus in der französischen Komödie von Beginn der Renaissance bis zu Molière. xv, 123 S. m. 2.80.

— Wiener, zur englischen Philologie, unter Mitwirkg. v. K. Luick u. A. Pogatscher hrsg. v. J. Schipper. VI. gr. 8. Wien, *W. Braumüller.*—VI. Schmid (D.) William Congreve, sein Leben u. seine Lustspiele. viii, 179 S. m. 4.

Bibliotheca buddhica. Çikshāsamuccaya. A compendium of Buddhistic teaching compiled by Çāntideva. Ed. by C. Bendall. I. gr. 8. viii, 96 S. St. Petersburg. L., *Voss' Sort.* m. 2.50.

Bibliothek, altfranzösische. 15. Bd. 8. L., *O. R. Reisland.*—15. Aliscans, m. Berücksicht. v. Wolframs v. Eschenbach Willehalm kritisch hrsg. v. Gust. Rollin. lxi, 163 u. 132 S. (1894.) m. 6.

Bibliothek der angelsächsischen Prosa, begründet v. Chrn. W. M. Grein, fortges. v. R. P. Wülker. 4. Bd. 1. Hälfte. gr. 8. L., *G. H. Wigand*.—
1. Alfred's, König, Uebersetzung v. Bedas Kirchengeschichte. Hrsg. v. Jac. Schipper. 1. Hälfte. ix, 272 S. m. 15.

Bissing (F. W. v.) Die statistische Tafel v. Karnak. 4. xxxviii, 67 S. L., *J. C. Hinrichs' Verl.* m. 15.

Bolland (G. J. P. J.) Die althellenische Wortbetonung im Lichte der Geschichte. 2. Druck. gr. 8. 101 S. Leiden. Amsterdam, *J. Müller*. m. 2.50.

Brockelmann (Carl). Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur. I. Bd. 1. Hälfte. gr. 8. 240 S. Weimar, *E. Felber*. m. 10.

Brugmann (Karl) u. Delbrück (Berthold). Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen. 2. Bearbeitg. 1. Bd.: Einleitung u. Lautlehre. 2. Hälfte (§695 bis 1084). gr. 8. ix u. S. 623–1098. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 12.

Catonis (M. Porci) de agri cultura liber, M. Terenti Varronis rerum rusticarum libri III, ex rec. Henr. Keilii. Vol. III. Fasc. I. Index verborum in Catonis de re rustica librum composuit Rich. Krumbiegel. gr. 8. iii, 82 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 3.

Chwolson (D.) Syrisch-nestorianische Grabinschriften aus Semirjetschie. Neue Folge. Hrsg. u. erklärt. gr. 4. 62 S. St. Petersburg. L., *Voss' Sort.* m. 6.

Columellae (L.) opera quae exstant, recensuit Vilh. Lundström. Fasc. I. Liber de arboribus qui vocatur. gr. 8. xii, 43 S. Upsaliae. L., *O. Harrassowitz*. m. 1.75.

Firmici Materni (Iulii) matheseos libri VIII, edd. W. Kroll et F. Skutsch. Fasc. I. Libros IV. priores et V. prooemium continens. 8. xii, 280 S. L., *B. G. Teubner*. m. 4.

Flensburg (Nils). Studien auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Wurzelbildung. I. Die einfache Basis *ter-* im Indogermanischen. Lex.-8. xi, 115 S. Lund, *Hj. Möller's Univ.-Buchh.* m. 2.60.

Gröber (Gust.) Grundriss der romanischen Philologie. 2. Abtlg. 4. (Schluss-)Lfg. gr. 8. vii u. S. 385–496. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 2.

Haeberlin (C.) Griechische Papyri. gr. 8. 131 S. L., *O. Harrassowitz*. m. 3.60.

Hayyûg: The Weak and Geminative Verbs in Hebrew. The Arabic text now published for the first time by Morris Jastrow, Jr. gr. 8. lxxxv, 271 S. Leiden, *Buchh. u. Druckerei vorm. E. J. Brill*. m. 10.

Heberdey (Rud.) Opramoas, Inschriften vom Heroon zu Rhodiapolis. Neu bearb. Lex.-8. 71 S. m. 5 Taf. Wien, *A. Hölder*. Kart., m. 5.

Horatius (Q. F.) Werke. Hrsg. v. O. Henke u. C. Wagener. 1. Bd.: Die Oden u. Epoden. Hrsg. v. Osk. Henke. Einleitung. Text. gr. 8. viii, 286 S. Bremen, *M. Heinsius Nachf.* m. 3.

Journal de la Société finno-ougrienne. XV. gr. 8. iii, 57, 64 u. 34 S. Helsingissä. L., *O. Harrassowitz in Komm.* m. 6.40.

Koehm (Jos.) Quaestiones Plautinae Terentianaeque. gr. 8. 56 S. Giessen, *J. Ricker*. m. 1.20.

König (Fr. Ed.) Historisch-kritisches Lehrgebäude der hebräischen Sprache. 2. Hälfte. 2. (Schluss-)Thl. A. u. d. T.: Historisch-comparative Syntax der hebr. Sprache. gr. 8. ix, 721 S. L., *J. C. Hinrichs' Verl.* m. 18.

Kroehnert (Otto). Canonesne poetarum scriptorum artificium per antiquitatem fuerunt? Diss. gr. 8. iii, 67 S. Königsberg, *Gräfe & Unzer's Sort.* m. 2.

Lange (Edm.) Die Arbeiten zu Thukydides seit 1890. Eine krit. Uebersicht. 1. Hft. [Aus 'Philologus.'] gr. 8. S. 658–713. L., *Dieterich.* m. 1.20.

Lindberg (O. E.) Vergleichende Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen. 1. Lautlehre. A. Konsonantismus. gr. 8. xi, 160 S. Gothenburg, *Wettergren & Kerber.* m. 8.35.

Lucani (M. Annaei) Pharsalia. Cum commentario critico ed. C. M. Francken. Vol. II continens libros VI–X. gr. 8. xiv, 276 S. Leiden, *A. W. Sijthoff.* m. 9.60.

Lydi (Ioannis) liber de ostentis et calendaria graeca omnia, iterum edidit Curt. Wachsmuth. 8. lxxii, 366 S. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 6.

Martin (E.) u. Lienhart (H.) Wörterbuch der elsässischen Mundarten. 2. Lfg. gr. 8. S. 161–304. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner Verl.* m. 4.

Mythographi graeci. Vol. III. Fasc. I. 8. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 1.20.
—I. Pseudo-Eratosthenis Catasterismi, recensuit Alex. Olivieri. xviii, 76 S.

Paulcke (Max). De tabula iliaca quaestiones Stesichoreae. Diss. gr. 8. 109 S. Regimonti Boruss. L., *G. Fock.* m. 2.50.

Paulson (Johs.) Lukrezstudien. I. Die äussere Form des lukretian. Hexameters. gr. 8. 37 S. Gothenburg, *Wettergren & Kerber.* m. —85.

Plini Secundi (C.) naturalis historiae libri XXXVII. Ed. Carol. Mayhoff. Vol. V. Libri XXXI–XXXVII. 8. x, 512 S. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 6.

Soltau (Wilh.) Livius' Geschichtswerk, seine Komposition u. seine Quellen. gr. 8. viii, 224 S. L., *Dieterich.* m. 6.

Tallqvist (Knut L.) Arabische Sprichwörter u. Spiele, gesammelt u. erklärt. gr. 8. 152 S. Helsingfors. L., *O. Harrassowitz.* m. 4.

Texte, Irische, m. Uebersetzungen u. Wörterbuch. Hrsg. v. Wh. Stokes u. E. Windisch. 3. Serie. 2. Heft. gr. 8. iii u. S. 285–596. L., *S. Hirzel.* m. 10.

Theophrast's Charaktere. Hrsg., erklärt u. übers. v. der philolog. Gesellschaft zu Leipzig. gr. 8. lxiv, 276 S. m. 14 Abbildgn. L., *B. G. Teubner.* m. 6.

Vatsyāyana : Das Kāmasūtram. Nebst dem Commentare des Yaçōdhara. Aus dem Sanskrit übers. u. hrsg. v. Rich. Schmidt. gr. 8. v, 478 S. L., *W. Friedrich.* m. 16.

Witkowski (Stanisl.) Prodromus grammaticae papyrorum graecorum aetatis Lagidarum. gr. 8. 65 S. Krakau, *Buchh. der poln. Verlagsgesellschaft in Komm.* m. 3.

Zimmern (Heinr.) Vergleichende Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen. Elemente der Laut- u. Formenlehre. Mit 1 Schrifttaf. v. Jul. Euting. 8. xi, 194 S. B., *Reuther & Reichard.* m. 5.50.

ITALIAN.

Euripide. *Medea*: tragedia con introduzione, commento ed appendice critica di G. B. Camozzi. Imola. 8vo, p. 188. L. 3.

Novati (Francesco). *L'influsso del pensiero latino sopra la civiltà italiana del medio evo*. Milano. 16mo, p. 180. L. 3.

Pizzi (Italo). *Grammatica elementare dell' antico iranico (zendo e persiano antico), con antologia e relativo vocabolario*. Torino. 8vo, p. 92. L. 2.50.

Pullè (L. F.) *Studi italiani di filologia indo-iranica*. Pisa. 8vo. L. 15.

Sofocle. *Elettra*, con note di Domenico Bassi. Torino. 8vo, p. 139. L. 1.80.

Studi italiani di filologia classica. Vol. V. Firenze. 8vo, p. 518. L. 20.

SPANISH.

Ximénez de Embun y Val (T.) *Lengua española en el siglo de oro de su literatura*. Zaragoza, 1897. 8vo, 304 pp. 8 pes.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Anzeiger für indogermanische Sprache u. Altertumskunde. Herausg. v. Wilhelm Streitberg. Achter Band. Drittes Heft. Freiburg i. d. S. 1897.

Archaeological Institute of America. Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Vol. VI, 1890-97. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897.

Aristophanes (The Wasps of). With introduction, metrical analysis, critical notes and commentary. By W. J. M. Starkie. London, *Macmillan & Co.* New York, *The Macmillan Co.*, 1897.

Bacchylides, The Poems of. From a papyrus in the British Museum. Ed. by F. G. Kenyon. London, *British Museum*, 1897.

Bierma (J. W.) Quaestiones de Plautina Pseudolo. (Thesis.) Groningae, *Scholtens & Zoon*.

Bolling (Geo. Melville). The Participle in Hesiod. (J. H. U. Doctoral Thesis.) Washington, D. C., *Catholic University Bulletin*, vol. III, pp. 421-71.

Brugmann (K.) u. Delbrück (B.) Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen. Erster Band. Einleitung u. Lautlehre v. Karl Brugmann. 2. Hälfte. 2. Bearbeitg. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner*, 1897. 12 m.

Buddismo per P. E. Pavolino. (Manuali Hoeppli.) Milano, *Ulrico Hoeppli*. 1 l. 50 c.

Cicero. Laelius de Amicitia, with notes by C. E. Bennett. (Students' Series.) Boston, *Leach, Shewell & Sanborn*, 1897.

— Selected Letters of. Ed. with introduction and notes by F. F. Abbott. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1897.

Columbia Bicycle Calendar for 1898. Hartford, Conn., *Pope Manufacturing Co.* 10 cts.

Drakoules (Platon E.) Neohellenic Language and Literature. Oxford, *B. H. Blackwell*, 1897. 1s. 6d.

Educational Review. Ed. by N. M. Butler. January, 1898. New York, *Henry Holt & Co.* \$3 per annum.

Emery (Annie C.) The Historical Present in Early Latin. (Bryn Mawr Diss.) Ellsworth, Maine, 1897.

English Dictionary (The Oxford). Ed. by J. A. H. Murray. FOISTY-FRANKISH (vol. IV), by Henry Bradley. (Double Section.) Oxford, *Clarendon Press*. New York, *Macmillan & Co.*, 1897. 5s.

Forman (L. L.) Index Andocideus, Lycurgeus, Dinarcheus. Oxonii, *E Prelo Clarendoniano*, MDCCCXCVII.

Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie. Herausg. von Georg Bühler. II. Band. 3. Heft, B. Inhalt: Indian Coins, by E. J. Rapson. With five plates. Strassburg, *K. J. Trübner*, 1898. Subs.-pr., 5 m.; Einzelpreis, 6 m.

Harvard Studies and Notes on Philology and Literature. No. V. Child Memorial Volume. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1896.

Horton-Smith (Lionel). Two Papers on the Oscan Word *Anasaket*. London, *D. Nutt*, 1897.

Isaiah, The Book of the Prophet. A new English translation, printed in colors exhibiting the composite structure of the book. With explanatory notes and pictorial illustrations by T. K. Cheyne. (Haupt's Polychrome Bible.) New York, *Dodd, Mead & Co.*, 1897. \$2.50.

Jenkins (O. P.) The Passing of Plato. Address. Leland Stanford University, 1897.

Kondratiew (Sergius). Index ad oratorem Lycurgum. Mosquae, *apud Tichomirowum*, 1897.

Leemen wagentje (Het). Indisch toonenspiet uit Sanskr̥t en Prākṛt in het Nederlandsch vertaald door J. P. Vogel. Amsterdam, *Scheltema en Holkema*, 1897.

Livius' Geschichtswerk, seine Komposition u. seine Quellen. Von Wilhelm Soltau. Leipzig, *Dieterich'sche Verlags-Buchhandlung*, 1897.

MacMechan (A.) Vergil. A lecture. Halifax, N. S.

Meyer (P.) Notice sur les *Corrogationes Promethei* d'Alexandre Neckham. Paris, *Klincksieck*, 1897.

Modern Language Association of America, Publications of the. Ed. by James W. Bright. Vol. XII, No. 4. N. S., vol. V, No. 4. Contents: XI. Goebel (J.) On the Original Form of the Legend of Sigfrid.—Proceedings. Baltimore, *John Murphy & Co.*, 1897.

Muret-Sanders encyclopaedisches Wörterbuch der englischen u. deutschen Sprache. Teil II. Deutsch-Englisch. New York, *The International News Co.*, 1897. 24 Lfgn. @ 1 m. 50 pf.

National Educational Association. Journal of Proceedings and Addresses of the 26th annual meeting, held at Milwaukee, July 6–9, 1897. Chicago, *University of Chicago Press*, 1897.

Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte u. deutsche Litteratur u. für Paedagogik. Herausg. v. Johannes Ilberg u. Richard Richter. Erster Jahrgang, 1898. I. u. II. Band. 1. Heft. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*.

Nolbac (P. de). Le Virgile de Vatican et ses peintures. Paris, *Klincksieck*, 1897.

Old Latin Biblical Texts. No. IV. Ed. by Henry J. White. Oxford, *At the Clarendon Press*. New York, *American Branch*, 1897. 5s.

Revue des Humanités en Belgique. Publication Trimestrielle. 1re année. Juillet–Octobre, 1897. Anvers, *Hasselt*, 1897. 5 fr. par an.

Studia Sinaitica. No. VI. A Palestinian Syriac Lectionary, containing Lessons from The Pentateuch, Job, Proverbs, Prophets, Acts, and the Epistles. Ed. by Agnes Smith Lewis, with critical notes by Eberhard Nestle and a glossary by Margaret D. Gibson. London, *C. J. Clay*, 1897. 12s.

Tannery (P.) Le traité du quadrant de Maître Robert Anglès. (Montpellier, XIIIe siècle.) Text latin et ancienne traduction grecque. Paris, *Klincksieck*, 1897.

Toutain (J.) L'Inscription d'Henchir Mettich. Un nouveau document sur la propriété agricole dans l'Afrique romaine. Académie des inscriptions. 1. série. Tome XI. 1re partie. Paris, *Klincksieck*, 1897. 3 fr. 80 c.

INDEX TO VOL. XVIII.

- | | |
|---|--|
| Abinnius, Flavius, Correspondence of, 228, 229 | Caecilius of Calacte, 301-12 |
| Accent, Grave, in Greek, 112 | Caliban, Etymology of, 237 |
| Aeschylus, Pers. 527-31, 228 | Callimachus, Epigrams of, 364 |
| S. c. Theb. 961 foll., 228 | Cambyses, Records of the time of, 117 |
| Air, the seat of the soul, 488 | Carpus (ap. Petron.), Etymology of, 241 |
| Albertus Magnus, Dante's obligations to, 485 | Castilian, Enclitic and proclitic cases in, 357-60 |
| his name = della Magna ('Germany'), 485 | Catullus, LVII 6, 113 |
| Alexander and Ptolemy worship in Egypt, 239 | Charisius, Present form of, 113 |
| Alkman's Partheneion, 365 | Chaucer characterized, 470, 471 |
| Antiphon and Attic criminal law, 364, 365 | C. l. L. 14672, 114 |
| Antony, Mark, Parthian expedition of, 363 | Cicero, Ep. ad Att. II 20, 1; IV 12, 2; XII 23, 3, 115 |
| Aristides, Election law of, 113 | Ep. ad Brut. I 4, 5, 115 |
| Aristid. Quint., p. 26, 231 | Ad Fam. VIII 17, 2 (em.), 190 |
| Aristokritos and his 'Theosophy,' 111 | Ep. ad Qu. Fr. I 11; II 14, 2; III 8, 1, 115 |
| Aristotle, 'Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, 54, 7, 110 | III, 110 |
| Arrian's Periplus, 109 | Cicero's Verrine orations, 93-5 |
| Assyrian: imittu and sattukku, 116 | influence, 242, 243 |
| Assyriologie, Beiträge zur, 116-18 | Cicotti's Processo di Verre (rev.), 93-5 |
| Athenaeus, 530e emended, 112 | CLEMENT, WILLARD K. The Use of <i>enim</i> in Plautus and Terence, 402-15 |
| Athenian kings, 363 | Clement of Alexandria and Philo, 365-6 |
| Attens, Primaeval, 109, 112, 120 | Comedy, Greek, Superstitions and Popular Beliefs in, 189-204 |
| Attic Dionysos-festivals, 240 | Commedia dell' arte, 359 |
| inscriptions of the Vth century, 303 | COOK, ALBERT S. Report of Englische Studien, 96-108 |
| Augustin, Confess. 8, 2, 3, 116 | Courthope's History of English Poetry (rev.), 464-80 |
| Babrius, LXI 75, 228 | Creole dialect of the Antilles, 486 |
| Bacchylides, Kenyon's, 492-3 | Ctesias and his Assyriaca, 240 |
| Bacon-Shakespeare question, 107 | Cyriacus of Ancona on Strabo, 114 |
| BALLANTINE, W. G. Negative Futures in the Greek New Testament, 453-9 | Cyrus, Records of the time of, 117 |
| Beiträge zur Assyriologie, 116-18 | Dahlerup's Nekrolog över Karl Verner, 91-3 |
| Benecke's Antimachus of Colophon and the Position of Women in Greek Poetry (noticed), 370 | Dante's obligations to earlier literature, 489 |
| BLOOMFIELD, MAURICE. Review of Helebrandt's Ritual-Literatur, 350-3 | Definition of some rhetorical terms, 206-13 |
| Boeotians as landlubbers, 493 | Delphi, Conflagrations of the temple at, 113 |
| BOLLING, GEORGE MELVILLE. Latin <i>-astro-</i> , 70-3 | Diodorus, XVIII 7, 5, 365 |
| Books Received, 130-2, 253-4, 381-2, 500-1 | Dionysus Musagetes, 365-6 |
| Bornecque's Ciceronis Oratio in Verrem De Signis (noticed), 95 | DODGE, DANIEL KILHAM. Review of Dahlerup's Nekrolog över Karl Verner, 91-3 |
| Bréal's Essai de Sémantique (noticed), 368 | Donatus, Commentum Terentii, MSS of, 239 |
| Breton, meaning of the word in the XIIth century, 486 | Door, Sacredness of, 191 |
| Brief Mention, 119-24, 241-6, 368-70, 492-5 | Dörpfeld and the Greek Theatre, 1-28 |
| Bucket, Kicking the, 191 | Dyroff's Geschichte des Pronomen Reflexivum (rev.), 214-27 |
| Bussell's School of Plato (noticed), 494 | |
| Byron as a translator, 238 | |

- Eclipses caused by evil spirits, 194
 Egypt, Alexander and Ptolemy worship
 in, 239
 Egyptian worships, 364
 Elizabethan drama, 235
 EMBRY, V. J. On the Definition of Some
 Rhetorical Terms, 206-17
 Empedocles emended, 366
 Englische Studien, Report of, 96-108, 233-8
 English, Courthope's History of English
 Poetry, 464-80
 drama in the XVIth century, 479
 Interchange and Tautology, 96
 Old English Poetry, Expanded Lines
 in, 237
 Quantity of vowel before -nd in M.E., 101, 237
 Tautology, 96
 To dare, 103
Enim in Plautus and Terence, 402-15
 Espagnolle's French etymologies, 123
 Ethics and Amenities of Greek Histori-
 ography, 255-74
Etiam in Plautus and Terence, 26-42
 Euphuism, 475 foll.
 Euripides, Danae of, 109
 Troades, Tyrrell's (noticed), 240
 Europe in the sixteenth century, 472-3
- FAY, EDWIN W. Textual Notes and
 Queries on Plautus, 168-88
 Note on Latin *nihil*, 462-3
 FERNALD, O. M. Review of Peck's
 Harper's Dictionary of Classical
 Literature and Antiquities, 78-84
 Fescennine verses, 112
 Fictitious sources in Greek historiog-
 raphy, 262 foll.
 Folk-tales, Orientalist theory of dissemi-
 nation of, 359
 Forman on *ἐπί* w. gen. and dat., 118, 119
 French: aochier, artiller, 361; baucan,
 487; chevène, 487; combre and its
 derivatives, 357; cormoran, 358;
 dôme = 1. δῶμα, 2. domum, 361;
 girouette, 358; goupillon, 361;
 hampe, 358; harengs à la haque, 487;
 hausse-col, 361; macabre, 358, 487;
 orpailleur, 487; penture, rature, 361;
 rouis, 487; vals, valt, valent, 485.
 French compound words, 484
 etymologies, Espagnolle's, 123
 Fügner's Lexicon Livianum, 246
- Galen's works, 110
 Stichometry in, 239
 Gallaway's Use of *μή* with participle in
 classical Greek, 369-70
 GARNETT, JAMES M. Review of Jusse-
 rand's Literary History of the Eng-
 lish People, 342-8
- Review of Courthope's History of Eng-
 lish Literature, 468-80
 Gascoigne characterized, 473
 Germanic Philology, Journal of (rev.), 225-7
 Gerund and Gerundive, 439-52
 GILDERSLEEVE, B. L. Review of Kai-
 bel's Sophokles' Elektra, 353-6
 Note on *οὐ μή* in later Greek, 460-1
 GOODELL, THOMAS DWIGHT. Dörpfeld
 and the Greek Theatre, 1-18
 GOODWIN, CHARLES J. Review of Pun-
 toni's L'inno Omerico a Demetra, 84-8
 Graeco-Syrian literature, 108, 112
 GRANDGENT, C. H. Review of Ram-
 beau and Passy's Chrestomathie fran-
 çaise, 224, 225
 Greece, Modern, Language-Standard in, 19-25
 Greek: Βελλεροφόντης, 490; βλεπεδαί-
 μων, 195; βουφόνια, 240, 489; δεισι-
 δαιμονία, 189; δικασκόπος, 443; εἰ μή
 διά, 246; ἐνιαυτός = anniversary, 367;
 ἐπί w. gen. and dat., 118-19; θίασος,
 441; θυεῖν and θύεσθαι, 367; κόρυδος,
 440; μή w. part., 369-70; μή ἄν c.
 part. = opt., 244; νέμειν and νέμε-
 σθαι, 76-7; οὐ, 49 foll.; οὐ μή, 453 foll.;
 πέλαγος, 366; πρὸς, 109, 120.
 Greek, Archaeologists', 118
 Comedy, Superstitions and Popular
 Beliefs in, 189-204
 Historiography, Ethics and Amenities
 of, 255-74
 and Latin in the XVIth century, 474
 New Testament, Negative Futures in,
 453-61
 papyrus MSS, Catalogue of, 232
 reflexive pronoun, 214 foll.
 superstition, 488
 Theatre, Dörpfeld and, 1-18
 theatre, ἐξώστρα, 488
 GRÜNER, GUSTAV. Review of Journal
 of Germanic Philology, 225-7
 Gudeman's History of Classical Philol-
 ogy (noticed), 370
- Harmodios and Aristogeiton, 110
 Harper's Dictionary of Classical Litera-
 ture and Antiquities (rev.), 78-84
Haud, Origin of, 43-69
 Heinze's Lucretius (rev.), 481-3
 HENDRICKSON, G. L. Are the Letters of
 Horace Satires? 312-24
 Review of Heinze's Lucretius, 481-3
 Heptanomis of Egypt from Hadrian's
 time, 116
 Hermes, 362-7
 Hermogenes and his commentators, 103
 Hervieux's Fabulistes latins (noticed), 361
 Hillebrandt's Ritual-Literatur (rev.), 350-3
 Hill's Sources of Greek History (noticed), 494

- Historiography, Greek, Ethics and Amenities of, 255-74
 Homeric Hymn to Demeter, 84-8
 Hopkins's Religions of India (rev.), 88-90
 Horace, Carm. I 27, 121
 II 6, 489
 III 24, 31. 32, 329-31
 IV 3, 17-20, 325, 327
 Sat. I 1, 93-6, 331-4
 I 5, 7. 43. 51. 77-80, 334-6
 I 9, 11. 22, 336-8
 Are his letters satires? 313-24
 Notes on, 325-38
 Page, Palmer and Wilkins's (noticed), 121
 HORTON-SMITH, LIONEL. The Origin of Latin *hand* and Greek *οὐ* and the extensions of the originally unintended form, 43-69
 Concluding Notes on the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive, 439-52
 HUMPHREYS, MILTON W. Report of Revue de Philologie, 228-33

 India, Religions of, 88-91
 Isocrates, Order of the orations of, in the archetype, 108
 Helena, 490

 Jannaris, Concise Dictionary of the English and Greek Languages (noticed), 21
 On *οὐ μή*, 461
 Jenkins's L'Espurgatoire Saint Patriz (noticed), 362
 Josephus, Niese's (noticed), 370
 Journal of Germanic Philology (rev.), 225-7
 Jusserand's Literary History of the English People (rev.), 342-8

 Kaibel's Sophokles' Elektra (rev.), 353-6
 Kalender of Shepherdes, 100
 Karsten's Journal of Germanic Philology (rev.), 225-7
 Keats' Youth and Early Poems, 236
 Keelhoff, J., on *εἰ μή διά*, 246
 Kenyon's Bacchylides (noticed), 492-3
 Kicking the bucket, 191
 KIRK, WILLIAM HAMILTON. *Etiam* in Plautus and Terence, 26-42
 νέμειν and *νέμεσθαι*, 76
 KNAPP, CHARLES. Notes on Horace, 325-38

 Langland, 470
 Language-Standard in Modern Greece, 19-25
 Latin: *aplopodite* = *haplopotidem* = *ἀπλοποτίδα*, 489; *-astro-*, 71-3; *aurum* or *avrum*? 491; *cuncti* < *cumque*, -ti, 109; *defraudit*, 489; *enim*, 402-15; *etenim*, 414; *etiam* (*eti-jam*) and other compounds of *-jam*, 109; in Plautus and Terence, 26-42; *fateor* and *infiteor*, 489; *favere* and *fovere*, 489; *gemelli* = *testiculi*, 113; *hand*, 43 foll.; *iocundus*, 441; *neque* with perf. subj., 123; *nihil*, 462-3; *opiter*, 489; *opter*, 114; *-per* in *parumper* and the like = *περ*, 490; *praestat* = *praestat*, 489; *qu* in *liquidus*, *liquor*, 229, 230; *rotundus*, 446; *serenus*, 489.
 Latin, African, 490
 correction of trochaic words, 111
 Gerund and Gerundive, 439-52
 in the XVIth century, 474
 Latin rhetorical terms: *adfectio* = *παρονομασία*, *anticipatio*, *προκατάληψις*, *articulus*, *asyndeton*, 206; *attenuatio*, *commiseratio*, *conexum* = *συμπλοκή*, *contendere*, *contentio* = *αντίθεσις*, *conversio*, *apostrophe*, 207; *conversum*, *αντιστροφή*, *defectus*, *ἔλλειψις*, *denominatio* = *παρονομασία*, *deprecatio*, *detractatio* = *διασυρμός*, 208; *disiunctum*, 208, 209; *disparsum*, *dissolutio*, *distributio*, 209; *divisio* = *διλεμμα*, *evacuatio* = *ἀνασκευή*, *expedio*, *exquisitio* = *ἐξετασμός*, *homoeon*, 210; *icon* = *simile*, *iniunctum* = *ὑπεζευγμένον*, *interrogatum* = *ἐρώτημα*, *interruptio* = *παρένθεσις*, *permutatio* = *ἀντιμεταβολή*, 211; *praeceptio* = *προκατάληψις*, *pronuntiatio* = *ὑπόκρισις*, *regressio* = *παλιλλογία*, 212; *solutum* = *asyndeton*, *traductio*, *transitus*, 213.
 Latin subjunctive in Independent Clauses
 in Plautus, 133-67, 278-301, 383-401
 Leges Anglorum, 99
 Linguistic development, Order of, 234
 Longinus (Ps.), *περί ὕψους* emended, 489
 Lope de Vega, Shakespeare and, 104
 Lounsbury's Chaucer, 106
 Lucian and Petronius, 114
 Nigrinus, 339-41
 Lucretius, Heinze's (rev.), 481-3
 Lycanthropy, 488
 Lyly, Importance of, 476
 Lyndsay, Sir David, characterized, 474

 Macabre, Danse (Dance Macabré), 358, 487
 Marlowe characterized, 478, 480
 Marston as a dramatist, 105-6, 233-4
 Merlin, M.E. Prose Romance of, 105
 Military Colonies of Octavian and Caesar
 in Gallia Narbonensis, 362
 MILLER, C. W. E. Review of Dyroff's *Geschichte des Pronomen Reflexivum*, 214-24
 Mitsodakis, *Praktische Grammatik der neugriechischen Schriftsprache* (noticed), 21
 Montgomerie, Alexander (b. 1545), 96-8

- MORRIS, E. P. Subjunctive in Independent Sentences in Plautus, 133-67, 275-301, 383-401
Mostellaria, Textual notes and queries, 168-88
MUSTARD, WILFRED P. Report of Rheinisches Museum, 108-16, 239-41, 488-91
Review of Cicotti's *Processo di Verre*, 93-4
Notice of Bornecque's *Ciceronis Oratio in Verrem De Signis*, 95
Naiad, Use of, 75
Name, Power of the, 194, 195
Change of name, Superstitious, 489
Necrology:
Allen, F. D., 247, 372-5
Lane, G. M., 247, 370-2
Montaignon, A. de, 488
Sundby, Thor., 359
Verner, Karl, 91-3
Zupitza, Julius, 238
Nereids as evil demons, 192-4
Nero and the Rhodians, 231
Niese's Josephus (noticed), 370
Nigrinus, Lucian's, 339-41
Nikokles ὁ καθαρχός, 240
Nonius, p. 63 M, 228
Nymph-names, On the alleged confusion of, 74-5
Obsequens, Julius, 239
OERTEL, HANNS. On the Character of Inferred Parent Languages, 416-38
Ophelia, Irish, not Greek, 238
Optative and Potential, 383 foll.
OSGOOD, CHARLES GROSVENOR, JR. Report of *Englische Studien*, 233-8
Parent Languages, Inferred, 416-38
Passy and Rambeau's *Chrestomathie française* (rev.), 224, 225
PERRIN, B. The Ethics and Amenities of Greek Historiography, 255-74
Petronius, 240
and Lucian, 114
Phaedrus, I 15. 1-2, 228
Append. 16, 7, 228
IV 9, 2, 232
Philo and Clement of Alexandria, 366
Phonetic laws violated, 485
Pindar and Women, 124
Pisistratus, Chronology of, 115
Plato and the A. U. C., 365
Pistoiese dialect, 486
Plagiarism in Greek literature, 255 foll.
Plautus, *Amphitr.* 96, 230
Trin. 540, 230
The subjunctive in independent sentences in Plautus, 133-67, 275-301, 383-401
Textual notes and queries in Plautus, 168-88
and Terence, *Enim* in, 402-15
Etiam in, 26-42
Plutarch, Scipio Nasica as a source of, 363
περί ἀποργίας, Source of, 365
Polybios, III 24, 114
Notes on, 366-7
POSTGATE, J. P. On the Alleged Confusion of Nymph-names, 74, 75
Potential and Optative, 383 foll.
Propertius, II 13 b, 114
II 13, 48, 115
Studies in, 364, 365-6
Provençal: *c* and *g* followed by *a*, 486
compound words, 484
Pyrrhus, War of, 366
Quomodo in the Romance languages, 485
Rambeau and Passy's *Chrestomathie française* (rev.), 224, 225
Recent Publications, 125-9, 248-52, 376-80, 495-9
Reisch on the Greek Theatre, 5 foll.
Renaissance in England, 469
Reports:
Beiträge zur Assyriologie, 116-18
Englische Studien, 96-108, 233-8
Hermes, 362-7
Revue de Philologie, 228-41
Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, 108-16, 239-41, 488-91
Romania, 357-62, 484-8
Reviews:
Courthope's *History of English Poetry*, 464-80
Dahlerup's *Nekrolog över Karl Verner*, 91-3
Heinze's *Third Book of Lucretius*, 481-3
Hillebrandt's *Ritual-Literatur*, 350-3
Jusserand's *Literary History of the English People*, 342-9
Kaibel's *Sophokles' Elektra*, 353-6
Peck's *Harper's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities*, 78-84
Puntoni's *Inno Omerico a Demetra*, 84-8
Revue de Philologie, 228-33
Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, 108-16, 239-41, 488-91
Rhetorical Terms, Definition of Some, 206-13
Rhodians, Nero and the, 231
Ries, Was ist Syntax? 106
RIESS, ERNST. Superstitions and Popular Beliefs in Greek Comedy, 189-205
Rizo-Rangabé's *Practical Method in Modern Greek* (noticed), 20
ROBERTS, W. RHYS. *Caccilius of Calacte*, 301-12
Roman colonial administration, 363-4
Romance: *Quomodo* in Romance languages, 485

- | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|--|---------------|
| Romania, | 357-62, 484-8 | <i>Etiam</i> in, | 26-42 |
| Romaunt of the Rose, | 104 | <i>Tessera hospitalis</i> , | 114 |
| Rome, founding of, Date of, | 365 | Theatre, Attic, | 367 |
| Rutherford's Scholia Aristophanica (noticed), | 245, 246 | Greek, <i>ἐξώρτα</i> , | 488 |
| Sackville's Induction, | 474 | Three-legged tables, Why? | 198 |
| Sandys' ed. of First Philippic and the Olynthiacs (noticed), | 245 | Thucydides, II 15, | 109, 112, 120 |
| Scenery of Ajax, Eirene and Prometheus, | 367 | VI 81, 5, | 244 |
| Schneidewin's Antike Humanität (noticed), | 242 | Marchant's Book VI of, | 244 |
| Scipio Nasica as a source of Plutarch, | 363 | Steup's Classen's (noticed), | 128 |
| Seneca's Tragicus, Choruses in, | 490 | Thumb's Handbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache (noticed), | 19 |
| Shakespeare and the Aubade, | 99 | Todd, H. A. Report of Romania, | 357-62, 483-8 |
| -Bacon question, | 107 | Tolman's Taming of a Shrew, | 200, 201 |
| and Lope de Vega, | 104 | Tractatus de diversis historiis Romanorum, | 98 |
| Macbeth and Kyd's Spanish Tragedy, | 237 | Triumvirate, Second, | 363 |
| and the Pilgrimage to Canossa, | 102, 103 | Trochaic words in Latin, Shortening of, | 111 |
| Taming of the Shrew, | 100, 101 | Tyrrell's Euripides' Troades (noticed), | 245 |
| Ships in antiquity, | 364 | Vergil's Eighth Eclogue, | 115 |
| Sidney, Sir Philip, characterized, | 476 | Fourth Eclogue, | 115 |
| Silence as to sources in Greek historiography, | 261 | Aen. IV 41, | 239 |
| SMITH, EMILY JAMES. Note on Lucian's Nigrinus, | 339-41 | VI 58, | 231 |
| Solinus (Pseudo-), | 112 | VI 616-20, | 239 |
| Soul of man seated in the air, | 488 | Verner, Necrology of, | 91-3 |
| Spanish: yogar, | 487 | Verrine Orationes, Cicero's, | 93-5 |
| Spenser characterized, | 477 | Vestal Virgins, Habit of, | 121 |
| Statius, Silvae, Praef. 28, | 229 | Vocal allusions, | 485 |
| IV 13, 19, | 116 | Warton's History of English Poetry, | 464 |
| Thebais and the Codex Puteanus, | 108 | Weil's Études sur le drame antique (noticed), | 243, 244 |
| Stedman's Modern Greek Mastery (noticed), | 20 | WHEELER, BENJAMIN IDE. The Question of Language-Standard in Modern Greece, | 19-25 |
| Stichometry in Galen, | 239 | Wied's Praktisches Lehrbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache (noticed), | 20 |
| Strabo, Cyriacus of Ancona on, | 114 | Williams' Questions of Good English (noticed), | 124 |
| STRATTON, A. W. Review of Hopkins's Religions of India, | 84-7 | Women in Pindar, | 124 |
| Subjunctive in Independent Sentences in Plautus, | 133-67, 275-301, 383-401 | Wyatt characterized, | 473 |
| Superstitions and Popular Beliefs in Greek Comedy, | 189 204 | Xenophon, Memorabilia, Lib. IV, | 110 |
| Surrey characterized, | 473 | Cynegeticus, | 239 |
| Tacitus, Consulship of, | 114 | obelized, | 115 |
| Taine's History of English Literature, | 465 | Zieliński's Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte (noticed), | 242-3 |
| Telmessians, Superstitious practices of, | 192 | | |
| Terence, Eum. 588, | 232 | | |
| <i>Enim</i> in, | 402-15 | | |

VOL. XVIII, 1

WHOLE NO. 69

THE
AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

EDITED BY
BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE

Professor of Latin in the Johns Hopkins University

BALTIMORE: THE EDITOR
NEW YORK AND LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO.
LITTLE, B. A. KENDALL

April 1897

CONTENTS.

I.—Dürpfeld and the Greek Theatre. By THOMAS DWIGHT GIBBS.
 II.—The Question of Language-standard in Modern Greece. By IDA WHEELER.
 III.—*Ætium* in Plautus and Terence. By WM. HAMILTON KIRK.
 IV.—The Origin of Latin *kand* and Greek *κν*; and the Extensions of Originally Unextended Form. By LIONEL HORTON-SMITH.
 NOTES:
 Latin *agere*. By GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING.—On the Apocryphal
 Fusion of Nymph-Names. Appendix. By J. P. POSTGATE.—
 and *ita etha*. By WM. HAMILTON KIRK.
 REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES:
 Peck's *Hayes's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities*.—
 Fontenay's *L'Unité Ouverte d'Amérique*.—Jastrow's *Handbooks of the*
History of Religions. Vol. I. Hopkins's *The Religions of India*.—
 Dillmeyer's *Nekrolog über Karl Verner*.—Gicotti's *Il Processo*
Verre.—Bouché-Latour's *M. Tullii Ciceronis Oratio in Verrem 2da*.
 REPORTS:
 Philological Society.—Rhénus-Les-Museum für Philologie.—Berlin.
 Vereinigung der Germanischen Sprachwissenschaft.
 BRIEF MENTIONS.
 RECENT PUBLICATIONS.
 BOOKS RECEIVED.

Open to original communication from all departments of philology, classical, comparative, general, modern, original reports of current philological research, summaries of important work, including philological journals of foreign review, by special arrangement. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume a year. Subscription, \$3.00 a year, payable in advance, collected by Messrs. Macmillan & Co., 66 Broadway, New York, who have also charge of the interests of the journal. Reviews of new publications will be inserted at the discretion of the Editors.

	1950	1951	1952	1953
1. Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
2. Federal Government	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
3. State Government	20.00	20.00	20.00	20.00
4. Local Government	70.00	70.00	70.00	70.00

... in the hands of ...
... was exhibited ...
... late by purchase and ...
... \$51 for the ...
... single volumes ...
... numbers (\$11, 12, 13, ...
... contains the ...
... edition of the ...

Baltimore, Md.

... of the ... of

LEMCKE & BUECHNER,

Formerly B. Westermann & Co.,

PUBLISHERS, BOOKSELLERS
AND IMPORTERS,

812 Broadway, New York,

With Offices at London, Leipzig and Paris.

JUST PUBLISHED—the American Edition of

FLUEGEL-SCHMIDT-TANGER'S

School- and Hand-Lexicon of the German and English Languages.

2 vols., large 8vo, half leather, \$4.50.

The German-English part separately, \$2.60.

Destined to replace the venerable Adler and, more or less, all other German-English Dictionaries now used in Colleges and High Schools. It is just the book which Professors of German have been asking us to supply for many years. When it was not promptly forthcoming, there was a project considered by these gentlemen for a time to compile a dictionary here. Happily Fluegel now is ready, and orders for Schools can be filled. Professors will please communicate with us direct.

SPECIAL NOTICE.

The stock of complete sets in the hands of the management of THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY was exhausted some time ago, but a few sets have been made up of late by purchase and exchange. These sets will be sold at the regular price, \$51 for the seventeen volumes, cash to accompany the order. Of single volumes (\$3) Volumes IV and VI cannot be furnished. Of single numbers (\$1) 13, 15, 21, 22, 23, 49, 50, 52 are wanting. No. 40, which contains the Index to Vols. I-X, is not furnished separately, but a small edition of the Index itself is for sale at \$1.00 a copy. Address,

B. L. GILDERSLEEVE, Baltimore, Md.

The Macmillan Company's

New Books in Foreign Languages, etc.

An Aid of Great Importance to Students of Early English.

Student's Dictionary of Anglo-Saxon (The). By HENRY SWEET, M. A., Ph. D., LL. D., Corresponding Member of the Munich Academy of Sciences. Small 4to, cloth, pp. xvi + 217. Price, \$1.75 net.

The Anglo-Saxon Primer and Reader by Henry Sweet are so well known that this needs no introduction; they rank at once among the books necessary to every student of Anglo-Saxon.

FRENCH.

BIART.—*Quand J'étais Petit.* Histoire d'un Enfant racontée par un Homme. By LUCIEN BIART. Adapted for Use in Schools, with Notes and Vocabulary by JAMES BOËLLE, B. A. Part I. 16mo, cloth. *Pitt Press Series.* Price, 50 cents net.

MOLIÈRE.—*L'Avare.* Par J.-B. P. MOLIÈRE. Edited with Introduction and Notes by E. G. W. BRAUNHOLTZ, M. A., Ph. D., University Lecturer in French. 16mo, cloth, pp. xlvii + 245. *Pitt Press Series.* Price, 70 cents net.

GERMAN.

MACMILLAN'S FOREIGN SCHOOL CLASSICS. Edited by G. EUGENE FASNACHT. **LESSING.**—*Minna von Barnhelm.* Edited with Introduction and Notes by Rev. CHARLES MERK, M. A., Ph. D., Leipzig. 12mo, cloth, pp. lxviii + 224. Price, 75 cents net.

AMERICANA GERMANICA. A Quarterly devoted to the Comparative Study of the Literary, Linguistic and other Cultural Relations of Germany and America. Editor, Professor M. D. LEARNED, of the University of Pennsylvania. Vol. I, No. 1. Single number, 75 cents. Annual subscription, \$2.00.

ENGLISH.

BARRÈRE and LELAND.—*A Dictionary of Slang, Jargon, and Cant.* Embracing English, American and Anglo-Indian Slang, Pidgin English, Gypsies' Jargon, and other irregular phraseology. Compiled and edited by ALBERT BARRÈRE, Officier de l'instruction publique; Professor R. M. A. WOOLWICH, author of 'Argot and Slang,' etc., etc.; and CHARLES G. LELAND, M. A., Hon. F. R. S. L., author of 'The Breitmann Ballads,' 'The English Gypsies and their Language,' etc., etc. In 2 vols. Vol. I, A-K, pp. xix + 500; vol. II, L-Z, pp. 415. Crown 8vo. Price, \$4.00.

In Preparation.

GERMAN.

HEINE.—*Selections from Heine.* Edited with Notes and Introduction by C. A. BUCHHEIM, Professor of German Literature in King's College. Uniform with *Deutsche Lyrik, Golden Treasury Series.*

The Macmillan Company, 66 Fifth Ave., New York.

THE FRIEDENWALD COMPANY,

Printers,
Lithographers,
Book Binders,

BALTIMORE, EUTAW AND GERMAN STREETS,

BALTIMORE, MD.

THE LEADING HOUSE.

Printers of the American Journal of Philology, American
Journal of Mathematics, Memoirs from the Biolog-
ical Laboratory, Studies in Historical and
Political Science, issued by the Johns
Hopkins University.

ESTIMATES CHEERFULLY SUBMITTED.

INDISPENSABLE TO EVERY LATIN TEACHER.

GILDERSLEEVE'S LATIN GRAMMAR.

THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.

By B. L. GILDERSLEEVE, Ph. D., Professor of Greek in the Johns Hopkins University, Editor of the American Journal of Philology, and GONZALEZ LODGE, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Latin in Bryn Mawr College, Pa. 550 pp. Cloth, \$1.20.

For school and college use, the new edition of Gildersleeve's Latin Grammar, in point of fulness, accuracy and convenience, rivals, if it does not surpass, all Latin grammars with which I am acquainted.—J. P. POSTGATE, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

It is a superfluous compliment to praise any work of Prof. Gildersleeve, who never does any which is not praiseworthy.—W. W. GOODWIN, Ph. D., Eliot Prof. of Greek Literature, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

CAESAR'S CIVIL WAR,

With Maps and Vocabularies. Edited for the use of Schools, with references to the Latin Grammars of Gildersleeve, Allen and Greenough, and Harkness. By B. PERRIN, Ph. D., Professor of Greek in Yale University. 12mo, 348 pp. Price, Cloth, \$1.00.

Prof. TRACY PECK, Yale University, New Haven, says: "It is matter for congratulation that at last, and so auspiciously, the 'Civil War' has been made available and attractive for American schools."

Prof. W. A. PACKARD, College of New Jersey, Princeton, N. J., says: "Perrin's 'Civil War' is thoroughly and skillfully edited, and is a welcome addition to our preparatory textbooks in Latin."

UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING COMPANY,

BOSTON, 352 *Washington St.* 43, 45, 47 E. Tenth St., NEW YORK.
NEW ORLEANS, 714-716 *Canal St.* [4 T.]

ESSAYS AND STUDIES

BY

BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE

520 pages, small quarto, bound in cloth. Price, \$3.50 (net).

EDUCATIONAL ESSAYS:—1. Limits of Culture. 2. Classics and Colleges. 3. University Work in America. 4. Grammar and Aesthetics.

LITERARY AND HISTORICAL STUDIES:—1. Legend of Venus. 2. Xanthippe and Socrates. 3. Apollonius of Tyana. 4. Lucian. 5. The Emperor Julian. 6. Platen's Poems. 7. Maximilian; his Travels and his Tragedy. 8. Occasional Addresses.

N. MURRAY,
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS,
BALTIMORE, MD.

Oct., 1890.

HELPS IN CLASSICAL STUDY.

HARPER'S CLASSICAL DICTIONARY.

Harper's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities. Edited by HARRY THURSTON PECK, M. A., Ph. D., Professor of the Latin Languages and Literature in Columbia University, City of New York. With the co-operation of many special contributors. Pp. xvi, 1701. With about 1500 illustrations. Royal 8vo, cloth, \$6.00; half leather, \$8.00. Two-volume edition, cloth, \$7.00.

Unquestionably, in many respects, the most authoritative work of the kind that has yet been published. . . . In short, this is what the editor claims for it—a classical encyclopaedia. There is no one volume on the market at once so complete and so succinct, and whose vast collection of information is so readily and immediately accessible.—*N. Y. Herald*.

The student of classical antiquity, whether in art, life, religion, or literature, will find the volume a whole library of information, admirably arranged for practical use. . . . The text is clear, terse, and pointed.—*Chicago Inter-Ocean*.

MODERN GREEK MASTERY.

A Short Road to Ancient Greek. By THOMAS L. STEDMAN, A. M., M. D. Pp. viii, 380. Post 8vo, cloth, \$1.50.

Dr. Stedman has filled a very actual want. . . . A work by means of which the mastery of the so-called modern Greek language will be very greatly facilitated and that of the ancient will be made more easy. . . . The parts dealing with the conjugation of the verb, especially the sections on the aorist and future, are written with the greatest clearness, and are readily comprehensible. . . . There never has been published in the English language such a practical method for the mastery of the Greek tongue; and our opinion is that this important and, as far as that is possible, perfect work of Dr. Stedman is a production of great weight.—*Atlantis*, New York.

AN ENGLISH-GREEK DICTIONARY.

A Concise Dictionary of the English and Modern Greek Languages, as Actually Written and Spoken. By A. M. JANNARIS, Ph. D. English-Greek. Pp. xvi, 436. Post 8vo, cloth, \$2.50.

The author has endeavored to render this work compact and concise by employing a judicious system of abbreviation and by omitting all references and quotations. The book is of interest to the student of Classic Greek who possesses any tendency towards philology. The extinction of the present infinitive, of the optative, and of part of the imperative will be noticed in examining the verb. Likewise the replacing of the dative by the accusative, the disappearance of rho final, and the abandonment of the reduplication in nouns and participles. Archaic or learned, colloquial, literary and ecclesiastical expressions are all given, and are marked with different signs. Careful comparison reveals the Roman, Byzantine, or Turkish influence in some of the older forms, and the tendency towards learned Greek in the present Restoration Period of the languages.

PROFESSOR GILDERSLEEVE'S PINDAR.

Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes. With Introductory Essay, Notes, and Indexes. By BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE, Professor of Greek in the Johns Hopkins University. Pp. cxvi, 396. 12mo, cloth, \$1.50.

Prepared with great exactness.—*Brooklyn Union*.

Never before did the appearance of an American edition of a Greek poet so nearly approach an 'event' in scholastic circles as the publication of Gildersleeve's 'Pindar.'—*New York Times*.

Pour ceux qui commencent l'étude de Pindare rien ne saurait remplacer ce livre.—*Revue de Philologie*.

PROFESSOR GILDERSLEEVE'S PERSIUS.

The Satires of A. Persius Flaccus. Edited by BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE, Ph. D. (Göttingen), LL. D., Professor of Greek in the Johns Hopkins University. Pp. 232. 12mo, cloth, 90 cents. By mail, \$1.00.

I discover in it at once ample evidence of the accurate and thorough scholarship which I expected to find. . . . I have myself found instruction and recreation in it. The 'Introduction' and 'Notes' are as good a whetstone as the 'Satires' themselves.—W. S. TYLER, Professor of Greek, Amherst College.

JUSTIN MARTYR.

The Apologies of Justin Martyr. To which is appended the Epistle to Diognetus. With an Introduction and Notes by BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE, Ph. D. (Gött.), LL. D., Professor of Greek in the Johns Hopkins University. Pp. xlii, 290. 12mo, cloth, \$1.30. By mail, \$1.44.

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK.

The above works are for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent by the Publishers on receipt of price. If ordered sent by mail, 10 per cent. must be added to cover cost of postage. [11.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, BALTIMORE.

- I. **American Journal of Mathematics.**
Edited by T. CRAIG, with the co-operation of S. NEWCOMB. Quarterly. 4to. Volume XIX in progress. \$5 per volume.
 - II. **American Chemical Journal.**
I. REMSEN, Editor. Ten numbers a year. 8vo. Volume XIX in progress. \$4 per volume.
 - III. **American Journal of Philology.**
B. L. GILDERSLEEVE, Editor. Quarterly. 8vo. Volume XVII complete. \$3 per volume. Index to Vols. I-X, \$1.
 - IV. **Studies from the Biological Laboratory.** 8vo. Volume V complete. \$5 per volume.
 - V. **Studies in Historical and Political Science.**
H. B. ADAMS, Editor. Monthly. 8vo. Volume XV in progress. \$3 per volume.
 - VI. **Johns Hopkins University Circulars.**
Containing reports of scientific and literary work in progress in Baltimore. 4to. Vol. XVI in progress. \$1 per year.
 - VII. **Johns Hopkins Hospital Bulletin.** 4to. Monthly. Volume VIII in progress. \$1 per year.
 - VIII. **Johns Hopkins Hospital Reports.** 4to. Volume VI in progress. \$5 per volume.
 - IX. **Contributions to Assyriology and Comparative Semitic Philology.**
(Beiträge zur Assyriologie, etc.) Vol. III in progress.
 - X. **Memoirs from the Biological Laboratory.**
W. K. BROOKS, Editor. Volume III complete. \$7.50 per volume.
 - XI. **Annual Report.**
Presented by the President to the Board of Trustees, reviewing the operations of the University during the past academic year.
 - XII. **Annual Register.**
Giving the list of officers and students, and stating the regulations, etc., of the University. *Published at the close of the academic year.*
-

In addition to the serials above named, copies may be obtained of the works mentioned below :

- THE CRITICAL EDITION OF THE HEBREW TEXT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.
Edited by Professor Paul Haupt. Prospectus on application.
- ROWLAND'S PHOTOGRAPH OF THE NORMAL SOLAR SPECTRUM. 10 plates. \$20.00.
- DESCRIPTION OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL. J. S. Billings, Editor. 116 pp. 4to. 56 plates. \$7.50, cloth.
- THE TEACHING OF THE APOSTLES. Complete facsimile edition. Edited by J. Rendel Harris. 110 pp. 4to. 10 plates. \$5.00.
- REPRODUCTION IN PHOTOTYPE OF A SYRIAC MS WITH THE ANTILEGOMENA EPISTLES. Edited by I. H. Hall. \$3.
- THE OYSTER. By W. K. Brooks. 240 pp. 12mo. 14 plates. \$1.00.
- STUDIES IN LOGIC. By members of the Johns Hopkins University. C. S. Pierce, Editor. 123 pp. 12mo. \$2.00, cloth.
- THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, with Speeches, etc., illustrating its significance. 48 pp. 16mo. 50 cents.
- BIBLIOGRAPHIA HOPKINSIENSIS. Part I. Philology. Parts II-III. Chemistry, Mineralogy and Geology. Parts IV-V-VI. Physics, Astronomy and Mathematics. 8vo. 30 cents per part.

A full list of publications will be sent on application.

Communications in respect to exchanges and remittances may be sent to The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland.

VOL. XVIII, 4

WHOLE NO. 72

THE
AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

EDITED BY
BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BALTIMORE: THE EDITOR
NEW YORK AND LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO.
LEIPSIC: F. A. BROCKHAUS

December, 1897

CONTENTS.

I.—The Subjunctive in Independent Sentences in Plautus. III. 1-
E. P. MORRIS, 107
II.—The Use of *enim* in Plautus and Terence. By WILLARD K. CLEMENT. 21
III.—On the Character of Inferred Parent Languages. By HANS
OERTEL, 31
IV.—Concluding Notes on the Origin of the Gerund and Gerundive. 43
LIONEL HORTON-SMITH, 43
V.—Negative Futures in the Greek New Testament. By W. G. LAM
LASTINE, 45
NOTE: 46
On Latin *nil* 'naught, not.' By EDWIN W. FAY.
REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES: 47
Couthope's A History of English Poetry.—Heinze's T. Lucretius Carus
de Rerum Natura.
REPORTS: 47
Romania.—Revue des Musées für Philologie.
BRIEF MENTION, 47
RECENT PUBLICATIONS, 48
BOOKS RECEIVED, 50
INDEX, 52

Open to original communications in all departments of philology, classical, comparative, oriental, modern; condensed reports of current philological work; summaries of chief articles in the leading philological journals of Europe; reviews by specialists; bibliographical lists. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume each year. Subscription price \$3.00 a year, payable to the editor in advance. Single numbers \$1.00 each. Suitable advertisements will be inserted at the following rates:

	100	1	30	40
First column	1.00	2.00	\$10.00	\$50.00
Half page50	1.00	20.00	25.00
Small space25	.50	12.00	15.00
Footnote10	.20	6.00	7.50

Beginning with the next number 73, the Agents of the Journal in England will be Messrs. Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., Paternoster House, Chancery Lane, London, W.C.

For advertisement rates and other particulars apply to the Editor, JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY, 1001 North 17th Street, Philadelphia, Pa. The Journal will be sold at any of the leading bookstores, or by the order of the publishers. Of single numbers \$1.00 each, which contains a small edition of the Journal. For a full and complete list of the contents of the Journal, apply to the Postoffice at

LEMCKE & BUECHNER,

Formerly B. Westermann & Co.,

PUBLISHERS, BOOKSELLERS AND IMPORTERS,

812 Broadway, New York,

With Offices at London, Leipzig and Paris.

The AMERICAN EDITION of the indispensable

FLUEGEL-SCHMIDT-TANGER'S

School- and Hand-Lexicon of the German and English Languages.
2 vols., large 8vo, half leather, \$5.20.

The German-English part separately, \$3.00.

Is destined to replace the venerable Adler and, more or less, all other German-English Dictionaries now used in Colleges and High Schools. It is just the book which Professors of German have been asking us to supply for many years.

For the next three months we shall supply teachers, referring to this advertisement, for cash-with-order copies at the trade net price.


BRUGMANN, Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages, English translation, 5 volumes, cloth, \$20.00 net, we offer for \$17.00 cash until the number of complete sets goes down to 100. No new edition will appear. The book is out of print in the British market.

SPECIAL NOTICE.


The stock of complete sets in the hands of the management of THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY was exhausted some time ago, but a few sets have been made up of late by purchase and exchange. These sets will be sold at the regular price, \$54 for the eighteen volumes, cash to accompany the order. Of single volumes (\$3) Volumes IV and VI cannot be furnished. Of single numbers (\$1) 13, 15, 21, 22, 23, 49, 50, 52 are wanting. No. 40, which contains the Index to Vols. I-X, is not furnished separately, but a small edition of the Index itself is for sale at \$1.00 a copy. Address,

B. L. GILDERSLEEVE, Baltimore, Md.









Stanford University Libraries



3 6105 007 354 819

STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
CECIL H. GREEN LIBRARY
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305-6004
(415) 723-1493

All books may be recalled after 7 days

DATE DUE

28D

JUN 10 1997

MAY 7 1997

